1929 was the time of the final transition from the New Economic Policy to the direct formation of the command and administrative system. JV Stalin performs all further modernization from above with the help of a powerful party-state machine, based on the organs of state security and internal affairs. If in the years of NEP the main carrier of modernization in society was an economic, creative person, now this person is obedient, conformist. Active, looking for people, dissatisfied with the curtailment of the market economy, the new party policy, socially "unreliable" by millions in 1930-1952. sent to corrective labor camps, to Soviet penal servitude. And before they become “camp dust” there, they actually do free work, carry out the construction of tens of thousands of the most important socialist enterprises and various other objects.

So, the suppression of individualism, dissent, the use of the free labor of millions of people immediately become important factors in Stalin's modernization. Stalinist modernization of the 30-40s. 20th century is rated as the most effective of all Russian modernizations, starting with Petrovskaya. W. Churchill's words are also cited as an example: "Stalin took Russia with a plow, and left it with an atomic bomb." Of course, before the revolution, Russia had not only plows, but also Nobel laureates, advanced aviation and navy. Meanwhile, the social danger of such transformations lies elsewhere. The Stalinist totalitarian state and the communist party, in order to achieve great goals, completely abandon the concept of "humanism". Opponents of such socialism, obvious, and often imaginary under conditions of terror, are "mad dogs", "fiends", "killer-poisoners", etc. Even the ritual of their execution after the death sentence, as A.G. Teplyakov in his book “Procedure: Execution of Death Sentences in 1920-

1930s" turned quite often into disgusting sadistic actions. One of Beria's subordinates

K. Savitsky during interrogation in 1953 stated: “For those arrested who gave confessions, measures of physical coercion were not applied during the investigation. But when the sentence was carried out, they were necessarily beaten on the instructions of Beria, who said: “Before you lead them to the next world, fill their faces” 1 . Such terror paralyzed any resistance in society.

In the process of Stalinist modernization, the peasantry was subjected to the most massive social repressions. By the spring of 1929, emergency measures in the countryside began to be applied more and more widely. In an effort to fulfill the grain procurement plan, the local authorities take the path of wholesale searches and confiscations. Since autumn

1929 the forcing of collectivization begins. On November 7, 1929, Stalin's article "The Year of the Great Turn" is published, which says that the bulk of the peasantry went to the collective farms, and in the socialist transformation Agriculture won a "decisive victory".

A special commission of the Politburo presented to Stalin its project for the implementation of collectivization. It was supposed to carry out collectivization in the main grain-growing regions in two to three years, and in the consuming zone - in three to four years, in economically backward national regions - in the years of the second five-year plan. However, Stalin made significant amendments and drastically reduced the terms. The North Caucasus, the Lower and Middle Volga completed collectivization in the fall of 1930 or in the spring of 1931, and the rest of the grain regions - in the fall of 1931 or, in extreme cases, in the spring of 1932. It was these terms that reflected the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of 5 January 1930 "On the pace of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction."

As early as December 27, 1929, in a speech at the All-Union Conference of Agrarian Marxists, I.V. Stalin announces the transition to a policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class. Specific measures for the implementation of this policy were developed by a special commission of the Politburo headed by V.M. Molotov. It was envisaged to carry out a complete confiscation from the kulaks of the means of production, livestock, household and residential buildings, as well as agricultural products, including seed stocks. Those who were dispossessed, together with their families, were sent to the northern and eastern regions of the country. The number of dispossessed was also determined - 5% of peasant farms. Up to 15% of the peasants were actually dispossessed.

"Dispossession" continued until the end of the spring of 1933, when Stalin and Molotov's instruction appeared, prescribing to limit dispossession and eviction. Around 1937-1938. 98% of peasant farms ended up in collective farms, and collectivization was practically completed. Many peasants deciphered the letters of the CPSU (b) as "the second serfdom of the Bolsheviks." Collective farmers found themselves in the position of campers only without an escort.

In Siberia, mass executions also began immediately after the start of the attack on the peasants. In 1930, the execution conveyor was running at full speed. The commandant's office of the OGPU embassy in Sibkrai immediately began the physical extermination of the kulaks convicted by the "troika". Orders for execution were signed directly by the plenipotentiary. The number of executioners usually included ordinary operatives. At a time, a team of three performers shot up to 20-25 people. 59 peasants - "rebels" of the Kochenevsky district of the Novosibirsk district in March 1930 were shot in three stages by employees of the OGPU embassy. In total, in 1930, the Siberian Chekists shot about 5,000 convicts in a troika 2 .

The order of dispossession of economically active peasants during the NEP period, who believed N.I. Bukharin and his slogan "Get rich!" determined by a legal document. On February 4, 1930, a secret instruction of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars appeared. She divided the "kulaks" into several categories. In fact, in practice, the following were used: I category (transfer to the OGPU, execution or concentration camp); Category II - complete confiscation of property and exile to remote sparsely populated areas. It is difficult to say exactly when Stalin hatched such Jesuit plans to deprive people of their property and use gratuitous labor: in Turukhansk exile, during the Civil War, or in the fight against Trotsky! By the way, Lev Davydovich had the idea of ​​creating labor armies earlier, and even earlier in August 1917, General Lavr Georgievich Kornilov. Apparently strong political personalities as opposites in approaches and actions often converge. The revolutionary idea of ​​expropriating the “loot” (Rob the loot!) well covered up the robbery of the landlords, the nobility, the bourgeoisie, and then the urban Nepmen and rural economic activists. The middle peasantry, in order not to fall under dispossession or directly into the OGPU, gave away horses, bulls, cows, agricultural implements themselves.

In the places of settlements, the kulaks were forced to work in logging, the hardest construction and land reclamation work. The main areas of kulak exile were the Urals, Siberia, the North, Kazakhstan, Far East. For 1930-1931 more than 300,000 peasant families, numbering 1.8 million people, became political migrants 3 .

In May 1929, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution "On the use of the labor of criminal prisoners." Soon in the same year, the term "corrective labor camp" appeared in Soviet legislation. The amended criminal legislation provided for a new punishment: imprisonment in forced labor camps in remote areas of the USSR for a period of three to ten years. Since 1929, the camps have become self-supporting. The number of prisoners grows from 180 thousand in the middle of 1930 to 510 thousand by the beginning of 1934. In 1940, the Gulag united 53 camps, 425 colonies - industrial, agricultural and other, 50 colonies for minors, 90 "baby houses". According to official data, by the beginning of the war with Germany, about 2.3 million people were kept in camps and colonies. Total from 1930 to 1953. about 18 million people visited the barracks of the camps and colonies, about one-fifth of them on political grounds” 4 .

The direct political terror of Stalinist modernization was supplemented by a kind of indirect economic terror.

A. Maslow, having built his “pyramid of human needs”, noted that the basic physiological needs of people, for example, in nutrition, must be satisfied unconditionally. Sociologist P. Sorokin pointed out that the suppression of basic instincts leads to revolution. But in the 1930s, the modernization revolution was carried out "from above", from the Kremlin. The theme of food and hunger was exploited completely shamelessly and immorally. Thus, in the early 1930s, the Torgsin system (trade with foreigners) appeared. Foreigners, of course, also used it. But the main thing was the pumping of gold, silver, and other valuables from the stocks "for a rainy day" from their own citizens. And this day has come: if there are jewels, hand them over and get food, if not, die. In 1932-33. carried out mass confiscation of grain and food stocks from rural residents. As a result, a terrible “artificial” famine struck the country. Millions of people were starved to death. Bread was sold abroad, exchanged for machinery and equipment. Artificial hunger pushed people to hand over the last to Torgsin. Even historical values ​​were irretrievably sent abroad in droves: paintings by great artists and other works of art.

The main source for Stalin's industrial modernization was the most severe redistribution of the country's entire surplus product in favor of heavy industry. Why did the production of consumer goods develop poorly? Because all funds went to the industry. The Soviet people: both peasants, and workers, and employees found themselves in a situation of underconsumption, people often did not eat their fill. In the Stalin era, in addition to the above, an important factor in savings is the sale abroad at dumping prices of grain, oil, timber and other raw materials. It should be recognized that the country in the 30s. It was necessary to solve the most important historical task of a geopolitical nature: to preserve independence and its vital geographical space, to confirm the status of a great power. Socialist construction in this case can be viewed as a single form of Soviet pre-war modernization for all regions.

In February 1931, the first All-Union Conference of Socialist Industry Workers took place. Stalin delivered a speech “On the tasks of business executives”, in which he quite clearly defined the timing of the upcoming industrial revolution: “We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we will do it, or we will be crushed ... We have all the “objective” possibilities for this. The only thing missing is the ability to truly use these opportunities… It's time for us to learn how to use these opportunities” 5 .

I.V. Stalin here shows a certain gift of foresight - it is in ten years that the war will begin, the country will be economically ready for it. The country will undergo industrial modernization, only its price will be monstrous.

Nevertheless, as a result of the first two five-year plans (1929-1937), the USSR made significant progress along the path of industrialization. The level of industrial production in 1913 was blocked by 8.2 times. Pre-revolutionary Russia ranked fifth in the world in terms of gross industrial output, and its share in world industrial production was 2.6%. The USSR is now in first place in Europe and second in the world in terms of shaft volume. The share in the world industry rose to 13.7%. On the eve of the first five-year plan, workers and employees accounted for 17.6% of the country's population, and in 1939 already 50.2% 6 .

In the Yenisei region, and since 1934 in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, during the years of the first and second five-year plans, the local economy began to develop at a high pace. Its modernization was based on expanded training of qualified personnel. In 1930-

1932 1,346 skilled workers were trained at the PVRZ using the industrial and brigade methods. In 1932-1938. The Yenisei Shipping Company trained about 3.7 thousand qualified workers through special courses and schools of trade and educational institutions. The economic modernization of the region during the years of the first five-year plan was facilitated by socialist competition. In general, during its period, the production of the region's industry increased by 3.4 times. The number of workers increased two and a half times. Output per worker exceeded the level of 1913 by 64% 7 . In 1933-1937. construction of large industrial enterprises began. Among them: the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine in the Arctic, a heavy engineering plant, a pulp and paper mill, and others. In 1937, the share of industry in the national economy of the region amounted to 65.3% compared with 25% in 1913. Now in the industrial output itself, 65.5% was the production of means of production. Coal mining in comparison with 1913 increased by 1938 by 33 times. By the end of 1940, the industry of the region had grown by 21 times compared to 1913. Electricity production to the level of 1932 - 28 times. The growth rates of the region's industry were ahead of the all-Union ones. In the USSR, they amounted to 14.7% per year, and in the region - 18.4%. In the 1930s, the region's agriculture became collective-farm, highly mobilized. General culture and education have been developed 8 .

In the Krasnoyarsk Territory, in the process of modernization, the same contradictions were manifested as in the whole of the USSR. A large share, especially in the North, was the efforts of camp prisoners in the total labor costs. Siberian working conditions have always been more difficult, often simply overwhelming manual labor dominated. But on the whole, a great deal of general benefit was being done, an industrial base was being laid for the entire country in case of military clashes. Development National economy The USSR during the years of the third five-year plan was held in the conditions of the outbreak of the Second World War. Therefore, the militarization of the country's economy became inevitable. In 1939, defense appropriations accounted for ¼ of state budget, and in 1940 - already 1/3 part, in 1941 - 43.4% 9 .

In the thirties of the twentieth century, deep positive social and cultural changes took place in the USSR in the lives of many people. The modernization of the economy required an increase in the well-being of the people, an increase in the education of people. If in 1928 the number of specialists with higher and secondary education was 0.5 million people, then by the beginning of 1941 it had grown to 2.8 million people 10 .

At the same time, compulsory seven-year education was introduced in the city and four years in the countryside. Mass socialist culture is spreading. Through films, theatre, physical culture and sports, on the one hand, social optimism and faith in a brighter future are being affirmed. On the other hand, hatred is being instilled towards the world bourgeoisie and its own “enemies of the people”, its corrupt hirelings and agents. Even the Moscow trials of such figures, yesterday's comrades-in-arms of Stalin, who deftly "disguised" their rotten political essence earlier, are taking place on the stage of theaters. People devoted to the cause of Stalin's party and the people received tickets for such "performances". It should be unambiguously emphasized once again: terror was an indispensable factor in the success of Stalin's modernization. It also assumed a complete change of personnel, the liquidation of the old Leninist guard. Thus, in 1934, the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b), the congress of the "victors of socialism", was held. By 1939, the 18th Party Congress, most of the delegates to the 17th had already been convicted and shot. Under Stalin, the leaders in the center and in the localities lived in constant tension and always expected a legitimate condemnation and execution in the event of their own political, economic and economic failures. 500 thousand Stalinist cadre nominees literally "digged the earth" so as not to get out of the confidence of the leader. They found themselves in a constant state of modernization, when the inhuman exertion of forces gives a positive effect for a while. Under normal democratic and legal conditions, such modernization is impossible. And under Stalin, even scientists created in concentration camps - "sharashkas" created for the scientific intelligentsia, advanced weapons and equipment, televisions and tape recorders. Laws and law itself in the USSR at that time were also modernized in a totalitarian spirit. On the one hand, legal arbitrariness was created, on the other hand, it was necessary to adopt the most progressive constitution of victorious socialism. The section on human rights was written by N.I. Bukharin, who was later shot himself on absurd charges. Why did Bukharin slander himself at one of the Moscow trials? And the goal turned out to be the same: so that his young wife would not be shot and his child would not be killed. In the thirties in the USSR it became possible to shoot children from the age of 12.

The Constitution came into force on December 5, 1936. This day became a public holiday. Article I declared that the USSR "is a socialist state of workers and peasants." The Soviets of Working People's Deputies became its political foundation (Article 2), all power belonged to the working people represented by these Soviets (Article 3). The socialist economic system and socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production became the economic basis (Article 4). Articles 9 and 10 allowed for a private economy based on personal labor, and the right of citizens' personal property to their labor income and savings, to a dwelling house and ancillary households, to personal consumption and convenience items. The right to inherit personal property was provided for. All these rights were protected by law 11 .

It can be noted that at the legal level, the CPSU (b), represented by its leadership, finally abandoned the principle of communist leveling. The possibility of accumulating personal property, improving the material well-being of citizens became an important factor accelerating modernization.

Chapter II of the Constitution of the USSR guaranteed a progressive state structure built on the successful solution of the national question in the 1920s and 1930s. XX century. Article 13 recognized as equal all Soviet socialist republics united in a single union. Article 16 guaranteed each republic the right to have its own constitution, "taking into account the peculiarities of the republic and built in full accordance with the Constitution of the USSR." All Soviet people became citizens of the USSR at the same time, retaining their republican status. All-Union laws were recognized as supreme, formally the republics retained the right to freely secede from the USSR

Serious modernization changes have taken place in the structure and procedure for the formation of the supreme bodies of the USSR. The former system of congresses of Soviets was abolished. Article 30 proclaimed: "The supreme body of state power in the USSR is the Supreme Soviet of the USSR." It was divided into two equal chambers: the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities.

(Article 33). Elections of deputies to the first chamber were carried out according to the principle of one deputy per 300,000 inhabitants (Article 34). They delegated to the Council of Nationalities by electoral means: the union republic - 25 deputies, the autonomous republic - 11, the autonomous region - 5, the autonomous district was represented by one deputy (Article 35). The Supreme Soviet, at a joint meeting of both chambers, elected the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “composed of the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, eleven of his deputies, the secretary of the Presidium and 24 members of the Presidium” (Art. 48) 13 . That is, the number of deputies for the chairman of the Presidium was equal to the actual number of union republics at that time.

The Soviets of Working People's Deputies were the local bodies of state power (Article 94). They made decisions and gave orders within the limits of the rights granted to them by federal and republican laws (Article 98). Their executive bodies were subordinate both to their Council, which elected them, and to a higher executive body (Article 101) 14 .

Chapter IX was devoted to the court and the prosecutor's office. Here Article 102 determined the entire structure of the courts: from the People's Court to the Supreme Court of the USSR. People's courts were elected by the citizens of the respective territorial region "on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot of citizens for a period of three years" (Article 109). Article 113 placed the highest supervision over the exact execution of laws on the prosecutor of the USSR. It was approved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for a period of seven years (Article 114). The prosecutor appointed local prosecutors. The Constitution guaranteed the independence of the prosecutor's office from local authorities 15 . But party bodies often directly "pressed" on the court and the prosecutor's office.

Equality in elections for all citizens, secret ballot, a wide range of personal rights, equality of sexes and nationalities before any law, freedom to worship and conduct anti-religious propaganda: all this was formally directly reflected in the Constitution.

But Article 126 defined the CPSU (b) as "the leading nucleus of all organizations of working people, both public and state" 16 . And this seemingly modest constitutional thesis finally established in the country the dictatorship of the party instead of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Since the time of the underground and the Civil War, the principle of democratic centralism has been in force in the party, which rightly, in emergency conditions, gave an advantage to the leaders. But this principle was fully preserved even in peacetime, under the plausible pretext of defending the unity of the Party. In the thirties, when the dictatorship of one leader was actually established in the CPSU (b), everything was decided personally by I.V. Stalin. The personality of Stalin is very contradictory, it magically attracts and causes panic in people until now. The cult of his personality still requires careful and close study. Stalin instantly made and canceled decisions, with one stroke of the pen moved millions and millions of people, selected virtually all the main cadres, raised any person to gigantic commanding heights and overthrew him into camp dust and grave darkness. Stalin, as it were, came from the depths of ancient times on the global wave of the growth of totalitarianism in the 30s and 40s. XX century. But only he became the world dictator No. 1. Stalin created an ideal system of state and law in which he could do what he considered necessary at the moment. Until the end of his life, he did not part with the idea of ​​a world revolution, his own world domination, preparing the USSR for a global world war.

Stalin's constitution turned out to be very democratic in form, but the political regime was openly totalitarian.

As they write A.G. Kanaev and S.A. Puntus: the tightening of the political regime in the 1930s. could not but affect the development of Soviet law. As early as 1931, at the First All-Union Congress of Marxist-statists, the criminal law principle “no crime, no punishment without an indication of this in the law” was condemned, as well as the idea of ​​a rule of law state. This was expressed in a departure from the fundamental principles of law: freedom of the individual and property, the presumption of innocence, proportionality of punishment to the severity of the crime, personal responsibility, etc. Particularly noticeable are the changes in criminal law, which was directed to fight domestic political opponents, to provide criminal-legal means of conducting domestic policy and had a pronounced tendency to tighten the existing norms. An example is the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 7, 1932 "On the protection of property of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation and the strengthening of public (socialist) property." It is known as the "law of three spikelets": regardless of the size of the theft of socialist property, the plunderers were declared "enemies of the people", and any theft was subject to severe punishment. Further tightening of criminal law was manifested in the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on July 8, 1934 "On supplementing the Regulations on state crimes (counter-revolutionary and especially for the USSR dangerous crimes against the order of government) with articles on treason" 17 .

It should be noted that the criminal process in the period under review acquires a dual character. Legal acts were adopted, both fixing some of the democratic principles of the criminal process, and becoming legal support for mass repressions. Moreover, the former were mainly declarative, while the latter actually acted. One of these acts is the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of December 1, 1934 "On the procedure for conducting cases on the preparation and commission of terrorist acts." In the pre-war period, there was a tightening of liability measures not only in criminal law, but also in other branches of law. So, on June 26, 1940, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the transition to an eight-hour working day, a six-day working week and the prohibition of unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions" was issued. It should be noted that this normative act established criminal liability for violation of labor discipline 18 .

This decree actually prepared the country for war. Hitler defeated France. The whole question was where he would go next. Stalin assumed that the object of attack would logically be England, and then possibly the United States. Really,

The facts confirm that Stalin was a zealous student of both Lenin and Trotsky, the two main leaders of the October Revolution of 1917. He practically successfully implemented all of their ideas, except for one: the world revolution. Stalin is a sufficiently shrewd politician not to understand the need for world domination for the USSR or its complete hegemony. The founders of Marxism immediately determined that

the victory of communism is possible only as a world victory. The formula "in one single country" was subjected to Trotsky's subtle criticism back in the twenties: "you can build, but you can't build." Events of the 80-90s of the XX century. emphasized his correctness. Therefore, Stalin could not understand this situation differently. In his opinion, to include Germany, Italy, France, Great Britain, defeated in any way, into the socialist sphere would mean the creation of the Socialist United States of Europe! Then you can put the US and Japan on their knees.

It should be noted right away that the problem requires a long study, but some points are gradually drawn by time. A certain role in this approach was played by the books of V. Suvorov (V.B. Rezun) "Icebreaker" and "M Day" (Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War; Day "M": When the Second World War began. M .: TKO "AST", 1994.576 p.). In the same year, a fundamental academic publication was published - Russia in the 20th century: Historians of the world argue. (M.: Nauka, 1994. 752 p.). The fourth section of it is called "War". Publications by I. Chelyshev (Russia), J. Zamoyski (Poland), G. Gorodetsky (Israel), A. Basov (Russia) draw a specific situation before

the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and after June 22, 1941. It turns out that the plans of I.V. Stalin were clearly offensive in nature. Moscow's accession to the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo pact was not ruled out. However, the Kremlin's appetites turned out to be so high that Hitler abandoned further constructive negotiations and secretly began to prepare for a preventive war with the USSR. Hitler's "preventiveness" of war has always been disputed by Soviet historians. But the fact of a powerful concentration of Soviet troops by the summer of 1941 on the western borders is now difficult to deny. 5,801 tanks were concentrated in the Kiev Military District, and 3,295 tanks in the Western Special District. Of these, KV tanks - 375 tanks, T-34 - 724, i.e. over a thousand new tanks! As the above historians also testify, on June 22, 1941, there were 9,200 Soviet tanks, 46,830 artillery pieces and mortars in the western border districts (some authors write about 14,192 tanks) 19 .

Jan Zamoyski writes that already in the autumn of 1940, through the Comintern, the transfer of communists began, mainly from the international brigades in Spain, from camps in France to Germany and the occupied countries with a general orientation towards a "pan-European October", i.e. a repetition of the revolutionary situation of 1918. The operation was planned to be carried out before spring

1942 Directives to the communist parties of the occupied countries in the spring of 1941 were of similar importance: to get in touch with the patriotic underground movement in order to achieve a leading role in these movements. This is especially evident in the example of Belgium and northern France. The main representatives of the Comintern were then in Belgium, including a certain Fred, who was mysteriously murdered later in Brussels.

It is significant that at 21:35 on June 22, 1941 (as G. Gorodetsky points out), the Soviet high command decided to switch to offensive operations in the main directions. The troops of the North-Western and Western fronts were given the task of "surrounding and destroying the enemy's Suwalki grouping and capturing the city of Suwalki by the end of June 24." Troops of the Southwestern Front: "surround and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on the Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopol front and by the end of June 24, capture the Lublin region." Did it turn out to be impromptu in the given situation of a sudden blow, or a long-standing preparation for an offensive "revolutionary" war? Stalin's activities have always been distinguished by increased secrecy, the most sensitive episodes of contemporary history to him still do not find full documentary coverage. There are simply no documents. It's clear that

June 22, 1941 Hitler outplayed Stalin. It was Stalin and his entourage who at that time turned out to be the “clay feet” of the Russian ear. By mid-July, the Red Army (see A. Basov's report) had lost 98 out of 170 divisions (28 were destroyed and 70 defeated). In 1941, 14 armies fought in encirclement. By mid-July, the spacecraft had also lost 1,600 aircraft. In 1941, out of 22.6 thousand tanks, it lost 20.5 thousand. In the Battle of Smolensk, the Kyiv and Moscow defensive operations, the irretrievable losses of the army amounted to 1.5 million people. According to eyewitnesses, Stalin wanted to sign a new "Brest" peace with the Germans in the fall of 1941. Only now Hitler considered that victory was in his pocket. And also deeply mistaken .

During the Great Patriotic War, a complete modernization of the state and society in a military way takes place. On the basis of industry and agriculture modernized in the 1930s, it was possible, through the heroic labor of the people, to provide the front with everything necessary. American aid, supplies from the United States played a big role, but not decisive. In the historiography of the post-Soviet period, many critical assessments have appeared in relation to I.V. Stalin, individual Soviet marshals. The essence of criticism: they did not spare people, they made huge losses. These authors seem to forget the fact that our troops fought with the best army in the world - the German militarist machine. And in the Second World War, no one could resist the Germans in the direction of their main attack, except for the Red Army, and then the Soviet.

Modernization during the war years led to the fact that the front and rear became a single social organism. On half-starvation rations, the workers, often women and teenagers, overfulfilled the plans by 100-200%, or even 10 times. Scientists and designers steadily improved weapons in a fantastically short time. The peasants - collective farmers themselves were malnourished, but they provided the front with bread in sufficient quantities. And here again it is necessary to single out the work of women and adolescents, when all men of military age, starting from 17 years old, went to the front. The war truly turned out to be the Great Patriotic War.

Naturally, the state then applied tough military legal solutions. And those who did not want to work hard and fight honestly were subjected to harsh measures. Perhaps someone suffered undeservedly, received too cruel a punishment, and there were quite a few such cases. But this war solved one question: whether there would be a state in which hundreds of peoples live in a peaceful environment, or they would dissolve in an alien environment. Hitler fought not only against Stalin, not only against communism, but against the peoples of the USSR for the establishment of totalitarian German Nazism, for the forcible Germanization of those people who would be allowed to live on.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet law developed towards the adoption of emergency norms. One of the most important acts is the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 22, 1941 "On Martial Law". In areas declared under martial law, all functions of state power were transferred to the military authorities. The decree tightened the regulation of labor relations. In particular, labor service was introduced for a number of jobs, and unauthorized leaving from work was equated with desertion. A similar policy in the field of labor legislation was continued by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 26, 1941 "On the working hours for workers and employees in wartime", according to which directors of enterprises received the right to impose overtime work up to three hours a day. Regular and additional vacations were cancelled, which were replaced by monetary compensation transferred to frozen deposits 22 .

The shortage of manpower in industry that persisted in wartime led to the adoption on February 13, 1942 of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for work in production and construction for the wartime period”, which introduced labor mobilization for work at enterprises of the most important industries men aged 16 to 55 and women aged 16 to 45. In criminal law in wartime, the norms of the pre-war period continued to operate, but were introduced

and new ones, caused by the peculiarities of the military situation. Thus, in November 1943, the Decree “On liability for the disclosure of state secrets or for the loss of documents containing state secrets” was adopted, according to which these acts were punishable by imprisonment for a term of 3 to 10 years. Also, criminal liability for theft and violations of labor discipline was increased, and criminal liability was established for evading labor mobilization and compulsory military training. Simultaneously with the Decree “On Martial Law”, the “Regulations on military tribunals in areas declared under martial law and in areas of military operations” were approved, according to which all cases against state security and crimes against defense were considered by military tribunals without the participation of people's assessors. The verdicts of the military tribunals were not subject to appeal, they entered into force and were executed immediately after they were passed.

The victory in the Great Patriotic War turned out to be extremely desirable, but for most people it was very bitter, overshadowed by the loss of loved ones and property. The Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Atrocities of the Nazi Invaders reported on September 12, 1945: “Before the war, 88 million people lived on the territory of the Soviet Union, which was under occupation ...

The Nazi invaders completely or partially destroyed and burned 1710 cities and more than 70 thousand villages and villages ... Among the destroyed and most affected cities are the largest industrial and cultural centers: Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod , Pskov, Orel, Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don and many others.

The fascist German invaders destroyed 31,850 industrial enterprises, which employed about 4 million workers; destroyed or removed 239 thousand electric motors, 175 thousand machine tools.

They destroyed 65 thousand kilometers of railway track, 4100 railway stations, ... 40 thousand hospitals, ... 84 thousand schools, technical schools, higher educational institutions, research institutes ...

They ruined and plundered 98 thousand collective farms, 1876 state farms and 2890 machine and tractor stations..”24.

The total damage amounted to a huge amount - 679 billion rubles in state prices in 1941. This did not include losses from the cessation or reduction in the work of enterprises and citizens, the cost of food and supplies confiscated by the German occupation forces, military spending of the USSR, as well as losses from a slowdown in the pace of overall economic development countries as a result of enemy actions during 1941-1945.

Human losses turned out to be incredible, hidden for a long time: more than 27 million people. There are no data on the population in the USSR in 1945.

At the beginning of 1950, 178.5 million people lived in the country, i.e. 15.6 million less than before the war (end of 1939 - 194.1 million). It should be noted that following the results of the Second world war The Soviet Union received a number of new territories and additional population.

After the end of hostilities, two options for the development of society turned out to be probable and possible. The first one is reformist: mitigation of the pre-war mobilization model of development, renunciation of the state of emergency, mass repressions, promotion of the development of democratization processes. The second one is counter-reformatory: complete resuscitation of the pre-war management model, preservation and strengthening of the totalitarian regime.

The possibility and necessity of the first path of development was determined by the increased international prestige of the victorious country, the growth of self-awareness of the Soviet people, increased resistance to the Stalinist regime of power, uprisings and escapes in the Gulag, the struggle against the implanted Soviet model of development in the Baltic States, in Western Ukraine, in the countries of Eastern Europe.

But it was the second version of the post-war development of the USSR through the restoration of the pre-war model of development and management of the national economy and society that became a reality. Stalin and his entourage did not conceive of leading the state through non-administrative means 25 .

On September 4, 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished, and its functions were transferred to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In March 1946, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was renamed into the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the people's commissariats - into ministries. In 1947, the State Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was transformed into the State Planning Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, whose tasks now included planning, recording and monitoring the implementation of national economic plans.

I.V. Stalin at the pre-election meeting of voters of the Stalin constituency of Moscow on February 9, 1946 determined the main directions of modernization: “The main tasks of the new five year plan consist in restoring the affected areas of the country, restoring the pre-war level of industry and agriculture and then surpassing this level. In the near future the rationing system will be abolished, special attention will be paid to expanding the production of consumer goods, to raising the living standards of the working people by consistently lowering the prices of goods, to the extensive construction of all kinds of research institutes that can enable science to develop its forces.

I have no doubt that if we render proper assistance to our scientists, they will be able not only to catch up, but in the near future to surpass the achievements of science outside our country” 26 .

In mid-March 1946, the newly elected Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved a five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR for 1946-1950. Its main tasks are to reach the pre-war level (1940) within two years - by 1948, and by the end of the five-year plan to significantly exceed it.

During the implementation of the five-year plan, the achievements of scientific and technological progress were used mainly in defense industry, which has been given explicit priority. Despite the partial conversion of the latter, the military-industrial complex (MIC) received further accelerated development. On August 29, 1949, an atomic bomb was tested, created by the efforts of Soviet scientists, primarily I.V. Kurchatov, Yu.B. Khariton, Ya.B. Zeldovich, A.D. Sakharov. Expenses for the development of nuclear missile weapons required gigantic funds, which were ruthlessly extracted from the sphere of public consumption.

Other sources included German reparations ($4.3 billion). They played a certain role in strengthening industrial power. 3.2 million German and 600 thousand Japanese prisoners of war worked in the USSR. From Germany there were trains with equipment, and sometimes with designers, engineers and workers. So, for example, the Junkers company was completely relocated from Dessau to Kuibyshev, the Oppel company from Eisenach to Moscow, and the Zeiss company from Jena to Krasnogorsk. But purchases of the latest equipment and technology in the United States soon ceased due to a ban imposed by the American side 27 .

The people, who spent enormous physical and moral efforts on labor accomplishments, were waiting for the fulfillment of the promises of I.V. Stalin about improving life. On December 14, 1947, the rationing system for food and industrial goods was finally abolished. This was accompanied by a monetary reform, during which 10 old rubles were exchanged for 1 new one. True, deposits in savings banks were recalculated at a preferential rate, but they accounted for only 15% of the population's money savings. And the new uniform prices in the state and cooperative retail trade were set at a level close to the previous commercial ones. All this, of course, significantly contributed to reducing the consumer pressure on the market for goods and services. In the future, this made it possible to carry out annual price reductions. The first of these occurred on April 10, 1948, when alcohol, vodka, perfumery and cosmetics, vitamins, motorcycles, bicycles fell by 20%, and tobacco and Moskvich cars by 10% 28 .

In the countryside, where the majority of the population lived, the situation worsened sharply as early as the autumn of 1946 due to crop failure, due partly to a terrible drought, and partly to a catastrophic failure in the management of collective farms. In 1948, collective farmers were urged to sell to the state small livestock, which they were allowed to keep according to the collective farm charter. As a result, over six months collective farmers secretly slaughtered more than 2 million heads of livestock. Fees and taxes on income from sales in the free market have increased significantly. In addition, trading in the market was allowed only if there was a special document confirming that the corresponding collective farm had fully fulfilled its obligations to the state.

At the end of 1949, the economic and financial situation of the collective farms deteriorated so much that the government had to develop a series of reforms. In 1950 and 1951 discussions were held in the country about agricultural policy and measures to improve it. A.A., who was previously responsible for agrarian policy. Andreev was replaced by N.S. Khrushchev.

On March 8, 1950, Pravda published, signed by Khrushchev, a new party plan for the reorganization of collective farms. The measures to enlarge collective farms that followed the decree of May 30, 1950, were carried out very quickly: in one year the number of collective farms decreased from 252 thousand to 121 thousand, and then to 94 thousand by the end

1952 All this was accompanied by a new significant reduction in the individual allotments of the peasants. Payments in kind, which constituted a significant part of the collective farm "earnings", were also reduced.

On March 4, 1951, Pravda published a project for the creation of "agrocities". N.S. Khrushchev outlined this clearly utopian idea even earlier in one of his public speeches at the end of January 1951. According to the “reformers”, the peasants, inclined to a new, urban lifestyle with comfort and communal services, would say goodbye to their so tenacious individualistic psychology and would become ordinary workers, i.e. workers. Thus, this project solved two problems at once: it destroyed the peasantry as part of the Soviet society and at the same time erased the difference between rural and urban labor. The day after the publication of the project, Pravda, however, came up with a clarification in which it was noted that in the previous issue it was not about the project, but about the beginning of the discussion. As a result of this "newspaper experiment", Stalin removed Khrushchev from the leadership of agriculture.

Of course, utopias economic theory were the contribution not only of Khrushchev. In the autumn of 1951, a discussion on political economy took place in the USSR. Based on its results, in 1952, the work of I.V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. The author warned against a hasty curtailment of commodity production in the country. Since there are two forms of ownership - state (nationwide) and collective farm, the exchange between them goes through purchase and sale. At the same time, Stalin noted: “Of course, when instead of two main production sectors, state and collective farm, one comprehensive production sector appears with the right to dispose of all consumer products of the country, commodity circulation with its “money economy” will disappear as an unnecessary element of the national economy 30.

Such financial modernization without world revolution would lead to complete economic catastrophe. All this was a utopia in the fullest sense of the word.

The post-war regime in the USSR in its political, ideological and socio-economic essence was deeply totalitarian. After the war, I.V. Stalin sought to strengthen the administrative-bureaucratic system. Thirteen years after the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b), the 19th Congress of the CPSU met. It replaced the name of the party, which became the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

Soviet physicist S.E. Frisch noted in his memoirs that a deeper differentiation took place in Soviet society than existed in the prewar years. An extensive class of privileged people appeared - the "Soviet elite". Strengthening of social differentiation was largely caused by the specifics of the war years. Thus, in the second half of the war, “special rations”, extra-limit distributions, and closed cooperatives arose. This whole system of privileges was preserved after the war 31 .

The USSR, having increased its authority due to the great victory, entered the Cold War with the West. A hot war unfolded in Korea, where on the one hand were US troops, and on the other, Chinese volunteers and Soviet pilots. Things were moving towards a new world war. Through the heroic efforts of Soviet scientists, relying on the labor contribution of the entire people, in 1949 they succeeded in creating domestic atomic weapons. It later became a deterrent to a major war for both the United States and the USSR. The internal situation in the USSR turned things definitively in the direction of counter-modernization. There was a struggle against Westernism "rootless cosmopolitanism." The sciences were banned: genetics, cybernetics, statistics and others. Repressions intensified: the security agencies, on Stalin's orders, fabricated a number of major "cases" that were absolutely illegal. But in the midst of the "case of the Kremlin doctors" I.V. Stalin, who refused their services for about six months, at the beginning of March 1953, as always for the domestic rulers, unexpectedly died. The country found itself without a "master". His entourage had to think hard: where and how to go further and who will be the new leader.

1 Teplyakov A.G. Procedure: execution of death sentences in the 1920s and 1930s. - M.: Return, 2007. - P.71.

2 Ibid. - p.47.

3 History of Russia from ancient times to the present day: textbook / A.N. Sakharov, A.N. Bokhanov, V.A. Shestakov; ed. A.N. Sakharov ... - S.643.

4 Ibid. - P.655-656.

5 Stalin I. Issues of Leninism. Eleventh edition. - M .: OGIZ State publishing house watered. lit., 1945. - S.329-330.

6 The experience of Russian modernizations of the XVIII-XX centuries ... - P.67-68.

7 Rogachev A.G. Pre-war Soviet modernization: preparation for the world war (in the book: USSR in the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War (1939-1945) -fascist troops near Moscow. - Krasnoyarsk: RIO SibGTU. 2001. - P.6-7.

8 Ibid. – P.8-9.

9 Domestic history: Proc. allowance / Under scientific. Ed. A.G. Rogacheva ... - S.129.

10 History of Russia from ancient times to the present day: textbook. /A.N. Sakharov, A.N. Bokhanov, V.A. Shestakov; ed. A.N. Sakharov ... - S.652.

11 Reader on the history of the state and law of Russia: textbook. allowance / comp. Yu.P. Titov - 2nd ed. revised and additional ... - S.347-348.

12 Ibid - S.348-350.

13 Ibid. - S.350-352.

14 Ibid. - S.356-357.

15 Ibid. - P.357-358.

16 Ibid. - P.359.

17 History of the State and Law of Russia in the 20th century: anthology / comp. A.G. Kanaev, S.A. Puntus ... - S.80.

18 Ibid. - P.80-81.

19 Rogachev A.G. World War or World Revolution? / In the book: The contribution of Siberians to the Great Victory: Proceedings. scientific-practical. conf. Krasnoyarsk, April 28, 1995 / Krasnoyarsk. Higher Command. Air Defense School of Radioelectronics. Krasnoyarsk, 1995. - P.135-137.

20 Ibid. – P.137.

21 Ibid. - P.136.

22 History of the State and Law of Russia in the 20th century: anthology / comp. A.G. Kanaev, S.A. Puntus ... - S.81.

23 Ibid. - P.82.

24 Reader on the history of Russia / author-compiler: A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva, T.A. Sivokhin ... - S.501.

25 Kofman Ya.M. Reforms and counter-reforms in recent national history (1945-2005): textbook for students of higher educational institutions / Ya.M. Kofman; Krasnoyar. State. Ped. Univ. V.P. Astafiev. - Krasnoyarsk: RIO GOU VPO KSPU them. V.P. Astafieva, 2006.- S. 21-22.

26 Russia we didn't know. 1939-1993: reader: for students of Art. class general education schools, gymnasiums, colleges, technical schools and university students / comp. L.Ya. Baranova, N.N. Baranov, Yu.V. Velichko and others; ed. M.A. Dashevskaya and others - Chelyabinsk: Yuzh.-Ural. book. Publishing house, 1995. - S.257.

27 Political history: Russia - USSR - Russian Federation: in 2 volumes. T. 2. - M .: TERRA, 1996. - P. 491.

28 Ibid. - P.508.

29 Kofman Ya.M. Reforms and counter-reforms in recent national history…. – p.28-3

30 Reader on the history of Russia / author-compiler: A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva, T.A. Sivokhin ... - S.506.

31 Frish S.E. Through the prism of time / S.E. Frisch. - M.: Politizdat, 1992. - P.323.

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Soviet model of industrialization Stalinist modernization country and its features

The "Great Leap Forward" of 1927 - the crisis of grain procurements. The procurement plan scheduled for the end (October-December) of 1927 failed: instead of 4.58 million tons harvested for the corresponding period last year, only 2.4 million tons were purchased. There was nothing to export and there was nothing to buy equipment for the industry, because. bread was the main article of export.

"Extraordinary" administrative measures of the party leadership Prohibition of market trading; Prosecution of wealthy peasants who do not want to hand over grain to the state at official prices; Searches in houses with the involvement of the rural poor; Party leaders went to the places to directly supervise the grain procurements. As a result, the necessary amount of grain was harvested, but a significant part of the peasants lost faith in the possibility of developing their farms.

"Great Leap Forward" As a result of trips around the country, it was concluded that it was necessary to sharply accelerate the pace of industrialization and carry out fundamental changes in agriculture, i.e. take the big leap

Grain Procurement Crisis: Causes and Ways Out Stalin I.V. Bukharin N.I. Causes of the crisis: Weak industry cannot ensure the release of the necessary goods. Small peasant farming is not capable of satisfying the needs of industry. The kulak deliberately sabotages the grain procurements. Causes of the crisis: Subjective factors: a reserve fund for manufactured goods was not created. Low purchase prices for bread were set. Ways out: Ways out: Concentration of all financial and material resources on solving the problem of industrialization. Reorganize agriculture on the basis of collective farms. Regulation of purchase prices. Some reduction in investment in metallurgy and machine building. Development of the Cooperative Movement in the Village The basis of the agricultural sector is individual farms.

Pobeda I.V. Stalin N.I. Bukharin put forward the proposition that the kulak would inevitably grow into socialism. His appeal to the peasants in 1925: "Get rich, do not be afraid of any repression!" Most of the party members sided with Stalin. At the Plenum of the Central Committee in 1929, N.I. Bukharin was accused of "right deviation", i.e. that he and his supporters "are going to slowly restore capitalism." A course was set for accelerated industrialization.

Causes of industrialization In 1928, the whole country produced 2 trucks and 3 tractors per day. About a quarter of textile equipment, half of steam turbines, almost 70% of machine tools and tractors were purchased abroad. By production industrial products per capita, the USSR was 5-30 times inferior to the advanced powers. Russia remained an agrarian country: by the end of the 1920s. 76% of the population lived in the countryside. The international environment was difficult.

Technical and economic backwardness of the USSR. The dependence of the Soviet Union on the import of machinery and equipment, this led to a weakening of the country's defense capability. Difficult international environment. Reasons for industrialization

“To slow down means to fall behind. And the retards are beaten. But we don't want to be beaten. We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We have to run this distance in 10 years. Either we do it or we'll be crushed." I.V. Stalin. I.V. Stalin on industrialization

XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - Congress of Industrialization (1925) Task: "To transform the USSR from a country that imports machinery and equipment into a country that produces them." The "new opposition" was defeated at the congress. G.E. Zinoviev was removed from the post of head of the Leningrad party organization. Instead, S.M. Kirov is a supporter of Stalin.

The goals of industrialization Eliminate the technical and economic backwardness of the country. Achievement of economic independence. Creation of a powerful defense industry. Priority development of basic industries (fuel, chemical, metallurgy, mechanical engineering).

Sources of industrialization Redistribution of budget funds in favor of industrial sectors. Receipt additional income due to the export of grain, oil, timber, furs, gold, oil and other goods. Sale of museum treasures. An increase in the progressive tax on Nepmen and income tax from urban and rural population. Carrying out public loans from the population. Organization of socialist emulation and shock work.

Loans from the population Grain export Sale of raw materials (oil, timber), gold, museum treasures Organization of competition and shock work Labor enthusiasm Sources of industrialization

Sources of Industrialization Workers were forced to subscribe to government loans. This money went to the needs of industrialization.

"Cadres decide everything!" I.V. Stalin Former peasants suddenly became workers Thousands of Gulag prisoners - victims of repression - worked and died on the construction of industrial giants.

First Five Year Plan: 1928 - 1932 In May 1929, the Fifth All-Union Congress of Soviets approved the first five-year plan for the economic and socialist development of the USSR. The main task of the five-year plan: the transformation of the country from agrarian to agro-industrial

First Five-Year Plan Enthusiasm… and you can't pick another word for the years of the First Five-Year Plan, it was enthusiasm that inspired the youth to daily exploits. I. Erenburg

Millions of people with great enthusiasm worked almost for free at the construction sites of the five-year plan. Competition under the slogan "Let's take a year from the five-year plan, we will complete the five-year plan in four years" unfolded throughout the country.

XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - January 1934 - approved the second five-year plan for the development of the national economy. Task: to complete the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, to build the material and technical basis of socialism. Second Five Year Plan: 1933 - 1937

The results of the five-year plans The first five-year plan 1928-1932. Second Five-Year Plan 1933-1937 Azovstal, Zaporizhstal Dneproges Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk metallurgical plants Donbass and Kuzbass mines Stalingrad, Kharkov tractor plants Moscow, Gorky automobile plants Chelyabinsk tractor plant Ural, Kramotor heavy engineering plants. Aircraft factories in Kharkov, Moscow, Kuibyshev.

Stakhanov movement - beginning of 1935. In 1935, Alexei Stakhanov, a miner of the Tsentralnaya - Irmino mine, set a record by extracting 102 tons of coal in 5 hours and 45 minutes instead of 7 tons according to the norm. His initiative spread to other industries.

Tkachikha E.V. and M.I. Vinogradov Newspapers reported on the achievements of N.A. Izotova, A.Kh. Busygina, E.V. and M.I. Vinogradov. In December 1935, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the "initiative of the working people." Production rates in the industry were increased by 15-20% Shakhter N.А. Izotov Kuznets A.Kh. Busygin

Achieving the goals of the USSR - an industrial-agrarian country New industries have been created The country's economic independence has been achieved A powerful military-industrial complex has been created Unemployment has been eliminated

Number of large state-owned industrial enterprises built, restored and put into operation Years Number of enterprises 1918–1929 1st Five-Year Plan (1928–1932) 2nd Five-Year Plan (1933–1937) 2200 1500 4500

New Industries

The cost of industrialization Decrease in the living standards of the population (the purchasing power of workers decreased by 40%) Lagging behind in light industry Famine of 1932-33 Robbery of the village Massive repressions

The life of the townspeople Housing rent was low, but living conditions did not improve, the population of cities was constantly increasing. The workers usually lived in communal apartments or barracks without any amenities.

Ministry of Education and Science of Russia

State educational institution

Higher professional education

St. Petersburg University of Service and Economics

Institute of Regional Economics and Management

discipline: "National History".

Modernization of the USSR in Stalin's Style: Goals, Sources, Methods, Forms, Results.

Completed by a 2nd year student

distance learning

Specialty 080507.65(061100)

Romanova Ekaterina Andreevna

Student card code

Checked by:_________________

Saint Petersburg

1. Introduction

2. Study of Stalin's industrialization

2.2 Sources

2.3 Methods

3. Conclusions on the results of modernization

4. List of used literature

Introduction

The Stalinist modernization of the USSR is the so-called " Stalinist industrialization» 30s. The aim of the work is to study the available materials about this period and to assess the role of modernization in the formation of the Soviet state.

We will also try to give an objective assessment of the role of Stalin in preparation for the Great Patriotic War and its initial period.

Let's try to answer the following questions:

1) what goals were pursued by the Soviet leadership when transferring the predominantly agrarian economy of the country to industrial rails?

2) during perestroika, the idea was formed that the NEP was a good alternative to the development of the country, is this true?

3) what funds were invested in modernization and was it possible to get by with lower costs?

4) was there an alternative to the course taken by Stalin for accelerated industrialization, accompanied by immeasurable suffering of the people and millions of human losses?

5) what methods were used to modernize the vast territory of the Soviet state?

6) how, in fact, did the modernization proceed, what difficulties arose?

7) what has the modernization led to, what are the positive and negative results?

2.1 Goals of modernization

The socialist industrialization of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (its other name is "Stalinist industrialization") was a process aimed at accelerating the economic and industrial potential of all the republics that were part of the Union. The main goal of industrialization is to reduce the country's lag behind the economically developed capitalist states. The task of industrialization was an officially announced program to transform the USSR from an agrarian country into one of the leading industrial powers. This process took place mainly in the 1930s.

Secondary goals: facilitating the management of various social groups of people, reducing the likelihood of mass riots, building up the country's economic and military potential, improving working conditions for workers, developing the country's defense capability.

Despite the fact that the main industrial potential of the Soviet Union was formed somewhat later (during the seven-year plans), industrialization is commonly understood as the era of the first five-year plans.

2.2 Sources of modernization

To understand the logic of the Soviet leadership, it is necessary to know in what world it existed. After the end of World War I, there were two views of the future. According to the first, an almost ideal world order was achieved, which could develop further, saving humanity from a huge number of problems, including the horrors of world wars. A similar view was shared by the liberal democracies that won the war: Great Britain, France, the United States.

There was another approach, according to which the contradictions facing the world were not resolved. A colossal conflict potential remained, which was to be resolved in the next world war. This approach was taken various currents Marxism and revanchist forces in countries that considered themselves offended by the results of the First World War: Germany, Japan, Italy. As subsequent events showed, the second view was more realistic.

Possessing a more adequate picture of the world, Marxists could build a more adequate external and internal politics. They were well aware that in the near future the country would be involved in the most severe global conflict. To what extent was Russia ready for it?

Recently, it has become customary to assert that in 1913 Russia was the most intensively developing world power. But it must be taken into account that the growth rate was so high because of the low base effect. By the beginning of the First World War, the Russian economy was much weaker than the economies of the leading countries, especially considering its structure, namely the inability to produce on a large scale the most advanced products by the standards of that time.

The First World War turned out to be a very long and stubborn battle between the warring parties. Economic potential acquired, in fact, a decisive role in the victory.

According to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, arms production in Russia lagged behind France, Great Britain, and Germany by about five times. The lag was especially pronounced in the latest industries at that time: the production of tanks and mortars, which Russia could not establish at all, aircraft and machine guns, where our country lagged behind by about 10 times.

Faced with a protracted war, the opposing sides began to transfer the economy to a military footing and were very successful. Russia was not capable of this. Relatively well developed military industry relied on a weak industrial base. Therefore, the rather large military industry of tsarist Russia could not meet the needs of the army.

Such a deplorable situation was due to the fact that Russia was in the first stage of industrialization, when light industries with low capital intensity and high labor intensity are developing. Only after the accumulation of significant capital in light industry does the development of heavy industry begin, which had not yet happened in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century.

But this state of the economy turned out to be completely inadequate to the military-strategic tasks facing the country at the beginning of the 20th century. The most difficult situation in Russia led to a revolution. The ensuing civil war seriously undermined Russia's already weak economic base. There was a colossal drop in production, the old qualified personnel were lost, some technologies disappeared. Russian industry, and previously rather backward, found itself in a catastrophic situation.

Until 1928, the government of the young Soviet state pursued a relatively soft new economic policy (NEP). This time was characterized by the fact that agriculture, food and light industry, retail trade were mainly in private hands. Under the control of the state were heavy industry, banks, wholesale and international trade and transport. State-owned enterprises were in healthy competition among themselves. The function of the State Planning Commission was mainly to develop forecasts that set the leading directions for development and determined the amount of state investment in a particular sector of the economy.

The NEP somewhat corrected the situation, but by the end of the NEP, industry had approximately reached the level of 1913, while the main competitors had gone far ahead over the past 20 years.

From the point of view of foreign policy, the state was in a rather difficult situation, since the leadership of the CPSU (b) did not exclude such a scenario in which the likelihood of a new war with the capitalist states would be very high. It was this fact that demanded almost complete rearmament from the country.

But the main problem was that it was impossible to start this rearmament at that moment, and the reason for this was the significant backwardness of heavy industry. At the same time, the pace of industrialization seemed to the government not too high due to a significant lag behind the capitalist states, in which in the 1920s. there was a significant economic recovery. In addition, there were serious social problems within the country, one of which was unemployment in the cities. By the end of the NEP policy, the number of unemployed was already more than 2 million people, which corresponded to about 10% of the urban population.

The country's leadership believed that one of the main factors holding back industrialization in the cities was the lack of food, since the villages did not want to provide the cities with cheap bread. And the government sought to overcome these difficulties through the planned distribution of resources between agriculture and industry, which was planned to be carried out by relying on the concept of socialism, which was publicly announced at the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) and at the III All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1925.

Believing that a new inter-imperialist struggle would take place in the near future, the Bolshevik leadership believed that the country needed to intensively develop the economy. First of all, heavy industry - the basis for military production. At the same time, the economic prerequisites for the development of heavy industry have not yet taken shape. The NEP existed for too little time for sufficient capital to be accumulated in light industry to invest in heavy industry. They could not be accumulated because of the position of the Bolshevik leadership. Allowing Nepmen to invest in heavy industry meant losing first economic power and then political power.

The Soviet leadership, led by Stalin, decided to build this base through industrialization. As soon as possible and at any cost.

2.3 Modernization methods

Thus, socialist industrialization began as one of the leading parts of the "triune task of radically reorganizing society," which included industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture (the creation of collective farms), and the cultural revolution. In science, the beginning of this process is considered to be the adoption and implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy (1928-1932). At the same time, a decision was made to eliminate private-commodity and capitalist forms of management.

Industrialization was impossible without a thorough reconstruction of the national economy. This process was to concentrate the main resources of the country on the development of heavy industry.

Economic breakthrough in the 1930s within the framework of Soviet ideology was considered one of the most important achievements of the USSR. However, since the late 1980s the topical issue of the real scale and real historical significance of industrialization has become the subject of rather heated discussions. These disputes directly concerned the real goals and means that the Soviet government chose to implement it, as well as the close connection of industrialization with collectivization and the mass repressions that soon followed. Particular attention in the discussions was paid to the results of industrialization, which had an impact on modern economy and society as a whole.

Special attention to development Soviet economy was given even under V. I. Lenin. During the years of the Civil War, the government, headed by the leader of the proletariat, began to develop a plan for the widespread electrification of the state.

In December 1920, at the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the plan of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) was adopted, and a year later it was approved by the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

This document planned the accelerated development of the electric power industry, and it was in close connection with the plans for the development of the territories. The GOELRO plan was designed for 10-15 years, and within its framework it was planned to build 30 power plants (20 thermal power plants and 10 hydroelectric power plants), whose total capacity was to be 1.75 million kW. This project included eight main economic regions: Central Industrial, Southern, Ural, Volga, Northern, West Siberian, Caucasian and Turkestan.

At the same time, the accelerated development of the country's transport support system was carried out at the same time: old railway lines were restored and new ones were built. In the same years, the construction of the Volga-Don Canal began.

It was with the GOELRO plan that the widespread industrialization of the USSR began. For example, electricity generated in 1932 increased 7 times compared to 1913, from 2 to 13.5 billion kW/h.

The choice of further ways to implement this plan was discussed over the next 2 years. As a result, two main approaches were developed - genetic and teleological. Supporters of the first were V. A. Bazarov, V. G. Groman, N. D. Kondratiev, who believed that the plan should be based on the laws of development and growth of the economy, which must be identified through a thorough analysis of existing trends. The teleological approach was followed by G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, V. V. Kuibyshev, S. G. Strumilin. From their point of view, the plan was to reshape the economy and be based on further structural changes production capabilities and tightening discipline.

STATEHOOD MODEL

The primary economic task of the post-war period was the restoration of the destroyed national economy. The material damage caused by the war amounted to almost a third of the national wealth, which was estimated at 679 billion rubles. The technical equipment of collective farms was virtually reduced to zero. The grain harvest amounted to half of the pre-war years. Due to the colossal human losses, mainly men of working age, the country's personnel potential has significantly decreased. According to Western experts, the recovery period in the USSR was to last about 15-20 years. Meanwhile, in February 1946, I.V. Stalin announced the need to achieve a threefold excess of the level of pre-war industrial production within three five-year plans. He stressed that "only under this condition can we assume that our Motherland will be guaranteed against any accidents." Already according to the five-year plan of 1946-1950. the volume of gross output was to exceed the pre-war figures by 48%. The strategy of reorienting the economy to a peaceful track was expressed in the abolition of the State Defense Committee on September 4, 1945. There was extensive demobilization.

Some restrictions of the “wartime regime” were lifted: the 8-hour working day was restored, mandatory overtime was canceled, annual leave. The principle of piecework wages was confirmed. The people's commissariats of mortar weapons and the tank industry were transformed, respectively, into the people's commissariat of engineering and instrument making and the people's commissariat of transport engineering. However, due to the beginning cold war» There was no global demilitarization of the Soviet economy.

The military-industrial complex continued to be the dominant area for the development of the national economy.

The priority of relying on heavy industry was the fundamental principle of Stalinist-type modernization. However, for the first time in many years, “Group A” production growth lagged behind that of the service sector.

Work on the restoration of the Dneproges, Donbass mines, mechanical engineering in Leningrad, cement plants in Novorossiysk, etc., caused a wide public outcry. The development of industry was embodied by the giant plants put into operation: Minsk Tractor, Kutaisi Automobile, Lisichansk Chemical. The epic of grandiose Gulag construction projects ended on May 31, 1952 with the opening of the Volga-Don shipping canal. Through the action of a complex of factors, among which paramount importance belonged to the enthusiasm of the winners in the war (for example, the neo-Ostakhan movement of the “high-speed workers”), the mobilization measures of the leadership (including forced labor of prisoners), reparations from Germany, during the fourth five-year plan, the pre-war economic potential was actually restored. Of course, it was a labor feat of the country. The way to find subsidies for the implementation of the economic breakthrough was the monetary reform, carried out on the basis of the decree of December 14, 1947 "On the implementation of monetary reform and the abolition of cards for food and industrial goods. The reform was confiscatory in nature, affecting the materially prosperous segments of the population. The old money was exchangeable at a rate of 10:1. Deposits in savings banks in excess of 3,000 rubles were revalued at a ratio of 2:1. Although food cards were abolished in the USSR in 1947 (in the first of the countries that suffered significantly from the war), fixed prices increased by 2.5-3.5 times.

Thereafter, there was a regular decrease retail prices for consumer goods. Financial resources of the state reflected a significant gold reserve, amounting to 2050 tons in the year of Stalin's death. The severe consequences of the war were aggravated by the drought, which led to famine in the southern regions of the European part of the USSR. The leaderships of Ukraine and Moldova used these difficult circumstances to implement the policy of collectivization in the territories of the republics annexed to the USSR in the prewar period, where the positions of private traders were still strong. A prominent role in the implementation of dispossession was played by the first secretary of the Republican Committee of Ukraine N.S. Khrushchev.

Collectivization in the Baltic States and Western Ukraine, accompanied by dispossession and the fight against insurgent detachments, was completed only by 1950.

During the war, the restrictive measures of the collective farm system were weakened, which was reflected in the tolerant attitude of the leadership towards the development of household plots and the private use of collective farm lands. A return to the pre-war collective-farm model did not seem like an obvious step to everyone among the party leaders, including Stalin himself. Chairman of the State Planning Commission N.A. Voznesensky called for encouraging the development of household work of peasants. Nevertheless, the Commission for Collective Farm Affairs, created on September 19, 1946, headed by A. Andreev, was charged with the task of returning the “illegally appropriated” collective farm lands.

But already in 1951-1952. a program is being developed to reform the collective farm system in the direction of weakening administrative guardianship, lowering taxes, introducing benefits for peasants, and increasing loans, which, as a result, due to a change in political leadership, was never implemented. In November 1948, the “Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature” was approved, which provided for the creation of an artificial sea in Western Siberia, the construction of a dam across the Pacific Ocean, the construction of giant hydroelectric power stations, the planting of forest protection plantations on an area exceeding 6 million hectares, and the introduction of grass-field crop rotations. The planting of forest belts, which began during Stalin's lifetime, slowed down the process of soil erosion and led to a slight increase in productivity.

The intention to weaken the repressive mechanism of the state in the post-war years was expressed in the moratorium of 1948-1949. on the use of the death penalty, which was soon abandoned in connection with the planned new wave of party purges. In general, the dynamics of repression was lower than in the 1930s, but remained significant. The majority of those convicted for political reasons (23% of the total number of prisoners) were persons accused of complicity with the occupation authorities. Prisoners of war and "Osterbeiters" rescued from German camps were placed in Soviet ones. Around the world, often with the assistance of former Western allies, a search was carried out for "displaced persons" for forced return to the USSR. Among them were even many representatives of the "first wave of emigration." Among those subject to externship there were numerous cases of suicide. On the other hand, in the western regions of the USSR and in the Caucasus in the post-war years, armed gangs of local separatists operated, among which the groups of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Baltic "forest brothers" stood out.

The deportation of a number of peoples accused of collective complicity with the Germans, which unfolded during the war years, is approved by a decree of June 26, 1946. Chechens, Ingush, Karachays, Balkars, Kalmyks, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Greeks, Volga Germans were subject to deportation to special settlements in Siberia and Central Asia , Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, Khemshins and some other peoples, with the elimination of the corresponding national-territorial formations. The basis for the repressions was the facts of cooperation of a certain part of the population of the deported peoples with the occupying German forces during the war.

However, the responsibility for individual manifestations of collaborationism unjustifiably extended to entire nations, among which, moreover, there were many representatives who fought heroically on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

This injustice subsequently gave rise to serious political consequences, including for national relations. The right vector of the party ideology led to the transformation of the internationalist doctrine of Marxism into "National Bolshevism" based on the principle of ethnocentrism. A.A. Zhdanov, who oversaw ideological work in the party, personified the national Bolshevik tendencies. He acted as the inspirer of the campaign against "rootless cosmopolitanism" that unfolded after his death, starting in 1949.

The priority of the Russian cultural-historical tradition was propagated, and "servile worship of the West" was condemned. The fight against cosmopolitanism was predominantly anti-American and anti-Zionist. The latter was largely predetermined by the pro-American course, the proclamation of Israel in 1948. The sympathy of many Soviet Jews for the recreated state was regarded as an expression of an anti-patriotic position towards the USSR. Under unclear circumstances, allegedly by employees of the MGB, in January 1948, the artistic director of the State Jewish Theater (GOSET) S.M. Mikhoels was killed in Minsk. In November 1948, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, created during the war years, was dissolved, and many of its activists were arrested.

The reason for the liquidation was the proposal of the JAC leadership to establish a Jewish republic in the Crimea on the site of the autonomous formation of the Crimean Tatars. Along with others, the wife of V.M. Molotov, actress P. Zhemchuzhina, was arrested and convicted on the basis of her friendly relations with the Israeli ambassador to the USSR, a Russian native, future Prime Minister Golda Meyer. L.M. Kaganovich collected signatures under a fabricated collective letter from the "Jewish community" about the deportation of Soviet Jews to Birobidzhan. Even during the war, a fundamental change in the nature of the relationship between the state and the Orthodox Church was revealed - from confrontation to cooperation. In the post-war years, the relevance of the dynamics of church restoration intensified. Almost doubled in the period from 1946 to 1953. the number of churches increased. Work on the prospect of church building was expressed in the establishment of two theological academies and 8 seminaries. Since the Easter celebrations of 1946, liturgical practice was resumed in the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, and the issue of returning the monastery to the jurisdiction of the patriarchate was put on the agenda. To the resolution “On the tasks of anti-religious, atheistic propaganda in the new conditions”, prepared in 1948 under the general guidance of M.A. Suslov, which proclaimed the task of eradicating religion as an indispensable condition for the transition from socialism to communism, Stalin actually applied a veto sanction.

In the post-war years, atheistic propaganda was practically reduced to nothing. It was then that the Union of Militant Atheists was dissolved.

Trying to raise the status of the Moscow Patriarchate in the ecumenical Orthodox movement, Stalin sought to award her the first position instead of the fifth ordinal line. The rehabilitation of Orthodoxy did not imply the implementation of the principle of freedom of conscience. Orthodox proselytism was accompanied by persecution of historical rivals of the Moscow Patriarchate. In a resolution of the Council for Cult Affairs of 1948, contrary to the thesis of the separation of church and state, religious trends were differentiated according to their degree of acceptability for the regime. The first group included only the Orthodox Church, which was to be assisted; to the second - the Armenian-Gregorian, Islamic and Buddhist denominations, which assumed a tolerant attitude; to the third - Catholicism, Lutheranism, Judaism, Old Believers, declared teachings hostile to Soviet power. In 1946-1949. the legal existence of the Uniate Church in the USSR is abolished, which was carried out in the conditions of armed resistance of terrorist groups of the separatist movement. At the Moscow meeting of the heads and representatives of the Orthodox Church, held in 1948 on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the autocephaly of the Russian Orthodox Church, the expansionism of the Roman curia and the ecumenistic tendencies of the development of Christianity in the West were condemned. The evolution of the management system consisted in the transfer of the center of gravity from the party to the structures of state executive power.

Occupation I.V. Stalin, since 1941, the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers placed accents. The leader now ruled the country as the head of government, and not as a party leader. I.V. Stalin insisted on a course of change functional role party, which was supposed to be freed from issues of economic life that fall within government competence. Thus, it was supposed to differentiate the state and party bodies that were in a state of confusion. The Politburo of the Central Committee, which included 11 members and 1 candidate, was restructured into the Presidium of the Central Committee, with a larger composition of 25 members and 11 candidates, which was aimed at reducing the influence of the Kremlin elite.

The leading factor in world politics in the post-war period was the unfolding "cold war" between the USSR and its Western allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.

There is a dispute about who initiated it. When pointing to responsibility in the deployment of the "cold war" by the West, it is customary to define the "Fulton speech" of Winston Churchill as its starting point. In March 1946, in the American city of Fulton, in the presence of US President Harry Truman, the former British Prime Minister outlined a program of struggle against the recent ally of the USSR. Pointing out that the United States was at the pinnacle of power, Churchill invited them to act as the world's policeman. Churchill proposed to organize an "iron curtain" against communism, to create "a fraternal association of English-speaking peoples" fighting "for the great principles of the English-speaking world."

The following year, on March 12, G. Truman, repeating the main motives of the "Fulton speech", proclaimed a "crusade" against communism. In the United States, the "age of McCarthyism" (named after Senator Eugene McCarthy) begins, which consisted in the fight against "anti-Americanism" - a campaign similar to the fight against "cosmopolitanism" in the USSR. Through the lips of McCarthy, it was proclaimed that the United States was on the verge of a communist revolution, as a result of which anti-Soviet hysteria unfolded in American society, expressed in the processes of exposure and persecution of the Communists as spies of the Kremlin. The "Marshall Plan" adopted in the United States was supposed to allocate significant sums of money to restore the economies of states that were significantly affected by the Second World War, including the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The provision of financial assistance was carried out in exchange for the manifestation of political loyalty to the United States, which predetermined the refusal of the states of the Soviet bloc to participate in the program. On April 4, 1949, NATO was established, securing the presence of American troops in Europe. The Soviet proposal for the USSR to join the North Atlantic Alliance was rejected, which was direct evidence of the anti-Soviet orientation of the created organization.

In 1950 - 1953 American troops fought in Korea, undermining the authority of both the diplomatic corps and the US military. The invasion of American troops was motivated by the successful offensive of the North Korean communist army on the positions of the southerners. The armed forces of the United States and a number of allies operated in Korea under the flag of the UN. The Soviet Union supplied weapons and provided diplomatic assistance to the North Korean regime, but refrained from direct military assistance, the provision of which would have meant the beginning of a third world war. Chinese volunteer units were sent to the DPRK. The American army lost 54 thousand people. Conflict relations were established between the USSR and the states formed in the second half of the 1940s - with the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel. Having lost its meaning in the conditions of the Cold War, the Allied Control Council for the occupied German territory was dissolved. The government of Federal Chancellor Karl Adenauer pursued a revanchist course on the issue of Germany's territorial losses in the East. An attempt to organize a Soviet blockade of West Berlin failed due to the help of Western countries. Proclaimed on May 14, 1948, Israel, which, as the Soviet leadership assumed, would become a communist outpost in the Middle East, the Kremlin initially showed a friendly attitude.

The USSR was the first country to officially recognize the Jewish state, despite the hostile attitude towards it of the Palestinian Arabs, in whose territory it was located. During the unfolding Arab-Israeli conflict through Czechoslovakia, Israel received Soviet weapons.

The permanent representative of the Ukrainian SSR in the UN Security Council, D.Z. Manuilsky, even proposed to solve the problem by resettling Arab refugees in Soviet Central Asia, with the provision of an autonomous or republican status within the USSR to the created entity. But when in the second half of 1948 the pro-American course of Israel became obvious, the Soviet Union reoriented itself to help the Arabs. The Soviet military presence in Europe was provided by a powerful armored group, consisting of several tens of thousands of combat vehicles. With Soviet assistance, communist parties come to power in Yugoslavia (1945), Albania (1946), Bulgaria (1946), Poland (1947), Romania (1947), Czechoslovakia (1948), North Korea (1948), East Germany (1949), China (1949). To coordinate the activities of the international communist movement, in September 1947, the "Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties" (Informburo) was established. The economic regulation of relations between the countries of the Soviet bloc took place within the framework of the "Council for Mutual Economic Assistance" (CMEA) created in January 1949. Attempts to demonstrate political independence in the ruling parties of the countries of the "socialist camp" led to the deployment of repressions against factionalists. The most large-scale of them took place in September 1949 in Hungary - under the "trial of the Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Rajk" - and in February 1952 in Czechoslovakia - under the "trial of the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia R. Slansky".

Stalin's intention to remove IB Tito from the leadership of Yugoslavia was unsuccessful and led to terror against numerous Yugoslav supporters of Moscow's course. In the summer of 1948, relations with the SFRY were severed. In the post-war years, the prospect of communist parties coming to power was real in France, Italy and Greece, but was averted by US and British intervention. Judging by the memoirs of V.M. Molotov, Stalin assessed the results of his activities in the international arena not as the leader of the world proletariat, but as a collector of the scattered lands of old Russia: “In the North, everything is in order, normal. Finland has been very guilty before us, and we will move the border away from Leningrad. The Baltics are primordially Russian lands! - again ours, Belarusians now all live together, Ukrainians - together, Moldovans - together. It's fine in the West. - And immediately moved to the eastern borders. - What do we have here? .. The Kuril Islands are ours now, Sakhalin is completely ours, look how good it is! And Port Arthur is ours, and our Farthest, - Stalin held a pipe through China, - and the CER is ours. China, Mongolia - everything is in order ... I don't like our border here! “Stalin said and pointed south of the Caucasus.”

On behalf of Stalin, Molotov is working through the UN channels on the issue of the transition of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits under the jurisdiction of the USSR, or at least the status of joint control with Turkey. An attempt was even made to unilaterally introduce the Soviet military flotilla into the straits, which was prevented by the preventive entry of British ships into the territorial waters of Turkey. As a restoration of the historical borders and ethnic integrity of the peoples of Transcaucasia, it was supposed to annex Azerbaijani lands from Iran, and Georgian and Armenian lands from Turkey. By prior agreement with Mao's cabinet, a project was considered to join the USSR, in the status of a republic, the Manchurian region.

It was planned to form the Balkan Federation, which included Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania and Greece.

The separatism of I. Broz Tito, who did not want to give up the highest step in the hierarchy to G. Dimitrov, caused the failure of the plan. Stalin tried to extend Soviet influence even to the African continent, choosing Libya as a penetration zone, which Molotov proposed at a meeting of foreign ministers at the UN to transfer under Moscow's control.

On the basis of the expiration of the American lease on Alaska in 1967, Stalin intended to eventually put forward demands for the return of "Russian America". The US monopoly on possession of nuclear weapons made the scenario of an atomic bombing of Soviet territory very likely. Therefore, the primary task set before Russian science in the postwar years was to achieve nuclear parity in the shortest possible time. A special committee created to implement this task was headed by L.P. Beria, whose figure in this post emphasized the degree of concern of the Kremlin with the problem. I.V. Kurchatov acted as the leader of the work from the scientific sphere. Despite the forecasts of US nuclear scientists about the ten-year period that the USSR would need to create nuclear weapons, the atomic bomb was tested at the test site in the Semipalatinsk region as early as August 1949. Obtaining certain information through intelligence contributed to the rapid pace of the creation of the bomb.

The further development of the nuclear industry was marked by the creation in 1953 of the hydrogen bomb and the opening in 1954 of the world's first nuclear power plant in Obninsk, which testified to the independence and even interception of the initiative by the Soviet side in the nuclear race with the United States. At the same time, rocket science was developing rapidly. The impetus for its formation was received after a successful test in 1947 under the leadership of S.P. Korolev of the first Soviet ballistic missile. Another significant success of domestic science was the testing in 1951 of the first Soviet computer. In 1947, the State Committee for the Introduction of New Technology was established. The dynamics of the development of Soviet science in the postwar years is illustrated by the opening of a group of new research institutes within the USSR Academy of Sciences: physical chemistry (1945), geochemistry and analytical chemistry named after V.I. Vernadsky (1947), macromolecular compounds (1948), precision mechanics and computer technology (1948). ), higher nervous activity (1950), radio engineering and radio electronics (1953), scientific information (1952), linguistics (1950), Slavic studies (1946). Collisions in the development of Soviet science were associated with party directive intervention, which was by no means always of a qualified nature.

Science and scientific directions differentiated into socialist and bourgeois. The latter, in particular, included genetics, stigmatized under the label "corrupt wench of imperialism."

The rout of genetics at the 1948 VASKhNIL session is one of the most negative illustrations of the intrusion of ideological bodies into scientific research.

The doctrine of heredity concealed the basis for the biological substantiation of class society. The group of "Morganists-Weismanists" was opposed to the Michurinist direction as presented by T.D. Lysenko, who proclaimed the influence of the environment as the decisive factor in biological processes. Stalin's own research on linguistics acquired a dogmatic character for Soviet philologists. The defeat of the Marrist school and the Stalinist provisions meant a reorientation from a class-internationalist interpretation of the nature of language to an ethnocentric interpretation. Attention was focused on the idea of ​​Slavic linguistic unity, which, given the post-war spread of Russian influence in Eastern Europe, created the prospect of realizing a pan-Slavic utopia. According to V.M. Molotov, Stalin's research in the field of linguistics was motivated by the desire to give the Russian language the status of a language of interethnic communication within a planetary framework. In the field of philosophy, party interference is illustrated by A.A. Zhdanov’s criticism of Aleksandrovsky’s works for the fact that he assigned a large role in the development of Marxism to the Western European contribution, expressed in the Hegelian direction. In connection with the right ideological course, the motto was put forward to "finish off national nihilism in history." The question of the "historical rehabilitation" of such representatives of conservative politics as A.A. Arakcheev, M.N. Katkov, K.P. Pobedonostsev and others was discussed. In historical works, the Russian people were presented by the creator of the most significant achievements of world science and culture.

The satirical wording “Russia is the birthplace of elephants” reflects the tendency of the russo-centric excess in the development of ideology.

The consideration of culture through the prism of an ideological order was expressed in the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the journals Zvezda and Leningrad”, prepared by A.A. Zhdanov, which received wide resonance. First of all, A.A. Akhmatova and M.M. Zoshchenko were subjected to elaboration, accused respectively of “decadence” and “bourgeois vulgarity”. Other resolutions analyzed the repertoire of drama theaters, the film " big life”, V. Muradeli’s opera “The Great Friendship”. Among those criticized was even the head of the Union of Writers A.A. Fadeev, who, according to Stalin, in the original version of the novel "The Young Guard" did not adequately reflect the role of the party in leading the Komsomol members. The author of popular song poems, M.V. Isakovsky, was criticized for the poem “Enemies burned their own hut”. A.P. Platonov turned out to be excommunicated from literary creativity. "Formalists" in music "became" S.S. Prokofiev and D.D. Shostakovich. A.A. Zhdanov condemned the passion for jazz music, making a summary: "from the saxophone to the knife - one step." At the same time, in the post-war years, the films Ivan the Terrible (directed by Eisenstein), Admiral Nakhimov (directed by Pudovkin), Michurin (directed by Dovzhenko), The Young Guard (directed by Gerasimov), The Tale of the Earth Sibirskaya (director Pyryev), The Return of Vasily Bortnikov (director Pudovkin), etc. Such literary works as L. Leonov’s Russian Forest, B. Polevoy’s Tale of a Real Man, Road House and “I was killed near Rzhev” by A. Tvardovsky, “Alitet goes to the mountains” by T. Semushkin, “To the new coast” by V. Latsis and others.

In general, by the end of the life of I.V. Stalin, the USSR reached the apogee of its state and geopolitical power. The success of the state was achieved by sacrificing significant human resources. Many of the contradictions and mistakes of the Stalinist state course will only become apparent in subsequent years. At the same time, many achievements of the USSR of the Stalin era created the basis for the relative social well-being of several subsequent generations of Soviet people.

RUSSIEPHOBIA

One of the most common myths to disavow the Stalinist period in the history of the USSR is the thesis that the Soviet economic miracle was achieved mainly through the exploitation of the slave labor of prisoners. The GULAG is presented as the main and, perhaps, the only factor in the accelerated restoration of the national economy. It followed from this that the feat of the people to overcome the post-war devastation in the shortest possible time is a product of Soviet propaganda. The USSR allegedly was able to carry out a forced breakthrough in the economy only due to the neo-slave-owning management model. The Gulag component really had a certain significance in ensuring an economic breakthrough. Not I.V. Stalin was the first to discover the possibility of using the labor of prisoners to solve economic problems. This resource was used in those years in Western countries. Indeed, in the USSR in the post-war period, there were orders from ministries for cheap camp forces. Prisoners were thrown into the most difficult areas of the "labor front", such as, for example, uranium mines. Their development was, as is known, strategically necessary for the USSR to implement the atomic project. However, the Gulag factor for the Stalinist economy should not be exaggerated at the same time.

The share of prisoners in Gulag camps and colonies in 1950 was only 3.2% of the total economically employed population of the USSR.

It is clear that the Gulag members are of decisive importance for the country's economy, given their specific gravity could not provide. Ideologically, the Soviet regime in the late Stalinist period was transformed from a left-communist to a national-Bolshevik one. However, National Bolshevism was not identical with nationalism. Establishing an equal sign between him and Nazism is a gross historical falsification. Proletarian internationalism after the war was still among the key ideological principles. Indeed, a broad campaign against "rootless cosmopolitanism" was launched in the country. But at the same time, about which they prefer to remain silent, a propaganda offensive against "great-power chauvinism" was carried out. Both biases - cosmopolitan and chauvinistic I.V. Stalin considered equally dangerous. The campaign against the "chauvinists" found its direct political manifestation in the course of the "Leningrad case". The "Leningraders", apparently, were really dissatisfied with the dominance of foreigners, and above all "Caucasians" in the leadership of the party. From this stemmed the proposal he blamed for the creation of an autonomous Russian Communist Party in relation to the CPSU (b). The very formulation of the question of foreign dominance was directed personally against I.V. Stalin.

Considering the discovered “groupism” (clanism) of people from Leningrad, their conspiracy seemed to him quite real. In order to impose a death sentence on them, they even took an emergency measure, restoring the abolished capital punishment, and violating the legal norm that the law has no retroactive effect. Such sharp steps I.V. Stalin could take action in the presence of a real significant threat. One of the leaders of the Leningrad group is the head of the State Planning Commission N.A. Voznesensky was, according to A.I. Mikoyan, a convinced Great Russian chauvinist. I.V. was also aware of his intolerant attitude towards foreigners. Stalin. He spoke of the chairman of the State Planning Commission as a chauvinist of a "rare degree." For on. Voznesensky, according to Stalin's assessment, "not only Georgians and Armenians, but even Ukrainians are not people." The connection between this assessment and the repressions in the "Leningrad case" seems quite obvious. The offensive against Great Russian nationalism was carried out, along with the fight against cosmopolitanism, in the sphere of culture. Thus, the work of A.T. Tvardovsky. In "Vasily Terkin" reviewers found a narrow understanding of the national, the absence of signs of internationalism, "muzhik idiocy."

Historiography condemned the "revisionist" attempts to justify the wars of Catherine II, to revise the thesis of the Russian Empire as a prison of peoples, to raise the tsarist generals M.D. Skobeleva, M.I. Dragomirova, A.A. Brusilov. It was in the Stalin years that the thesis about the creation in the USSR of a new, never seen before multinational community, the Soviet people, was formulated for the first time in the social sciences. This concept could not appear without the consent of I.V. Stalin. Any Russian-nationalist component in the ideological construct "Soviet people" turned out to be inappropriate. When the topic of Stalinist nationalism is stated, anti-Semitism is most often implied.

The myth of I.V. Stalin as an anti-Semite was launched into wide circulation at the suggestion of L.D. Trotsky.

He needed this thesis to justify the degeneration of the regime ("Stalin's Thermidor"). Later, the Trotskyist myth was picked up by N.S. Khrushchev. I.V. Stalin really allowed anti-Semitic rhetoric at the everyday level.

However, nothing of the kind was contained at the level of Stalin's official speeches. Public assessment of I.V. Stalin of anti-Semitism was definitely negative: “National and racial chauvinism is a relic of the misanthropic mores characteristic of the period of cannibalism. Anti-Semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous survival of cannibalism. Anti-Semitism is beneficial to the exploiters, like a lightning rod that keeps capitalism out of the reach of the working people. Anti-Semitism is dangerous for working people, like a false path leading them astray and leading them into the jungle. Therefore, communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable and sworn enemies of anti-Semitism. In the USSR, anti-Semitism is most severely prosecuted by law as a phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet system. Active anti-Semites are punishable by death under the laws of the USSR.” Even during the Yalta Conference I.V. Stalin told F. D. Roosevelt that he was a supporter of Zionism.

To a large extent, it was thanks to the USSR that in 1948 the formation of the Jewish national state of Israel took place on the territory of Palestine. It was initially seen as a Soviet outpost in the Middle East, a counterbalance to the then British Empire-oriented Arab world. An important role in the struggle for the sovereignty of the Israeli state was played by I.V. Stalin from Czechoslovakia at the disposal of the Israelis weapons. Another thing is that when among the Jews of the USSR, on a wave of enthusiasm in connection with the successes of Israel, Jewish identity began to be preferred over the Soviet one, the Stalinist policy of supporting the Zionist movement ended. The impetus was a spontaneous rally, unauthorized by the authorities, organized by the Jews of Moscow in honor of the first Israeli ambassador Golda Meyer during a visit to that Moscow synagogue. During a reception in the Kremlin, the wife of V.M. Molotov, who was considered the most likely successor to I.V. Stalin, addressed the Israeli woman in Yiddish "I am a Jewish daughter!".

The interests of Israel for a part of the Soviet political elite turned out to be more significant than the interests of the USSR.

The discovery of this fact forced I.V. Stalin to the purge of elitist groups from Zionism, never extended to all Jews. The "case" of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC) is often presented as the most obvious manifestation of Stalin's anti-Semitic policy. However, its dissolution itself was not something unprecedented. After the war, many anti-fascist organizations (including national ones) were disbanded due to the exhaustion of their tasks. JAC existed even longer than others. Directly to the defeat of the organization I.V. Stalin was prompted by a message from representatives of the Jewish community with a proposal to create a union republic in Crimea based on the titular nation of Jews. The letter was written in an ultimatum form. I.V. Stalin took it as an ultimatum.

However, again, the defeat of the JAC, carried out mainly on charges of links with the intelligence services of foreign states, was not any kind of nationalist action. Zhores Medvedev testifies that the course of I.V. Stalin in the Jewish question "was political and manifested itself in the form of anti-Zionism, not Judeophobia." In order to be convinced of the absence of state anti-Semitism in the USSR in the post-war years, it is enough to refer to the list of nominees for the Stalin Prize in the field of literature and art. The representation of persons of Jewish nationality in it remained very significant at the very apogee of the struggle against "rootless cosmopolitanism". Moreover, the awards were given out precisely for active participation in this struggle. "Cosmopolitanism", thus, contrary to the untwisted myth, was not for I.V. Stalin synonymous with Jewish identity.