Nureev R.M., Doctor of Economics, State University-Higher School of Economics;

Latov Yu.V., PhD in Economics, AU MIA

Competition of Western institutions of private property

with Eastern institutions of power-property in Russia in the 1990s-2000s.

In Russia in the 2000s there is a tension between economic growth and economic development. On the one hand, there is a noticeable annual increase in GDP (although high growth rates can hardly be called sustainable). On the other hand, institutional changes seem to many to be insufficient and even regressive.

Administration of the President V.V. Putin sees the path to sustainable economic growth in the centralization of state power. What does the centralization of state administration mean in modern Russia? Is this a step forward towards a social market economy (or another national model of an effective market economy), or a step back towards a command economy?

To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the "institutional genotype" of Russian society and, in particular, to analyze such a basic institution of the command economy ("Eastern despotism") as power-property.

Power-property vs. private property in the history of Russia. The institutional concept of a command economy has its origins in the principles formulated in the 1850s. ideas of K. Marx devoted to the Asian mode of production 1 . However, within the framework of the Marxist tradition, a detailed discussion of this problem could hardly have occurred. Since Marxists understood socialist transformations as the transformation of the state into the main regulatory center, they consciously or subconsciously avoided parallels between the command economy in the past and the command economy in the "bright future" (one of the exceptions is the position of the "opportunist" G.V. Plekhanov). It was not until 1957 that a comprehensive (though not entirely successful) institutional analysis of "Eastern despotism" was given by the ex-Marxist KA, who had gone over to anti-communist positions. Wittfogel 2 .

In Soviet social science, the discussion of the concept of the Asian mode of production for a long time could only take place in a narrow circle of Oriental historians. Despite the "unreliability" of this concept, they managed to achieve noticeable success in understanding the institutions of the ancient/medieval command economy. In particular, the sinologist L.S. Vasiliev proposed the apt term "power-property" to denote the institution of dependence of property rights on official status, typical for the countries of the East 3 . Power-property arises with monopolization official functions in the social division of labor, when power is not based on private property, but, on the contrary, the basis of property rights is a high position in the traditional hierarchy.

In the West, after the "Eastern despotism" K.-A. Wittfogel, a stable tradition has developed to draw parallels between the Asian mode of production and "state socialism" (we can name, for example, the works of R. Pipes 4). In the socialist countries, only dissident thinkers such as M. Djilas and M. Voslensky could write about this. In the domestic scientific literature, this analogy was first openly stated by R.M. Nureyev a year before the collapse of the USSR 6 , and in post-Soviet Russia it has almost become a commonplace 7 .

In the 1990-2000s. There were two main positions on the extent to which "Eastern despotism" based on the institutions of power-property is rooted in Russia.

The first position, emphasizing the despotic tendencies in the history of Russia, is most clearly expressed in the period " cold war"R. Pipes. Its essence is that since the time of the Mongol-Tatar invasion, since the 13th century, Russian civilization has become sharply orientated, importing "oriental despotism" from the East. According to this concept, Russia is "coded" for the dominance of power-property by the features of its political history (the influence of the Horde, then Turkey, then Marxism).

A special variation of this position is the concept of L.V. Milova 8 . According to her, the mobilization-communal nature of Russian agriculture (short term of agricultural work, low productivity of agriculture, high dependence of the result not on labor, but on the "weather") doomed the Russian peasant to communal collectivism, preventing the development of effective individual farming. So, in this interpretation, Russia is "coded" for the dominance of power-property by the peculiarities of its natural environment. However, since in the modern world Russia has the ability to consciously orient itself towards the West, and not towards the East, and since agriculture has long ceased to be the leading industry, the "bad genotype" can be gradually corrected by importing Western institutions of private property.

The second position is most clearly represented by A. Yanov 9 and B.N. Mironova 10 . This position emphasizes, on the contrary, the anti-despotic tendencies in the history of our civilization.

First, it is not necessary to identify Russian civilization with Muscovy. The history of the veche republics of Novgorod and Pskov (before the 15th century), the Russian-Lithuanian state (before the 17th century) - all these alternative versions of the Russian / Orthodox civilization demonstrate that the Russians could also develop private property institutions close to those of Western Europe 11 .

Secondly, even in Muscovy, along with the institutions of despotism, there were strong alternative tendencies. For example, only in Russia, Zemsky Sobors (an approximate analogue of Western parliaments) decided on the choice of the ruling dynasty (as in 1613) - such a "rampant democracy" in the Middle Ages did not happen not only in the East, but also in the West (except perhaps the Commonwealth).

Thirdly, in pre-revolutionary Russia "on all fronts" there was an offensive of "normal" Western institutions of economic and political democracy based on private property. The belief has been repeatedly expressed in the literature that if it were not for the catastrophe of 1917, then by the middle of the 20th century. Russia would finally liquidate despotic remnants and become a "normal" European country, like Germany.

Thus, supporters of this position emphasize that the Russians do not have a despotic "gene code", but subjective political events ("mistakes" by Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Lenin, Stalin ...) prevent Russia from Europeanizing.

Apparently, both of these positions ("Russia is a country with an eastern genetic code" and "Russia is a country with a western genetic code") can and should be integrated. Why should the problem of the "gene code" of Russian civilization be considered according to the "either-or" principle? If we use evolutionary biological analogies, then a person may have a biological predisposition to both music and marksmanship at the same time, and whether he becomes a musician or a sniper depends on his personal choice.

The development of Russian civilization should, in our opinion, be interpreted as a competition between two institutional systems - power-property contra private property 12 . In the Russian social "genocode" there is both despotism (traditions of tsarist/imperial autocracy + Soviet partocracy) and democracy (traditions of veche + zemstvos + Soviets). Probably the first tradition is still stronger. But economic/political democracy is also natural for Russia, albeit to a lesser extent. It can also be updated.

The entire socio-economic history of Russia is, first of all, the history of the competition between these two traditions ("institutional matrices"). This competition took different forms - the confrontation of different models of the emerging Russian civilization, then different trends within one civilization (Table 1).

Table 1

Competition of institutions

power-property and private property in the history of Russia

historical	Development of the institutional system of power-ownership	Development of the institutional system of private property
Princely and tsarist Russia (XIII - XVII centuries): strengthening of power-property	Strengthening of the Moscow autocracy, the local system, the ideology of "sobornost".	Military defeat of the Novgorod-Pskov democracy; "erosion" of the democratic traditions of the Russian-Lithuanian state.
Imperial Russia (XVIII - early XX centuries): strengthening of private property	Strong government regulation; strengthening of the rural redistribution community.	Fixing the private property of the nobility (1762), entrepreneurs and peasants (since 1907).
Soviet Russia (1917-1991): strengthening of power-property	Creation of a state planning system based on communist ideology; development of shadow privileges for the nomenklatura.	Development of the shadow economy of "guild workers" and "speculators"; the transition from the culture of peasant collectivism to the urban "petty-bourgeois" way of life.
Post-Soviet Russia (since 1992): strengthening of private property	Institutional corruption, control of power elites over business elites, preservation of traditions of paternalism and "collectivism of not free people".	The development of private entrepreneurship, the formation of elements of civil society, the strengthening of individualistic mentality.

The concept of institutional competition makes it possible to better understand the contradictions and possible ways of Russia's development at the beginning of the 21st century.

Power-property vs. private property in modern Russia. At present, it is becoming more and more obvious that radical economic reforms in Russia, having become a natural result of the decline of the Soviet-type command economy, did not interrupt the existence of institutions of power-property, but transformed them 13 .

To understand in what direction power-property developed, it is enough to recall the duality of the position of the Soviet nomenklatura.

Firstly, the duality of power-property consisted in the fact that representatives of the Soviet nomenklatura were both subordinates and bosses. In addition, unlike the usual hierarchical structure, they were characterized by the indivisibility of functions: party and state, legislative and executive, administrative and judicial, and often civil and military.

Secondly, throughout the history of the Soviet Union, a double dualism persisted - a planned and market economy, on the one hand, and a legal and illegal economy, on the other. As a result, power-property existed both as a legal and as an illegal institution. In fact, at the “highest and last stage of socialism”, private-state (nomenklatura) property was formed, since the objects of state property were actually disposed of by sectoral and regional elites associated with the criminal world and themselves undergoing mafia.

This duality of the position of the Soviet nomenclature turned out to be largely inherited by the post-Soviet elite, which predetermined the development of privatization and other radical reforms of the 1990s.

Rice. 1. Change in the de facto property system in Russia.

Already by the end of the 1990s. it became obvious that the system of power-property in the competition with the new institutional arrangement did not give up its positions (see Fig. 1).

Evidence of this can be considered, for example, the composition of the Russian political and economic elite top level formed in the 1990s. Three-quarters of the President's entourage and the Russian government then consisted of people from the Soviet nomenklatura, the regional elite and even more - by 4/5, and even the business elite - by 60%. There is every reason to believe that in the 2000s. the Russian elite retained its genetic connection with the Soviet nomenklatura (especially in the regions).

However, the origin of post-Soviet managers from the Soviet nomenklatura, strictly speaking, does not prove anything in itself. After all, if a person started a business career in the USSR, then he was forced to fit into the existing hierarchy, even if its rules seemed unnatural to him. Finally, it cannot be ruled out that some ex-nomenklatura workers were able to "squeeze a slave out of themselves" and become normal managers of the Western type.

The preservation of power-property is proved, first of all, by an analysis of the "old-new" rules for the functioning of business and government.

In Russia in the 2000s many institutions of power-property continue to exist:

• in the rules of relations between government officials/politicians and entrepreneurs, this is informal institutional corruption, supplemented by the strengthening of the formal power (non-economic) control of the state over business;
• in the rules of relations between entrepreneurs and employees - informal paternalism;
• in mental attitudes - orientation to network relationships, "collectivism of not free people", admiration for power.

As before, in modern Russia, at every institutional level, there is a confrontation between the institutions of power-property and the institutions of private property (see Table 2). Moreover, there was a partial revival of the existing until the 17th century. competition between different regional models of Russian civilization. After all, Belarus and Ukraine, having become independent states, remain largely part of the Russian cultural space, a kind of "other Russia" (like Novgorod in the 14th century). As a result, on the example of Belarus, one can observe the variant of the most stable power-property, and on the example of Ukraine, a more dynamic (than in Russia) development of private property institutions. Of course, now this institutional competition of "different Russias" is no longer manifested in military confrontation, but in the struggle for labor resources, for control over capital assets, for the export-import of institutions.

In the reports of the participants of our section, first of all, the old and new institutions of power-property, which demonstrate high competitiveness in a collision with institutions of private property, will be discussed.

table 2

Institutions of power-property and private property

in modern Russia

institutional levels	Institutes private property ("western matrix")	Institutes power-property ("eastern matrix")
1. Economic institutions	Institutions of a market economy: private property, commodity exchange, competition, hired labor.	Institutions of "razdatochnoe economy" (Bessonova): the obligation of political loyalty for the business elite, the use of power by the political elite to lobby for personal entrepreneurial interests; administrative mechanisms for redistribution; institutional corruption, network connections.
2. Constitutional institutions	Institutions of a federal political system: federation, elections in a multi-party system, lawsuits, independent public organizations.	Unitary-centralized politic system Keywords: administrative-territorial division, hierarchical vertical headed by the center, appointments, infringement of political opposition, administrative complaints.
3. Supra-constitutional institutions	The values ​​of individualism and social equality.	Values ​​of transpersonal collectivism ("collectivism of unfree people") and patriarchy (admiration for "bosses").

In 1992, the Law of Ukraine "On limiting monopoly and preventing unfair competition in business" was adopted. In 2001 - "On the Protection of Economic Competition", which contains the basic provisions of competition law - concerted actions, concentration of business entities, norms of the competitive process, sanctions for violation of the law.

Competition- competition between business entities in order to obtain advantages over other business entities due to their own achievements, as a result of which consumers have the opportunity to choose between several sellers, buyers, and a separate business entity cannot determine the conditions for the circulation of goods on the market. Fair competition leads to production efficiency, to the development of the entire national economy Therefore, the state should limit the formation of monopolies. monopoly an enterprise is considered when its market share exceeds 35% or when the combined share of the three entities exceeds 50%.

The negative consequences of monopolism are manifested in the form of a decrease in product quality, limitation of technological development, limitation of the competitiveness of other economic entities by creating obstacles for them to access markets.

6.3. Institutes of contract law and entrepreneurship in the transition economy

The Civil Code of Ukraine establishes the principles of contractual relations, the rules and procedure for concluding a contract, the content of the contract, the rights and obligations of the parties, and ways to protect the violated rights of the parties to the contract.

Treaty is an agreement between two or more parties to establish, modify or terminate civil rights and responsibilities. Treaties are divided into unilateral, bilateral and multilateral. If one party assumes the obligation to perform certain actions in relation to the other, which has only the right to demand without fulfilling a counter obligation, the contract is called unilateral. A bilateral contract takes place when both parties are endowed with both rights and obligations.

The criterion for classifying contracts is whether they are paid or not. The presumption of payment is established, unless otherwise provided by law, by the contract itself, or does not follow from its essence. Some contracts are always reimbursable (paid), for example, purchase and sale, contract, delivery, and the other part is always gratuitous (donation, inheritance). Some contracts, depending on the conditions, can be both paid and gratuitous (services for maintenance, cleaning, which can be performed by both employees and family members).

Principles contractual obligations are the freedom of the contract, the economy of cooperation, the proper performance of obligations, the obligation to fulfill the contract, the judicial application of contractual and legal sanctions against the violator of obligations. The general civil principles of contractual obligations include justice, good faith, reasonableness, non-abuse of the right, morality.

The formation of the institution of contract law is especially necessary for small and medium-sized businesses.

Setting the character of the entire institutional economic environment. The institution of private property determines that persons or organizations that own their property have full rights and responsibilities for its use and disposal.

The activity of private owners is regulated competition institution, i.e. they compete with each other in obtaining the necessary production resources and selling the results of their activities.

Reproduction market economies impossible otherwise than through exchanges (buying and selling) produced products and services that have the nature of goods.

Private ownership of the means of production and labor force employment institution. Thus, labor relations also have the nature of an exchange, or sale and purchase, as K. Marx wrote, of labor power.

The socially recognized criterion of efficiency, the regulator, through which the activities of isolated private farms are correlated on a scale of the whole society, is profit, or, more broadly, capital, which K. Marx singled out as the main social relation of market (capitalist) economies.

Command-administrative or redistributive:

The first in the list of basic institutions that regulate the reproduction of redistributive economies is the institution common property . The institution of common property means that the owner of the main resources and means of production is recognized - explicitly or latently - by society as a whole. This implies the possibility of using the goods produced and consumed by all members of society according to the rules established each time and does not imply boundaries between them in terms of property rights, as is typical under the dominance of the institution of private property.

Reproduction processes in a redistributive economy are not regulated by exchange relations, which are inappropriate within the framework of a common distributed property, but are carried out on the basis of distribution.

Ticket 4. Formation of a new model economic system Russia

There are many factors that affect the economic growth of a country, but there are only two key ones. First, the accumulation of capital - physical or human, per employed person or per capita. Secondly, changes in the technological level of the economy, expressed by the indicator of total factor productivity (TFP). These changes reflect the pace of technological progress and structural changes in the economy. All other factors (government policy, preferences of the population and market institutions that determine the investment climate in the country, the level of development of infrastructure sectors, etc.) have a positive or negative impact on the rates economic growth through these two processes.

Based on the premise that the main drivers of growth are capital accumulation and the increase in FNA, it is possible to estimate the contribution of investment in productive capital to growth rates Russian economy. Let us assume that in the next 10 years there will be a uniform recovery of the disposal of about 60% of the value of existing fixed assets. production assets. Then, with the growth of gross investments by 7% per year, their net growth should be 2%. This is a rather optimistic forecast, exceeding the value of the increase in the physical volume of fixed assets (excluding depreciation) for 2001, which, according to the State Statistics Committee, amounted to only 1.7% (Rossiya v digits 2002, p. 59). With a factorial share of labor in GDP of approximately 50%, a 2% increase in fixed capital per year will provide a 1% increase in GDP per employed person.

Thus, taking into account the actual degree of depreciation of fixed production assets in Russia, which, according to official data, is more than 40%, we can state that investments in production capital will only be able to give a slight increase in GDP. It follows from this that the main role in ensuring the sustainable growth of the Russian economy will have to play an increase in the OFP.

Hopes of many advocates of liberalization foreign trade and entry into the WTO in Russia are associated with the model of export-oriented growth. This is due to the fact that countries that are open to the world market demonstrate relatively higher rates of long-term growth. The most striking example is the economies of Southeast Asia (SEA), which have achieved undoubted success due to the reorientation to foreign markets. Can Russia, by copying the experience of these countries, achieve faster growth rates, especially in manufacturing industries? Such structural shifts would mean a significant change in the specialization of our country in the system of international integration relations and its approach to advanced economies.

The problem is that the model of export-oriented growth in the version of the countries of Southeast Asia is hardly applicable in Russia. On the one hand, the process of import substitution after the crisis showed that a number of industries are quite capable of international competition, although considering the value for money. The dynamics of some segments of the domestic market gave rise to a certain optimism and hope for a possible continuation of growth due to external expansion. However, these hopes are hardly justified, primarily because of the scale of the Russian economy. As long as there is a significant potential of their own markets, it hardly makes sense to invest in promoting products abroad, especially in countries where competition is much sharper. The shifts in the quality level that have taken place in some places were also calculated mainly on the standards of the domestic market. Foreign investments, which partly gave rise to them, were also calculated on the potential of the domestic market. Of course, over time, increasing returns to scale of production can give Russia a gain in international trade, but this is only possible as a result of the development of domestic markets.

All this convinces of the inapplicability for Russia of a development strategy that is trying to copy the Korean or Chinese model. First, for many political and economic reasons(instability tax laws, non-transparency of business conditions, not very consistent liberalism of the current authorities) it is naive to count on the attractiveness of Russia for TNCs. Secondly, it is unlikely that domestic politicians and "strong" business executives would have liked the idea of ​​reorganizing the national economy under the control of world corporations. Thirdly, the scale of our country is large enough for the development of the domestic market, but not enough to create a system regional production similar to East Asian. For this reason, direct foreign investment in Russia they are guided by the domestic, not the foreign market. Fourth, a trade policy that seeks export expansion but is based on restricting imports will slow down technological growth and do more harm than good. Fifth, the export-oriented growth of the raw materials sector, which in principle is not capable of inducing long-term development, is programmed not only by Russia's existing specialization, but also by the vague strategy of the government. For example, the implementation of plans to supply US state reserves with Russian oil means an increase in raw material exports by two to three times in 5-7 years and the final consolidation of our country's status as a world energy supplier.