One of the most notable events of the new leadership of the country of the USSR, headed by L.I. Brezhnev was holding economic reform. Its main ideologist and initiator was the chairman of the government A.N. Kosygin.

The first step in the transformations was the liquidation of economic councils and the restoration of the sectoral principle of managing the national economy.

The course of the new reform was aimed at expanding the economic independence of enterprises and strengthening the system of their material incentives, for this the number of mandatory planned indicators was significantly reduced. Now the leading indicator of the efficiency of the enterprise was the cost indicator of sold products. This innovation stimulated enterprises to produce high-quality, competitive goods that were used on the market. Enterprises and associations were transferred to the system of economic accounting (self-supporting), which involves leaving a part of the profits received at the enterprise. From it, funds for the development of the enterprise, its social sphere and the employee incentive fund were formed. The task of the reform is to increase the level of intensification of production and, as a result, to ensure sustainable growth of the economy as a whole.

Simultaneously with the economic reform in the industrial sector, the new leadership took a number of measures to overcome the crisis in agriculture, where there was a noticeable decrease in gross indicators. For the five-year period until 1970, a reduced plan was established for mandatory purchases of grain and livestock products, with a simultaneous increase in purchase prices. And for the above-planned sale of grain farms received a surcharge of 50% to the basic purchase price.

The increase in purchase prices during the reforms of 1953-1954 and 1965. massive capital investment in the 1970s and early 1980s. as a result, did not contribute to the development of this industry. It did not meet the growing needs of the national economy, but demanded more and more investments from the state, turning into a "black hole" of the Soviet economy. It was agriculture that most clearly reflected the failure of "socialist methods of management."

By the beginning of the 1970s. there have been significant changes in the development priorities of the third scientific and technological revolution, the main direction of which was information Technology. IN National economy only 1/5 of the inventions were introduced. The lag in the development of scientific and technical progress occurred against the background of the final return of the leadership to the previous economic practice as a result of the economic counter-reform of 1979. Traditional industries, developing on the basis of a predominantly extensive method, rather than knowledge-intensive industries, remained the strategic directions of economic policy. During these years, the USSR came out on top in the world in the production of oil, gas, steel, iron ore, mineral fertilizers, sulfuric acid, tractors, combines, etc. Due to the weak implementation of the achievements of scientific and technical progress, even in traditional industries, the Soviet economy lagged behind more and more. Average annual growth rate industrial production from 8.5% in 1966-1970 decreased to 3.6% in 1981-1985, national income - from 7.2% to 2.9%. By the early 1980s, the Soviet economy entered a period of stagnation. In real terms, production volumes in a number of industries not only did not grow, but, on the contrary, decreased. In fact, the growth of labor productivity has stopped.

The situation in the military-industrial complex was a little better. Despite the establishment of military-strategic parity with the United States, the arms race continued into the 1970s and 1980s. According to Western estimates, the military spending of the USSR amounted to about ¼ of GDP, which was many times higher than the corresponding figures for the United States. Up to 80% of domestic engineering worked for military needs. Enormous funds were spent by the state to maintain anti-imperialist regimes around the world.

Considerable funds for ensuring the growth of the living standards of the Soviet people and maintaining the fading pace of development of the national economy were brought in by the massive export of oil and gas. Only for the 1970-1980s. annual oil exports almost doubled from 66.8 million to 119 million. tons, and gas - 16 times (from 3.3 billion to 54.2 billion m3). The expanding cooperation of the socialist countries within the framework of the CMEA had a positive impact on the development of the consumer goods market. As a result of the expansion of foreign economic relations, the foreign economic turnover of the USSR for 1970-1985. increased more than six times - from 22.1 billion to 142 billion rubles. This contributed to the long-term maintenance of the fading growth rates of the country's national economy during the period of stagnation and in the subsequent era of reforms. One of the formidable manifestations of the systemic crisis was suppressed inflation, which was based on a growing year by year gap in the growth rates of the population's money incomes and the fading growth rates of aggregate supply in the market of consumer goods and services. This problem emerged as the main one during the period of "perestroika" and in the first years of the radical reforms of the transition to a market economy.

Domestic culture in a totalitarian society In 1946-1950, educational institutions destroyed by the war were mostly restored. In a short time, the system of universal primary education was restored. Since 1952, education in the amount of 7 classes has become compulsory, and already in the mid-1950s, compulsory ten-year education was introduced in the capitals and large cities.

Significant changes in the field of education took place in 1958. Instead of a seven-year education, a universal eight-year education was introduced, the transition to which was completed by 1963. During these years, there was a tendency in school education for the predominance of polytechnic knowledge over general education, an excessive increase in teaching hours for vocational training to the detriment of the basic sciences. In this regard, in 1964, the period of industrial training was reduced from 3 to 2 years. The secondary school has turned from an eleven-year school into a ten-year school.

In the 1960s, the system of vocational education also underwent a radical transformation. FZO schools, craft, railway, construction and agricultural mechanization schools were transformed into urban and rural vocational schools with general education.

It should be noted that in the Soviet period, success in public education was mainly associated with collective indicators. The elimination of illiteracy was an undeniable achievement. In 1966, a transition was made to universal secondary education. It should be noted that education from elementary to higher was free of charge. By the beginning of the 1980s, more than 3 million students were studying in 488 universities in Russia, and in 2500 specialized secondary educational institutions- more than 2.5 million people. By the number of specialists with higher and secondary education, the country occupied one of the first places in the world.

Despite all this, the quality of training specialists did not meet the world level and the requirements of scientific and technological progress. Education, especially in the humanities, had a truncated one-sided and pronounced ideological character. The transition to secondary universal education led to a sharp decline in the level of knowledge. Compulsory education developed among young people a negative attitude towards learning, the beginnings of obscurantism. Chase after quantitative indicators expanded the dissemination of pseudo-education.

In the postwar years, the sphere of science, like all culture, was subjected to ideological pressure. Not only in the humanities, but also in the exact and natural sciences that seem to have nothing in common with ideology, the principle of loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist method came to the fore. In 1947, pogrom "discussions" on philosophy, biology, linguistics, and political economy unfolded in the country. Whole line scientific directions in physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology was declared ideologically wrong, and the scientists who developed these areas were persecuted. Domestic genetics was finally defeated, and the development of cybernetics was halted for many years. This marked the beginning of the lag of Russian science in many basic industries. Moreover, in a number of sciences, as it was especially in biology, pseudoscientific ideas were planted.

In the post-war years, the party leadership placed the main emphasis in the scientific sphere on strengthening the military power of the state. The physics of the atomic nucleus and elementary particles was first of all assigned to the number of priorities. The Institute of Atomic Energy and the Institute of Nuclear Problems were established. On August 29, 1949, an atomic weapon was tested under the leadership of I. Kurchatov.

It should be said that a noticeable rise in domestic science was observed in the 50-60s. Achievements in the field of nuclear physics, rocket science and space exploration are well known. A hydrogen bomb was created, a thermonuclear fusion reaction was carried out, in 1957 the first artificial satellite was launched, and in 1961 the first manned spacecraft was launched. Since that time, active space exploration has begun. Theoretical developments continued. In 1957, the most powerful elementary particle accelerator at that time, the synchrophasotron, was put into operation. Work related to the atom is concentrated at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. The peaceful use of atomic energy was being developed. The world's first nuclear power plant was opened in 1954 in Obninsk.

In the 1960s and 1970s, domestic science achieved significant success in its basic branches. Nobel Prize for fundamental research in the field of electronics, Academicians N. Basov and A. Prokhorov were awarded. Academician L. Landau was awarded the Nobel Prize for the development of the theory of liquid helium. Academician A. Logunov developed a new approach to the problem of multiple particle production at high energies. Under his leadership, the Institute of High Energy Physics was founded and a proton synchrotron was built. A group of scientists led by G. Flerov synthesized new elements of the periodic table. During these years, new branches of science were opened - solid state chemistry, solid state physics. Research in the field of genetics and cybernetics is being resumed. The development of cosmonautics in these years was associated with the transition from single flights to the creation of orbital stations and the conduct of long-term near-Earth expeditions. It should be noted that this sphere of domestic science did not survive the unofficial competition with the United States, which was the first to land a man on the surface of the Moon and switched to the use of reusable spacecraft. It should be said that successes in science were largely due to the military-political interests of the Soviet Union, its prestige in the international arena. The discoveries and inventions of domestic scientists who did not have access to the military-industrial complex were introduced very slowly or remained in the form of theoretical developments and projects. This attitude led to the fact that in the 70s in the country that first went into space, 40% of the workers and 75 peasants worked by hand. Scientific and technological progress in production was introduced very slowly. The same can be said about the sphere of everyday life.

Thus, both education and science, like all culture, were under the control of the state machine in Soviet times. Undoubted quantitative successes were achieved - the network of educational and research institutions was significantly expanded, illiteracy was eliminated, and the number of people employed in these areas of culture increased. However, the quality and level of knowledge has significantly decreased and lagged behind modern requirements. With certain successes in science, the result of its development was a general lag behind the world level, especially in those branches of knowledge in which the state and ideology strongly interfered and artificially slowed down.

After the end of the war, totalitarianism takes a number of measures aimed at eradicating the expectations of liberal changes in the life of society, which manifested themselves as a result of the victorious completion of the struggle against fascism. These measures affected not only political sphere but also culture, including art. In August 1946, at the initiative of Stalin, a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted "On the magazines Zvezda and Leningrad", and then a whole series of other "ideological" resolutions: "On the repertoire of drama theaters and measures to improve it", "On motion picture" big life"," About Muradeli's opera "The Great Friendship" and others.

They gave a signal for public persecution of many cultural figures: writers A. Akhmatova, M. Zoshchenko, E Kazakevich, Y. German, composers V. Muradeli, S. Prokofiev, A. Khachaturian, D. Shostakovich, film directors G. Kozintsev, V. Pudovkin, S. Eisenstein and others. This whole company had as its goal to "restrain" the intelligentsia as a whole, to squeeze their creativity into the Procrustean bed of party spirit and socialist realism.

Change of leadership and attempts at liberalization public life In the 1950s, they brought a noticeable revival to artistic creativity. at this time, new literary and art magazines were born, which greatly expanded the possibilities for publications of poets and writers. The democratic nature of the Novy Mir magazine edited by Tvardovsky led to its immense popularity. Bold works appeared that exposed the cult of personality: "Terkin in the next world" by Tvardovsky, "The Heirs of Stalin" by E. Yevtushenko, "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" by A. Solzhenitsyn. This gave rise to hopes for the free development of the literary and artistic life of the country. However, despite the general warming of the situation in society, the essence of the totalitarian system remained the same, and its attitude to culture did not change either. In response to public calls to cancel the Stalinist decrees on cultural issues of 1946-1948, it was categorically stated that they "played a huge role in the development of artistic creativity along the path of socialist realism" and in their "basic content remain relevant."

In the 50s - the first half of the 60s, writers and poets A. Voznesensky, D. Granin, V. Dudintsev , S. Kirsanov, sculptors and artists E. Neizvestny, R. Falk, director M. Khutsiev and others. N. Khrushchev, as the first person in the state, played a significant role in these divisions. For the novel "Doctor Zhivago" published abroad, which received Nobel Prize in literature, its author B. Pasternak was subjected to outright persecution and expelled from the Writers' Union.

Perhaps the main content of artistic creativity in this period was the confrontation between the political and cultural forces of the Stalinists and anti-Stalinists. Plays by V. Rozov, books by V. Aksenov and A. Gladilin, poems by E. Yevtushenko and A. Voznesensky, films by M. Khutsiev were perceived as a moral and political position that rejected Stalinism. However, this position suffered from a naive belief in the possibility of correcting and overcoming past mistakes. The creativity of the artistic intelligentsia was not yet directed against the totalitarian system.

The development of artistic culture in the 60-80s took place in an atmosphere of neo-Stalinism. The inconsistency of "stagnation" manifested itself in a very peculiar way in the spiritual life of society. Official culture leaned more and more towards ritual, stripped of any content. At the same time, through the elementary denial of this officialdom, the opportunity for the formation of an "anti-style" in any artistic version has significantly expanded. This refers to the inconsistency with the method and tasks of socialist realism as they were understood by the ideological leadership of the country. The originality and originality of the creators of culture, such as I. Glazunov, A. Tarkovsky, E Neizvestny, led to the "anti-style", first of all. But it must be said that the gap between reality and officialdom led to a situation where an artist, objectively reflecting life, voluntarily or involuntarily came to an anti-style. Village writers V. Belov, V. Rasputin, V. Astafiev, who skillfully show the tragedy of the extinction of the basis of national culture - the Russian village, with their realism, are an example of this. The peaks of the unofficial trend in artistic life were the work of V. Shukshin and V. Vysotsky. If the former, with the ideas of Russian freemen and heightened anti-urbanism in literature and cinema, was more understandable to the intelligentsia, then the uniqueness of Vysotsky's poems and songs lies in their accessibility and popularity in all strata and circles of society.

Speaking about the official culture, it should be said that in addition to the rejection of reality, it was characterized by significant "militarization". The further the events of the war went into the past, the more war there was in artistic creativity. The plots of Stalin's lawlessness and repression, which appeared in the 50-60s, were expelled and replaced by total "heroization". The theme of a simple man in the war was gradually transformed into a "lyrical figure for scale." The production theme was also actively included in the rank of heroic.

Exercising total control, the state first of all paid attention to those branches of artistic creativity that have the widest audience - literature, cinema, and television. What, in the opinion of officials, did not contribute to or harmed the cause of communist education, should not have reached the people. This approach determined the birth of an original phenomenon in the national culture - samizdat literature. Prohibited books were distributed in typewritten form. Samizdat was closely associated with the social movement of dissidents and acquired political significance. The state monopoly on all means of culture and the impossibility of realizing creative ideas, promoting their activities led to the fact that in the 60-80s many figures of national culture were forced to go abroad. Some were forcibly expelled from the country by the authorities. The poet I. Brodsky, writers A. Solzhenitsyn, V. Voinovich, V. Maksimov, V. Nekrasov, directors Yu. Lyubimov, A. Tarkovsky and many others continued to work abroad. Thus, despite totalitarianism, domestic literature and art developed, constantly striving to escape from the petty tutelage of the state. The works created in this case demonstrated the preservation and development of the best humanistic and realistic traditions of Russian artistic culture. Only the physical destruction of the creators of culture could create the illusion of complete subordination of artistic creativity to ideological canons. Periods of weakening and "tightening the screws" in public life during the Soviet era equally stimulated creative activity, both generated by hopes and growing moral protest.

post-war economy. Second World War caused enormous damage to the national economy of the USSR. In 1945, the industry of the areas liberated from the fascist occupation produced only 30% of pre-war products (in Ukraine - 26% of the pre-war level), agriculture - 60%. In the occupied territories, 2/3 of the national property of the USSR was lost (in Ukraine, only 19% of the pre-war number of industrial enterprises remained unscathed). If the cost of everything destroyed in European countries amounted to 260 billion dollars, then almost half (128 billion dollars) of them accounted for the USSR in Germany - 48 billion dollars). Soviet spending on the war amounted to $357 billion, while US spending was $275 billion. Human resources should be added to the huge military spending - more than 27 million people, almost half of which are Ukrainians (Ukraine's human losses, according to various sources, are 7- 15 million people).

At the same time, the overall level of industrial production in 1945, p. according to official Soviet statistics, it decreased by only 8% compared to 1940. This was facilitated by an evacuation unprecedented in its scale. Up to 2.6 thousand enterprises were evacuated to the eastern regions of the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan (1 thousand enterprises and more than 4 million people were evacuated from Ukraine to ensure their work), about 10 million heads of cattle were driven from there are 1.5 million heads of cattle. This contributed to the accelerated development of the eastern regions. During the war, 3.5 thousand units were put into operation here. large enterprises, grew at a particularly rapid pace military production. As a result, the industrial power of the Urals increased 3.6 times, Western Siberia - 2.8 times, the Volga region - 2.4 times. The share of Ukraine, for example, in the volume of all-Union production fell from 18% in the pre-war period to 7% in 1945. In the future, despite the rapid development of the national industry, Ukraine will no longer be able to regain its place as the sole leader, since the new industrial centers that arose during Ural, developed at a faster pace.

With a general decline in industrial potential, the heavy industry of the country exceeded by 12% pre-war level. Its share in the total volume of industrial production rose in 1945 to 74.9%. This happened, in particular, due to a sharp drop in the production of the already underdeveloped light and food industries. In 1945, the output of cotton fabrics amounted to only 41% of the 1940 level, p. leather shoes - 30, sugar - 21%, etc. So, the war not only inflicted enormous losses on industry, but also changed its geography, especially the sectoral structure. Therefore, in a specific sense, the Great Patriotic War can be regarded as another, too special stage in the further industrialization of the USSR.

The main sources of restructuring. Due to the loss of a significant part economic potential in the western territories (on the eve of the war, the share of only Ukraine (Ukrainian SSR) in the Soviet Union in coal mining was 50.5%, iron ore - 67.6, in iron smelting - 64.7, steel - 48.9%) and the movement of significant parts to the East, and also in connection with the need to transfer the economy to a military footing, the national income of the USSR in 1941 decreased by 1/3. Since 1943, the national income has been gradually increasing, in 1944 it grew already by 30%, although its volume did not reach the pre-war level until the end of the war.

This was reflected in the formation of the state budget, which in 1942 decreased to 50 billion rubles (on the scale of prices that were in force at that time). To fill the budget and cover expenses, attracted additional income mainly from domestic sources. These belonged to them.

1. Receipts from state-owned enterprises, which, as a result of organizational and technical measures aimed at increasing labor productivity, reducing production costs and product costs, have significantly improved economic performance. From 1942 to 1945 they increased by 60 billion rubles.

2. Income from the population. After the introduction at the beginning of the war of some new taxes (military and others), their share in the budget increased from 5.2% (1941) to 13.2% (1945). In general, from 1942 to 1945, the total revenues from the population to the budget increased by 36 billion rubles.

Significant financial assistance to the state was provided by the population in the form of a subscription to a state loan. During the war years, four state loans were issued, and with their help, an additional 67 billion rubles of revenues to the state budget were collected. Voluntary contributions from citizens should be added to this. In total, during the war years, the population received in the form of voluntary contributions 94.5 billion rubles, 130.7 kg of gold, 13 kg of platinum, 9.5 tons of silver, a significant amount of valuable products, bonds and foreign currency.

3. Revenues from changes in the structure of state budget expenditures. In the most intense period of the war, about 60% financial resources budget was used to finance defense. In 1944 their share dropped to 52.3%, and in 1945 to 42.9%.

4. The growth of industrial potential in the East of the country and its further development expanded the possibilities for increasing the means of the national economy. The share of revenues to the state budget from this region grew. If in 1942-1943. budget spending revenues prevailed, they amounted to 17.3 and 15.8%, respectively, then in 1944-1945. the situation has changed, and they already amounted to 20.3 and 24.9%, respectively.

5. Assistance from the states of the anti-Hitler coalition (by lend-lease). Under an agreement between the United States, Great Britain and Canada, during the war, arms, food, and equipment worth $ 9.8 billion were supplied to the Soviet Union as assistance. However, all imports during the war years amounted to only about 4% of the industrial production of the USSR during this period.

Until now, economic sources should be added to the huge enthusiasm and patriotism of the people. Women became the main productive force, whose share in the national economy from 1940 to 1945 increased from 39 to 56%, including in industry - up to 52%. In 1942, the People's Commissariat of Heavy Engineering lacked 5,000 workers, the People's Commissariat of Tank Industry - 45,000, the People's Commissariat of Armaments - 64,000, the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry - 215,000, the People's Commissariat of Ammunition - 35,000, the People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy - 9,000, the People's Commissariat of Nonferrous metallurgy - 8 thousand people. (45% of the pre-war population of the country remained in the occupied territory). they were replaced by children, pensioners, rural residents.

The material and technical support of the army, which required the continuous expansion of military production and the renewal of military equipment, the restoration of the economy destroyed by the war, were most closely connected with the need for a national growth of fixed assets as a base for expanded reproduction. In the USSR, the volume of capital investments during the war years was constantly increasing: in 1943 it amounted to 25.9 billion rubles, in 1944 - 35.6 billion, in 1945 - 42.9 billion rubles. This made it possible to restore the volume of fixed assets in 1945 by 91% compared to 1940 (in 1942 they amounted to 63% of the level of 1940, p. in 1943 - 76, in 1944 - 87%) .

Expanded reproduction was carried out in the sphere of material and non-material production. As a result of the war in 1942, the fund of non-material production in the national economy (housing stock, institutions for socio-cultural and domestic purposes) decreased by almost 50% compared to the pre-war level. The relocation to the East of a large number of enterprises, a significant number of workers and members of their families, required the expansion, in the then terminology, of non-productive funds. The allocation of capital investments for this purpose, the efforts of the working people, made it possible not only to stop the reduction of non-productive assets, but also to gradually increase them. In 1943 they increased in comparison with 1942 by 29%. In 1944, the increase in non-productive assets was 20%. In none of the other countries that fought during the Second World War, there was almost no housing construction. In the USSR in 1942, 5.8 million square meters were built. m of living space, in 1943 - 10.5 million, in 1944 - 15.7 million, in 1945 - 15 million square meters. m.

Significantly worse conditions prevailed in agriculture - up to 100 thousand collective farms and state farms, 2.6 thousand machine and tractor stations were destroyed. The working-age population has decreased by almost 1.5 times. The power supply of agriculture fell by almost 40%. The number of horses decreased by about 1.5 times, cattle - by 20, pigs - by 65%. The sown area decreased by 36.8 million hectares, the grain yield decreased from 8.6 centners per hectare in 1940 to 5.6 centners per hectare in 1945. Gross agricultural output in 1945 decreased compared to 1940. by 40%, the production of grain and cotton decreased by 2 times, meat - by 45%. More than 70 thousand villages were completely or partially destroyed in the USSR, 28 thousand of them in Ukraine, 30% of rural residents were left homeless.

Consequently, in contrast to industry and transport, which, although they suffered heavy losses, were rebuilt quickly and as a matter of priority already during the war years, the situation in agriculture was simply catastrophic. The majority of the population of the USSR literally teetered on the brink of survival. In 1946, due to crop failure and exorbitant siphoning of food resources from the village (that year, collective farms in Ukraine collected grain 2.6 times less than before the war, and grain procurement plans were increased from 340 to 360 million poods), due to export deliveries abroad in Ukraine, Moldova, the regions of the Central Black Earth zone, the Lower and part of the Central Volga region, a terrible famine began, which covered up to 100 million people. From hunger and disease in 1946-1948. about 2 million people died, of which almost half - in Ukraine (in 16 eastern regions, as well as in Izmail and Chernivtsi regions, almost 282 thousand died in 1946, and in 1947 - more than 528 thousand people). Until the summer of 1947, almost 1 million patients with dystrophy were registered in Ukraine alone.

Choice of economic strategy. As before, the choice of the economic strategy of the USSR was determined by the political course, which depended primarily on the will of I. Stalin and on the correlation of forces in the ruling elite. He was an important factor in possible foreign loans and investments. The degree of conversion and the volume of resources that turned to the development of the military-industrial complex, the level of economic cooperation with Western states largely determined the scale of savings, their structure (in particular, the share of domestic savings in GDP) and the degree of closeness (autarky) of the Soviet economy.

The war brought the USSR closer to world society, and its relations with the Western states entered into partnership, it would seem, even friendly character. The victory in the war changed the stuffy social atmosphere of the late 1930s and gave impetus to the democratic renewal of the Soviet system, hopes for a change for the better. In the public mind, fear began to gradually disappear. The war taught people to think critically. For many of them, it became the "discovery" of the Event (more than 6 million people went abroad as part of the active army and another 5.5 million repatriates), shook ideological stereotypes, arousing interest and sympathy for Western civilization.

Reformist sentiments also penetrated into the Bolshevik elite, which was significantly updated during the war years. The war accustomed the administrative corps to the initiative, casting the identification of "saboteurs" and "enemies of the people" into the background. During the war years, unlike in other countries, the degree of centralized state regulation of some sectors of the Soviet economy decreased. As a result, in areas that were not occupied, incomes increased slightly rural population. Concern for the survival of the population and the fulfillment of state tasks prompted the local authorities to encourage small-scale production. The return to civilian life required either legitimization, institutionalization of these innovations, a significant correction of the pre-war economic policy, or a return to the previous centralized model of the economy with a hypertrophied military sector (even civilian enterprises simultaneously had a military profile, mobilization capacities in case of war), strict administrative and political control over the activities of the economic administration, enterprises and all workers.

Adopted in May 1946, the Law on the five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR for 1946-1950. determined tense tasks, the main of which was: to ensure the priority restoration and development of heavy industry and railway transport. This was the first step towards returning to the pre-war model of development of the national economy. However, many aspects of economic strategy have not yet been determined. The task of the fourth five-year plan did not rule out some options for development within the framework of the centralized system of planning and management of the national economy of the USSR.

However, the progressive disintegration of the anti-Hitler coalition, the struggle against the Western powers for the division of Europe and the beginning of the Cold War contributed to the final victory of the supporters of centralization and development of the military-industrial complex, behind whom I. Stalin stood. Some internal factors also acted in the same direction: the famine of 1946, p. which contributed to a sharp increase in state control over the countryside, exacerbation of the socio-economic situation in the cities (including the abolition of the card system and the monetary reform of 1947).

Features of restoration in the USSR. In 1947, the Soviet government withdrew from the Marshall Plan aimed at the economic revival of Europe, and began planting openly communist governments in Eastern Europe, providing "socialist transformations", which further strained relations with the United States. The country not only returned to the previous economic model, but also lived literally in the pre-war regime, which determined the features of the recovery period in the USSR.

Firstly, this is not only a reliance on internal resources and forces, but also a variety of assistance to other countries of the socialist camp.

Second, in contrast to the West, where the recovery began with the stabilization national currency, restoration of infrastructure (roads, communications, etc.), development of agriculture and light industry, then reconstruction and technical re-equipment of heavy industry, in the USSR the emphasis was placed primarily on the restoration of heavy industry, on saving and accumulating finance and resources at the expense of agriculture economy, light industry and social sphere. In 1946-1950. 80% of investments were directed to the needs of heavy industry as the basis of the military-industrial complex. This, of course, had an effect in industries focused on the military-industrial complex (electric power, metallurgy, machine building, etc.), but at the same time slowed down and deformed the process of production of consumer goods and the development of agriculture.

The post-war village was financed according to the residual principle (no more than 7% of the total allocations). It was forced to fulfill at least three tasks: to meet the needs of industry in raw materials, to solve the problem of supplying cities with food, to grow a sufficient amount of agricultural products for export to the countries of Eastern Europe. Trying to fulfill these large-scale tasks in the face of a chronic shortage of funds, the official authorities practiced traditional command methods: increasing pressure on the village, establishing strict order - a campaign to eliminate and violate the collective farm charter (1946); direct repression - deportation to Siberia of persons who "maliciously" evade labor activity in agriculture (since 1948); attempts to restructure the organization of agricultural production - the policy of consolidation of collective farms (1950).

Thirdly, the forcing of the development of heavy industry and the military-industrial complex, as before the war, was accompanied by powerful mobilization and propaganda measures - movements of leaders and innovators, socialist competition. In 1946, 80% of workers and employees were involved in the movement for the early fulfillment of the five-year plan and an increase in labor productivity, and at the end of 1948 - already 90%.

Fourth, colossal, unprecedented in the 20th century. use of non-economic coercion. Repressions did not stop during the war, and after its end they began to increase. For 1945-1953 the number of prisoners in the camps and colonies of the Gulag increased from 1.5 million to 2.5 million people. According to some estimates, as a result of the post-war wave of repressions, 5.5-6.5 million people ended up in prisons, camps, colonies and exile. The sphere in "pagan-camp, essentially slave labor, was an important integral part of the Soviet economy. The Ministry of Internal Affairs became a huge economic department. The hands of prisoners built numerous large objects of the fourth and fifth five-year plans in the nuclear, metallurgical, energy industries, and transport.

Fifthly, the emergency nationalization of the economy. This, in particular, made it possible to mobilize significant material and human resources in a short time, quickly transfer them from one place to another and concentrate on restoring or building the necessary facility.

Restoration and development of the national economy. According to official data, already in 1948 the volume of industrial production of the USSR reached the pre-war level. During the years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, gross industrial output increased by 73% compared with 1940 instead of 48% according to the five-year plan. At the same time, heavy industry increased production by 2 times (engineering - by 2.3 times), and light industry - by only 23%. Main production assets increased by 58%, labor productivity in industry - only by 37%. So, industrial production developed mainly on an extensive basis.

Success in the development of the industry, capital construction contributed not only to internal factors (the hard work of people, the concentration of resources through "savings" on the living standards of the people, agriculture, light industry and the social sphere), but also Germany's reparations. In general, they amounted to 4.3 billion dollars, which provided almost half of the equipment for industrial facilities, the acceleration of scientific and technical progress. However, for all their importance, reparations and spoils of war could not compensate for the absence of large foreign investment, large-scale assistance from the USSR to the Eastern European countries of the Soviet bloc, China and Korea.

Conversion freed up significant industrial capacities. In 1946, the share of military spending fell to 24% (against 32% in 1940); the strength of the armed forces in 1945-1948. decreased by more than 3.9 times: from 11.4 to 2.9 million people. True, in 1947 the decline in some military sectors was again replaced by an upswing. However, even according to official Soviet statistics, in the fourth five-year plan, 19.8% of the state budget was allocated to strengthen the defense capability (in the first five-year plan - 5.4%, in the second - 12.7%, and over the three years of the third - 26.4%). Thanks to this, in the mid-1950s, the foundations of the military-industrial complex were laid in the USSR, which became an important, priority part of the economy.

The situation in agriculture remains difficult. The pressure on the countryside was comparable only to the period of mass collectivization, but now the main efforts of the state-administrative apparatus were not focused on creating collective farms, but on the ruthless withdrawal of food and money resources from them. Often, having fulfilled the state supply plan, the collective farms were left without bread. In 1947, the average grain distribution rate per workday was almost 2 times lower than in 1940, and in some collective farms grain was not distributed to the peasants at all. In subsequent years, despite some improvement, income from collective farms averaged only 20.3% of the cash income of a peasant family, and in 1950 27.4% of collective farms did not give money at all for workdays. As a result of the expanded state campaign in 1946-1947. the area of ​​household plots of peasants was reduced by 10.6 million hectares.

The village remained the main "donor" of the Stalinist economy and, at the same time, the stepson of the allocation of state resources. It is no coincidence that in the early 1950s it only approached the pre-war level, although according to the plan of the Fourth Five-Year Plan it should exceed it by 27%. The average annual growth rate of agricultural production in 1950-1953, according to official data, was 1.6%.

Despite increased pressure on the countryside, the food problem remained acute in the postwar years. Only in December 1947 was the card system for food and industrial goods abolished and a transition was made to selling them in open trade at uniform state retail prices. Simultaneously with the abolition of the card system, a monetary reform was carried out, the purpose of which was to eliminate the consequences of the war in the financial and monetary sphere and streamline the entire financial system. These government measures have had mixed results. In particular, the abolition of the rationing system, of course, testified to some stabilization of the national economy. However, after 1947 wage most of the population, which had grown by only half the pre-war level, lagged significantly behind the new state prices, which were almost three times higher than the pre-war level. Therefore, in 1947-1950. Commodity prices fell five times. However, over time, this process seemed to be torn off from its prehistory and deposited in the mass consciousness as the Stalinist course of regular price reductions.

had an ambiguous effect on the living standards of the population and monetary reform. On the one hand, it brought the money supply that was in circulation in line with the needs of the economy. During the war years, due to large military spending and a deficit in the state budget, the state was forced to resort to money issue. In addition, in the occupied territories, the Nazis, in order to undermine the economy of the USSR, put into circulation a significant amount of counterfeit money. All this led to the fact that after the war there was a money supply in circulation, which was 3.8 times higher than the pre-war one and significantly exceeded the needs of the national economy. That's why purchasing power ruble fell. We reassessed the labor savings of the population in savings banks under several conditions (up to 3 thousand rubles, the exchange of banknotes was carried out as 1: 1; for those who had deposits from 3 to 10 thousand, the exchange went as 2: 3, and for deposits of more than 10 thousand rubles - as 1: 2). On the other hand, the currency reform hit hard on the peasantry, who kept money mainly at home and were forced to exchange at a rate of 1:10.

Despite the gradual increase in nominal and, in part, real wages, even in the cities the standard of living of 1940 was achieved only in 1951, p. a level of 1928, p. which, in turn, approached the level of 1913, p. reached only in 1954. The housing problem became extremely aggravated.

Consequently, the political and economic leadership of the USSR in the postwar years chose the most complex and resource-intensive option for the restoration and development of the Soviet economy. It envisaged not only self-reliant authoritarian development, but was also limited to the course of maximizing the development of heavy industry and the military-industrial complex due to the unprecedented robbery of the countryside, curbing the living standards of the population, and slowing down the development of the social sphere, light and food industries. The implementation of such a course required not just large-scale non-economic coercion, but mass repressions and, at the same time, formal approval of it (the course) by the population of the country. During this period, the USSR completed the formation of the post-war command and administrative system.

Development of the national economy of the USSR, the task was set for 1976-1980. ..increase the responsibility of design, engineering and scientific organizations for high technical and economic level design solutions... To improve the quality and reduce the time of development and examination of projects and estimates.

The Regulations on the enterprise give certain concepts of the enterprise as the main link in the national economy of the USSR and a general description of the foundations of its organization and management, as well as the content of the charter, property and funds are characterized

In accordance with this, each chapter of the course in the economics of a branch includes initial provisions linked to the main directions in the development of the national economy of the USSR.

The directives of the XIX Congress of the CPSU under the Fifth Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR (1951 - 1955) planned an increase in oil production by 85%, further intensification of exploration work for oil and gas, widespread use of modern intensive methods of developing oil fields, development of drilling operations, development of the richest oil fields under the bottom of the Caspian Sea. The gas industry was faced with the task of further increasing gas production, expanding the construction of main pipelines with a transition to diameters of 529 - 720 mm, which predetermined a faster increase in the throughput of gas pipelines.

Thus, the characteristics of the current state of the oil and gas industry testifies to the rationality of its further development, which consists in a) prospecting and exploration of oil and gas bearing areas in the form of individual deposits and entire regions b) increasing the size of the industry’s provision with industrial and other categories of reserves, allowing the development of oil and gas production in accordance with the growth the needs of the national economy of the USSR and the countries of the socialist community c) the development of oil and gas fields with the management of the extraction of natural resources from the bowels to the surface of the earth d) the most expedient use of oil and gas raw materials in the system of the fuel and energy complex.

Political approach to solving economic problems. The development of the socialist economy, as is known, is determined by the general line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The state plans for the development of the national economy of the USSR and its individual sectors have become the main instrument for implementing

One of the main tasks of the national economy of the USSR for the current five years is to increase the efficiency and quality of social production and a significant increase in the return on capital investments and fixed assets, which are the material base of production and the most important component productive forces countries.

The socialist economy is characterized by high stable growth rates of fixed assets. So, the main production assets of the national economy of the USSR for 1940-1975. increased 11.32 times, including 1.43 times over the years of the eighth five-year plan, 1.5 times for the ninth, and 1.42 times for the tenth.

The national economy of the USSR ... Statistical Yearbook.

In 1928, the national economy of the USSR had 521 thousand specialists with higher and secondary specialized education, including 233 thousand people with higher education and 288 thousand people with secondary education. In 1977, 25,178,000 specialists with higher and secondary special education were already working in the national economy of the USSR, including 10,537,000 with higher education and 14,641,000 with secondary education.

Thus, while the general growth of workers and employees in the national economy of the USSR from 1928 to 1977 was 9.33 times, the number of specialists with higher and secondary specialized education increased 48.32 times.

Exhibition of achievements of the national economy of the USSR. Higher a-lenic carboxylic acids. - M. Science, 1969.

The data in the tables do not correspond to the data of the CSO (see National Economy of the USSR in 1970, p. 110), which is to a certain extent explained by the inclusion of the CSO in the world consumption of peat and firewood, as well as the difference in the calculation of hydro and atomic energy.

The high rates of development of the national economy of the USSR and other socialist countries require appropriate energy and heat supply, which, in turn, dictates the need to use large reserves of highly efficient energy sources, primarily natural gas, as sources of heat and energy. From this position, it should be recognized as rational to further increase the use of gas as an energy fuel.

Under these conditions, it is very important to correctly assess the proportions in the development of the fuel and energy branches of industry and other branches of the national economy of the USSR.

In the ninth five-year plan, as outlined by the five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1971-1975, industrial output (in comparable prices) in 1975 will increase by almost 47% compared to 1970, and electricity production by 44%. From this it follows that the ratio in the growth rates of electricity generation and the entire industrial production will be expressed by a coefficient of 0.94.

In accordance with the data of the CSO (National Economy of the USSR. 1922-1972. Jubilee Statistical Yearbook. M., Statistics, 1972, 61 pp.), the table has been amended.

The US press publishes a significant number of monographs and articles on the future development of the country's energy sector, energy consumption, and the prospects for providing energy resources. Numerous studies carried out in various government organizations, institutions and individual scientists are devoted to various aspects of this problem. Forecasts cover periods up to 2000, and sometimes up to 2200 G. It is characteristic that when forecasting up to 2000, dates are singled out either directly coinciding with the periodization of the long-term plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR (1970, 1980, 1985, 1990), or close to them. Although these works do not directly mention this, it is not difficult to guess that the selection of such dates is far from accidental; apparently, an important role is played by the desire to compare the rates of development and volumes of production and consumption of various types of energy resources in the USSR and the USA.

National Economy of the USSR in 1965. Statistics Publishing House, 1966, p. 102.

National economy of the USSR in 1964. Statistics Publishing House, 1965, p. SW.

National Economy of the USSR in 1964. Statistics Publishing House, 1965. Calculations of electricity consumption per capita are made by the author.

National Economy of the USSR in 1965. Statistics Publishing House, 1966. a Oil and Gas J., 62, No. 50, 1964, p. 47-49.

Statistical Yearbooks National Economy of the USSR for 1949-1964. Publishing House Statistics.

In 1958, the efficiency of primary energy in world industry was 57%, in transport 16%, in

] Responsible for the release of L.A. Umansky.
(Moscow: Publishing House "Finance and Statistics", 1987. - State Committee of the USSR on Statistics)
Scan, OCR, processing, Htm format: Efremov, 2012; Scan, processing, Djv format: ???, provided by: Mikhail, 2013

• SUMMARY:
  Preface (3).
  MAIN INDICATORS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE USSR FOR 70 YEARS OF SOVIET POWER
  The scale of creation (5).
  World Renewal (28).
  Building the foundations of a new society (32).
  Implementation of the Leninist plan for the construction of socialism (33).
  Economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War (43).
  Restoration and further development of the national economy (47).
  The development of the national economy in 1961-1985. (49).
  Course - acceleration (52).
  1986 - Perestroika in action (56).
  INTENSIFICATION OF PUBLIC PRODUCTION
  Science and technological progress (60).
  The material and technical base of the national economy, its technical re-equipment and reconstruction (100).
  Efficiency in the use of labor resources (107).
  Resource saving (112).
  Improving management and economic mechanism (115).
  DEVELOPMENT OF MATERIAL PRODUCTION
  Gross social product and national income (122).
  Industry (125).
  Fuel and energy complex (161).
  Metallurgical complex (164).
  Machine building complex (166).
  Chemical-forest complex (176).
  Construction complex industry (184).
  Production of consumer goods (186).
  Agro-industrial complex (200).
  Crop production (222).
  Livestock (253).
  Food industry (268).
  Capital investments and supplies of material resources (274).
  Forestry (285).
  Agricultural enterprises (287).
  Personnel in the agro-industrial complex (300).
  Labor productivity in the agro-industrial complex (311).
  Capital construction (316).
  Transport and communications (340).
  Rail transport (343).
  Maritime transport (348).
  River transport (350).
  Main pipeline transport (353).
  Road transport (354).
  Urban passenger electric transport (363).
  Air transport (368).
  Communication (370).
  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING STANDARDS OF THE PEOPLE
  population and labor resources (373).
  Use of national income (430).
  Wages and incomes of the population (431).
  Providing the population with goods and services (449).
  Housing (508).
  Public education and culture (523).
  Health protection (585).
  NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
  Earth (607).
  Subsoil (608).
  Forest protection (610).
  Rational use and protection of water resources (612).
  Air basin (614).
  Environmental protection in the area of ​​Lake Baikal (616).
  Costs for environmental protection measures and commissioning of facilities (618).
  FINANCE AND CREDIT (620).
  FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE USSR
  Foreign trade of the USSR (640).
  Cooperation of countries - members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (648).
  Economic and technical assistance to the USSR (650).
  INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
  Development of the USSR and other socialist countries in comparison with the capitalist countries (653).
  Territory and population of the countries of the world 699 Brief methodological explanations of certain statistical indicators given in the yearbook (711).

Publisher's note: The Jubilee Statistical Yearbook contains the most important data on the economic and social development of the USSR during the years of Soviet power, characterizing the population, the development of branches of the national economy, science and technology, and the growth of the people's well-being. Some data characterizing the development of other socialist countries are published. A number of indicators are compared with those of capitalist countries.
For economists, statisticians, scientific, party and economic workers, propagandists.

This is the historically established unity of all sectors of the country's economy, interconnected by the division of labor.

The national economy of the entire Soviet Union, of every Union and Autonomous Republic, of every region and territory, includes branches of material production and branches of the so-called non-productive sphere.

The most important branches of material production are industry, agriculture, freight transport, construction, as well as trade, catering, procurement of agricultural products, logistics.

Branches of the non-manufacturing sphere - housing, consumer services and public utilities(water supply, sewerage, passenger transport, etc.), health care, science, education, art.

A young local historian, getting acquainted with the economy of any region or district, must first of all find out what share in the economy is occupied by the branches of material production and the non-productive sphere. At the same time, it should be taken into account that in the sphere of material production there are industries that create the means of production, tools of labor, and industries that produce consumer goods.

The national economy under socialism is based on public ownership of the means of production, on the labor of workers free from exploitation. The purpose of production in our country is to ensure the well-being and free comprehensive development of all members of society. This is the basic law of socialism.

The "Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the period up to 1990" states: "In the eighties, the Communist Party will consistently continue to implement its economic strategy, the supreme goal of which is the steady rise in the material and cultural standard of living of the people, the creation of better conditions for the all-round development of the individual on the basis of a further increase in the efficiency of all social production, an increase in labor productivity, and an increase in the social and labor activity of Soviet people.

With great strength economic development The country has become socialist competition, which raises the consciousness of the working people, mobilizes them for the further development of the economy, improving the quality of work. That is why it is so important to discover and disseminate new, effective types of socialist emulation, the most successful methods of material incentives for the best workers.

Article 16 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states: "The economy of the USSR constitutes a single national economic complex, covering all links of social production, distribution and exchange on the territory of the country." The creation of such a single complex is the result of a long work on the rational distribution of productive forces. The most important principles of socialist management were developed by the founder of the first socialist state, V. I. Lenin. They received a deeply scientific interpretation in his works: “The State and Revolution”, “Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power”, “Outline of the Plan of Scientific and Technical Works”, “On the Unified Economic Plan”, “On the Food Tax”, etc.

The planned nature of economic management is a distinctive feature of socialist management and, at the same time, the fundamental advantage of socialism over capitalism. The greatest merit of V. I. Lenin is that he developed a scientifically substantiated plan for building socialism, armed the party with the correct principles of guiding the national economy.

Already the first unified state plan for the development of the national economy of the Soviet Republic based on electrification, developed in 1920 on the instructions and under the leadership of V. I. Lenin by the State Commission for Electrification of Russia (GOELRO), was a long-term plan for the country's comprehensive economic development. It reflected Lenin's ideas of electrifying the whole country and creating a large-scale industry. V. I. Lenin called this plan the second program of the party.

The Leninist principles of economic planning and development were embodied in the very first state five-year plan, where it was written: “The USSR cannot build and develop its national economy otherwise than by fully taking into account all the natural, economic and national characteristics of its association and specializing its individual parts. Only in this way can the greatest coefficient of efficiency of social labor be achieved.

Union republics and economic regions are essentially specialized territorial national economic complexes. The rapid growth of the economy of the Union republics has led to the fact that they all now have a diversified industry and highly mechanized agriculture. An interconnected economic complex, including the national economy of all the republics of the Soviet Union and developing according to a single state plan in the interests of the whole country and each republic separately, is the economic basis of a developed socialist society.

The country's economy as a single national economic complex requires strict proportionality in the development of all its links, both territorial and sectoral.

The national economy of the USSR is a very complex complex of industries and diverse economic ties. For example, the industrial element of the unified national economic complex of the USSR (in the diagram - the "Industry" block) is now formed by more than 280 industries, about 30 thousand associations and enterprises. Agrarian bloc (" Agriculture”) - more than 47 thousand collective farms and state farms and 7 thousand inter-farm organizations. Construction - almost 30 thousand primary contractors.

The scheme of the structure of the national economy of the USSR shows only the main branches of the national economy and their most important interrelations. There is no other country in the world where such huge, diverse and planned productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the state.

When planning the development and distribution of productive forces, the fact that the economy of our country is developing in close cooperation with the economies of other socialist countries, especially the members of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), is always taken into account. On the basis of the principles of friendship, sovereignty and mutual benefit, economic ties between the CMEA countries are deepening every year, plans for the development of individual industries and the exchange of products are being coordinated. This helps each country to increase the pace of economic development. At present, the CMEA countries together produce about ⅓ of the world industrial products and more than ¼ of the world's national income.

The Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the period up to 1990, approved by the XXVI Congress of the CPSU, provide for further dynamic and balanced development of the country's economy as a single national economic complex, proportional growth of all its branches and economies of the Union republics, improvement territorial division of labor. The need was emphasized to concentrate forces and resources on solving the main national economic tasks, to ensure the phased implementation of targeted comprehensive programs on the most important socio-economic problems, to expand and improve economic, scientific, technical and cultural ties with foreign countries, and above all with the countries of the socialist community.

EXPLORE YOUR LOCATION

1. Find out the origin of the name locality, the history of its origin and development.
2. Determine geographical position locality.
3. Describe the natural conditions: climatic features, relief, geological structure, minerals, vegetation, rivers, lakes, reservoirs and their economic significance.
4. What population lives in this settlement (its number, composition, main occupations).
5. Collect information about the people who took an active part in the establishment of Soviet power and in the life of the country during the first five-year plans, about the initiators of the Stakhanov movement, about the participation of your countrymen in the Great Patriotic War, about the life of the settlement in the post-war period.
6. Do a search on the topic "Their names are the streets of our village."
7. Visit the leading enterprises of your locality.

Find out when and in connection with what the enterprise arose, its main types of products, what tasks it faces in the new five-year plan, and what indicators it is fighting for in work.