Industrialization of the USSR

Socialist industrialization of the USSR (Stalin's industrialization) - the transformation of the USSR in the 1930s from a predominantly agricultural country into a leading industrial power.

The beginning of socialist industrialization as an integral part of the “triple task of radical reconstruction of society” (industrialization, collectivization Agriculture And cultural revolution) was laid down in the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy (-). At the same time, private commodity and capitalist forms of economy were eliminated.

According to popular opinion, the rapid growth production capacity and the volume of heavy industry production allowed the USSR to win the Great Patriotic War. The increase in industrial power in the 1930s was considered within the framework of Soviet ideology one of the most important achievements of the USSR. Since the late 1980s, there have been discussions in Russia about the cost of industrialization, which have also cast doubt on its results and long-term consequences for the Soviet economy and society.

GOELRO

The plan provided for the accelerated development of the electric power industry, tied to territorial development plans. The GOELRO plan, designed for 10-15 years, provided for the construction of 30 regional power plants (20 thermal power plants and 10 hydroelectric power stations) with a total capacity of 1.75 million kW. The project covered eight main economic regions (Northern, Central Industrial, Southern, Volga, Ural, West Siberian, Caucasian and Turkestan). At the same time, the development of the country's transport system was carried out (reconstruction of old and construction of new railway lines, construction of the Volga-Don Canal).

The GOELRO project laid the foundation for industrialization in Russia. Electricity production in 1932 compared to 1913 increased almost 7 times, from 2 to 13.5 billion kWh.

Discussions during the NEP period

One of the fundamental contradictions of Bolshevism was the fact that the party, which called itself the “workers” and its rule the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” came to power in an agrarian country where factory workers made up only a few percent of the population, and even then the majority of them were recent immigrants from the village who have not yet completely broken ties with it. Forced industrialization was designed to eliminate this contradiction.

From a foreign policy point of view, the country was in hostile conditions. According to the leadership of the CPSU(b), there was a high probability of a new war with capitalist states. It is significant that already at the 10th Congress of the RCP(b) in 1921, the author of the report “On the Soviet Republic Surrounded”, L. B. Kamenev, stated that preparations for the Second World War had begun in Europe:

What we observe every day in Europe ... testifies that the war is not over, armies are moving, battle orders are given, garrisons are sent to one area or another, no borders can be considered firmly established. ... one can expect from hour to hour that the old completed imperialist massacre will give rise, as its natural continuation, to some new, even more monstrous, even more disastrous imperialist war.

Preparation for war required thorough rearmament. However, it was impossible to immediately begin such rearmament due to the backwardness of heavy industry. At the same time, the existing pace of industrialization seemed insufficient, since the gap with the capitalist countries, which experienced economic growth in the 1920s, increased.

One of the first such rearmament plans was outlined already in 1921, in the project for the reorganization of the Red Army, prepared for the X Congress by S. I. Gusev and M. V. Frunze. The project stated both the inevitability of a new big war and the unpreparedness of the Red Army for it. Gusev and Frunze proposed developing a powerful network of military schools in the country and organizing mass production of tanks, artillery, “armored cars, armored trains, airplanes” in a “shock” manner. A separate paragraph also proposed to carefully study the combat experience of the Civil War, including the units opposing the Red Army (officer units of the White Guards, Makhnovist carts, Wrangel’s “bomb-throwing airplanes,” etc. In addition, the authors also called for urgently organizing the publication in Russia of foreign “ Marxist" works on military issues.

After the end of the Civil War, Russia again faced the pre-revolutionary problem of agrarian overpopulation ( "Malthusian-Marxian trap"). During the reign of Nicholas II, overpopulation caused a gradual decrease in average land plots; the surplus of workers in the countryside was not absorbed either by the outflow to the cities (which amounted to about 300 thousand people per year with an average increase of up to 1 million people per year), or by emigration, or by Stolypin's government program for the resettlement of colonists beyond the Urals. In the 1920s, overpopulation took the form of unemployment in cities. It became a serious social problem that grew throughout the NEP, and by its end it amounted to more than 2 million people, or about 10% of the urban population. The government believed that one of the factors hindering the development of industry in the cities was the lack of food and the reluctance of the countryside to provide the cities with bread at low prices.

The party leadership intended to solve these problems through a planned redistribution of resources between agriculture and industry, in accordance with the concept of socialism, which was announced at the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) and the III All-Union Congress of Soviets in the city. In Stalin’s historiography, the XIV Congress was called the “Congress of Industrialization ", however, he only accepted common decision about the need to transform the USSR from an agricultural country to an industrial one, without defining specific forms and rates of industrialization.

The choice of a specific implementation of central planning was vigorously discussed in 1926-1928. Supporters genetic approach (V. Bazarov, V. Groman, N. Kondratyev) believed that the plan should be drawn up on the basis of objective patterns of economic development, identified as a result of an analysis of existing trends. Followers teleological approach (G. Krzhizhanovsky, V. Kuibyshev, S. Strumilin) ​​believed that the plan should transform the economy and proceed from future structural changes, production capabilities and strict discipline. Among the party functionaries, the first were supported by the supporter of the evolutionary path to socialism N. Bukharin, and the latter by L. Trotsky, who insisted on immediate industrialization.

One of the first ideologists of industrialization was the economist E. A. Preobrazhensky, close to Trotsky, who in 1924-1925 developed the concept of forced “super-industrialization” by pumping out funds from the countryside (“initial socialist accumulation,” according to Preobrazhensky). For his part, Bukharin accused Preobrazhensky and the “left opposition” that supported him of instilling “military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry” and “internal colonialism.”

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I. Stalin, initially stood on Bukharin’s point of view, but after Trotsky was expelled from the party’s Central Committee at the end of the year, he changed his position to the diametrically opposite one. This led to a decisive victory for the teleological school and a radical turn away from the NEP. Researcher V. Rogovin believes that the reason for Stalin’s “left turn” was the grain procurement crisis of 1927; The peasantry, especially the wealthy, massively refused to sell bread, considering the purchase prices set by the state to be too low.

The internal economic crisis of 1927 was intertwined with a sharp aggravation of the foreign policy situation. On February 23, 1927, the British Foreign Secretary sent a note to the USSR demanding that it stop supporting the Kuomintang-Communist government in China. After the refusal, Great Britain broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR on May 24-27. However, at the same time, the alliance between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists fell apart; On April 12, Chiang Kai-shek and his allies massacred the Shanghai Communists ( see Shanghai Massacre of 1927). This incident was widely used by the “united opposition” (“Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc”) to criticize official Stalinist diplomacy as obviously a failure.

During the same period, there was a raid on the Soviet embassy in Beijing (April 6), British police conducted a search in the Soviet-English joint stock company Arcos in London (12 May). In June 1927, representatives of the EMRO carried out a series of terrorist attacks against the USSR. In particular, on June 7, the White emigrant Kaverda killed the Soviet plenipotentiary in Warsaw Voikov, on the same day in Minsk the head of the Belarusian OGPU I. Opansky was killed, a day earlier the EMRO terrorist threw a bomb at the OGPU pass office in Moscow. All these incidents contributed to the creation of a climate of “military psychosis” and the emergence of expectations of a new foreign intervention (“crusade against Bolshevism”).

By January 1928, only 2/3 of the grain was harvested compared to the level of the previous year, as peasants withheld grain en masse, considering purchase prices to be too low. The disruptions that began in the supply of cities and the army were aggravated by the aggravation of the foreign policy situation, which even reached the point of carrying out a trial mobilization. In August 1927, panic began among the population, which resulted in widespread purchasing of food for future use. At the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (December 1927), Mikoyan admitted that the country had survived the difficulties of “the eve of war without having a war.”

First Five Year Plan

In order to create our own engineering base, a domestic system of higher technical education was urgently created. In 1930, universal primary education was introduced in the USSR, and compulsory seven-year education in cities.

To increase incentives to work, pay became more closely tied to productivity. Centers for the development and implementation of the principles of scientific organization of labor were actively developing. One of the largest centers of this kind (CIT) has created about 1,700 training points with 2 thousand highly qualified CIT instructors in different parts of the country. They operated in all leading industries National economy- in mechanical engineering, metallurgy, construction, light and forestry industries, railways ah and motor transport, in agriculture and even in the navy.

In parallel, the state moved to a centralized distribution of the means of production and consumer goods belonging to it, the introduction of command-administrative management methods and nationalization was carried out private property. Arose politic system, based on the leadership role of the CPSU (b), state property on the means of production and a minimum of private initiative. The widespread use of forced labor of Gulag prisoners, special settlers and rear militia also began.

In 1933, at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin said in his report that according to the results of the first five-year plan, less consumer goods were produced than necessary, but the policy of relegating the tasks of industrialization to the background would lead to the fact that we do not have it would be the tractor and automobile industries, ferrous metallurgy, metal for the production of cars. The country would be without bread. Capitalist elements in the country would incredibly increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism. Our situation would be similar to that of China, which then did not have its difficult and military industry, and became the target of aggression. We would not have non-aggression pacts with other countries, but military intervention and war. A dangerous and deadly war, a bloody and unequal war, because in this war we would be almost unarmed before enemies who have at their disposal all modern means of attack.

The First Five-Year Plan was associated with rapid urbanization. The urban labor force increased by 12.5 million, of whom 8.5 million were rural migrants. However, the USSR reached a share of 50% of the urban population only in the early 1960s.

Use of foreign specialists

Engineers were invited from abroad, many well-known companies, such as Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG And General Electric, were involved in the work and supplied modern equipment; a significant part of the models of equipment produced in those years at Soviet factories were copies or modifications of foreign analogues (for example, the Fordson tractor, assembled at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant).

A branch of Albert Kahn, Inc. was opened in Moscow. under the name "Gosproektstroy". Its leader was Moritz Kahn, brother of the head of the company. It employed 25 leading American engineers and about 2.5 thousand Soviet employees. At that time it was the largest architectural bureau in the world. Over the three years of Gosproektstroy’s existence, more than 4 thousand Soviet architects, engineers and technicians studied through the American experience. The Central Bureau of Heavy Engineering (CBTM), a branch of the German company Demag, also operated in Moscow.

Albert Kahn's company played the role of coordinator between the Soviet customer and hundreds of Western companies that supplied equipment and advised on the construction of individual facilities. So, technology project The Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant was carried out by Ford, the construction was carried out by the American company Austin. The construction of the 1st State Bearing Plant in Moscow (GPZ-1), which was designed by the Kana company, was carried out with technical assistance from the Italian company RIV.

The Stalingrad Tractor Plant, built to Kahn's design in 1930, was originally built in the USA, and then dismantled, transported to the USSR and assembled under the supervision of American engineers. It was equipped with equipment from more than 80 American engineering companies and several German firms.

results

Growth in the physical volume of gross industrial output of the USSR during the 1st and 2nd Five-Year Plans (1928-1937)

Products	1928	1932	1937	1932 to 1928 (%) 1st Five Year Plan	1937 to 1928 (%) 1st and 2nd five-year plans
Cast iron, million tons	3,3	6,2	14,5	188 %	439 %
Steel, million tons	4,3	5,9	17,7	137 %	412 %
Rolled ferrous metals, million tons.	3,4	4,4	13	129 %	382 %
Coal, million tons	35,5	64,4	128	181 %	361 %
Oil, million tons	11,6	21,4	28,5	184 %	246 %
Electricity, billion kWh	5,0	13,5	36,2	270 %	724 %
Paper, thousand tons	284	471	832	166 %	293 %
Cement, million tons	1,8	3,5	5,5	194 %	306 %
Granulated sugar, thousand tons.	1283	1828	2421	165 %	189 %
Metal-cutting machines, thousand pcs.	2,0	19,7	48,5	985 %	2425 %
Cars, thousand units	0,8	23,9	200	2988 %	25000 %
Leather shoes, million pairs	58,0	86,9	183	150 %	316 %

At the end of 1932, the successful and early completion of the first five-year plan was announced in four years and three months. Summing up its results, Stalin said that heavy industry fulfilled the plan by 108%. During the period between October 1, 1928 and January 1, 1933, the production fixed assets of heavy industry increased by 2.7 times.

In his report at the XVII Congress of the CPSU(b) in January 1934, Stalin cited the following figures with the words: “This means that our country has become firmly and finally an industrial country.”

The First Five-Year Plan was followed by a Second Five-Year Plan, with somewhat less emphasis on industrialization, and then a Third Five-Year Plan, which was derailed by the outbreak of World War II.

The result of the first five-year plans was the development of heavy industry, due to which GDP growth during 1928-40, according to V. A. Melyantsev, amounted to about 4.6% per year (according to other, earlier estimates, from 3% to 6 .3%). Industrial production in the period 1928-1937. increased by 2.5-3.5 times, that is, 10.5-16% per year. In particular, the production of machinery in the period 1928-1937. grew at an average of 27.4% per year.

With the beginning of industrialization, the consumption fund and, as a consequence, the standard of living of the population sharply decreased. By the end of 1929, the rationing system had been extended to almost all food products, but there was still a shortage of ration goods, and huge queues had to be faced to purchase them. Subsequently, the standard of living began to improve. In 1936, ration cards were abolished, which was accompanied by an increase in wages in the industrial sector and an even greater increase in state ration prices for all goods. The average level of consumption per capita in 1938 was 22% higher than in 1928. However, the greatest increase was among the party and labor elite and did not affect the vast majority at all rural population, or more than half of the country's population.

The end date of industrialization is defined differently by different historians. From the point of view of the conceptual desire to raise heavy industry in record time, the most pronounced period was the first five-year plan. Most often, the end of industrialization is understood as the last pre-war year (1940), or less often the year before Stalin's death (1952). If we understand industrialization as a process, the goal of which is the share of industry in GDP, characteristic of industrial developed countries, then the USSR economy reached such a state only in the 1960s. The social aspect of industrialization should also be taken into account, since only in the early 1960s. the urban population exceeded the rural one.

Professor N.D. Kolesov believes that without the implementation of the industrialization policy, the political and economic independence of the country would not have been ensured. The sources of funds for industrialization and its pace were predetermined by economic backwardness and the too short period of time allotted for its elimination. According to Kolesov, the Soviet Union managed to eliminate backwardness in just 13 years.

Criticism

During the Soviet era, communists argued that industrialization was based on a rational and feasible plan. Meanwhile, it was assumed that the first five-year plan would come into effect at the end of 1928, but even by the time of its announcement in April-May 1929, work on its preparation had not been completed. The original form of the plan included goals for 50 industrial and agricultural sectors, as well as the relationship between resources and capabilities. Over time, the main role began to be played by achieving predetermined indicators. If the growth rate of industrial production initially set in the plan was 18-20%, then by the end of the year they were doubled. Despite reporting the success of the first five-year plan, in fact, the statistics were falsified, and none of the goals were even close to being achieved. Moreover, there was a sharp decline in agriculture and in industrial sectors dependent on agriculture. Part of the party nomenklatura was extremely indignant at this; for example, S. Syrtsov described reports about achievements as “fraud.”

Despite the development of new products, industrialization was carried out predominantly by extensive methods: economic growth was ensured by an increase in the rate of gross accumulation in fixed capital, the rate of savings (due to a fall in the consumption rate), the level of employment and the exploitation of natural resources. British scientist Don Filzer believes that this was due to the fact that as a result of collectivization and a sharp decline in the standard of living of the rural population, human labor became greatly devalued. V. Rogovin notes that the desire to fulfill the plan led to an environment of overexertion of forces and a permanent search for reasons to justify the failure to fulfill inflated tasks. Because of this, industrialization could not be fueled by enthusiasm alone and required a number of coercive measures. Beginning in 1930, the free movement of labor was prohibited, and criminal penalties were introduced for violations of labor discipline and negligence. Since 1931, workers began to be held liable for damage to equipment. In 1932, forced transfer of labor between enterprises became possible, and the death penalty was introduced for theft of state property. On December 27, 1932, the internal passport was restored, which Lenin at one time condemned as “tsarist backwardness and despotism.” The seven-day week was replaced by a continuous working week, the days of which, without having names, were numbered from 1 to 5. Every sixth day there was a day off, established for work shifts, so that factories could work without interruption. Prisoner labor was actively used (see GULAG). In fact, during the years of the first Five-Year Plan, the communists laid the foundations for forced labor for the Soviet population. All this has become the subject of sharp criticism in democratic countries, not only from liberals, but primarily from Social Democrats.

Industrialization was largely carried out at the expense of agriculture (collectivization). First of all, agriculture became a source of primary accumulation, due to low purchase prices for grain and re-export at higher prices, as well as due to the so-called. “super tax in the form of overpayments on manufactured goods”. Subsequently, the peasantry also provided the labor force for the growth of heavy industry. The short-term result of this policy was a drop in agricultural production: for example, livestock production decreased almost by half and returned to the 1928 level only in 1938. The consequence of this was a deterioration in the economic situation of the peasantry. A long-term consequence was the degradation of agriculture. To compensate for the losses of the village, it was necessary additional expenses. In 1932-1936, collective farms received about 500 thousand tractors from the state, not only to mechanize land cultivation, but also to compensate for the damage from the reduction in the number of horses by 51% (77 million) in 1929-1933.

As a result of collectivization, famine and purges between 1927 and 1939, mortality above the “normal” level (human losses) amounted, according to various estimates, from 7 to 13 million people.

Trotsky and other critics argued that, despite efforts to increase labor productivity, in practice average labor productivity was falling. This is also stated in a number of modern foreign publications, according to which for the period 1929-1932. value added per hour worked in industry fell by 60% and returned to 1929 levels only in 1952. This is explained by the emergence of a chronic commodity shortage in the economy, collectivization, mass famine, a massive influx of untrained labor from the countryside and the expansion of enterprises labor resources. At the same time, the specific GNP per worker increased by 30% during the first 10 years of industrialization.

As for the records of the Stakhanovites, a number of historians note that their methods were a continuous method of increasing productivity, previously popularized by F. Taylor and G. Ford. In addition, the records were largely staged and were the result of the efforts of their assistants, and in practice they turned out to be a pursuit of quantity at the expense of product quality. Due to the fact that wages were proportional to productivity, the salaries of Stakhanovites became several times higher than the average wages in the industry. This caused a hostile attitude towards the Stakhanovites on the part of the “backward” workers, who reproached them for the fact that their records lead to higher standards and lower prices. Newspapers talked about “unprecedented and blatant sabotage” of the Stakhanov movement on the part of craftsmen, shop managers, and trade union organizations.

The expulsion of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev from the party at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) gave rise to a wave of repression in the party, which spread to the technical intelligentsia and foreign technical specialists. At the July plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1928, Stalin put forward the thesis that “as we move forward, the resistance of capitalist elements will increase, the class struggle will intensify.” That same year, a campaign against sabotage began. The "saboteurs" were blamed for failures to achieve plan targets. The first high-profile trial in the case of “saboteurs” was the Shakhty case, after which charges of sabotage could follow for the enterprise’s failure to fulfill the plan.

One of the main goals of accelerated industrialization was to overcome the gap with developed capitalist countries. Some critics argue that this lag itself was primarily a consequence of the October Revolution. They point out that in 1913 Russia ranked fifth in world industrial production and was the world leader in industrial growth with an annual rate of 6.1% for the period 1888-1913. However, by 1920, the level of production had fallen nine times compared to 1916.

Soviet propaganda announced the growth of the socialist economy against the background of the crisis in capitalist countries

Soviet sources claimed that the economic growth was of an unprecedented nature. On the other hand, a number of modern studies claim that the GDP growth rate in the USSR (mentioned above 3 - 6.3%) was comparable to similar indicators in Germany in 1930-38. (4.4%) and Japan (6.3%), although they significantly exceeded the indicators of countries such as England, France and the USA, which were experiencing the “Great Depression” during that period.

The USSR of that period was characterized by authoritarianism and central planning in the economy. At first glance, this gives weight to the widespread opinion that the USSR owed its high rate of increase in industrial output precisely to the authoritarian regime and the planned economy. However, a number of economists believe that the growth of the Soviet economy was achieved only due to its extensive nature. Counterfactual historical studies, or so-called “virtual scenarios,” have suggested that industrialization and rapid economic growth would also have been possible if the NEP had remained in place.

Industrialization and the Great Patriotic War

One of the main goals of industrialization was to build up the military potential of the USSR. So, if as of January 1, 1932, the Red Army had 1,446 tanks and 213 armored vehicles, then on January 1, 1934 there were 7,574 tanks and 326 armored vehicles - more than in the armies of Great Britain, France and Nazi Germany combined.

The relationship between industrialization and the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War is a matter of debate. During Soviet times, the accepted view was that industrialization and pre-war rearmament played a decisive role in victory. However, the superiority of Soviet technology over German technology on the western border of the country on the eve of the war could not stop the enemy.

According to historian K. Nikitenko, the built command-administrative system negated the economic contribution of industrialization to the country's defense capability. V. Lelchuk also draws attention to the fact that by the beginning of the winter of 1941, the territory on which 42% of the population of the USSR lived before the war, 63% of coal was mined, 68% of cast iron was smelted, etc.: “Victory had to be forged not with the help of the powerful potential that was created during the years of accelerated industrialization.” The invaders had at their disposal the material and technical base of such giants built during the years of industrialization as

Industrialization is a process of radical restructuring of the country's economy, aimed at creating and increasing industrial potential. Industrialization – inevitable condition transforming an agricultural country into a powerful, industrialized power.
In the Soviet Union, this process took place in the shortest possible time - from 1929 to 1940.

Reasons for industrialization in the USSR.
A crisis "New Economic Policy" (NEP)). The NEP, proclaimed by the Bolsheviks immediately after the end of the Civil War, contributed to the revival of the economy in the post-war years. But by the end of the 1920s, the NEP, having completed its tasks, turned out to be unable to bring the country's economy to a new level. In 1928, by majority economic indicators Soviet Union reached the indicators of the Russian Empire of the pre-war 1913 model, and surpassed it in some industries. For example, production volumes in mechanical engineering in 1928 were 80% higher than in 1913, Electricity production amounted to 5 billion kW against 1.9 billion kW, 1.8 thousand tractors were produced, which were not produced in the Russian Empire at all. However, even such growth rates did not meet the country's needs.
Economic security of the USSR. At the end of the 1920s, the Soviet Union continued to be under political and economic blockade. There was an urgent question about economic security a country based on self-sufficiency in industrial goods. But the USSR continued to remain a country with a predominant agricultural sector of the economy, and was forced to turn to the foreign market to purchase industrial goods.
Military security of the USSR . The First World War did not resolve the contradictions between the powers, but only postponed them for a short period. A new world war was inevitable. And the USSR, included in the sphere of world politics, would be its participant. But the new war required developed industry, which simply did not exist in the USSR during the NEP period. The historically important issue that had already faced the Russian Empire was not resolved - the industrial development of the country, the creation modern economy corresponding to the status of a world power. The rate of industrial growth in pre-revolutionary Russia was not enough to wage a modern war. For example, during the three years of the war, 28 thousand machine guns were produced in Russia, 280 thousand in Germany, and 326 thousand in France. Aviation engines were not produced in Russia at all and 3.5 thousand aircraft were built on foreign-made engines, while 48 thousand aircraft were produced in France during the same period. The situation with weapons was not the best in Soviet Russia in the 1920s, which was a direct consequence of undeveloped industry.

Progress of industrialization.
Industrialization in the USSR was carried out based on five-year plans(five year olds). The plan of the first five-year plan, 1929 - 1932, was completed in 4 years and 3 months. The Second Five-Year Plan, 1932–1937, was not implemented. The third five-year plan remained unfinished due to the outbreak of war. Therefore, when summing up the results of industrialization in the USSR, it is customary to operate with indicators for 1940.
Industrialization in the USSR was not aimed at making a profit, but at creating conditions, a base, for stable industrial growth in the coming years. For this purpose, first of all, enterprises of group “A” were created - production of means of production: energy, metallurgy, mining industry, transport and machine tool building. This laid the foundation for the development of industry in the USSR for decades to come.
Another feature of the transformation of the Soviet Union into an industrial superpower was the lack of foreign loans and investment. In conditions of foreign policy isolation, they simply had nowhere to come from. The USSR carried out industrialization at the expense of internal reserves. But this does not mean that there was no cooperation with industrialized countries. On the contrary, the USSR actively attracted foreign specialists, bought means of production, and, most importantly, technology. The economic crisis that occurred in Western countries in the early 1930s helped him in this. In times of crisis, Western companies willingly cooperated with the USSR. With the involvement of foreign specialists and technologies, such large industrial enterprises as the DneproGES, MMK, tractor factories in Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk, the Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant and others were built.

Results of industrialization in the USSR.
General results. Over the course of ten years, the Soviet Union made an unprecedented breakthrough in industrial development. From 1929 to 1940, more than 8.5 thousand large enterprises . Among them are such giants as: DneproGES, Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, Stalingrad, Chelyabinsk and Kharkov Tractor Plants, Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant, Zaporizhstal, Azovstal, Uralmash, Krivoy Rog and Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plants and many others. The Moscow and Leningrad metro systems were put into operation.
The growth rate of industrial production was three times higher than in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the century.
This allowed the USSR to become not only an industrial power, but also to become a leader among industrialized countries. Thus, in 1937, in terms of absolute volumes of industrial production, the Soviet Union ranked second in the world, second only to the United States. True, it lagged behind Germany, Great Britain and France in terms of production per capita. In the same 1937, the share of imports of industrial goods was only 1% of consumption volumes. Thus, the problem of economic independence was solved. The country provided itself with the necessary goods. Moreover, the USSR itself exported the products of its factories. For example, having abandoned the import of tractors in 1932, in 1934 the Soviet Union itself began exporting tractors of its own production.
One of the results of industrialization in the USSR was the creation of new industries - machine tool building, aircraft manufacturing, automobile manufacturing, production of tractors, bearings, and instrument making.
GDP growth during the first five-year plans was 6% annually. A industrial production grew every year by 11–16%.

The results of industrialization in the USSR for defense industry. One of the objectives of industrialization was to ensure the country's defense capability. In fact, the defense industry was created anew. This made it possible to begin large-scale rearmament of the army in 1939. Unfortunately, it was not completed by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - there was not enough time. But during the war itself, it was the industrial potential of the USSR that made it possible to establish mass production of weapons and ammunition and, in the shortest possible time, to rebuild industry for military production.

Results of industrialization in the USSR for agriculture. The main results of industrialization for agriculture were:
- mechanization of agricultural production. With the beginning mass production tractors and other agricultural machinery in the early 1930s, agriculture received a powerful impetus for development due to mechanization. From 1929 to 1940, more than 700 thousand tractors were produced in the USSR (40% of their world production). In the village, an infrastructure was created for the use and maintenance of this equipment - Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS). Accordingly, mass training of specialists was organized - tractor drivers, mechanics, drivers, etc.
- mass relocation of the rural population to cities. It was a consequence of both collectivization and industrialization. Actually, the massive influx of free labor from the countryside, and during the first five-year plan alone such population migration amounted to about 12 million people, created favorable conditions for successful industrial construction. The mechanization of rural production freed up a lot of workers, who found employment during industrialization. In total, from 1928 to 1940, about 35 million people moved from rural areas to cities. However, until the early 1960s, the share of rural residents was more than 50% of the total population.

Results of industrialization in the USSR in the social sphere. Industrialization in the USSR directly influenced public life:
- science and education. During industrialization, education was faced with completely different tasks than in the 1920s - not just the elimination of illiteracy (the ability to read and write), but the training of qualified specialists. For this purpose, in 1930, universal primary education was introduced for rural residents, and compulsory seven-year education for the urban population (in rural schools, compulsory “seven-year education” was introduced in 1934). In 1932, a ten-year system of secondary education was introduced. In 10 years, from 1929 to 1939, the number of secondary school students tripled - from 13.5 million to 31.5 million.
At the same time, a higher education system was created, its goal was to train domestic engineering personnel. So, by 1937 the number of higher educational institutions increased 7.7 times compared to 1914.
It was in the 1930s that the foundations of Soviet science were laid, which very soon became one of the most advanced in the world.
- standards of living. At the end of the 1920s, due to the winding down of the NEP and the restructuring of the economy, the standard of living of the population decreased and a shortage of consumer goods arose. In 1929, a card system for the distribution of goods was introduced, which extended not only to food. But by the mid-1930s, there were already quite enough goods and products, and rising wages, especially in industry, made these goods accessible to the population. In 1936, the card system was abolished. By the end of the 1930s, the population's level of consumption of goods and services was more than 20% higher than 10 years earlier.

In general, industrialization in the USSR achieved its goals.
Without industrialization in such a short time, the political and economic independence of the USSR would not have been achieved. The Soviet Union managed to close the gap with world powers in just 11 years, which, without exaggeration, is an economic miracle.

After the civil war, the Russian economy, to use modern “Obama” language, “was torn to shreds.” Truly torn and ruined. And the NEP only somewhat stabilized the problem of providing the country's population with food and consumer goods, but it caused a sharp increase in class contradictions in the countryside due to the growth in the number of kulaks and aggravated the class struggle in the countryside to open kulak uprisings.

Therefore, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) set a course for the development of the country’s industrial production in order to gain the opportunity to independently solve the national economic problems facing Russia, which had been destroyed by many years of war. Moreover, an accelerated solution. That is, the party set a course for the industrialization of the country.

Stalin said:

“We are 50-100 years behind advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do this or we will be crushed. This is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the USSR dictate to us.”

Industrialization is the socio-economic policy of the Bolshevik Party in the USSR, from 1927 to the end of the 30s, the main goals of which were the following:

1. Elimination of the technical and economic backwardness of the country;

2. Achieving economic independence;

3. Creation of a powerful defense industry;
4. Priority development of a complex of basic industries: defense, fuel, energy, metallurgical, machine-building.

What paths of industrialization existed by that time and which ones were chosen by the Bolsheviks?

From Stalin's statements regarding industrialization:

1.“knows various ways of industrialization.

England industrialized thanks to the fact that it plundered the colony for tens and hundreds of years, collected “additional” capital there, invested it in its industry and accelerated the pace of its industrialization. This is one way of industrialization.

Germany accelerated its industrialization as a result of the victorious war with France in the 70s of the last century, when it took five billion francs in indemnity from the French and poured it into its industry. This is the second way of industrialization.

Both of these methods are closed to us, because we are a country of Soviets, because colonial robberies and military seizures for the purpose of robbery are incompatible with the nature of Soviet power.

Russia, old Russia, handed over enslaving concessions and received enslaving loans, thus trying to gradually get out onto the path of industrialization. This is the third way. But this is the path of bondage or semi-bondage, the path of turning Russia into a semi-colony. This path is also closed to us, because we did not wage a three-year civil war, repelling any and all interventionists, so that later, after defeating the interventionists, we would voluntarily go into bondage to the imperialists.

There remains a fourth path of industrialization, the path of one’s own savings for the cause of industry, the path of socialist accumulation, which Comrade repeatedly pointed out. Lenin, as the only way to industrialize our country.

(“On the economic situation and policy of the party” vol. 8 p. 123.)

2. “What does it mean to industrialize our country? This means turning an agricultural country into an industrial country. This means placing and developing our industry on a new technical basis.

Nowhere else in the world has it happened that a huge backward agrarian country turned into an industrial country without robbing colonies, without robbing foreign countries, or without large loans and long-term loans from outside. Remember the history of industrial development in England, Germany, America, and you will understand that this is exactly the case. Even America, the most powerful of all capitalist countries, was forced to spend 30-40 years after the civil war in order to develop its industry through loans and long-term credits from outside and the plunder of neighboring states and islands.

Can we take this “tested” path? No, we cannot, because the nature of Soviet power does not tolerate colonial plunder, and there is no reason to count on large loans and long-term credits.

Old Russia, Tsarist Russia, moved towards industrialization in a different way - by concluding enslaving loans and issuing enslaving concessions to the main branches of our industry. You know that almost the entire Donbass, most of the St. Petersburg industry, Baku oil and whole line railways, not to mention the electrical industry, were in the hands of foreign capitalists. This was the path of industrialization at the expense of the peoples of the USSR and against the interests of the working class. It is clear that we cannot take this path: it was not for this that we fought the yoke of capitalism, it was not for this that we overthrew capitalism in order to then voluntarily go under the yoke of capitalism.

There is only one path left, the path of one’s own savings, the path of saving, the path of prudent management in order to accumulate the necessary funds for the industrialization of our country. There are no words, this task is difficult. But, despite the difficulties, we are already resolving it. Yes, comrades, four years after the civil war we are already solving this problem.

(“Speech at a meeting of workers of the Stalin railway workshops of the October road” vol. 9 p. 172.)

3. “There are a number of accumulation channels, of which at least the main ones should be noted.

Firstly. It is necessary that the surplus accumulation in the country is not dissipated, but collected in our credit institutions, cooperative and state, as well as through internal loans, for their use for the needs, first of all, of industry. It is clear that investors should receive a certain percentage for this. It cannot be said that in this area things are at all satisfactory for us. But the task of improving our credit network, the task of raising the authority of credit institutions in the eyes of the population, the task of organizing the business of internal loans undoubtedly faces us as the next task, and we must solve it at all costs.

Secondly. It is necessary to carefully close all those paths and cracks through which part of the country's surplus accumulation flows into the pockets of private capital to the detriment of socialist accumulation. To do this, it is necessary to pursue a pricing policy that would not create a gap between wholesale prices and retail prices. It is necessary to take all measures to reduce retail prices on industrial products and agricultural products in order to stop or at least minimize the leakage of surplus accumulation into the pockets of private traders. This is one of the most important issues of our economic policy. From here comes one of the serious dangers both for the cause of our accumulation and for the chervonets.

Third. It is necessary that within the industry itself, in each of its branches, certain reserves should be set aside for the purpose of depreciation of enterprises, for the purpose of their expansion, for the purpose of their further development. This matter is necessary, absolutely necessary, it must be moved forward at all costs.

Fourthly. It is necessary that certain reserves accumulate in the hands of the state, necessary to insure the country against all kinds of accidents (shortfalls), to feed industry, to support agriculture, to develop culture, etc. It is now impossible to live and work without reserves. Even a peasant with his small farm cannot now manage without certain supplies. Moreover, the state of a great country cannot do without reserves.

(“On the economic situation and policy of the party” vol. 8 p. 126.)

Funds for industrialization:
Where did the Bolsheviks get funds for industrialization?

1. Funds were withdrawn from agriculture and light industry;

2. Funds came from the sale of raw materials (Oil, gold, timber, grain, etc.);

3. Some treasures of museums and churches were sold;

4. The private sector was taxed up to the complete confiscation of property.
5. By reducing the standard of living of the population, due to rising prices, the introduction of a card distribution system, individual government loans, etc.

6. Through the enthusiasm of workers building for themselves new world without exploitation of man by man.

7. Through powerful propaganda and agitation of new forms and new, collectivist methods of labor organization.

8. By organizing the advanced Stakhanov movement both in industrial production and in agriculture.

9. By introducing state awards for labor achievements.

10.By developing a free system social benefits and state guarantees for working people: free education and free medicine for all groups of the population, free nurseries, kindergartens, pioneer camps, sanatoriums, and so on and so forth.
And again Stalin’s words regarding the foundations of industrialization in the USSR:

“So, is it possible to industrialize our country on the basis of socialist accumulation?

Do we have sources of such accumulation sufficient to ensure industrialization?

Yes, it's possible. Yes, we have such sources.

I could refer to such a fact as the expropriation of landowners and capitalists in our country as a result of the October Revolution, the destruction of private ownership of land, factories, factories, etc. and their transfer to public ownership. It hardly needs proof that this fact represents a fairly substantial source of accumulation.

I could further refer to such a fact as the cancellation of the tsarist debts, which removed billions of rubles of debt from the shoulders of our national economy. We should not forget that in leaving these debts we had to pay annually several hundred million in interest alone, to the detriment of industry, to the detriment of our entire national economy. Needless to say, this circumstance brought great relief to our accumulation.

I could point to our nationalized industry, which has recovered, which is developing and which provides some profits necessary for the further development of industry. This is also a source of accumulation.

I could point to our nationalized foreign trade, giving some profit and representing, therefore, a certain source of accumulation.

One could refer to our more or less organized state internal trade, which also produces a certain profit and thus represents a certain source of accumulation.

One could point to such a lever of accumulation as our nationalized banking system, which gives a certain profit and feeds our industry to the best of our ability.

Finally, we have such as state power, which disposes state budget and which collects a small amount of money for the further development of the national economy in general, and our industry in particular.

These are basically the main sources of our internal accumulation.

They are interesting in the sense that they give us the opportunity to create those necessary reserves, without which the industrialization of our country is impossible.”

(“On the economic situation and policy of the party” vol. 8 p. 124.)

For, according to Stalin, the rapid pace of development of industry in general and the production of means of production in particular represents the main beginning and key of the country's industrial development, the main beginning and key of the transformation of our entire national economy on the basis of advanced socialist development.

At the same time, we cannot and should not curtail heavy industry for the sake of the comprehensive development of light industry. And light industry cannot be developed sufficiently without the accelerated development of heavy industry.

(“XV Congress of the CPSU(b)” vol. 10 p. 310.)

The result of industrialization was:

1. Creation of a powerful industry in the country;
From 1927 to 1937, over 7 thousand large industrial enterprises were built in the USSR;
2. The USSR took 2nd place in the world in terms of industrial production after the USA.

3. The USSR created its own powerful defense industry, new to Russia.

4. In the USSR, on the basis of powerful industrial production, industrial science also began to develop powerfully, determining the technical level of technologies developed and used in industrial production.

5. The USSR became the birthplace of technical astronautics, creating a new one in the country, global industry production, space, significantly ahead of the United States in this direction.

The results of the industrialization of the USSR turned out to be stunning not only for the inhabitants of the USSR, but also for the whole world. After all, former tsarist Russia in an unusually short time became a powerful, industrially and scientifically developed country, a power of global importance.

As you can see, Stalin turned out to be right in making from a completely collapsed Russia, from Russia plows and bast shoes, an advanced industrial power with the shortest working day in the world, the best free education in the world, advanced science, free medicine, national culture and the most powerful social guarantee of the rights of the country's workers

However, in today's Russia, everything is done differently from how Stalin did it in the USSR, and we have a Russia with barely glimmering industrial production, completely collapsed agriculture, dead science, a poor population barely making ends meet, but with countless billionaires of its own.

So who was right in choosing the path of development for Russia, the Bolsheviks or the current democrats? In my opinion, Bolsheviks! After all, not a single word of Stalin about the industrialization of Russia is still outdated.

IndustrializationUSSR

By 1926, on the basis of the NEP, the country's industrial development had reached pre-war levels. However, the USSR continued to lag significantly behind the developed capitalist countries. In general, the national economy was at the pre-industrial stage of development. if the Soviet state wanted to remain a subject of world politics, it not only had to complete industrialization, but do it as quickly as possible.

Various forms of implementing the long-term development strategy were proposed: two-year plans, four-year plans, seven-year plans. Ultimately, we settled on a five-year cycle.

First Five Year Plan

During the years of the first five-year plan (1928/1929-1932/1933), the USSR was supposed to turn into an industrial-agrarian country. Over 5 years, electricity production should have increased almost 4.5 times. It was planned to put 42 new power plants into operation. Coal production was supposed to double. As the plan progressed, these figures were further increased. The party put forward the slogan “Five-Year Plan in Four Years.”

The country was covered in construction sites. The reconstruction of industrial enterprises began in Moscow, Leningrad, Nizhny Novgorod, and Donbass.

Colossal funds were required for industrial construction. In an agrarian country, they could be taken, first of all, from the peasantry.

An additional tax was established on the peasantry, and forced loans among the population became widespread. Almost every worker was forced to give part of his earnings to the cause of industrialization. The largest source of income was the sale of vodka. The export abroad of bread, oil and oil products, timber, furs, and flax increased sharply. In particular, the export of commercial timber increased. These sources of funds continued to operate in the future.

In January 1933, the Soviet leadership announced the brilliant victory of the Five-Year Plan in 4 years and 3 months. It was a lie. Almost all tasks five year plan turned out to be failures. The quality of the products remained extremely low.

Nevertheless, Soviet industry made a huge leap in five years. 1,500 enterprises were built. Entire industries that did not exist before were created: automobile, tractor, petrochemical, aircraft manufacturing. From a country importing equipment, the USSR turned into a country producing industrial equipment. The country gained the opportunity to create modern types of weapons.

Second Five Year Plan

At the beginning of 1934, the second five-year plan (1933-1937) was approved. If during the years of the first five-year plan, as was believed then, the economic foundation of socialism was built, then the main task of the second five-year plan was to build a socialist society. Average annual growth industrial products should have been 16.5%, It was planned to complete the construction of the giants of ferrous metallurgy: Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk, Zaporozhye plants. In the eastern regions of the country it was planned to create bases for the coal, metallurgical, engineering, and chemical industries.

Fulfilling the tasks of the second five-year plan was associated with enormous difficulties. The country lacked skilled workers and engineers. Yesterday's peasants came to construction sites, factories, factories, and transport. Many of them did not have industrial skills and saw machines for the first time in their lives. The lack of qualified specialists and workers, the low quality of management decisions made by semi-literate party officials and heads of state-owned enterprises led to chaos, confusion in production, frequent downtime, low discipline, absenteeism, and marriage. These shortcomings were compensated by a large workforce, a low standard of living, and the tendency of workers to do overtime work, subbotniks, and the use of prison labor. During the Second Five-Year Plan, the standard of living of the urban population increased slightly. Very slowly, especially in small towns, such achievements of civilization as water supply, sewerage, and central heating were introduced. Slowly developed public transport. The level of service in trade and healthcare remained low. During the second five-year plan, 4.5 thousand new industrial enterprises were built. Industrial production doubled. The private trader was almost completely driven out of the economy. The Communist Party concluded that socialism had won in the country.

Third Five Year Plan

During the Third Five-Year Plan (1938-1942), the task was set to catch up with developed countries in industrial production per capita and begin a gradual transition from socialism to communism. Particular attention was paid to strengthening labor discipline. A number of government decrees subjected workers to criminal penalties for absenteeism and tardiness. The working day was extended, production standards were raised, piece rates were reduced, the length of the working week was increased, and transfers from one enterprise to another without the consent of the administration were prohibited. The state actually attached workers and employees to enterprises, which was tantamount to introducing elements of serfdom into the country. During the Third Five-Year Plan, special attention was paid to the military industry. Industrialization, carried out in the late 20s and 30s, changed the face of the Soviet Union. From 1928 to 1941 approximately 9 thousand large enterprises were built. New industries emerged. The production of aircraft, cars, tractors, combines, synthetic rubber, and various types of equipment intended for heavy industry and increasing military power was launched on a mass scale. Large industrial centers arose in the East, in previously uninhabited areas. The urban population has increased. From the patriarchal-peasant country, the country moved to the industrial stage of development. At the same time, manual labor prevailed in construction and agriculture. Light industry did not receive proper development. Very little attention was paid to the construction of roads, warehouses, and what is called economic infrastructure. At the end of the 1930s, there was less living space per city resident than before the revolution. Most huddled in communal apartments, barracks, basements. Infant mortality was high.

The development of Soviet industry was closely connected with the processes occurring in the country's agriculture.

Collectivization of agriculture: Preasons and beginning

Having adopted a course for accelerated industrialization, the Soviet leadership was faced with the problem of funds and labor. Both could be obtained, first of all, from the peasantry. Transfer funds from villages to industry by establishing low prices for agricultural products and high for industrial products, naturally, it was not possible to do so without coercion. The peasants voluntarily did not hand over their grain to the state on unfavorable terms. The country periodically experienced food difficulties. The country's small, fragmented, technically weakly armed peasant economy was unable to provide the growing urban population with food and the rapidly developing industry with raw materials. Emergency measures against the peasantry, that is, the forcible confiscation of grain from them, carried out at the beginning of 1928 did not produce serious results. In 1929, there was a new decrease in grain supplies. It was impossible to carry out industrialization without fundamentally solving the agricultural problem. The ideas of cooperation among the Russian peasantry were actively developed by V.I. Lenin. He hoped for the possibility of a slow, gradual, voluntary process of agricultural cooperation. The logic and practice of socialist construction dictated fast and tough paces and methods.

Only the hardworking, highly qualified, wealthy peasantry, the kulaks, could resist forced collectivization in the countryside. In order to drive peasants into collective farms, it was necessary to eliminate this layer of the population.

The transition to a policy of collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks began in the summer of 1929, shortly after the adoption of the first five-year plan. By June of this year, 1 million peasant households were united in collective farms. By the end of 1929, there were already 4.5 million peasant households in collective farms. Kulaks were not allowed to be admitted to collective farms.

When carrying out collectivization, the parties and the state relied on the poor peasantry and farm laborers, the weakest, unskilled part of rural society. 35 thousand workers were sent to the village to implement the policies of the Communist Party. Komsomol youth were used en masse. They used deception (go to the collective farms and the state will provide you with everything you need), threats (the slogan was put forward: “Whoever does not go to the collective farm is an enemy of Soviet power”), violence (groups of Komsomol members, without the consent of the peasants, took their property to the collective farm yard) .

Each province, each district received the task of arresting and deporting a certain number of kulaks. Some of the peasants were shot. The bulk of the dispossessed were sent to sparsely populated, often almost uninhabitable regions of the country: to the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan, and northern regions. At the same time, they were not allowed to take clothes and things with them, and many were thus doomed to death. The property of the repressed went to the collective farm. They themselves worked in logging, in the mining industry, and a smaller part was used in agriculture.

The peasants, subjected to socialist restructuring, resisted. Mass slaughter of livestock began. The “red rooster” - arson, the favorite weapon of all peasant revolts in Russia - began to roam the villages. They burned not only collective farm property, but also their own property, following the principle: “Let the fire consume what you have acquired, but it will not go to you.” In some areas, peasants took up arms. From January to mid-March 1930 alone, more than two thousand anti-collective farm uprisings took place in the country. The country was brought to the brink of civil war. Under these conditions, the country's leadership was forced to make temporary concessions. It was recognized that serious mistakes were made in the matter of collectivization: the principle of voluntariness was violated, various local conditions were not taken into account, there was a run ahead in the matter of socialization of peasant property, abuses during dispossession.. There was a massive withdrawal of peasants from collective farms. If by March 1930 more than half of all peasant farms were collectivized, then by June less than a quarter of the farms remained on collective farms. In some areas, the withdrawal from collective farms was even more significant. However, after the harvest of 1930, the collective farm offensive resumed. Now other, more “subtle” methods were used for the socialist reconstruction of the village. Villages and villages whose population did not join collective farms were listed on “black boards.” The supply of goods to them and the issuance of loans were stopped. Individual farmers were driven from their plots to inconvenient, remote lands and were stifled by taxes. Thus, an individual owner paid a tax ten times more than a collective farmer, and a wealthy peasant - 140 times more.

At the turn of the 1920-1930s. in the USSR there was a change in the model of economic development, which was expressed in two processes: industrialization and collectivization.

Industrialization- this is the process of creating modern heavy industry, large-scale machine production, i.e. the development, first of all, of metallurgy and mechanical engineering.

Industrialization itself began in Russia at the end of the 19th century. However, this process was interrupted first by the First World War and then by the revolution. Therefore, the Soviet Union seriously lagged behind Western countries in terms of economic development. This backwardness was supposed to be overcome during industrialization. Industrialization in the USSR was carried out in two stages:

Stage 1- 1926-1928 - reconstruction and re-equipment of old enterprises;

Stage 2- 1929-1937 - construction of new enterprises.

Goals of industrialization in the USSR:

Elimination of technical and economic backwardness;

Achieving economic independence;

Providing a technical base for agriculture;

Development of new industries;

Creation of a powerful military-industrial complex (MIC).

Industrial construction in the USSR was carried out within the framework of the so-called. five-year development plans or five-year plan First Five Year Plan- 1928-1932; Second Five Year Plan- 1933-1937; Third Five Year Plan began in 1938 and was supposed to end in 1942, but it was interrupted by the Great Patriotic War.

Industrialization in the USSR was distinguished by the following characteristic features:

1) Construction, first of all, of large enterprises producing means of production (i.e. equipment and machinery). Creation of the domestic automobile industry and electric power complex. Among the giant construction projects one should name: the Stalingrad, Kharkov and Chelyabinsk tractor plants, the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, the Gorky and Yaroslavl Automobile Plants, the Likhachev Automobile Plant (ZIL) in Moscow, the Dnepropetrovsk hydroelectric power station, etc. Much attention was also paid to the development of transport. Suffice it to recall the construction of the railway that connected Turkestan with Siberia (Turksib), as well as the first in the USSR metro in Moscow.

Ivanovo in the late 1920s - 1930s. it also resembled a huge construction site. At this time, the Melange plant (one of the largest textile enterprises in the USSR), the Krasnoaya Talka plant, Ivtorfmash (the largest peat engineering plant in the USSR), and the chemical plant named after. Baturin, metalworking plant named after. Queen "Ivtekmash", artificial sole plant (ISU), furniture plant, refrigeration plant, meat processing plant, confectionery factory "Krasnaya Zarya"

2) High rates of industrialization, which, first of all, became possible due to the unprecedented labor enthusiasm of the population, increased labor productivity, and the development of new technology. Stakhanov movement(named after the miner A.G. Stakhanov) for increasing labor productivity and better use of technology, covered in the 1930s. the whole country. For example, in the Ivanovo region, the first to respond to the Stakhanov movement were Vichuga textile workers - sisters Evdokia and Maria Vinogradov, weavers of the Ivanovo factory named after. F. Zinoviev T. Shuvandin and E. Gonobobleva, who instead of 6 began to service 20 mechanical machines.

3) Militarization of the economy, creation of a modern military industry;

4) Curtailment of market relations. Industrialization was carried out by team methods, there was a final rejection of the NEP;

5) Artificial and unjustified overestimation of plans industrial construction, which J.V. Stalin insisted on. As a result, 100% of the pre-war five-year plans could not be achieved. The starting year of the first five-year plan ended with exceeding the plan, and the second year of the first five-year plan ended with similar achievements. However, as the methods and forms of leadership that developed in the 1920s were eliminated. During the time of the NEP, and their replacement with administrative-command management methods, which were accompanied by unjustified revisions of five-year plan targets from an economic point of view, an increasingly large-scale failure to meet planned targets began.

6) Declining living standards of the population. The process of accelerated industrialization was inevitably associated with difficulties. It was carried out relying only on internal resources (both human and financial). During the first five-year plans, the standard of living of Soviet people decreased noticeably and the birth rate fell. There was a shortage of qualified personnel at construction sites and enterprises. This was due to the insufficient level of education and culture of the general population. Since the late 1920s. Until 1935, the USSR had a card system for the distribution of products and consumer goods, covering workers and office workers. The village was self-sufficient.

At the same time, it should be noted that the population steadfastly endured these difficulties, understanding the importance of industrialization. People saw new neighborhoods being built in towns and cities, which were proudly called “socialist cities.” Every Soviet person, seeing the “birth of a new world,” himself participated in its creation, believing that just a little more, and life would get better. This faith, of course, only grew with each newly built school, hospital, library, club, and cinema.

In 1935, cards were abolished - another victory; in 1936, a new Constitution was publicly discussed. The Soviet people were filled with pride for V. Chkalov and his comrades who flew across the North Pole. They admired the Papaninites, as before the Chelyuskinites, and watched the movie “Chapaev”. Radio, sound cinema, the first metro in Moscow in the USSR - everything was perceived by people as a victory and the final approval of the Soviet way of life, the ideals of socialism and gave impetus to the general movement forward.

A phenomenon of the 1930s. was that the so-called administrative-command economy was combined with the enthusiasm of millions of ordinary people, with boundless faith in the ideas of the October Revolution (or, as they said then, the Great October Revolution). Of course, a big role here belonged to ordinary communists, who every day purposefully and with extraordinary energy carried out organizational and ideological work among the masses. This contributed to the unification of people, cemented teams, and strengthened faith in Lenin’s ideas of socialist construction.

Of course, the people of those years, building plants, mines, factories, mastering new technology, perfectly saw and felt the brunt of the difficulties. Suffice it to recall the famine in the USSR of 1932-1933, which claimed several million lives, both in rural areas and in cities. Nevertheless, faith in a bright future forced us to tighten our belts and work for the good of our Motherland.

An illustrative example is the construction of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works. Foreigners who visited this gigantic construction site were amazed at the courage and dedication of the Soviet people. They were perplexed to learn that almost none of the construction workers voluntarily take advantage of their days off and few leave work after their shift ends. Naturally, the tone at the construction site was set by the communists and Komsomol members, whose fighting spirit and organization united the team. Subbotniks and so-called “storms” have become the norm here. It is not surprising that Magnitostory became one of the brightest symbols of heroism during industrialization.

Against the background of the world economic crisis, which shocked the USA and Europe, the idea of ​​a happy future in the USSR not only helped Soviet people endure difficulties, but also formed in them a special psychology of winners.

The main problem of industrialization is finding funds for its implementation. Industrial construction was financed from several sources: 1) government loans from the population; 2) profit from the state monopoly on foreign trade; 3) use of agricultural resources, which was the main reason collectivization and subsequent de-peasantization.

Traditionally, it is believed that industrialization was carried out mainly by siphoning resources from the countryside. Of course, there is a great deal of truth in this. Considerable funds, for example, came from direct overpayments by peasants associated with the difference in prices for industrial and agricultural goods. Thus, in addition to direct and indirect taxes that the peasantry paid to the state, there was a so-called “super tax” in the form of shortfalls in the price of agricultural products.

However, we should not forget that in the interests of finding funds for industrialization in the late 1920s. it was decided to use through the state budget also the income of other sectors of the national economy, the savings of the population accumulated during the NEP years (primarily in the form of internal loans). Thus, the mass subscription of the population to industrialization loans (the first loan was issued in 1927) yielded significant amounts. For example, in 1927-1928. with their help, the state received an additional 726 million rubles. (i.e. almost 50% of the funds allocated that year for investment in industry).

The Great Patriotic War interrupted the Third Five-Year Plan in its midst. The achievements of the first five-year plans became all the more significant. Largely thanks to the industrial potential created in the late 1920s - 1930s. The USSR was able to repel fascist aggression and win the Great Patriotic War.

In less than 13 years before the war, about 9 thousand plants, factories, mines, power plants, and oil fields came into operation in the USSR. Already in 1930 (for the first time in the history of our country), the production of means of production exceeded the production of consumer goods in volume. There was a revival and reconstruction of old industries - ship and locomotive construction, ferrous metallurgy, fell into complete disrepair after the Civil War. New industries were created practically from scratch: aviation, auto and tractor manufacturing, chemical industry, non-ferrous metallurgy etc. Construction of modern defense industry made it possible to strengthen the country's defense capability, which was very important in the conditions of the impending war. At the same time (in 1930) there was unemployment has been eliminated.

During the Second Five-Year Plan, the rise in labor productivity became a decisive factor in increasing production output. By 1937, labor productivity increased by 82% compared to 1933. During the Second Five-Year Plan, production intensification also increased significantly. The displacement of extensive methods becomes a distinctive feature of this time. The industry was no longer losing money, as it had been until the mid-1930s. By the beginning of the third five-year plan, it had become generally profitable.

By 1937 The USSR has completely overcome its technical and economic backwardness compared to Western countries and became completely economically independent. During the Second Five-Year Plan, the USSR essentially stopped importing agricultural machinery and tractors (although it should be recognized that not all equipment produced in the USSR was of high quality). Stopped importing cotton. Costs for the purchase of ferrous metals from 1.4 billion rubles. during the first five-year plan they decreased to 88 million rubles. (1937). In 1936 specific gravity Imported products in the country's total consumption decreased to 1-0.7%. The trade balance of the USSR in 1937 became active and brought profit.

Thus, during the years of industrialization, the USSR turned from a country importing machinery and equipment into a state that independently produced everything necessary for the construction of a socialist society and maintained complete economic independence in relation to the surrounding capitalist countries. The once agricultural country has reached the level of the most developed countries in the world in terms of the structure of industrial production. In terms of the volume of industrial production of the USSR by the end of the 1930s. overtook Great Britain, Germany, France, taking second place in the world after the United States. And for the first time, the rate of industrial growth exceeded the development indicators of the American economy. At the same time, during industrialization, the number of the working class already amounted to 1/3 of the population of the USSR, and together with employees - more than 50% of the workers. As a result, millions of yesterday's peasants were involved in advanced industrial production, who became active participants in socialist construction.

Industrialization stimulated scientific and technical progress. If in the 1920s. priority was given to copying foreign models of equipment, then in the 1930s. own original designs began to appear. The USSR could implement such ambitious projects as the creation of a record aircraft, on which in 1937 the crews of V.P. Chkalov and M.M. Gromov flew from Moscow through the North Pole to the USA, setting world distance records. In the same year, a large-scale air expedition was undertaken to the Central Arctic with the organization of the world's first long-term drifting station, led by I.D. Papanin. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the first in Europe installation for accelerating elementary particles, the cyclotron, appeared in the USSR.

It should be noted that industrialization in the USSR occurred in a much shorter time frame, than in the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan. It must also be recognized that during the years of industrialization there were a cadre of workers, engineers, technicians, scientists, party and Komsomol workers was created, who grew up on the great construction projects of that time, which, having been hardened in extreme conditions, then ensured victory in the Great Patriotic War, prepared a breakthrough in astronautics, the deployment of scientific and technological revolution in the country, etc.

At the same time, the results of industrialization could have been even more impressive if it had not been for the situation that developed in the 1930s. administrative-command system in the USSR, accompanied by mass repressions. The tragedy consisted not only in the damage suffered by the directors and engineering corps, the personnel of the people's commissariats and numerous enterprises, but also in the decrease in the labor enthusiasm of the working groups and their creative activity.

The personality cult of J.V. Stalin certainly had a detrimental effect on the development of the USSR. The country's leaders have repeatedly resorted to direct deception of the working class and all working people. Reporting data on the results of the first five-year plans was deliberately distorted, which, if we take the real indicators, turned out to be unfulfilled in almost all sectors. By distorting information, Soviet leaders artificially supported faith in the infallibility of leader Stalin and “fueled” the enthusiasm of the masses.

It must be admitted that according to the results of the first five-year plans, the USSR, despite all its successes, never turned into an industrial country. Only in the 1960s. The share of industry in the national income of the state exceeded the share of agriculture.

However, before the Great Patriotic War, the USSR became a powerful agrarian-industrial state with a working class of 23 million, having overcome unemployment, overcoming its technical and economic backwardness and dependence on imported industrial products.

At the same time, we should not forget that the achievements of industrialization, as well as collectivization, which will be discussed later, were accompanied by unjustified sacrifices among the population and colossal costs.