Social results of the industrialization of the USSR. The beginning of the industrialization of the USSR

Industrialization of the USSR- the process of accelerated build-up of the industrial potential of the USSR to reduce the backlog of the economy from the developed capitalist countries, carried out in the 1930s. The official task of industrialization was to transform the USSR from a predominantly agrarian country into a leading industrial power.

The beginning of socialist industrialization as an integral part of the "triune task of radically reorganizing society" (industrialization, collectivization of agriculture and cultural revolution) was laid down by the first five-year plan development national economy (-). At the same time, privately owned and capitalist forms of economy were eliminated, thus eliminating competition, which led to a decrease in the level of goods produced.

In Soviet times, industrialization was considered a great feat. The rapid growth of production capacities and production volumes of heavy industry (4 times) was of great importance for ensuring economic independence from the capitalist countries and strengthening the country's defense capability. At this time, the USSR made the transition from an agrarian country to an industrial one. During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet industry proved its superiority over the industry of Nazi Germany. Since the late 1980s, there have been discussions in the Soviet Union and Russia about the cost of industrialization, which have also called into question its results and long-term consequences for the Soviet economy and society. However, no one denies the fact that the economies of all post-Soviet states to this day function at the expense of the industrial base that was created during the Soviet period.

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GOELRO

The plan provided for the advanced development of the electric power industry, tied to the plans for the development of the territories. The GOELRO plan, designed for 10-15 years, provided for the construction of 30 district power plants (20 TPPs and 10 HPPs) with a total capacity of 1.75 million kW. The project covered eight main economic regions (Northern, Central Industrial, Southern, Volga, Ural, West Siberian, Caucasian and Turkestan). In parallel, the development of the country's transport system was carried out (reconstruction of old and construction of new railway lines, construction of the Volga-Don Canal).

The GOELRO project made industrialization possible in the USSR: electricity generation in 1932 compared to 1913 increased almost 7 times, from 2 to 13.5 billion kWh [ ] .

Features of industrialization

One of the fundamental contradictions of Bolshevism was the fact that a party that called itself a "workers" party and called its government the "dictatorship of the proletariat" came to power in an agrarian country where factory workers made up only a few percent of the population, and then most of them were recent immigrants from the village, who have not yet completely broken ties with it. Forced industrialization was designed to eliminate this contradiction.

From a foreign policy point of view, the country was in hostile conditions. According to the leadership of the CPSU (b), there was a high probability of a new war with the capitalist states. It is significant that even at the X Congress of the RCP (b) in 1921, the author of the report “On the Soviet Republic Surrounded” L. B. Kamenev stated that the preparations for the Second World War that had begun in Europe [ ] :

What we see every day in Europe ... testifies that the war is not over, armies are moving, battle orders are being issued, garrisons are sent to one place or another, no borders can be considered firmly established. ... it can be expected from hour to hour that the old finished imperialist slaughter will give rise, as its natural continuation, to some new, even more monstrous, even more disastrous imperialist war.

Preparations for war required a thorough rearmament. However, it was impossible to start such rearmament immediately due to the backwardness of heavy industry. At the same time, the existing pace of industrialization seemed insufficient, as the gap with the capitalist countries, which experienced an economic boom in the 1920s, increased.

One of the first such plans for rearmament was outlined already in 1921, in the draft of the reorganization of the Red Army, prepared for the X Congress by Gusev, S. I. and Frunze M. V. The draft stated both the inevitability of a new big war, and the unpreparedness of the Red Army for it. Gusev and Frunze proposed to deploy a powerful network of military schools in the country, and to organize the mass production of tanks, artillery, "armored cars, armored trains, airplanes" in a "shock" manner. In a separate paragraph, it was also proposed to carefully study the combat experience of the Civil War, including the units that opposed the Red Army (officer units of the White Guards, Makhnovist carts, Wrangel's "bombing airplanes", etc. In addition, the authors also called for the urgent organization of the publication in Russia of foreign " Marxist" writings on military issues.

After the end of the Civil War, Russia again faced the pre-revolutionary problem of agrarian overpopulation ( "Malthusian-Marxian trap"). During the reign of Nicholas II, overpopulation caused a gradual decrease in average land plots, the surplus of workers in the countryside was not absorbed either by the outflow to the cities (which amounted to about 300 thousand people per year with an average increase of up to 1 million people per year), nor by emigration, nor by the initiated Stolypin's government program for the resettlement of colonists beyond the Urals. In the 1920s, overpopulation took the form of urban unemployment. It became a serious social problem that grew throughout the entire NEP, and by its end amounted to more than 2 million people, or about 10% of the urban population. The government believed that one of the factors hindering the development of industry in the cities was the lack of food and the unwillingness of the village to provide the cities with bread at low prices.

The party leadership intended to solve these problems through a planned redistribution of resources between agriculture and industry, in accordance with the concept of socialism, which was announced at the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the III All-Union Congress of Soviets in the city. In Stalinist historiography, the XIV Congress was called the "Congress of Industrialization ", however, he only accepted common decision about the need to transform the USSR from an agrarian country into an industrial one, without defining specific forms and rates of industrialization.

The choice of a specific implementation of central planning was vigorously discussed in 1926-1928. Supporters genetic approach (V. Bazarov, V. Groman, N. Kondratiev) believed that the plan should be drawn up on the basis of objective patterns of economic development identified as a result of an analysis of existing trends. Adherents teleological approach (G. Krzhizhanovsky, V. Kuibyshev, S. Strumilin) believed that the plan should transform the economy and proceed from future structural changes, production capabilities and strict discipline. Among party functionaries, the former were supported by N. Bukharin, a supporter of the evolutionary path to socialism, and the latter by L. Trotsky, who insisted on an accelerated pace of industrialization.

One of the first ideologists of industrialization was an economist close to Trotsky E. A. Preobrazhensky, who in 1924-1925 developed the concept of forced "super-industrialization" at the expense of funds from the countryside ("initial socialist accumulation", according to Preobrazhensky). For his part, Bukharin accused Preobrazhensky and the "Left Opposition" who supported him of planting "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry" and "internal colonialism."

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I. Stalin, at first stood on the point of view of Bukharin, but after Trotsky was expelled from the Central Committee of the party at the end of the year, he changed his position to a diametrically opposite one. This led to a decisive victory for the teleological school and a radical turn away from the NEP. Researcher V. Rogovin believes that the reason for Stalin's "left turn" was the grain procurement crisis of 1927; the peasantry, especially the prosperous, massively refused to sell bread, considering the purchase prices set by the state to be too low.

The internal economic crisis of 1927 was intertwined with a sharp aggravation of the foreign political situation. On February 23, 1927, the British Foreign Secretary sent a note to the USSR demanding that they stop supporting the Kuomintang-Communist government in China. After the refusal, Great Britain broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR on May 24-27. However, at the same time, the alliance between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists fell apart; On April 12, Chiang Kai-shek and his allies massacred the Shanghai Communists ( see Shanghai massacre of 1927). This incident was widely used by the “united opposition” (“the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc”) to criticize the official Stalinist diplomacy as a deliberate failure.

In the same period, there was a raid on the Soviet embassy in Beijing (April 6), the British police searched the Soviet-English joint-stock company Arcos in London (May 12). In June 1927, representatives of the ROVS carried out a series of terrorist attacks against the USSR. In particular, on June 7, the Soviet plenipotentiary representative in Warsaw, Voikov, was killed by a white émigré Kaverda, on the same day the head of the Belarusian OGPU I. Opansky was killed in Minsk, the day before, the ROVS terrorist threw a bomb at the OGPU pass office in Moscow. All these incidents contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of "war psychosis", the emergence of expectations of a new foreign intervention ("crusade against Bolshevism").

By January 1928, only 2/3 of the grain was harvested compared to the level of the previous year, as the peasants massively held back bread, considering the purchase prices to be too low. The interruptions in the supply of cities and the army that had begun were exacerbated by the aggravation of the foreign policy situation, which even reached the point of carrying out a trial mobilization. In August 1927, a panic began among the population, resulting in a wholesale purchase of products for future use. At the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (December 1927), Mikoyan admitted that the country had gone through the difficulties "on the eve of the war without having a war."

First Five Year Plan

In order to create our own engineering base, a domestic system higher technical education was urgently created. In 1930, universal primary education was introduced in the USSR, and compulsory seven years in the cities.

In order to increase incentives to work, pay became more tied to performance. Centers for the development and implementation of the principles of scientific organization of labor were actively developed. One of the largest centers of this kind (CIT) has created about 1,700 training centers with 2,000 highly qualified CIT instructors in different parts of the country. They operated in all leading industries National economy- in mechanical engineering, metallurgy, construction, light and forestry industries, on railways and motor transport, in agriculture and even in the navy.

In parallel, the state moved to a centralized distribution of the means of production and consumer goods belonging to it, the introduction of command-administrative management methods and nationalization were carried out. private property. arose politic system based on the leading role of the CPSU(b), state property on the means of production and a minimum of private initiative. Also, the widespread use of forced labor by Gulag prisoners, special settlers and rear militia began.

In 1933, at a joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin said in his report that, according to the results of the first five-year plan, consumer goods were produced less than necessary, but the policy of pushing the tasks of industrialization into the background would lead to the fact that we do not it would be the tractor and automobile industries, ferrous metallurgy, metal for the production of machines. The country would sit without bread. The capitalist elements in the country would enormously increase the chances for the restoration of capitalism. Our position would be analogous to that of China, which at that time did not have its own difficult and military industry, and became the object of aggression. We would not have non-aggression pacts with other countries, but military intervention and war. A dangerous and deadly war, a bloody and unequal war, because in this war we would be almost defenseless against enemies who have at their disposal all modern means of attack.

The first five-year plan was associated with rapid urbanization. The urban labor force increased by 12.5 million, of which 8.5 million were migrants from countryside. However, the share of 50% of the urban population of the USSR reached only in the early 1960s.

Use of foreign specialists

Engineers were invited from abroad, many well-known companies such as Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG And General Electric, were involved in the work and supplied modern equipment, a significant part of the models of equipment produced in those years at Soviet factories were copies or modifications of foreign analogues (for example, the Fordson tractor, which was assembled at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant).

A branch of Albert Kahn, Inc. was opened in Moscow. under the name "Gosproektstroy" (English) Russian. Its leader was Moritz Kahn, the brother of the head of the company. It employed 25 leading American engineers and about 2,500 Soviet employees. At that time it was the largest architectural bureau in the world. Over the three years of Gosproektstroy's existence, more than 4,000 Soviet architects, engineers, and technicians have passed through it, studying the American experience. The Central Bureau of Heavy Engineering (TsBTM), a branch of the German company Demag, also operated in Moscow.

Albert Kahn's firm played the role of coordinator between the Soviet customer and hundreds of Western companies that supplied equipment and advised on the construction of individual facilities. Thus, the technological project of the Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant was carried out by Ford, the construction project was carried out by the American company Austin Motor Company. The construction of the 1st State Bearing Plant in Moscow (GPZ-1), which was designed by the Kana company, was carried out with the technical assistance of the Italian company RIV.

results

The growth of the physical volume of the gross industrial output of the USSR during the years of the 1st and 2nd five-year plans (1928-1937)

Products	1928	1932	1937	1932 to 1928 (%) 1st five-year plan	1937 to 1928 (%) 1st and 2nd five-year plans
Pig iron, million tons	3,3	6,2	14,5	188 %	439 %
Steel, million tons	4,3	5,9	17,7	137 %	412 %
Rolled ferrous metals, million tons	3,4	4,4	13	129 %	382 %
Coal, million tons	35,5	64,4	128	181 %	361 %
Oil, million tons	11,6	21,4	28,5	184 %	246 %
Electricity, billion kWh	5,0	13,5	36,2	270 %	724 %
Paper, thousand tons	284	471	832	166 %	293 %
Cement, million tons	1,8	3,5	5,5	194 %	306 %
Sugar sand, thousand tons	1283	1828	2421	142 %	189 %
Machine tools, thousand pieces	2,0	19,7	48,5	985 %	2425 %
Cars, thousand units	0,8	23,9	200	2988 %	25000 %
Leather shoes, million pairs	58,0	86,9	183	150 %	316 %

At the end of 1932, the successful and early completion of the first five-year plan was announced in four years and three months. Summing up its results, Stalin said that heavy industry had fulfilled the plan by 108%. During the period between October 1, 1928, and January 1, 1933, the production fixed assets of heavy industry increased 2.7 times.

In his report at the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b) in January 1934, Stalin gave the following figures with the words: "This means that our country has become firmly and finally an industrial country."

The first five-year plan was followed by the second five-year plan, with somewhat less emphasis on industrialization, and then the third five-year plan, which was disrupted due to the outbreak of the Second World War.

The result of the first five-year plans was the development of heavy industry, due to which the GDP growth during 1928-40, according to V. A. Melyantsev, amounted to about 4.6% per year (according to other, earlier estimates, from 3% to 6 .3%) . Industrial production in the period 1928-1937 increased by 2.5-3.5 times, that is, 10.5-16% per year. In particular, the production of machinery in the period 1928-1937. grew by an average of 27.4% per year.

With the beginning of industrialization, the consumption fund fell sharply, and as a result, the standard of living of the population. By the end of 1929, the card system was extended to almost all food products, but there was still a shortage of rations, and huge queues had to be stood to buy them. In the future, the standard of living began to improve. In 1936, the cards were abolished, which was accompanied by an increase in wages in the industrial sector and an even greater increase in state ration prices for all goods. The average per capita consumption in 1938 was 22% higher than in 1928. However, the greatest growth was among the party and labor elite and did not affect the vast majority of the rural population, or more than half of the country's population, at all.

The date of the end of industrialization is determined by different historians in different ways. From the point of view of the conceptual desire to raise heavy industry in record time, the most pronounced period was the first five-year plan. Most often, the end of industrialization is understood as the last pre-war year (1940), less often the year before Stalin's death (1952). If industrialization is understood as a process, the purpose of which is the share of industry in GDP, characteristic of industrial developed countries, then the economy of the USSR reached such a state only in the 1960s. The social aspect of industrialization should also be taken into account, since only in the early 1960s. the urban population exceeded the rural population.

Professor N. D. Kolesov believes that without the implementation of the industrialization policy, the political and economic independence of the country would not have been ensured. The sources of funds for industrialization and its pace were predetermined by economic backwardness and the too short period allotted for its elimination. According to Kolesov, the Soviet Union managed to eliminate backwardness in just 13 years.

Criticism

During the years of Soviet rule, the communists argued that industrialization was based on a rational and feasible plan. Meanwhile, it was assumed that the first five-year plan would come into effect at the end of 1928, but even by the time it was announced in April-May 1929, work on its compilation had not been completed. The original form of the plan included goals for 50 industries and agriculture, as well as the relationship between resources and opportunities. Over time, the achievement of predetermined indicators began to play the main role. If the growth rate of industrial production, which was originally laid down in the plan, was 18-20%, then by the end of the year they were doubled. Western and Russian researchers argue that despite the report on the successful implementation of the first five-year plan, the statistics were falsified, and none of the goals was even close to being achieved. Moreover, there was a sharp decline in agriculture and industries dependent on agriculture. Part of the party nomenklatura was extremely outraged by this, for example, S. Syrtsov described the reports on achievements as "fraudulent" .

Despite the development of new products, industrialization was carried out mainly by extensive methods: economic growth was ensured by an increase in the rate of gross fixed capital formation, savings rates (due to falling consumption rates), the level of employment and the exploitation of natural resources. British scientist Don Filzer believes that this was due to the fact that as a result of collectivization and a sharp decline in the standard of living of the rural population, human labor has greatly depreciated. V. Rogovin notes that the desire to fulfill the plan led to an overstrain of forces and a permanent search for reasons to justify the failure to fulfill overestimated tasks. Because of this, industrialization could not be fueled by enthusiasm alone and required a series of coercive measures. Beginning in October 1930, the free movement of labor force was prohibited, and criminal penalties were introduced for violations of labor discipline and negligence. Since 1931, workers have become liable for damage to equipment. In 1932, the forced transfer of labor between enterprises became possible, and the death penalty was introduced for theft of state property. On December 27, 1932, the internal passport was restored, which Lenin at one time condemned as "tsarist backwardness and despotism." The seven-day week was replaced by a continuous working week, the days of which, having no names, were numbered from 1 to 5. Every sixth day was a day off, set for work shifts, so that factories could work without interruption. The labor of prisoners was actively used (see Gulag). In fact, during the years of the first five-year plan, the communists laid the foundations for forced labor for the Soviet population. All this has become the subject of sharp criticism in democratic countries, and not only from the liberals, but also from the social democrats.

The dissatisfaction of the workers from time to time resulted in strikes: at the Stalin plant, the plant. Voroshilov, the Shostensky plant in Ukraine, at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant near Nizhny Novgorod, at the Hammer and Sickle plant of Mashinotrest in Moscow, the Chelyabinsk tractor building and other enterprises.

Industrialization was largely carried out at the expense of agriculture (collectivization). First of all, agriculture has become a source of primary accumulation, due to low purchase prices for grain and subsequent exports at higher prices, as well as due to the so-called. "supertax in the form of overpayments on manufactured goods". In the future, the peasantry also ensured the growth of heavy industry with a labor force. The short-term result of this policy was a temporary drop in agricultural production. The consequence of this was the deterioration of the economic situation of the peasantry, Famine in USSR (1932-1933) . To compensate for the losses of the village, it took additional expenses. In 1932-1936, the collective farms received about 500,000 tractors from the state, not only to mechanize the cultivation of the land, but also to compensate for the damage from the reduction in the number of horses by 51% (77 million) in 1929-1933. The mechanization of labor in agriculture and the unification of disparate land allotments ensured a significant increase in labor productivity.

Trotsky and foreign critics have argued that despite efforts to increase labor productivity, in practice average labor productivity has been falling. This is also stated in a number of modern foreign publications, according to which for the period 1929-1932. the added value per hour of work in industry fell by 60% and returned to the level of 1929 only in 1952. This is explained by the appearance in the economy of a chronic commodity shortage, collectivization, massive famine, a massive influx of unskilled labor from the countryside, and an increase in labor resources by enterprises. At the same time, the specific GNP per worker increased by 30% in the first 10 years of industrialization.

As for the records of the Stakhanovites, a number of historians note that their methods were an in-line method of increasing productivity, previously popularized by F. Taylor and G. Ford, which Lenin called "sweatshops". In addition, the records were largely staged and the result of the efforts of their assistants, but in practice turned into a pursuit of quantity at the expense of product quality. Due to the fact that wages were proportional to productivity, the salaries of Stakhanovites became several times higher than the average wages in the industry. This aroused hostility towards the Stakhanovists from the side of the "backward" workers, who reproached them for the fact that their records lead to higher standards and lower prices. Newspapers talked about the "unprecedented and undisguised sabotage" of the Stakhanov movement by craftsmen, shop managers, and trade union organizations.

The exclusion of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev from the party at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) gave rise to a wave of repression in the party, which spread to the technical intelligentsia and foreign technical specialists. At the July Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1928, Stalin put forward the thesis that "as we move forward, the resistance of the capitalist elements will increase, the class struggle will intensify." In the same year, a campaign against wrecking began. "Wreckers" were blamed for failures in efforts to meet the targets of the plan. The first high-profile trial in the case of "saboteurs" was the Shakhty case, after which accusations of sabotage could follow the failure of the enterprise to fulfill the plan.

One of the main goals of accelerated industrialization was to overcome the lag behind the developed capitalist countries. Some critics contend that this lag itself was primarily a consequence of the October Revolution. They draw attention to the fact that in 1913 Russia ranked fifth in world industrial production and was the world leader in industrial growth with a rate of 6.1% per year for the period 1888-1913. However , by 1920 the level of production had fallen ninefold compared to 1916 .

Soviet propaganda claimed that the economic growth was unprecedented. On the other hand, a number of modern studies prove that the GDP growth rates in the USSR (3-6.3% mentioned above) were comparable with those in Germany in 1930-38. (4.4%) and Japan (6.3%), although they significantly exceeded the performance of countries such as England, France and the United States, which were experiencing the Great Depression at that time.

The USSR of that period was characterized by authoritarianism and central planning in the economy. At first glance, this gives weight to the widespread opinion that the USSR owed its high growth rates of industrial output precisely to the authoritarian regime and the planned economy. However, a number of economists believe that the growth of the Soviet economy was achieved only due to its extensive nature. Counterfactual historical studies, or so-called "virtual scenarios", have suggested that if the NEP were maintained, industrialization and rapid economic growth would also be possible.

It should be noted that during the years of industrialization in the USSR, an average population growth of 1% per year was observed, while in England it was 0.36%, in the USA 0.6%, and France 0.11%.

Industrialization and the Great Patriotic War

One of the main goals of industrialization was to build up the military potential of the USSR. So, if as of January 1, 1932, there were 1446 tanks and 213 armored vehicles in the Red Army, then on January 1, 1934 - 7574 tanks and 326 armored vehicles - more than in the armies of Great Britain, France and Nazi Germany combined.

The relationship between industrialization and the victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War is a matter of debate. In Soviet times, the point of view was accepted that industrialization and pre-war rearmament played a decisive role in the victory. However, the superiority of Soviet technology over German technology on the western border of the country on the eve of the war could not stop the enemy.

According to the historian K. Nikitenko, the built command and administrative system nullified the economic contribution of industrialization to the country's defense capability. V. Lelchuk also draws attention to the fact that by the beginning of the winter of 1941, the territory was occupied, in which 42% of the population of the USSR lived before the war, 63% of coal was mined, 68% of cast iron was smelted, etc.: “Victory had to be forged not with the help of the powerful potential that was created during the years of accelerated industrialization. At the disposal of the invaders was the material and technical base of such giants built during the years of industrialization as the Novokramatorsk and Makeevka metallurgical plants, Dneproges, etc.

But supporters of the Soviet point of view object that industrialization most affected the Urals and Siberia, while the occupied territories were dominated by pre-revolutionary industry. They also point out that the prepared evacuation of industrial equipment to the regions of the Urals, the Volga region, Siberia and Central Asia played a significant role. Only during first three months of the war, 1360 large (mainly military) enterprises were moved

Synopsis on the history of Russia

1). Definition: industrialization is the process of creating large-scale machine production in all sectors of the economy and, first of all, in industry.

2). Background of industrialization. In 1928, the country completed the recovery period, reached the level of 1913, but the Western countries have gone far ahead during this time. As a result, the USSR lagged behind. Techno-economic backwardness could become chronic and turn into historical.

3). The need for industrialization. Economic - large-scale industry, and first of all group A (production of means of production), determines the economic development of the country as a whole, and the development of agriculture, in particular. Social - without industrialization, it is impossible to develop the economy, and, consequently, the social sphere: education, healthcare, recreation, social security. Military-political - without industrialization it is impossible to ensure the technical and economic independence of the country and its defense power.

4). industrialization conditions: the consequences of the devastation have not been fully eliminated, international economic relations have not been established, there is not enough experienced personnel, the need for machines is met through imports.

5). Goals, methods, sources and timing of industrialization. Goals: the transformation of Russia from an agrarian-industrial country into an industrial power, ensuring technical and economic independence, strengthening defense power and raising the welfare of the people, demonstrating the advantages of socialism. Sources: internal loans, siphoning funds from the countryside, income from foreign trade, cheap labor, the enthusiasm of workers, the labor of prisoners. Methods: The state initiative is supported by enthusiasm from below. Command-administrative methods dominate. Terms and rates: Short terms of industrialization and shock rates of its implementation. The growth of the industry was planned - 20% per year.

6). Beginning of industrialization. December 1925 - The 14th Party Congress emphasized the absolute possibility of the victory of socialism in one country and set a course for industrialization. In 1925, the restoration period ended and the period of reconstruction of the national economy began. 1926 - the beginning of the practical implementation of industrialization. About 1 billion rubles have been invested in industry. This is 2.5 times more than in 1925. In 1926-28. large-scale industry doubled, and gross industry reached 132% of the 1913 level.

7). Negative aspects of industrialization: commodity hunger, ration cards (1928-1935), decline wages, lack of highly qualified personnel, population migration and exacerbation housing problems, difficulties in setting up new production, massive accidents and breakdowns, as a result - the search for the perpetrators.

8). Pre-war five-year plans. During the years of the first five-year plan (1928/1929 - 1932/1933), adopted by the 5th Congress of Soviets in May 1929, the USSR turned from an agrarian-industrial country into an industrial-agrarian one. 1500 enterprises were built. Despite the fact that the first five-year plan turned out to be significantly underfulfilled in almost all indicators, the industry made a huge leap. New industries were created - automobile, tractor, etc. Industrial development achieved even greater success during the years of the second five-year plan (1933-1937). At that time, the construction of new plants and factories continued, and the urban population increased sharply. At the same time, it was great. specific gravity manual labor, light industry did not receive proper development, little attention was paid to the construction of housing and roads.

Main directions of economic activity: accelerated growth rates of group A, annual growth industrial products- 20%. The main task is the creation of a second coal and metallurgical base in the east, the creation of new industries, the struggle to master new technology, the development of an energy base, and the training of qualified specialists.

The main new buildings of the first five-year plans: Dneproges; Stalingrad, Kharkov and Chelyabinsk tractor plants; Krivoy Rog, Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants; automobile plants in Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod; canals Moscow-Volga, Belomoro-Baltiysky, etc.

labor enthusiasm. The role and importance of moral factors were great. Since 1929 mass socialist competition has developed. Movement - "five-year plan in 4 years". Since 1935, the "Stakhanov movement" has become the main form of socialist competition.

9). The results and significance of industrialization.

Outcomes: 9 thousand large industrial enterprises equipped with the most advanced technology have been put into operation, new industries have been created: tractor, automobile, aviation, tank, chemical, machine-tool building. Gross industrial output increased 6.5 times, including group A - 10 times. In terms of industrial output, the USSR came out on top in Europe and second in the world. Industrial construction has spread to remote areas and national outskirts, the social structure has changed and demographic situation in the country (40% of the urban population). The number of workers and engineering and technical intelligentsia increased sharply. Funds for industrial development were taken by robbing the peasantry driven into collective farms, forced loans, expanding the sale of vodka, exporting grain, oil, and timber abroad. The exploitation of the working class, other sections of the population, prisoners of the Gulag has reached an unprecedented level. At the cost of enormous exertion of forces, sacrifices, predatory waste natural resources the country entered the industrial path of development.

Industrialization

Industrialization- this is the process of creating modern heavy industry, large-scale machine production, that is, the development, first of all, of metallurgy and mechanical engineering.

Actually, industrialization began in Russia at the end of the 19th century. However, this process was interrupted first by the First World War, and then by the revolution. Therefore, the Soviet Union seriously lagged behind the Western states in terms of economic development. This backwardness was supposed to be overcome in the course of industrialization. Industrialization in the USSR was carried out in two stages:

Stage 1- 1926-1928 - reconstruction and re-equipment of old enterprises;

Stage 2- 1929-1937 - construction of new enterprises.

The goals of industrialization in the USSR:

Elimination of technical and economic backwardness;

Achievement of economic independence;

Summing up the technical base for agriculture;

Development of new industries;

Creation of a powerful military-industrial complex (MIC).

Industrial construction in the USSR was carried out within the framework of the so-called. five year plans development or five-year plan. First five-year plan- 1928-1932; Second five-year plan- 1933-1937; Third five-year plan began in 1938 and was supposed to end in 1942, but it was interrupted by the Great Patriotic War.

Industrialization in the USSR was distinguished by the following characteristic features:

1) Construction first large enterprises that produce the means of production (i.e., equipment and machinery). Creation of the domestic auto industry and electric power complex. Among the construction projects - giants should be called: Stalingrad, Kharkov and Chelyabinsk Tractor Plants, Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, Gorky and Yaroslavl Automobile Plants, the Likhachev Automobile Plant (ZIL) in Moscow, the Dnepropetrovsk Hydroelectric Power Plant, etc. Great attention was also paid to the development of transport. Suffice it to recall the construction of the railway that connected Turkestan with Siberia (Turksib), as well as the first in the USSR metro in Moscow.

2) High rates of industrialization, which, first of all, became possible due to the unprecedented labor enthusiasm of the population, the increase in labor productivity, and the development of new technology. Stakhanov movement(named after the miner A.G. Stakhanov) for increasing labor productivity and better use of technology, covered in the 1930s. the whole country. For example, in the Ivanovo region, the Vichug textile workers were the first to respond to the Stakhanov movement - the sisters Evdokia and Maria Vinogradov, weavers of the Ivanovo factory named after. F. Zinoviev T. Shuvandina and E. Gonobobleva, who instead of 6 began to service 20 machine tools.

3) Militarization of the economy, the creation of a modern military industry;

4) Curtailment of market relations. Industrialization was carried out command methods, final rejection of the NEP;

5) Artificial unjustified inflated plans industrial construction, which I.V. Stalin insisted on. As a result, 100% completion pre-war five-year plans failed to achieve. The starting year of the first five-year plan ended with overfulfillment of the plan, and the second year of the first five-year plan ended with similar achievements. However, as the methods and forms of leadership that developed in the 1920s were eliminated. during the NEP, and their replacement by administrative-command management methods, which were accompanied by economically unreasonable revisions of five-year plans, an increasingly large-scale failure to fulfill planned indicators began.

6) Decline in the standard of living of the population. The process of implementing forced industrialization was inevitably associated with difficulties. It was carried out relying only on internal resources (both human and financial). During the years of the first five-year plans, the standard of living of Soviet people dropped noticeably, and the birth rate fell. There was a lack of qualified personnel at construction sites and enterprises. The insufficient level of education and culture of the general population affected. From the end of the 1920s. Until 1935, the USSR had a rationing system for the distribution of products and consumer goods, covering workers and employees. The village was self-sustaining.

At the same time, it should be noted that the population steadfastly endured these difficulties, realizing the importance of industrialization. People saw how new neighborhoods were being built in towns and cities, which were proudly called "socialist cities". Every Soviet person, seeing the "birth of a new world", himself participated in its creation, believing that just a little more, and life would get better. This belief, of course, only increased with each newly built school, hospital, library, club, cinema.

Phenomenon of the 1930s was that the so-called administrative-command economy was combined with the enthusiasm of millions of ordinary people, with boundless faith in the ideas of the October Revolution (or, as they said then, the Great October Revolution). Of course, people of those years, building factories, mines, factories, mastering new equipment, perfectly saw and felt the brunt of the difficulties. Suffice it to recall the famine in the USSR in 1932-1933, which claimed several million lives, both in the countryside and in the cities. Nevertheless, faith in a bright future made me tighten my belt and work for the good of the Motherland.

An illustrative example is the construction of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works. Foreigners who visited this gigantic construction site were amazed at the courage and dedication of the Soviet people. They were perplexed to learn that almost none of the builders voluntarily use the weekend and few leave work after the end of the shift. Naturally, the tone at the construction site was set by the communists and Komsomol members, whose fighting spirit and organization rallied the team. Subbotniks and so-called "assaults" have become the norm here. It is not surprising that Magnitostorey has become one of the brightest symbols of the heroism of the times of industrialization.

Against the backdrop of the global economic crisis that shook the United States and Europe, the idea of a happy future in the USSR not only helped the Soviet people endure hardships, but also shaped their special psychology of winners.

The main problem of industrialization is the search for funds for its implementation. Industrial construction was financed from several sources: 1) government loans from the population; 2) profit from the state monopoly on foreign trade; 3) the use of agricultural resources, which was the main reason collectivization and subsequent dispossession.

Traditionally, it is believed that industrialization was carried out mainly by pumping resources from the village. Of course, there is a lot of truth in this. Considerable funds, for example, were provided by direct overpayments of peasants related to the difference in prices for industrial and agricultural goods. Thus, in addition to direct and indirect taxes that the peasantry paid to the state, there was a so-called "surplus tax" in the form of shortfalls in the price of agricultural products.

However, we should not forget that in the interests of finding funds for industrialization in the late 1920s. it was decided to use through the state budget also the income of other sectors of the national economy, the savings of the population accumulated during the years of the New Economic Policy (primarily in the form of internal loans). Thus, the mass subscription of the population to industrialization loans (the first loan was made in 1927) yielded significant sums. The Great Patriotic War interrupted the Third Five-Year Plan in its full swing. The more significant were the achievements of the first five-year plans. Largely due to the created industrial potential in the late 1920s - 1930s. The USSR was able to repel fascist aggression and win the Great Patriotic War.

In less than 13 years before the war, about 9,000 plants, factories, mines, power plants, and oil fields were put into operation in the USSR. Already in 1930 (for the first time in the history of our country) the production of means of production exceeded the production of consumer goods in terms of volume. There was a revival and reconstruction of old industries - ship and steam locomotive building, ferrous metallurgy, fallen into disrepair after the Civil War. New branches of production were created practically from scratch: aircraft, auto and tractor construction, chemical industry, non-ferrous metallurgy etc. Construction of a modern defense industry allowed to strengthen the country's defense, which was very important in the context of the impending war. At the same time (in 1930) there was eliminated unemployment.

During the years of the second five-year plan, the rise in labor productivity became the decisive factor in increasing output. By 1937, labor productivity had increased by 82% compared to 1933. The intensification of production also increased significantly during the years of the second five-year plan. The displacement of extensive methods becomes a hallmark of this time. Industry no longer made a loss, as it had until the mid-1930s. By the beginning of the third five-year plan, it had become generally profitable.

By 1937 The USSR completely overcame its technical and economic backwardness compared with Western countries and became completely economically independent. During the years of the second five-year plan, the USSR essentially stopped importing agricultural machinery and tractors (although it must be admitted that not all equipment manufactured in the USSR was of high quality). Stopped importing cotton. Costs for the acquisition of ferrous metals from 1.4 billion rubles. during the years of the first five-year plan were reduced to 88 million rubles. (1937). In 1936, the share of imported products in the country's total consumption fell to 1-0.7%. The trade balance of the USSR in 1937 became active and made a profit.

Thus, during the years of industrialization, the USSR turned from a country importing machinery and equipment into a state that independently produced everything necessary for the construction of a socialist society and retained complete economic independence in relation to the surrounding capitalist countries. Once an agrarian country, it has reached the level of the most developed countries of the world in terms of the structure of industrial production. In terms of industrial output of the USSR by the end of the 1930s. overtook Great Britain, Germany, France, taking second place in the world after the United States. And for the first time in terms of industrial growth, it surpassed the indicators of the development of the American economy. At the same time, in the course of industrialization, the number of the working class already amounted to 1/3 of the population of the USSR, and together with employees - more than 50% of workers. As a result, at the forefront industrial production millions of yesterday's peasants were involved, who became active participants in socialist construction.

Industrialization stimulated scientific and technical progress. If in the 1920s priority was given to copying foreign models of technology, then in the 1930s. began to appear their own original designs. The USSR could implement such ambitious projects as the creation of a record aircraft, on which in 1937 the crews of V.P. Chkalov and M.M. Gromov flew from Moscow over the North Pole to the United States with the establishment of world distance records. In the same year, a large-scale air expedition to the Central Arctic was undertaken with the organization of the world's first long-term drifting station headed by I.D. Papanin. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the first in Europe installation for dispersal of elementary particles, the cyclotron, appeared in the USSR.

It should be stated that industrialization in the USSR took place in a much shorter time, than in the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan. It must also be recognized that during the years of industrialization there were created cadres of workers, engineers, technicians, scientists, party and Komsomol workers who grew up on the great construction sites of that time, who, having hardened in extreme conditions, then ensured victory in the Great Patriotic War, prepared a breakthrough in astronautics, the deployment of scientific and technological revolution in the country, etc.

At the same time, the results of industrialization could have been even more impressive if it had not been for the developments that took place in the 1930s. administrative-command system in the USSR, accompanied by mass repressions. The tragedy consisted not only in the loss suffered by the directors and engineering corps, the cadres of the people's commissariats and numerous enterprises, but also in the decrease in the labor enthusiasm of the workers' collectives, their creative activity.

It must be admitted that, according to the results of the first five-year plans, the USSR, despite all the successes, did not turn into an industrial country. Only in the 1960s. the share of industry in the national income of the state exceeded the share of agriculture.

Nevertheless, the USSR before the Great Patriotic War became a powerful agrarian-industrial state with 23 million working class, who defeated unemployment, overcame its technical and economic backwardness and dependence on imported industrial products.

At the same time, we should not forget that the achievements of industrialization, as well as collectivization, were accompanied by unjustified casualties among the population and colossal costs.

Industrialization in the USSR: plans, reality, results

Introduction

industrialization soviet political

Industrialization(from lat. industria - diligence, activity), the process of creating large-scale machine production in all sectors of the national economy and especially in industry.

Industrialization ensures the predominance of industrial production in the country's economy, the transformation of an agrarian or agro-industrial country into an industrial-agrarian or industrial one.

The nature, pace, sources of funds, goals and social consequences of industrialization are determined by the prevailing in a given country. industrial relations.

The position of any country depends on the degree of its economic development. In the second half of the 1920s, the most important task of economic development for the USSR was the transformation of the country from an agrarian into an industrial one, ensuring its economic independence and strengthening its defense capability. An urgent need was the modernization of the economy, the main condition of which was the technical improvement of the entire national economy.

1. The need for industrialization

Economic history any industrial country confirms that the rise of heavy industry or its rise after the devastation caused by the war requires enormous funds, large subsidies, loans. Soviet Russia could provide for itself only by its own efforts. Especially with greater joy V.I. Lenin informed the participants of the IV Congress of the Communist International (November-December 1922) that the state's trading activities under the NEP made it possible to accumulate the first "capital" - "twenty million gold rubles."

No doubt, the amount of investments was very small. But, firstly, it already existed, and secondly - and Lenin emphasized this especially - "it is intended only to raise our heavy industry." We had to save on everything, even on schools (by the way, Lenin said these words in the same report where he spoke about the accumulated twenty million). However, the country that was the first to dare to overthrow the exploiters and start the construction of socialism alone in an environment of devastation had no other way.

The saved funds went to the revival of large enterprises that had fallen into decay, to the restoration of transport, and to the construction of power plants. In 1922, Kashirskaya GRES, designed to serve Moscow, was one of the first to be put into operation.

In the course of the restoration of large-scale industry, proletarian solidity grew stronger, the number of activists, conscious participants in the struggle for an increase in production, who were imbued with a sense of responsibility for the fate of the whole country, grew.

The policy of price reduction, carried out in 1924-1925. on the basis of reducing the cost of production, expanding production, reducing overhead costs, improving the work of the trading apparatus, it strengthened the position of state industry and helped it successfully compete with private capital in servicing the mass consumer - peasants and workers. As the restoration of large-scale industry was completed, it became increasingly clear that the further advancement of large-scale industry required an increase in expenditures not so much on repair and reconstruction, but on new construction.

Gradually (at first on a very limited scale) a process of expanding the scale of new construction began to take shape. Power plants were built, the first steps were taken to establish a domestic auto industry, tractor production, and the aviation industry. There was no doubt, however, that in order to move on to large-scale construction, to the mass creation of new factories, mines, power stations, oil fields, etc. not only huge funds are needed. An energetic, purposeful activity of the state was required, connected with a general revision of the investment policy, with a radical change in the national economic proportions.

Determining the main direction of the industrialization policy, the party also took into account such a specific moment as the presence of a capitalist encirclement. The construction of socialism, which initially unfolded within the framework of one country, was sharply complicated by the active desire of the bourgeois world to discredit the Soviet experience by any means, to frustrate the "Bolshevik experiment", to push the USSR onto the path of capitalist existence. Hence the need to strengthen the defense capability of the USSR.

The tasks of strengthening the defensive power of the Soviet state were all the more responsible and complex because the Red Army lagged behind the armed forces of the capitalist states in terms of technical equipment. Overcoming the backlog to a large extent rested on the weakness of the domestic military industry.

In December 1925, at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party, the question of the industrialization of the country was considered. The congress discussed the need to transform the USSR from a country importing machinery and equipment into a country producing them. For this, it was necessary to develop production to the maximum, ensure the economic independence of the country, and also create a socialist industry based on improving its technical equipment.

Industrialization was the key task of socialist construction. The development of industry guaranteed the relative economic independence of the socialist state from the capitalist powers; it was the basis for the creation of a military complex. Also, “large-scale machine industry,” Lenin emphasized, “is capable of organizing agriculture,” thereby changing the class composition of the petty-bourgeois population in favor of the working class.

Industrialization was seen as a multifaceted process of creating an integrated economy with a more accelerated pace of development of production, means of production.

The restoration of the destroyed economy presented the Soviet leadership with an alternative; either continue the NEP (New Economic Policy) and build socialism with the hands of the capitalists, or embark on a systematic, centralized, shock and nationwide industrial breakthrough.

The past year 1925 was marked at the congress by the rapid growth of the national economy as a whole, approaching pre-war level and the growth of its individual branches: industry, agriculture, transport, foreign trade, domestic trade, credit system and banks, public finances, etc. Within the national economy, with all the diversity of its constituent parts (subsistence peasant farming, small-scale commodity production, private-economic capitalism, state capitalism and socialism), the share of socialist industry, state and cooperative trade is sharply increasing. , nationalized credit and other commanding heights of the proletarian state.

Thus, there is an economic offensive of the proletariat on the basis of a new economic policy and the advancement of the USSR economy towards socialism. State socialist industry is increasingly becoming the vanguard of the national economy, leading the national economy as a whole.

The congress notes that these successes could not have been achieved without the active participation of the broad working masses in the general work of building socialist industry (campaigns to raise labor productivity, production conferences, etc.).

At the same time, however, the special contradictions of this growth and the specific dangers and difficulties that this growth determines develop. These include: the absolute growth of private capital with a relative decline in its role, especially private merchant capital, which shifts its operations to serve the countryside; the growth of kulak farms in the countryside, along with the growth of the latter's differentiation; the growth of a new bourgeoisie in the cities, which is striving to unite economically with the merchant-capitalist and kulak farms in their struggle to subdue the bulk of the middle peasant farms.

Proceeding from this, the congress instructs the Central Committee to be guided in the field of economic policy by the following directives:

A)put at the forefront the task of ensuring the victory of the socialist economic forms over private capital, the strengthening of the monopoly of foreign trade, the growth of socialist state industry and the involvement, under its leadership and with the help of cooperatives, of an increasing number of peasant farms in the mainstream of socialist construction;

b)ensure economic independence for the USSR, protecting the USSR from turning it into an appendage of the capitalist world economy, for which purpose to steer a course towards the industrialization of the country, the development of the production of means of production and the formation of reserves for economic maneuvering;

V)based on the decisions of the XIV Party Conference, to promote in every possible way the growth of production and trade in the country;

G)use all resources, observe the strictest economy in spending public funds to increase the rate of turnover of state industry, trade and cooperation in order to increase the rate of socialist accumulation;

e)develop our socialist industry on the basis of a higher technical level, but in strict accordance with both the capacity of the market and the financial possibilities of the state;

e)promote in every possible way the development of Soviet local industry (district, district, province, region, republic), stimulating in every possible way local initiative in organizing this industry, designed to satisfy the most diverse needs of the population in general, the peasantry in particular;

and)to support and push forward the development of agriculture along the lines of raising agricultural culture, developing industrial crops, improving farming technology (tractorization), industrializing agriculture, streamlining land management and giving every possible support to various forms of collectivization of agriculture.

2. Goals and plans for industrialization

Back in 1926, Stalin declared that industrialization was the main path of socialist construction. Stalin did not want to rule bastard Russia. A great leader needed a great power. He sought to create above all a great military power. Thus, the strategy of forced development was adopted. This program was based on the choice of one priority direction in the development of the economy - heavy industry.

Basic goals:

a) elimination of technical and economic backwardness;

b) achieving economic independence;

c) creation of a powerful defense industry;

d) priority development of basic industries.

In the development of industrialization, the emphasis was not on the gradual replacement of imports of industrial products, but on the concentration of all available resources in the most advanced sectors: in energy, metallurgy, the chemical industry, and mechanical engineering. These sectors were the material basis of the military-industrial complex and, at the same time, industrialization by industry.

Liquidated in 1930 commercial loan are moving to centralized (through State Banks) lending. Many taxes are replaced by one - turnover tax.

3. Means and sources for industrialization

The first source in the late 1920s was the robbery of the peasantry. Stalin declared that in order to ensure the rapid pace of industrialization, the country could not do without a supertax on the peasantry, which paid something like a tribute.

Bukharin stated in his speech: Sources may be different. They could be wasting the resources we had on issuing paper money with the risk of inflation and commodity hunger, in the transformation of the peasants. But this is not stable; it may threaten to break with the peasantry. IN AND. Lenin pointed out other sources. First of all, the maximum reduction of all unproductive expenses, which are huge in our country, and an increase in labor productivity. Not emission, not consumption of stocks, not taxation of the peasantry, but a qualitative increase in the productivity of labor for the whole people and a resolute struggle against unproductive expenditures—these are the main sources of accumulation.

State plan headed by G.M. Krzhizhanovsky proposed a different project. Industrialization should take place in 4 stages:

· development of the extractive industry and the production of industrial crops;

· reconstruction of transport;

· the industrial stage, based on the correct placement of industrial enterprises and the rise of agriculture;

· extensive development of the national economy on a broad energy base.

Main sources:

1.GRAIN EXPORT. The largest revenue for the export of grain was obtained in 1930 - 883 million rubles. The export of a large amount of bread in 1932-1933, when the country was on the cards, brought a total of 389 million rubles, and the export of timber almost 700 million rubles. Only the sale of furs in 1933 made it possible to earn more money than for the exported grain (and after all, grain was bought from the peasants at a very low price).

.LOANS FROM PEASANTS. In 1927 - 1 billion rubles.

.In 1935 - 17 billion rubles.

.GROWTH OF PRICES FOR WINE AND VODKA PRODUCTS, the sale of which was expanding: by the end of the 20s, the income from vodka reached 1 billion rubles. and about the same gave the industry.

.EMISSION. The growth of the money supply, not backed by goods, continued on a large scale until the end of the 1st Five-Year Plan. Issue increased from 0.8 billion rubles. in 1929 to 3 billion rubles.

4. First five-year plan (1929-1932)

The main task of the introduced planned economy was to build up the economic and military power of the state at the highest possible pace, at initial stage it boiled down to the redistribution of the maximum possible amount of resources for the needs of industrialization. The first five-year plan (October 1, 1928 - October 1, 1933) was announced at the 16th Conference of the AUCP(b) (All-Union Communist Party) (April 1929) as a complex of carefully thought out and realistic tasks. This plan, immediately after its approval by the Fifth Congress of Soviets of the USSR in May 1929, gave grounds for the state to carry out a number of measures of an economic, political, organizational and ideological nature, which elevated industrialization to the status of a concept, the era of the "great turning point". The country had to develop the construction of new industries, increase the production of all types of products and begin to produce new technology.

First of all, using information and communication technologies (propaganda), the party leadership ensured a massive mobilization in support of industrialization. Komsomol members, in particular, received it with enthusiasm. Millions of people selflessly, almost by hand, built hundreds of factories, power plants, laid railroads, subways. Often had to work in three shifts. In 1930, the construction of about 1500 facilities was launched, of which 50 absorbed almost half of all capital investments. A number of gigantic industrial structures were erected: DneproGES, metallurgical plants in Magnitogorsk, Lipetsk and Chelyabinsk, Novokuznetsk, Norilsk and Uralmash, tractor plants in Volgograd, Chelyabinsk, Kharkov, Uralvagonzavod, GAZ, ZIS (modern ZIL), etc. In 1935 The first stage of the Moscow Metro with a total length of 11.2 km was opened.

Particular attention was paid to the industrialization of agriculture. Thanks to the development of the domestic tractor industry, in 1932 the USSR refused to import tractors from abroad, and in 1934 the Kirov Plant in Leningrad began producing the Universal tractor, which became the first domestic tractor exported abroad. In the ten pre-war years, about 700 thousand tractors were produced, which accounted for 40% of their world production.

The domestic system of higher engineering and technical education was urgently created. In 1930, universal primary education was introduced in the USSR, and compulsory seven-year education was introduced in the cities.

In 1930, speaking at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin admitted that an industrial breakthrough was possible only through the construction of “socialism in one country” and demanded a multiple increase in the five-year plan targets, arguing that the plan could be overfulfilled in a number of indicators.

Since capital investment in heavy industry almost immediately exceeded the previously planned amount and continued to grow, money emission (that is, the printing of paper money) was sharply increased, and during the entire first five-year period, the growth of the money supply in circulation more than doubled the growth in the production of consumer goods, leading to higher prices and shortages of consumer goods.

In parallel, the state moved to a centralized distribution of the means of production and consumer goods belonging to it, the introduction of command-administrative management methods and the nationalization of private property were carried out. A political system emerged based on the leading role of the CPSU(b), state ownership of the means of production, and a minimum of private initiative.

Results of the first five years.

The first five-year plan was associated with rapid urbanization. The urban labor force increased by 12.5 million, of which 8.5 million were from the countryside. The process continued for several decades, so that in the early 1960s the urban and rural populations became equal.

On the created industrial base, it became possible to carry out large-scale rearmament; during the first five-year plan, defense spending rose to 10.8% of the budget.

5. Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937)

In the course of work on the plan for the second five-year plan, which already covered 120 branches of industry against 50 branches in 1928-1932, it became clear that not all of its drafters realistically imagine the real difficulties of the further growth of the Soviet economy and the circumstances on which their successful overcoming. A demand was put forward to continue the accelerated development of heavy industry, and at a rate higher than during the period of the first five-year plan. The Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held at the beginning of 1934, specifically considered the draft of a new five-year plan and brought complete clarity to the understanding of the essence and specifics of the industrial development of the USSR in 1933-1937. People's Commissar for Heavy Industry G.K. Ordzhonikidze criticized those who proposed to further expand the scope capital construction and production of the most important means of production. G.K. Ordzhonikidze introduced an amendment to the draft resolution of the congress, which received unanimous support: the average annual growth rate of industrial output for the second five-year period was set at 16.5% against 18.9 according to the Gosplan's estimates.

In a fundamentally new way, the congress raised the question of the correlation between the growth rates of industrial production, means of production and consumer goods. The accelerated development of heavy industry in previous years made it possible in a short time to lay the foundation for the technical reconstruction of all branches of the national economy. Now it was necessary to complete the construction of the material and technical base of socialism and ensure a significant rise in the people's well-being. The average annual growth rate of means of production was determined at 14.5%.

By laying the foundations of heavy industry by the beginning of the second five-year plan and achieving a noticeable predominance of industrial output over gross agricultural output. The Communist Party did not consider the task of industrializing the USSR to be completely solved. At the XVII Congress, in accordance with the materials of the January (1933) joint Plenum and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the very fact of the transition of the country to industrialization was emphasized and it was directly spoken about the continuation of the industrialization policy during the years of the second five-year plan. In contrast to the previous period, when the course towards creating the foundations of heavy industry was dominant, now the center of gravity shifted to the plane of the struggle to complete the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy, to strengthen the import independence of the first and then still the only proletarian state in the world.

The fundamental feature of the industrialization of the USSR during the years of the second five-year plan was that the entire grandiose program of new construction, the completion of technical reconstruction as a whole had to be carried out with a relatively low increase in the number of workers and employees. Within the framework of the entire national economy, an increase of 26% was planned, including in large-scale industry - by 29%. At the same time, the congress approved the task of raising labor productivity in industry by 63% against 41% in the first five-year plan. Thus, the directive was adopted that labor productivity "become a decisive factor in the fulfillment of the planned program for increasing output in the second five years."

During the years of the second five-year plan, 4.5 thousand large industrial enterprises were built. Among them: Ural machine-building, Chelyabinsk tractor, Novo-Tula metallurgical and other plants. Dozens of blast furnaces, mines, power plants. The first metro line was laid in Moscow. The industry of the Union republics developed at an accelerated pace. Ordzhonikidze, who became chairman of the Supreme Economic Council in 1930, called for realism and advocated a reduction in a number of tasks. It was then, in the mid-1930s, that the slogan "Cadres decide everything" entered our everyday life. Primary (4-grade) education was introduced as compulsory only in 1930. Even in 1939, every 5th person over 10 years old still could not read and write.

There were about 1 million specialists with higher education. Personnel grew rapidly. The youth were in leadership positions. Communists and Komsomol members rallied the team, were a vivid symbol of the heroism of the times of industrialization. (Magnitostroy was headed by 26-year-old Yakov Gugel). People believed in victory and that the production would not suffer, they worked with enthusiasm, sometimes seven days a week and for 12-16 hours in a row.

There was construction beyond the Arctic Circle. For example, a metallurgical plant in Norilsk, mines in Vorkuta, as well as railways. The required number of volunteers for this construction was not found. And then dozens of camps with hundreds of thousands of prisoners appeared in the right places. Their labor built the Belomorkanal, the Kotlas-Vorkuta railway. They were called enemies of the people, they were turned into such a labor force that does not require any costs, is easily commanded and transferred.

The Stakhanov movement became an example of new trends, a course towards the development of advanced technology. Massive innovation in the middle of the second five-year plan confirmed its promise. The rise grew until 1937. It was then that the double meaning of the slogan "Cadres decide everything" was revealed. Stalin's repressions against industrial workers hit in the late 1920s. Kalinin, Molotov, Kaganovich reported on massive sabotage in almost all areas of industrialization. The arrests began. Violation of the law, repressions, arbitrariness turned the administrative-command administration into an administrative-punitive one.

Other measures have also been taken:

Heavy industry was switching to self-financing; succeeded in minimizing the issue of money; the country almost stopped importing agricultural machinery and tractors; cotton imports, the cost of acquiring ferrous metals from 1.4 billion rubles. in the first five-year plan were reduced in 1937 to 88 million rubles. Export made a profit.

Results of the second five-year plan.

The national economic plan, scheduled for 1933-1937, was completed ahead of schedule - in four years and three months. The decisive role in achieving such a high result was played by the working class, primarily those of its detachments that were employed in the industrial sphere of production - in industry, construction, and transport.

Over the entire period of the second five-year plan, labor productivity in the industries of group "A" increased by 109.3%, that is, more than doubled, slightly exceeding the planned targets, which were also considered tense. Among those who overfulfilled the tasks were machine builders and ferrous metallurgy workers, the latter even surpassed the successes of machine building workers: they achieved the highest increase in industry - 126.3%. Impressive were the shifts in reducing the cost of industrial production of the industries of group "A".

The successes of the light industry looked much more modest. On the whole, the light industry did not cope with the plan for increasing labor productivity, although progress was significant in relation to the first five-year plan.

A fundamentally important result of the implementation in 1933-1937. industrialization policy was to overcome the technical and economic backwardness, the complete conquest of the economic independence of the USSR. During the years of the second five-year plan, our country essentially stopped importing agricultural machinery and tractors, the purchase of which abroad in the previous five-year plan cost 1,150 million rubles. The same amount of money was then spent on cotton, now also removed from imports. The cost of acquiring ferrous metals dropped from 1.4 billion rubles in the first five-year plan to 88 million rubles in 1937. In 1936, the share of imported products in the country's total consumption fell to 1-0.7%. By the end of the second five-year plan, the trade balance of the USSR became active and made a profit.

6. Third Five-Year Plan (1938-1942, frustrated by the start of the war)

The Third Five-Year Plan was held in conditions when a new world war was beginning. Defense appropriations had to be sharply increased: in 1939 they amounted to a quarter of state budget, in 1940 - already up to one third, and in 1941 - 43.4 percent.

The creation of a powerful industrial potential then took place in the conditions of ever-increasing restrictions on Soviet democracy. It came to repression, which hit the industry no less than the Red Army. The tragedy was not only in the damage suffered by the directors and engineering corps, the personnel of the people's commissariats and numerous enterprises. The labor intensity of collectives decreased, the creative activity of millions of workers and employees decreased. And this at a time when fascist aggression was becoming more real day by day.

If for the first two five-year plans the main task was to catch up with the developed countries in terms of industrial production, then for the third five-year plan the task was put forward to catch up with them in industrial output per capita, which was 5 times lower.

The main focus now was on quantitative indicators, but quality. Emphasis was placed on increasing the output of alloyed and high-quality steels, light and non-ferrous metals, and precision equipment. During the years of the five-year plan, serious measures were taken to develop the chemical industry and chemicalization of the national economy, to introduce comprehensive mechanization, and even the first attempts were made to automate production. For three years (until 1941) the volume of production increased by 34%, which was close to the planned figures, although they were not achieved. In general, the pace of economic development was rather modest. It was felt that the gains are given by a huge tension. One of the main reasons was that the administrative system and directive planning could give good results in the construction of new enterprises where manual labor predominated. When industrialization began to come to an end, the AKC, having exhausted its capabilities, began to falter. The new technological level increased the requirements for the balance of all sectors of the economy, for the quality of management and for the workers themselves. The unresolvability of these problems gave rise to failures in the economy.

The political situation in Europe testified to the approach of war, so the third five-year plan became the five-year period of preparation for war. This was expressed as follows. First, instead of giant enterprises, it was decided to build medium-sized backup enterprises in various parts of the country, but mainly in the east. Secondly, military production grew at an accelerated pace. According to official data, the average annual growth rate of military production was 39%. Thirdly, many non-military enterprises received military orders and mastered the production of new products, switched to their production to the detriment of civilian products. Thus, in 1939, the production of tanks doubled, and armored vehicles, 7.5 times, compared with 1934. Naturally, this led to a reduction in the production of tractors, trucks, and other civilian products. For example, in 1939 Rostselmash fulfilled its annual task by 80%, but at the same time the plan for military production by 150%. It is clear that he produced few agricultural machines. Fourthly, new construction, and for 1938-1941. about 3 thousand new large plants and factories were put into operation, it went mainly in the east of the country - in the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia. These areas by 1941 began to play a significant role in industrial production. In addition, during the years of the third five-year plan, the foundations of industrial infrastructure were laid here, which made it possible in the most difficult first months of the war to evacuate industrial enterprises from the western regions and put them into operation as soon as possible, which would be simply impossible without the industrial capacities existing there, iron roads, power lines, etc. The most important problem of the third five-year plan was the training of qualified personnel. The system of training workers in production through a network of courses and circles of technical study that had taken shape during the years of the second five-year plan no longer fully satisfied the rapidly growing needs of industry for qualified personnel.

Therefore, on October 2, 1940, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a system for training state labor reserves was created. It was envisaged that up to a million young men and women would be admitted annually to vocational and railway schools, FZU schools and their maintenance at the expense of the state. After graduation, the state had the right to send young workers at its discretion to any of the industries. Only in Moscow, 97 schools and schools of trade and educational institutions for 48,200 students and 77 vocational schools with a two-year training period were opened. The country's institutes and technical schools continued to train workers of higher and secondary qualifications. By January 1, 1941, there were 2401.2 thousand graduates in the USSR, which was 14 times higher than the level of 1914. And, nevertheless, despite the undoubted successes in this area, the needs of the economy were not satisfied to the proper extent. The quality indicators left much to be desired. So, in 1939, only 8.2% of workers had an education of 7 classes or more, which had a negative effect on the pace of mastering new technology, on the growth of labor productivity, etc. Approximately the same picture was in relation to the ITR. By 1939, out of 11-12 million employees, only 2 million had a diploma of higher and secondary specialized education.

Thus, despite certain successes in the training of personnel for industry, their shortage continued to be felt. Labor productivity grew slowly (approximately 6% per year), and the pace of development of some industries slowed down. The average annual growth rate of industrial production, according to individual experts, amounted to 3-4%. Why has the pace of development slowed down? The administrative system of planning and management could give good results in the initial period of industrialization in the construction of enterprises in which manual labor prevailed.

Economic development In the 1930s, the country's development took place in difficult emergency conditions, which depended on both internal and external factors. Constantly during this period, the threat of war from the Western countries was escalated. Therefore, as we have already noted, the goals and nature of the pre-war five-year plans, and especially the third, were connected with the need to strengthen the country's defense capability. There was an accelerated development of industry to modernize and increase the production of military equipment, often to the detriment of civilian products.

And, nevertheless, despite the difficulties, shortcomings and distortions caused by the dominance of the administrative-command system and excessive centralization, the economy of the USSR continued to successfully develop and gain momentum. The success of this development has been quite impressive.

7. Results and results of industrialization in the USSR

During the pre-war five-year plans in the USSR, a rapid growth in production capacities and production volumes of heavy industry was ensured, which later allowed the USSR to win the Great Patriotic War. The build-up of industrial power in the 1930s was considered one of the most important achievements of the USSR within the framework of Soviet ideology. Since the late 1980s, however, the question of the true scope and historical significance of industrialization has become the subject of debate regarding the true goals of industrialization, the choice of means for its implementation, the relationship of industrialization with collectivization and mass repression, as well as its results and long-term consequences for the Soviet economy and society.

Despite the development of the production of new products, industrialization was carried out mainly by extensive methods, since as a result of collectivization and a sharp decline in the standard of living of the rural population, human labor was greatly depreciated. The desire to fulfill the plan led to an overexertion of forces and a permanent search for reasons to justify not fulfilling overestimated tasks. Because of this, industrialization could not feed on enthusiasm alone and required a number of coercive measures. Beginning in 1930, the free movement of labor was prohibited, and criminal penalties were introduced for violations of labor discipline and negligence. Since 1931, workers have become liable for damage to equipment. In 1932, the forced transfer of labor between enterprises became possible, and the death penalty was introduced for theft of state property. On December 27, 1932, the internal passport was restored, which Lenin at one time condemned as "tsarist backwardness and despotism." The seven-day week was replaced by a continuous working week, the days of which, having no names, were numbered from 1 to 5. Every sixth day was a day off, set for work shifts, so that factories could work without interruption. The labor of prisoners was actively used. All this became the subject of sharp criticism in democratic countries, and not only from the liberals, but primarily from the social democrats.

The working people brought the country to the ranks of the first world powers, with their selfless work created a solid foundation for its industrial and defense might.

In terms of absolute volumes of industrial production, the USSR in the late 1930s took second place in the world after the United States. Moreover, the growth of heavy industry was carried out at an unprecedented pace. So, in 6 years from 1929 to 1935, the USSR managed to increase the smelting of pig iron from 4.3 to 12.5 million tons. It took the USA 18 years for this.

Why was it possible to create industrial technology in the USSR, because here, unlike the West, there was neither a market economy nor civil society?

First, the industrial transformation in the USSR was of a secondary nature. Since it was carried out much later than in developed countries, newly built and reconstructed enterprises used equipment and technology exported from abroad, as well as methods of organizing labor.

Secondly, the industrial type of production may initially be formed in certain sectors of the economy. IN Stalinist industrialization emphasis was placed on the priority development of the heavy and defense industries.

Thirdly, industrial technology was created to extract surplus value from wage labor and served as a means of capitalist exploitation. It alienated a person from his work just as much as the despotic Stalinist state. The Stalinist model essentially reproduced early industrial capitalism under a socialist flag.

Fourth, an important feature of Soviet society up until the 1970s was its focus on the future, its willingness to endure fear and terror, to submit to strict discipline and inhumane technology in the name of a brighter future for their children and future generations in general.

Thanks to these circumstances, industrialization was completed. It had a certain similarity with the imperial model of modernization. Thus, the need for a “jump” was explained by a military threat, which was quite real from the second half of the 1930s.

List of used literature

1.Lelchuk V.S. Industrialization of the USSR: History, Experience, Problems. M.: Politizdat, 1984. - 304 p.

.History of industrialization of the USSR. 1926-1928 Documents and materials. Publishing house - SCIENCE. 1969 Ch. edition: M.P. Kim; L.I. Yakovlev

.History of industrialization of the USSR. 1929-1932 Documents and materials. Publishing house - SCIENCE. 1970 Ch. edition: M.P. Kim; L.I. Yakovlev

.History of industrialization of the USSR. 1933-1937 Documents and materials. Publishing house - SCIENCE. 1971 Ch. edition: M.P. Kim; L.I. Yakovlev

.Industrialization of the Soviet Union. New documents, new facts, new approaches. Ed. S.S. Khromov. In 2 parts. Moscow: Institute Russian history RAS, 1997 and 1999.

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Industrialization is a process of radical restructuring of the country's economy, aimed at creating and building up industrial potential. Industrialization - inevitable condition the transformation of an agrarian country into a powerful, industrialized power.
In the Soviet Union, this process took place in the shortest possible time - from 1929 to 1940.

Causes of industrialization in the USSR.
A crisis "New Economic Policy" (NEP). The NEP, proclaimed by the Bolsheviks immediately after the end of the Civil War, contributed to the revival of the economy in the post-war years. But by the end of the 1920s, the NEP, having fulfilled its tasks, was unable to bring the country's economy to a new level. In 1928, for the most part economic indicators The Soviet Union reached the indicators of the Russian Empire of the pre-war 1913 model, and surpassed it in some sectors. For example, production volumes in mechanical engineering in 1928 were 80% higher than in 1913, electricity production amounted to 5 billion kW against 1.9 billion kW, 1.8 thousand tractors were produced, which were not produced in the Russian Empire at all. However, even these growth rates did not meet the needs of the country.
Economic security of the USSR. In the late 1920s, the Soviet Union continued to be in a political and economic blockade. There was a sharp question about economic security country based on self-sufficiency in manufactured goods. But the USSR continued to be a country with a predominantly agricultural sector of the economy, and was forced to turn to the foreign market to purchase industrial goods.
Military security of the USSR . The First World War did not resolve the contradictions between the powers, but only postponed them for a short period. A new world war was inevitable. And the USSR, included in the sphere of world politics, would be its participant. But the new war required a developed industry, which simply did not exist in the USSR during the NEP period. The historically important issue that was still before the Russian Empire was not resolved - the industrial development of the country, the creation modern economy corresponding to the status of a world power. The growth rate of industry in pre-revolutionary Russia was not enough to wage a modern war. For example, during the three years of the war, 28,000 machine guns were produced in Russia, 280,000 in Germany, and 326,000 in France. Aircraft engines were not produced in Russia at all and 3.5 thousand aircraft were built on foreign-made engines, while in France 48 thousand aircraft were produced during the same period. The situation with weapons was not the best in Soviet Russia in the 1920s, which was a direct consequence of an undeveloped industry.

The progress of industrialization.
Industrialization in the USSR was carried out based on five year plans(five years). The plan of the first five-year plan, 1929-1932, was completed in 4 years and 3 months. The plan of the second five-year plan, 1932-1937, was not fulfilled. The Third Five-Year Plan was left unfinished due to the outbreak of the war. Therefore, summing up the results of industrialization in the USSR, it is customary to operate with indicators for 1940.
Industrialization in the USSR was not aimed at making a profit, but at creating conditions, a base, for the stable growth of industry in the coming years. To do this, first of all, enterprises of the “A” group were created - the production of means of production: energy, metallurgy, mining, transport and machine tool building. This laid the foundation for the development of industry in the USSR for decades to come.
Another feature of the transformation of the Soviet Union into an industrial superpower was the lack of foreign loans and investment. In conditions of foreign policy isolation, they simply had nowhere to come from. The USSR carried out industrialization at the expense of internal reserves. But this does not mean that there was no cooperation with industrialized countries. On the contrary, the USSR actively attracted foreign specialists, bought means of production, and, most importantly, technology. He was helped in this economic crisis that happened in Western countries in the early 1930s. During the crisis, Western companies willingly cooperated with the USSR. With the involvement of foreign specialists and technologies, such major industrial enterprises as DneproGES, MMK, tractor plants in Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk, the Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant and others were built.

Results of industrialization in the USSR.
General results. For ten years, the Soviet Union made an unparalleled breakthrough in the development of industry. From 1929 to 1940, more than 8.5 thousand large enterprises. Among them are such giants as: DneproGES, Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Plant, Stalingrad, Chelyabinsk and Kharkov Tractor Plants, Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant, Zaporizhstal, Azovstal, Uralmash, Krivoy Rog and Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plants and many others. The Moscow and Leningrad metros were put into operation.
The growth rate of industrial production was three times higher than in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the century.
This allowed the USSR to become not only an industrial power, but also to become a leader among industrialized countries. So, in 1937, in terms of absolute volumes of industrial production, the Soviet Union ranked second in the world, second only to the United States. True, lagged behind Germany, Great Britain and France in terms of production per capita. In the same 1937, the share of imports of manufactured goods was only 1% of consumption. Thus, the problem of economic independence was solved. The country provided itself with the necessary goods. Moreover, the USSR itself exported the products of its factories. For example, having abandoned the import of tractors in 1932, in 1934 the Soviet Union itself began to export tractors of its own production.
One of the results of industrialization in the USSR was the creation of new industries - machine tool building, aircraft building, automotive industry, the production of tractors, bearings, and instrument making.
GDP growth, during the years of the first five-year plans, was 6% annually. And industrial production grew every year by 11 - 16%.

Results of industrialization in the USSR for the defense industry. One of the tasks of industrialization was to ensure the country's defense capability. Actually defense industry was re-created. This made it possible from 1939 to begin a large-scale rearmament of the army. Unfortunately, it was not completed by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - there was not enough time. But in the course of the war itself, it was precisely the industrial potential of the USSR that made it possible to organize the mass production of weapons and ammunition, and to restructure industry for military production in the shortest possible time.

Results of industrialization in the USSR for agriculture. The main results of industrialization for agriculture were:
- mechanization of agricultural production. Since the beginning mass production tractors and other agricultural machinery in the early 1930s, agriculture received a powerful impetus for development through mechanization. From 1929 to 1940, more than 700 thousand tractors were produced in the USSR (40% of their world production). In the countryside, an infrastructure was created for the use and maintenance of this equipment - Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS). Accordingly, mass training of specialists was organized - tractor drivers, mechanics, drivers, etc.
- mass migration of the rural population to the cities. It was both a consequence of collectivization and industrialization. Actually, the massive influx of free labor from the countryside, and during the years of the first five-year plan alone such migration of the population amounted to about 12 million people, created favorable conditions for successful industrial construction. The mechanization of rural production freed up a mass of workers who found employment in the course of industrialization. In total, from 1928 to 1940, about 35 million people moved from the countryside to the city. However, until the early 1960s, the proportion of rural residents was more than 50% of the total population.

Results of industrialization in the USSR in the social sphere. Industrialization in the USSR directly affected public life:
- science and education. In the course of industrialization, completely different tasks were set before education than in the 1920s - not just the elimination of illiteracy (the ability to read and write), but the training of qualified specialists. To this end, in 1930, universal primary education was introduced for rural residents, and compulsory seven-year education was introduced for the urban population (in rural schools, the mandatory "seven-year" was introduced in 1934). In 1932 a ten-year system of secondary education was introduced. In 10 years, from 1929 to 1939, the number of secondary school students tripled - from 13.5 million to 31.5 million.
At the same time, a system of higher education was being created, its goal was to train domestic engineering personnel. So, by 1937 the number of higher educational institutions increased by 7.7 times compared with 1914.
It was in the 1930s that the foundations of Soviet science were laid, which very soon became one of the most advanced in the world.
- standards of living. At the end of the 1920s, in connection with the curtailment of the NEP and the restructuring of the economy, the standard of living of the population decreased, and a shortage of consumer goods arose. In 1929, a card system for the distribution of goods was introduced, which extended not only to products. But by the mid-1930s, there was already quite enough goods and products, and the growth of wages, especially in industry, made these goods affordable for the population. In 1936 the card system was abolished. By the end of the 1930s, the level of consumption of goods and services by the population was higher by more than 20% than 10 years ago.

In general, industrialization in the USSR achieved its goals.
Without carrying out industrialization in such a short time, the political and economic independence of the USSR would not have been achieved. The Soviet Union managed to close the gap with world powers in just 11 years, which, without exaggeration, is an economic miracle.