November 6, 1991 It is this date that can be considered the starting point of economic reforms in Russia. The authorities have set themselves the task of ridding the country of the communist past as quickly as possible. It was impossible to do this without radical changes in the economy, which had existed for many years in the form of a planned economy.

Gaidar's reforms served as a lever that created a free market in Russia. The government of that period liberalized retail prices, reorganized the tax system, and created a new foreign trade system. All these abrupt changes were soon called "shock therapy".

Price liberalization

October 28, 1991, a few days before the appointment of Yegor Gaidar as Deputy Prime Minister for economic policy, Russian President Boris Yeltsin delivered a keynote speech at the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. The head of state announced the need. It was the most important feature of the classical market economy. The initiative of the president was adopted by the congress delegates almost unanimously.

The beginning of Gaidar's economic reform was to be carried out as soon as possible. It was planned that the liberalization would be announced as early as December 1. This was opposed by the union republics, which still had a single ruble zone with Russia. Gaidar's reforms were remembered by compatriots by the name of this economist for a reason. Although Boris Yeltsin, who used his presidential powers, defended the new bills before parliament, the development of all projects lay on the shoulders of Yegor Timurovich and his team.

The actual beginning of Gaidar's economic reform came on January 2, 1992, when the presidential decree "On Measures to Liberalize Prices" was adopted. The changes made themselves felt instantly. The state stopped regulating 80% of wholesale prices and 90% of retail prices. The federal government temporarily retained control only over socially significant consumer goods: milk, bread, etc. This reservation was not taken in vain. Gaidar's economic reform was carried out in conditions of social turbulence, when the population was left empty-handed after the crisis of the planned system and the collapse of the Soviet system.

Gaidar Program

In preparing its program, the government proceeded from the point of view that Russia does not have any "special path", and it needs to adopt all the main features of Western market economies. Until the end of 1991, it was still unclear what agenda the Russian authorities would choose. Various politicians and economists proposed their projects: Yavlinsky, Shatalin, Saburov, Abalkin, etc.

In the end, Gaidar's program "won" after all. It was not only economic. The reforms were supposed to form a new national statehood in the country through the construction of market relations, the place of which was empty after the collapse of communism. Yegor Gaidar outlined his ideas in the documents Immediate Economic Prospects for Russia and Russia's Strategy in the Transitional Period. According to these projects, the reforms were carried out on the basis of the principles of privatization, liberalization and financial stabilization.

Gaidar's team identified three main problems that the young state inherited from the Soviet Union. These were inflationary, payments and systemic crises. The last of these was that public authorities had lost their own ability to regulate the flow of resources.

It was planned, first of all, to restructure and significantly increase the overall level, as the Rakovsky government once did in Poland. Gaidar believed that in this case, inflation would persist in the country for about six months at first. However, this project had to be abandoned. Calculations showed the authorities that the country simply could not withstand the crisis for another six months. Therefore, it was decided to start a radical liberalization immediately. Time has shown that neither one nor the other way promised the economy anything good.

Economic collapse

Price liberalization led to many negative consequences that were inevitable with such a forced pace of change in the economy. New order on the market was at odds with monetary policy - already in the summer of 1992, domestic enterprises lost working capital. In the spring, the Central Bank began to issue a large number of loans to industry, farmers, former Soviet republics, etc. This was done in order to cover the budget deficit. However, at the same time there was a colossal jump in inflation. In 1992, it reached the level of 2,500%.

The collapse occurred for several reasons. First of all, the catastrophe erupted due to the fact that before the liberalization of prices there was no replacement for money, which would rid the country of obsolete Soviet rubles. New currency appeared only in 1993, when Gaidar's economic reform had already been completed, and he himself left the Government.

Hyperinflation has left a significant part of the Russian population without a livelihood. In the mid-90s, the share of low-income citizens was 45%. The Soviet deposits of the population in Sberbank depreciated, having lost their purchasing power. The government blamed the crisis on the Supreme Council, which forced it to issue additional currency.

The issue of additional money supply began to be practiced in the last Soviet years, when the state used it to finance domestic spending. When Gaidar's reforms began, this system finally collapsed. The former paid the Russian enterprises in the same rubles, which only aggravated the crisis even more. In the summer of 1992, as a countermeasure, special non-cash cards were created with the help of which settlements with the rest of the CIS countries began to be carried out.

Parliament vs Government

Gaidar's economic radical reforms were subjected to harsh criticism from the people's deputies from the very beginning. As is known, on April 6 they opened their VI Congress. By this time, the government received a fairly close-knit opposition, which was based on agrarian and industrial lobbyists, dissatisfied with the reduction in state funding.

At one of its meetings, the congress adopted a resolution in which the main claims against the Government's policy were formulated. E. T. Gaidar's reforms were called the cause of a number of economic problems: a drop in the standard of living of the population, the destruction of former economic ties, a production decline, a lack of money, etc. In general, the Government's inability to keep the situation in the country under control was noted. The deputies believed that Gaidar's reforms were carried out without regard for the opinion of society and business owners. In the resolution, the congress delegates suggested that the president change the economic course, taking into account all their proposals and reservations.

In response to the deputies' attack, the Government, together with Gaidar, submitted a letter of resignation to Boris Yeltsin. In the attached report, the ministers criticized the proposals of the congress, noting that if the government follows this course, then government costs will rise to over a trillion rubles, and inflation will reach a threshold of 400% per month.

The resignation was not accepted, but Yeltsin still made concessions to the deputies. He introduced new people to the Government - the so-called "red directors" who lobbied for the interests of the owners large enterprises who received their positions in the Soviet years. Georgy Khizhu and Vladimir Chernomyrdin were in this cohort.

This was followed by attempts to stabilize the financial situation. To do this, the Government has cut public spending and introduced new taxes. In May 1992, inflation dropped slightly. Another requirement of the Supreme Council was fulfilled - the monetary policy. The Government also allocated 600 billion rubles to pay off debts to miners and other striking workers of large enterprises.

In July there were reshuffles in the leadership of the Central Bank. The new head, Viktor Gerashchenko, who had already held this position in the Soviet Union, opposed Ye. Gaidar's reforms, which implied cost cuts. In the second half of 1992, the volume of lending to the Central Bank increased by 3 times. By October, the budget deficit was reduced by 4% of GDP compared with August figures.

Beginning of privatization

In June 1992, Yegor Gaidar became Prime Minister. That same summer, privatization began in Russia. The reformers wanted to implement it as quickly as possible. The Government believed that Russia needed the emergence of a class of owners that would become the backbone and support of the state's economic policy. The privatization of enterprises took place in conditions when plants and factories actually went bankrupt. Businesses were sold for next to nothing. Purchases took on an avalanche-like character. Due to numerous holes in the legislation, transactions were made with violations and abuses.

When E. T. Gaidar's reforms had already ended, in the mid-1990s, loans-for-shares auctions were held in Russia, at which the country's largest and most important enterprises passed into the hands of new owners at many times lower prices. As a result of these transactions, a new class of oligarchs emerged, which led to an even greater social gap between the rich and the poor.

Supporters of the reform of the Gaidar government and privatization believed that it was necessary to abandon the old Soviet system as soon as possible. National economy with excessive monopolization and centralization. The forced pace of sales led to numerous excesses and mistakes. According to opinion polls, about 80% of the Russian population considers the results of privatization illegitimate.

Vouchers

For mass privatization, a voucher was introduced - a privatization check, which was intended to be exchanged for assets in state-owned enterprises. It was transferred to private hands. It was planned that with the help of this tool, municipal enterprises will become private property.

In total, about 146 million vouchers were printed. Citizens who received the check could use the paper to subscribe to the shares of an entire enterprise or to participate in an auction. You can also sell paper. Residents of the country could not participate in privatization directly. They needed to corporatize their enterprises or transfer vouchers to checks. investment funds(CHIF). In total, more than 600 such organizations were created.

Practice has shown that privatization checks have actually become objects of speculation. Many owners of these securities sold them to merchants with a dubious reputation or invested in CIFs, hoping to receive significant dividends. As a result of this practice, the real value of securities fell rapidly. In such conditions, the population began to strive to get rid of vouchers as soon as possible. Basically, they settled in the hands of shadow traders, speculators, officials and the administration of the enterprises themselves.

Due to its haste, privatization (the name of Gaidar's economic reform) took place under the conditions of price liberalization, when the value of the voucher fund became dozens of times less than the real value of enterprises. According to estimates, speculators were able to buy the 500 largest factories and plants for $7 billion. However, in fact, they were estimated at 200 billion dollars. It was the so-called "wild capitalism", which allowed 10% of the population to establish control over the national treasure. The main income was brought by the export of gas, oil and non-ferrous metals. Enterprises with new owners not only did not return profits to the Russian economy. They did not even go to pay off the rapidly growing external debt of the state.

agricultural policy

In 1992, the beginning of Gaidar's reforms was also marked by changes in the countryside. New forms of farms began to play an important role in the agrarian economy. Appeared closed and open joint-stock companies, cooperatives, and limited liability partnerships. In total, they accounted for about 2/3 of the agricultural sector of the economy. The crisis hit hard on all these new farms. There was a shortage of agricultural machinery, vehicles, mineral fertilizers, etc.

The government adopted a program to eliminate the remnants of the Soviet system - state farms and collective farms. In March 1992, there were approximately 60,000 individual farms in Russia. By autumn, their number had increased fivefold. However, due to a lack of technology, they still could not provide the country with a sufficient amount of crops. The regression led to the fact that by the mid-90s, production fell by 70% compared to the last Soviet season. The farmer was unable to feed Russia, and all because of a significant increase in prices for reagents, equipment, etc.

Defense industrial complex

In 1992, the state drastically reduced arms purchases. During the Soviet era, the military-industrial complex became too bloated. The lion's share of the budget was spent on it. In conditions economic crisis the state simply could not provide jobs for most of the enterprises, which led to their bankruptcy and sale to third parties.

The problem with research and development work (R&D) has become especially acute. The procedure for financing this complex was destroyed, because of which highly qualified teams fell apart and were left without work. It was then that the so-called “brain drain” began - the emigration of scientists, engineers, designers, etc. They massively left for Western countries in search of a better life, while their enterprises were idle.

The government, reforming the defense industry, made several serious mistakes: it did not start restructuring or transferring factories to the reserve. Some experts say that the authorities did wrong when they removed the restriction on the import of consumer goods, which left enterprises without a niche in the market.

Gaidar's resignation

In December 1992, Yegor Gaidar resigned from the post of Prime Minister. His departure became a compromise in relations between the Supreme Council and the President of Russia. It was assumed that the agreement would allow for a painless referendum on a new constitution. However, the deputies refused to fulfill their obligations, which led to a conflict between the Government and the President. It ended with the events of October, when Moscow experienced several days of street fighting.

In that crisis autumn, Gaidar once again returned to the government and became the first deputy chairman there, as well as the minister of economy. He finally left the top leadership positions on January 20, 1994. By this time, all the main economic reforms of E. Gaidar had already been carried out, and the country lived in a new economic reality.

Positive results of reforms

Back in December 1992, on the eve of his first resignation, he summed up his work. The Head of Government at the 7th Congress of People's Deputies emphasized the main successes of the authorities. Has been reorganized tax system, privatization and agrarian reform (reorganization of state and collective farms) began, the fuel and energy complex was restructured, oil companies, reduced spending on the purchase of ammunition and military equipment.

Economy Minister and Gaidar's colleague Andrey Nechaev named other important steps taken by the Government during the crisis period. In addition to the price liberalization already described above, the state allowed free trade, settled foreign debts by opening credit lines in the West. The Gaidar reform of 1992 reduced the budget deficit. Important tax innovations were the introduction of taxes on oil production. The planned system of the economy remained in the past. The state began to resort to state orders. In the field of investment, the relationship between the authorities and private entrepreneurs has become key. Trade with the former Soviet republics was structured in a new way - it switched to world prices and market principles.

E. T. Gaidar, whose economic reforms led to the restructuring of all financial relations, advocated the establishment of commercial principles in the export of weapons for the army. An important innovation was the adoption of the bankruptcy law. With the advent of the market economy, the first investment companies, as well as exchanges, which could not be in the USSR.

"Shock therapy"

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself at a crossroads that had not yet been in the history of mankind. A huge state with 70 years of life under communism and a planned economy behind it had to move to a civilized market model. In 1991-1992 no other country in the world has carried out such a forced experiment on itself. Two years before Russia, similar transformations began in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but they still did not give a visible result and existed only in the form of outlines.

The essence of Gaidar's reforms boiled down to the fact that the Government had to literally blindly, at its own peril and risk, operate on the sick economy of its country. True, something was nevertheless adopted from former comrades in the socialist camp. For example, temporary jobs have been created in Russia, similar to the Decree on Free Trade in Poland. These measures made it possible to fill the street stalls. True, these changes had their costs. Such trade took on strange forms - new kiosks arose chaotically and without any regulation.

The economic reform of Ye. Gaidar's government (the transition from a socialist economy to a market economy) began too late. In fact, time was lost back in the late 80s, when the first serious signs of a crisis appeared. The Soviet resource-based economy was in the throes of falling oil prices, leading to queues at stores and the rationing system even before Gaidar's reform began. The name "shock therapy" was given to the changes deservedly - the system had to be changed in emergency conditions.

On March 19, economist Yegor Gaidar, one of the main ideologists and leaders of economic reforms in Russia in the early 1990s, would have turned 60 years old.

Opinion polls with enviable constancy place the politician in the category of the main popular anti-heroes, although over the years the degree of this dislike is weakening, according to T.

If in 2002, according to VTsIOM statistics, 55% of Russians considered Gaidar's reforms to be destructive, in 2010 a similar epithet was applied to them by 23% (however, another 15% believed that there was no need for them at all).

At the same time, the number of those who fully approve of the actions of the Yeltsin-Gaidar government increased: from 2% in 2002 to 7% in 2010. The numbers are still teetering on the brink of statistical error.

But on the other hand, apparently, the supreme leaders of Russia belong to this category of the population. Thus, after Gaidar's death, current President Vladimir Putin called him a "true citizen", a "patriot", a "strong-spirited man" who, having led the transformation process, "showed his best professional and personal qualities."

The Russian service of the BBC decided to summarize some of the common statements about the merits of the politician, accompanying them with the least possible arguments and counterarguments. Theses to the disputes that will inevitably unfold around the name of Yegor Gaidar for a long time to come.

Gaidar ruined the economy, the country was plunged into disaster

The transformational decline that occurred in Russia in the post-reform years was indeed enormous and, according to some estimates, unprecedented for the state in the absence of wars, epidemics and natural disasters:

The shadow economy grew from 10-15% of GDP under Brezhnev (according to the most generous estimates) to 50% of GDP in the mid-1990s
Income inequality has increased: the so-called Gini coefficient increased from 26% in 1986 to 40% in 2000
In the first years after the collapse of the USSR, there was a doubling of crime
Mortality in 1990-1994 increased by 60%
The share of spending on R&D fell from 3.5% of GDP to about 1%
Aggregate Index industrial production Russia only in 2008 reached the level of the early 1990s

("Economics of Russia. Oxford collection"; other sources).

However, it would be too incorrect to attribute all the consequences of this transformational recession to the policies of Yegor Gaidar:

Firstly, he came to the government only in November 1991, when the process of transformation in the country was already in full swing.
Secondly, it is difficult to blame Yegor Gaidar for the formation of structural distortions in the Soviet economy: in particular, for the accumulation of a giant "money overhang" (money not backed by goods), which forced the Soviet government under the chairmanship of Valentin Pavlovan to begin monetary reform.
Thirdly, Gaidar is hardly to blame for the fact that prices for the main Soviet export resource - oil - have been falling since 1980, forming a budget deficit: first due to the overproduction of the resource, and in 1991 - in connection with the end of the Gulf War "

Gaidar saved the country from mass starvation

This point of view is as popular among Yegor Gaidar's associates as it is unpopular among his opponents.

In the book "Forks recent history Russia," Gaidar himself wrote about the situation that had developed by the time he came to the government, as follows: "The country was still bankrupt, foreign exchange reserves turned out to be close to zero. Grain stocks, according to optimistic forecasts, were enough until about February-March 1992 ... "

"The choice of the option of accelerated price liberalization and forced lifting of trade restrictions prevented a catastrophic scenario in the country's food market in the spring of 1992," he noted.

Opponents of this view argue that there was no food disaster:

First, the USSR had strategic grain reserves, which economist Andrey Illarionov estimates at 48 million tons, which was enough to feed the people for a year in the absence of a new crop.
Secondly, even the dying food distribution system, according to politician Grigory Yavlinsky, "did not cause fear that everything was about to die," because a new system was gradually replacing it: yes, "it was chaotic, strange, perverted, shady ", but it's quite functional.
Thirdly, Gaidar, speaking of the depletion of grain reserves by March 1992, everywhere refers to a document that indicates the corresponding danger in March 1991 - that is, a year earlier than the described potential catastrophe

The policy of the Gaidar government led to the fact that the savings of Russians depreciated

"... According to today's self-confidently smirking face of a politician, one does not see embarrassment: how, by ruining savings deposits, he threw tens of millions of his compatriots into poverty (destroying the basis of that very "middle class" that he swore to create), "- wrote in 1998 about Yegor Gaidar Alexander Solzhenitsyn, quite exhaustively reflecting the opinion of the majority of Russians about the achievements of Gaidar's reforms.

This opinion is refuted by a number of researchers on the following grounds:

The first steps towards freezing the deposits of the population in the Savings Bank were made by the Soviet government within the framework of monetary reform Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov on January 22, 1991, according to which citizens of the USSR were forbidden to withdraw more than 500 rubles per person per month
Yes, a few months later the ban was lifted, but at the same time in April they raised official prices by 65-70%. It was still far from next year's inflation of 2508.8%, but the purchasing power of money began to decline rapidly
In fact, there was no money in the Savings Bank, because in 1990 the government of Nikolai Ryzhkov withdrew all 369 billion rubles accumulated by Soviet citizens for financing budget deficit.

There are also counterarguments:

• The Soviet authorities confiscated the money, but only as borrowed money that should have been returned. The problem is that the annual rate on these credit resources was at the level of 5% (that's how much the government paid Sberbank for using the money), and neither the Pavlov government nor the new Russian authorities, including Gaidar's team, went for a radical increase in the rate
• As a result, the real savings rate of the population was, according to some estimates, minus 60.8% in 1991 and minus 94.4% in 1992. Thus, in 1991, citizens' savings depreciated by almost 61%, and the following year, the remaining amount devalued by another 94.4%.

It was impossible to simply take and release prices, as Gaidar did

On January 2, 1992, the Yeltsin-Gaidar government released from regulation prices, which until then had been set by the state for decades of Soviet rule. This process is called price liberalization.

So far, Russian public and academic discourses have not formed a unified approach to this reform.

• Managed to eliminate the trade deficit
• The country was saved from imminent famine (“Anyone who remembers the absolute emptiness of the shelves in the fall of 1991 and the real threat of famine in large cities understands why price liberalization was then accepted without much discussion,” wrote one of Yegor Gaidar’s associates, now rector of the Academy of Public Administration under President Vladimir Mau)
• The internal convertibility of the ruble was ensured (that is, they prevented the transition to barter, when money costs nothing and it is easier for people to exchange goods)

Opponents of reform in this form point to the following circumstances:

• The huge accumulated "money overhang", that is, the insecurity of money in goods, with simultaneous liberalization should have led to an increase in inflation - and it happened
• It was impossible to release prices in a situation where the entire economy of the country is state-owned, as a result of which huge monopolies begin to dictate prices (not prices are liberalized, but monopolies are being liberalized)
• In the absence of restraining mechanisms, price liberalization led "not to the creation of mechanisms for market competition, but to the establishment of control over the market by organized criminal groups that extract super profits through price gouging," wrote economist Sergei Glazyev.

The Gaidar government laid the foundations for future economic growth in Russia

To give an exhaustive, more accurate assessment of the legacy of Yegor Gaidar is the task of the future. In the meantime, without falling into any of the extremes, we can only state that he really laid the foundations for the financial and economic structure of modern Russia, whatever this structure may be.

• In addition to price liberalization, creating financial market, privatization, Gaidar also participated in the development tax code, Budget Code, legislation on the Stabilization Fund of Russia
• Many associates and simply supporters of Gaidar occupy key positions in the state and academic hierarchies (head of the Ministry of Economics Alexei Ulyukaev, rector of the RANEPA Vladimir Mau)
• The rise in prices for energy resources of the times of Vladimir Putin was superimposed on the economic institutions already created by that time and functioning

At the same time, it was in the 1990s, according to some economists, that the structure Russian economy finally came to the resource type.

The post-reform years have become "a period of rapid de-industrialization of the Russian economy and its transfer to a resource-based track, and the increase in world fuel prices since 1999 seems to have strengthened this trend," wrote Vladimir Popov, chief researcher at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

In 2004, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in his article "The Crisis of Liberalism in Russia," came to the same conclusion: it was then that Russia firmly settled on a raw material needle (however, it was not specifically about Gaidar, but about liberal rule in general).

Subtotal

To sum up these thesis notes on the debate about Yegor Gaidar, one can use the words of the French moral philosopher La Rochefoucauld, who said as early as the 17th century: "Philosophy triumphs over the sorrows of the past and future, but the sorrows of the present triumph over philosophy."

As long as the 1990s are alive and "bleeding" in the minds of the majority of the Russian population, no dry academic discussions about Gaidar's legacy will overcome this powerful emotional field. Yes, and academic discussions, as the above discussions partially show, do not seem to be completely cleared of emotions yet.

From the new year, 1992, the implementation of the program for Russia's transition to a market economy began under the leadership of the government, headed by Boris Yeltsin (he combined this position with the presidential one until June 1992), and most importantly, the deputy president for economic policy (then first deputy and Acting Prime Minister) Yegor Gaidar. In December 1992, Gaidar, under fire from criticism, was dismissed and replaced by Viktor Chernomyrdin. But the foundation economic system, created by him in 1992, has survived to this day.

Economic and ideological justification of reforms

The economic crisis in the USSR began in the late 1980s. At the same time, as a way out of the crisis, projects began to be proposed for transferring the Soviet economy to capitalist rails. This included not only the abandonment of the state production plan and the transition to market pricing, but also the privatization of many public sector enterprises. Stagnation in the public sector became apparent in the early 1990s, although there is still no unequivocal opinion about its causes: were they purely economic or also political.

Opportunities for private entrepreneurship appeared under M. S. Gorbachev. Some attribute the economic difficulties of the last years of the existence of the USSR to the fact that state-owned enterprises began to sell their products through the private sector, which, without producing anything, began to receive speculative profits. Inflation in the last two years of Gorbachev's rule increased markedly, the standard of living of the majority of the population fell. Then the first legal Soviet millionaires appeared. [S-BLOCK]

Gaidar's reforms, on the whole, continued the line that emerged under Gorbachev, only they were radical and took place at an accelerated pace. At that time, there was a discussion in society and in political circles about how to carry out obviously overdue transformations. The most famous program (alternative to Gaidar's) for the transition to capitalism was the famous "500 days", prepared by a team of economists led by academician Stanislav Shatalin and Grigory Yavlinsky and proposed to the leadership of the USSR under Gorbachev in 1990. This project was supported by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Ryzhkov and approved in September 1990. However, its implementation was never started for political reasons. In addition to the fact that "500 days" provided for implementation on a scale of the entire Soviet Union, the last leadership of the USSR clearly lacked the political will to implement unusual plans. Yeltsin from August 1991 headed for the exit Russian Federation from the USSR, and no longer returned to the 500 Days project.

Yeltsin, who loved decisive action, was clearly impressed by Gaidar's readiness to carry out large-scale economic modernization without stopping at nothing. Prior to his appointment to the government, Yegor Gaidar was in charge of the economic block in the leading publications of the CPSU - the Kommunist magazine and the Pravda newspaper. Back in the 1980s, he developed a critical attitude towards economics Marx and the activities of his Soviet followers. But his familiarity with alternative economic theories was narrow (it could not have been otherwise in Soviet conditions) and selective. In particular, later his opponents pretended to him that he compiled his program according to the recipes of one American economist - Milton Friedman, known for his monetarist concept, which by the beginning of the 1990s had already become archaic. Gaidar continued to blindly follow this theory.

Key reforms and their features

The basis of the transformations were: free market pricing, privatization of the public sector, the abolition of the state monopoly on foreign trade and combating the state budget deficit by saving on social spending. The key moment was the liberalization of prices for goods, announced on January 2, 1992. As a result, for one month, the average retail prices soared by 345%, and annual inflation was 2500%. Retail turnover fell by half over the year, which clearly showed the decline purchasing power most of the population.

On June 11, 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted state program privatization. According to it, small enterprises could be sold into private hands, and large ones were transformed into open joint-stock companies. At the same time, so-called vouchers were introduced, which each citizen of the Russian Federation could purchase from the state for 25 rubles, at the rate of one voucher per person. It was recorded on the voucher nominal cost- 10,000 rubles, i.e. that share of federal property, which accounted for one citizen. The vouchers were promoted as an opportunity for every citizen to participate in the privatization of state property. In fact, these financial documents have become a type of shares, freely traded on stock market. Their real market value was negligible, and most citizens simply sold them off. And immediately there were speculators who began to buy them in huge quantities from the population. Several thousand vouchers in one hand already represented a real amount for which it was possible to buy a block of shares in the enterprise.

Gaidar's innovations marked the beginning of the formation of a large private sector in the Russian economy, the creation of large corporations with mixed public-private capital, sharp social stratification and the formation of a class of business oligarchs closely associated with government bodies and government orders. In short, these reforms laid the foundation for the socio-economic order of modern Russia.

Positive and negative ratings

Rector of the RANEPA Vladimir Mau believes that in disputes about the significance of the economic model proposed by Gaidar, the parties mainly start from two unprovable judgments: Gaidar ruined the economy and robbed the people, or the economy was ruined by the communists before Gaidar, and he built it anew. It is clear that such discussions will lead nowhere and will stop only when this discussion itself economic model for some reason will cease to be a reality.

Specific claims against Gaidar relate to what happened during his time and after him, throughout the 1990s, the real decline in production (by 45% over a decade), as well as the fact that middle class, which was declared to be the main interest in reforms, did not arise under Gaidar. On the contrary, the majority of those who, by their income, could be included in this class in the late Soviet period and form its basis in market conditions, during the period of Gaidar's reforms sank to the category of paupers. Historian Yu. P. Bokarev believes that Gaidar's reform had such consequences because it did not take into account the realities of modern post-industrial society and did not set as its task the transition to it, but was inspired by ideas gleaned from the books of economists of the old industrial age. The free privatization of apartments cannot be credited to Gaidar, in view of the fact that the law on this was adopted by the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation back in June 1991.

Yeltsin's decree of 29 January 1992 on complete freedom of trade mitigated the negative social consequences of Gaidar's reforms. Citizens, barely making ends meet, were able to feed themselves and their families through the sale of part of their property in those difficult years.

The reforms of the government of Yegor Gaidar, which functioned from November 1991 to December 1992, created the basic institutions of a market economy that were absent in Russia before the collapse of the USSR - free prices, convertible currency and private property. Looking back, we can distinguish several main blocks of the transformations carried out then.

First of all, it is economic liberalization. In the Soviet Union, the state exercised control over pricing, as well as foreign and domestic trade. In November 1991, the Gaidar government abolished the state monopoly on foreign trade: from that moment on, all enterprises, regardless of their form of ownership, could import and export goods without obtaining special registration. Two months later, prices were liberalized: sellers of goods and services were given the right to set prices at the level they themselves saw fit. This measure was supplemented by a presidential decree on free trade, thanks to which citizens have the opportunity to sell the goods they have with their hands, without fear of being punished by law enforcement agencies.

The second block of transformations was associated with the introduction of the institute private property. It is worth noting here that, in fact, privatization began in the era of Perestroika. After the adoption of the laws "On State Enterprise" (1987), "On Cooperative Activities" (1988) and "On Lease" (1989), the state lost control over the directors of enterprises: nominally remaining hired managers, they concentrated commodity and cash flows and therefore acted in the logic of privatization of profits and nationalization of costs. The key task of mass privatization, which began in August 1992, was to secure the legal ownership of state property to those who actually managed it. Now the owners (and not the state) bore full financial responsibility for the quality of management of the assets at their disposal. Exactly the same principle began to operate in relation to the owners of service enterprises (shops, hairdressers, repair shops), which began to be transferred to private hands during the “small” privatization that started in March 1992.

The third block of reforms is the introduction of a convertible national currency. In 1991, the USSR nominally still had a single currency for the whole country, but the union center lost control over its circulation: central banks republics uncontrollably issued non-cash rubles, which financed the deficits of the republican budgets. This situation continued after December 1991: now the former Soviet republics continued to issue non-cash rubles, which were used to purchase goods on the territory of the RSFSR; in conditions of free prices, this led to the export of inflation to Russia. In June 1992, the central banks of the republics were transferred to correspondent accounts: now the payments of these countries were realized only in the amount of funds that were on the correspondent account of their central banks with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. In July 1992, the multiplicity of exchange rates characteristic of socialism was finally eliminated: from that moment on, the exchange rate of the Russian national currency began to be officially determined by the Central Bank based on the results of daily trading on the MICEX.

The fourth block of reforms is the stabilization of public finances. Price liberalization has turned the subdued inflation, which was expressed in the twilight of the Soviet era in the aggravation of food shortages, into the open: in January 1992, in monthly terms, it amounted to 245.3%. To suppress inflation, it was necessary to abandon emission financing of the budget deficit. The first attempt to get away from centralized loans of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation was made at the beginning of 1992: in January-April, the Bank of Russia did not provide the government with a penny Money. However, with the beginning of the spring sowing campaign, monetary policy was relaxed; The emission began to work to the fullest in the fall of 1992 - after Viktor Gerashchenko became chairman of the Central Bank. This quickly affected inflation rates: if in May-August its average monthly rate was 12.6%, then in September-December it was already 21.4%. The government could completely stop financing the budget deficit only in 1995, thanks to which the annual inflation began to consistently decrease: if in 1994 it was 214.8%, then in 1997 it was 11%. The first deficit-free budget was adopted only in 1999, after the country had learned the bitter lessons of default.

In 1992, many economic transformations took place in the Russian Federation. They radically changed the country. There was a transition from a planned economy to a market economy. Economists, historians and politicians disagree about these reforms. What was the meaning of the transformations, how people reacted to them and why this particular path was chosen, the experts discussed.

Questions:

What was the state of the country before the reforms?

Evgeny Yasin

IN economic area we were approaching a crash driven by falling oil prices, budget imbalances, the inability to buy important goods from abroad, deteriorating financial situation workers. The political side was also extremely difficult. I suspect that since September 1990, Gorbachev's closest associates in his party work put forward certain demands, which he first fulfilled, and then did not want to.

Alexander Rutskoy

The country was in a state of economic crisis. A shallow, short-lived crisis. If we approach the topic of overcoming the crisis, using the works of John Case, a supporter of the managing market economy, then we will definitely get a positive result. I don't know what Mr. Gaidar was guided by when referring to Fridman, but Gaidar's reforms have nothing in common with Fridman's theory. This is just sheer stupidity, which ultimately led the country to default.

Were the reforms well thought out?

Evgeny Yasin

When you start reforms, talking about what they are thought out and so on is empty talk, because in the aggregate, in interconnection, you can make decisions that form a certain core - the beginning of the reform. And then they already look at the circumstances and take measures that will be forced by the circumstances. Gaidar had a well-thought-out program of reforms. At first, its principled position was the liberalization of prices, which he did. From my point of view, this was absolutely the right decision, because it opened up the possibility of solving the many problems that lurked in the planned economy. The second core is privatization. It was longer term. This is not so much an administrative move, but an institutional act that lies in changing the behavior of the population.

Alexander Rutskoy

No, they were made spontaneously. You know, the same John Case, whom I just referred to, has a wonderful statement: the transition to new forms economic relations through price liberalization is the path to poverty. Which, in fact, was done by Gaidar.

Was there an alternative to these reforms?

Evgeny Yasin

I think there may be an alternative. There were two options - either shock therapy, that is, the most rigid and short jerk, or you take slow actions that stretch. The Ryzhkov government applied the second option. In the situation in which Russia found itself, it was difficult to drag out reforms. Each step caused resistance and the need for some solutions that would complement or somehow correct what you had done. This path has been used before, but did not lead to the desired result.

Alexander Rutskoy

Of course it was. There was an alternative proposal by Yavlinsky, there was an alternative proposal by Abalkin, there was a draft proposal by Glazyev. They differed from Gaidar's ideas in that the proposals were in the nature of priority and sequence, without inventing any inventions. It was impossible to start with price liberalization, this time. Secondly, the very idea of ​​privatization is complete nonsense. As a result, we see who owns the national treasure of the country today. Open Forbes magazine and look at the biographies of these billionaires, then you will understand. Dozens of generations created the country's national treasure, and it was dispersed through loans-for-shares auctions for next to nothing. Just recently, they showed an interview with Mr. Chubais himself, where he says: “We didn’t care how much they paid for enterprises, for the energy system, we were interested in one thing - to drive the last nail into the cover of communism.” It was on these principles that privatization was built.

How did people react to the reforms?

Evgeny Yasin

Those citizens who lived in large cities and in some part of medium ones took this positively. As for the countryside, small towns and a certain part of the population of medium and large cities, they expected something good, but prices rose sharply, and financial policy tightened. Many were unhappy.

Alexander Rutskoy

Gaidar also spoke about this. When he was informed that the poverty of the population had reached such a climax that people were simply dying out, Mr. Gaidar replied that it was natural selection. The whole country was put not only on its knees, but in general in an uncomfortable position - on all fours. Our country was treated with disdain. Armed forces were destroyed, the military-industrial complex was plundered. Natural resources distributed left and right. Budget-forming enterprises were sold for next to nothing.

In what situation was the country after the reforms?

Evgeny Yasin

The main results of the reform were summed up in 1997. Important steps have been taken. On the one hand, this year we can observe financial stabilization. I draw your attention to the fact that inflation in 1997 was 11% against 2500% in 1992. Financial stabilization, that is, the completion of the process of price liberalization and stabilization of the economy, was basically completed in 1997. Then came 1998, and we got the consequences of creating our own financial market, selling government valuable papers. And then the crisis began, because there was no confidence in the new papers. The situation was unstable. One could conclude that the reforms were unsuccessful. But in fact, by the end of 1998, after the devaluation, it became clear that the economy was recovering. It was observed in 1999 and 2000. The revival later showed that Russia began to work market economy. Therefore, even then it was possible to draw conclusions that, in the end, these reforms were successful.

Alexander Rutskoy

Everyone remembers the state the country was reduced to: shuttle traders, sports complexes became markets. Everyone traded everywhere. Businesses were closed. They didn't pay a salary. Pensions were not paid. How can this state be called? Collapse. Not only economic, but also social. After 5 years in 1998, we got the result of this mediocre leadership of the country and the mediocre implementation of reforms - a default. The most shameful phenomenon in the economy is when a country is unable to pay both its internal and external debts.