The bankers who convinced rich depositors to voluntarily give up their money, the rescuers of these depositors, who received 127 billion rubles from the budget, but never paid the money... The former owners of Trust Bank were arrested in absentia, the prosecutor's office is already interested in the reorganization of the bank. The financial recovery of the Trust could ultimately cost the state a record amount.

IRINA BEGIMBETOVA

Vyacheslav Malafeev, like other eminent investors, refuses to talk about his financial losses at Trust Bank. Most likely, we are talking about multimillion-dollar losses: his own business (real estate agency M-16) brings the famous goalkeeper as much as a contract with Zenit. Malafeev recently spoke about this, but he promised to publish exact earnings only after the contract with Zenit expires, on June 30. Perhaps after this it will be easier for him to make statements about the Trust. However, in any case, the prospects for returning the deposit seem vague.

Since August 2011, the bank began offering clients whose accounts started with 3 million rubles to transfer money from deposits to credit notes (a type of securities). Trust sold notes to clients until the last day before the reorganization in December 2014. In 2015, after the introduction of a financial recovery regime, the bank canceled its obligations under the notes. It is not known exactly how many clients and for what amount Trust sold credit notes, but according to estimates of an initiative group formed from among the victims, about 2 thousand people bought the notes for about 20 billion rubles.

Since last year, security holders have been trying to get their money back through the courts. As Radik Lotfullin, head of the insolvency and bankruptcy practice at Nektorov, Saveliev & Partners (the firm represents the interests of some note holders in the courts), told Dengi, Trust hid from its clients the true risks of purchasing securities. In particular, the bank argued that the client would lose the money invested in the notes only in the event of the bank's license being revoked and bankruptcy. However, the bank wrote off four of the seven note issues on the basis that its capital adequacy standards had fallen below the minimum value (2%) and a reorganization regime was introduced in the bank. Such conditions were included in the subordinated loan agreements between the bank and the Dutch companies C.R.R. B.V. and CL Repackaging, which acted as issuers of the securities. The bank wrote off the remaining issues, guided by new changes in the law on banks and banking. True, they came into force after the introduction of reorganization in the bank.

For the bank itself, the transfer of client investments from deposits to notes provided several advantages. "Trust" did not pay contributions to the Deposit Insurance Agency ( securities unlike deposits, there is no need to insure), in addition, the notes increased the bank's capital.

Most of the cases of credit note holders are considered by the Basmanny District Court of Moscow, which refuses claims from Trust clients. “It is clear to us that the court is biased,” says Radik Lotfullin. “How else can we explain the fact that the court ignored all our arguments and evidence, including the testimony of five bank employees, according to which depositors were not told about the risk of cancellation of credit notes.”

So far, note holders have been able to win cases only in the regions: decisions were made in favor of the plaintiffs, according to Alexander Ochkov, a representative of the initiative group, in 20 cases. “I had a simple strategy: transactions for the purchase of credit notes violated the law on the protection of consumer rights,” explains Alexander Sergeev, head of the department, the logic of his victory civil law and the process of the St. Petersburg branch of the Higher School of Economics.— The bank did not have the right to offer securities to depositors who do not have the status of a qualified investor. The bank assigned status to clients, but clearly in violation of the procedure, through imaginary transactions: clients were given five contracts to sign for the purchase of securities and immediately five contracts for their sale. And all in one package with credit notes!"

First, the Kuibyshevsky District Court of St. Petersburg, and then the City Court, sided with Sergeev. At the end of April, the latter's decision came into force. True, the bank can appeal it in cassation within six months. Another of the cases, in which Honored Doctor of Karelia Vladimir Olshevsky is the plaintiff, has reached the Supreme Court of Russia, which will hear the case on June 7.

Originally from MENATEP

Having begun to actively attract funds from the public, the bank tried to convince clients that Trust was a “tough nut to crack.”

Credit notes were just one way of masking holes in the Trust's capital. The history of this bank began in 1995 as a St. Petersburg subsidiary of the Moscow MENATEP bank, controlled by Mikhail Khodorkovsky. MENATEP did not survive the crisis of 1998: in May 1999 its license was revoked, and in September of the same year it was declared bankrupt: its debt to creditors amounted to about 40 billion rubles. After this, part of MENATEP's assets was transferred to MENATEP St. Petersburg and another Trust and Investment Bank (DIB) controlled by Khodorkovsky. According to banki.ru, MENATEP St. Petersburg received the bank's branch network and card business, and DIB received the majority of YUKOS' financial flows.

In October 2003, searches were carried out at the MENATEP St. Petersburg office as part of the YUKOS criminal case. Almost simultaneously, the boards of MENATEP St. Petersburg and the investment bank Trust (this is the name DIB received) changed. Chairman of the Board of Menatep St. Petersburg Dmitry Lebedev left his post. Ilya Yurov, who previously served as Chairman of the Board of Trust, was elected Chairman of the Board of Directors of both banks. At that time, both banks were at the top of the ratings of the largest banks in the country: investment bank Trust was 17th in size equity(5.18 billion rubles) and 15th in terms of net assets (36.74 billion rubles), MENATEP St. Petersburg is 23rd in terms of equity capital (4.12 billion rubles) and 14 -th in terms of net assets (RUB 42.42 billion).

In May 2004, the top management of the banks, led by Yurov, bought both assets from the MENATEP group, and the head office was transferred to Moscow. In 2005, MENATEP St. Petersburg was renamed into the national bank Trust: the banks operated under a common brand until 2008, when they merged into one national bank Trust.

The bank began to actively attract funds from the public, and emphasized its reliability with the help of images of brutal celebrities. In 2009, the face of the bank’s advertising campaign was the athlete, actor and showman Vladimir Turchinsky, and from 2010 to 2014 the bank was advertised by Bruce Willis.

Clearly, the problems of the Trust emerged in 2014. Although, as the Vedomosti newspaper wrote at the end of 2014, everything was clear to the bank’s auditors back in 2009. Vedomosti received a report prepared by auditors Ernst & Young (today EY) on the failed deal: in 2009, Trust shareholders negotiated a merger with the All-Russian Regional Development Bank (a subsidiary bank of Rosneft). According to Vedomosti, which reviewed the report, in mid-2009, 60% of Trust’s loan portfolio, which amounted to 65 billion rubles. after deducting reserves, accounted for parties related to the bank. More than 60% of such loans were issued for projects of the bank’s largest beneficiaries - Chairman of the Board of Directors Ilya Yurov, members of the Board of Directors Nikolai Fetisov and Sergei Belyaev. The remaining share was spent on restructuring problem loans of shareholders and loans to friendly structures in order to maintain Central Bank standards.

In addition, auditors Ernst & Young discovered that Trust received subordinated loans, which allowed the bank to increase capital, through an illegal self-financing scheme. Credit notes issued under this scheme were precisely those offered to Trust clients.

In 2009, the Fitch Ratings agency also drew attention to the opacity of some of the bank's assets and its relations with its largest borrowers. In July 2010, it assigned Trust a long-term “possible default” rating, after which the bank refused to cooperate with the agency.

Throughout 2014, when Trust's problems became obvious, the bank several times approached the minimum core capital adequacy ratio of 5%. This first happened in March 2014, after which the bank raised RUB 3.14 billion in capital. through an additional issue of shares. But this “Trust” only lasted for six months: in September 2014, it again approached the critical point. In December, the bank planned to increase capital through an additional issue of 1.4 billion rubles, but the deal was cash-free - the shares were paid for by the building that the bank rents for the main office. The bank was finished off by the panic of depositors, who at the end of 2014 took money from banks. The outflow of deposits from Trust was small - about 3 billion rubles, but this was enough. On December 22, 2014, the Central Bank decided to reorganize the bank.

According to data as of December 1, 2014, deposits in Trust amounted to more than 144 billion rubles; in terms of the volume of funds of the population of the banks being rehabilitated, Trust took second place after the Bank of Moscow (147 billion rubles of funds of the population at the time of the decision to reorganize) .

The bank is interesting in all respects

Former Trust shareholders Ilya Yurov (left) and Nikolai Fetisov (right) were arrested in absentia, their current place of residence remains a secret

FC Otkritie Bank was chosen as the sanator of the Trust, which received 127 billion rubles for this program. from the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA). As the DIA reported, one of the key selection criteria was the “smallest amount of funds” allocated for financial recovery. DIA General Director Yuri Isaev stated in December 2014 that “the 127 billion rubles allocated by the Bank of Russia for the rehabilitation of Trust Bank will be enough.” However, a year later, Otkritie turned to the DIA for an additional amount to rehabilitate Trust, requesting another 47 billion rubles. Initially, the size of the hole in the bank was estimated at 68 billion rubles, but a few months later the volume of the shortage increased by 70% - to 114 billion rubles.

According to sources of the Kommersant newspaper, this growth was explained by the fact that the schemes for “inflating” capital on the part of the former owners stopped working, and half of the shortfall was made up of “scheme” assets.

As Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Mikhail Sukhov stated at the stage of making the decision on reorganization, the Trust’s reporting was falsified. In April 2015, the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Moscow opened a criminal case on especially large-scale fraud (Part 4 of Article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) against former top managers"Trust". The former and... O. chairman of the board of the bank Oleg Dikusar and financial director Evgeny Romakov. According to investigators, the accused entered into fictitious agreements with legal entities registered in Cyprus, and from 2012 to 2014 transferred them 7.05 billion rubles. and $118.3 million. Then the money was transferred to the accounts of individuals and legal entities associated with the Trust.

The suspects, according to investigators, were not alone: ​​former shareholders of Trust - Ilya Yurov, Nikolai Fetisov and Sergei Belyaev - were arrested in absentia by a Russian court. But by that time, the bank’s beneficiaries had not been in Russia for a long time: apparently, they left the country immediately after the decision on reorganization. It is not known exactly where they are now, presumably in the UK and the USA.

There are several precedents in the Trust case. Firstly, the bank is suing the former owners. Only the DIA has experience in prosecuting former owners in foreign courts, which achieved in a British court the seizure of the foreign assets of the founder of Mezhprombank, Sergei Pugachev. In the same court, Trust managed to achieve a similar decision, and now it will consider a claim for damages in the amount of $830 million: Trust believes that the former owners issued loans to their own companies offshore. Trust is suing a number of Cypriot companies associated with former owners in Moscow arbitration: according to Interfax, the total amount of claims is more than 37 billion rubles.

Another precedent is a repeated competition for reorganization. Otkritie has already applied for “additional” funding, but the Central Bank and the DIA now believe that additional funds should not be allocated without a competition. If Otkritie receives the requested 47 billion, the reorganization of Trust will become the largest in history (174 billion rubles). So far, the record holder is Mosoblbank, with more than 172 billion rubles allocated for its rehabilitation.

The results of the competition are expected to be announced on June 17. Of the major financial and credit organizations, Alfa Bank showed interest in it. According to the press service of Otkritie Holding, the group will also take part in the competition. This means that the Central Bank has no serious complaints about the financial recovery procedure carried out by Otkritie, which means it is unlikely to change the sanatorium. “If Otkrytie remains the sanatorium of Trust and does not receive additional money for this, the group will certainly cope with financial recovery, it has large resources, the only problem is whether then this project will be profitable for Otkritie,”— notes managing partner of NAFI Pavel Samiev.

The reorganization of Trust and the allocation of additional funding for it, meanwhile, aroused claims from the Prosecutor General's Office. In April, she sent a submission to the Central Bank, noting that the regulator, in principle, has not developed criteria for selecting investors, and the possibilities, procedure and basis for additional financing are not limited in any way. “The main complaint about all these stories with additional allocation of money is the complete opacity of the entire reorganization process,” agrees Pavel Samiev.

In particular, the situation with payments on those same credit notes is unclear. According to Radik Lotfullin, who refers to the DIA's participation plan in the Trust bankruptcy procedure, the money for payments to note holders was included in the reorganization plan. According to the bank's reports, in 2015 it reserved 27.1 billion rubles for these purposes. However, in May, Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation Mikhail Sukhov said that the bank could receive partial compensation for losses on credit notes. In general, whether there was money and where it was is a big question.

The bank was established in 1995 in St. Petersburg under the name Menatep St. Petersburg as one of the subsidiaries of the Moscow bank Menatep. Initially, Menatep SPb was created as a mono-office bank operating in the North-West region. However, as a result of the August 1998 crisis, when Menatep stopped operations, the bulk of its business was transferred to Menatep SPb and Trust and Investment Bank (DIB). When distributing assets, Menatep SPb received the bank's branch network and card business, and DIB received most of YUKOS' financial flows. At the same time, Menatep SPb Bank managed to receive support from the management of Gazprom, which led to significant changes in the composition of the bank’s owners and gave impetus to the development of a new line of business. In 2000, the bank, which operated in the form of a closed joint stock company, was transformed into an open joint stock company. In August 2015, the legal form was changed to PJSC.

In the summer of 2004, the management of Trust IB (formerly DIB), led by the chairman of the boards of directors of both banks, Ilya Yurov, completed a transaction to buy out ownership rights in relation to controlling stakes in Trust and Menatep SPb banks from the previous owners. As a result, ownership rights to 99.3% of the shares of Menatep SPb were transferred from the Menatep MFO to the management of the Trust investment bank. In March 2005, the bank was renamed into the open joint-stock company National Bank Trust (NB Trust), in November 2006 it “moved” from St. Petersburg to Moscow, and two years later completed the long-announced deal to merge IB Trust. .

Until the end of December 2014 the main shareholder credit organization was CJSC Trust Management Company (93.77% of shares), the ultimate owners of which, according to a complex ownership scheme, were members of the bank’s board of directors Ilya Yurov, Sergei Belyaev and Nikolai Fetisov. Ilya Yurov directly owned a stake of almost 4.5% of the shares of National Bank Trust. Let us note that the bank’s management was interested in attracting a third-party investor, in particular, Rosneft was mentioned. In December 2013, the board of directors of the credit institution decided to increase the authorized capital by issuing and placing additional ordinary registered uncertificated shares of the bank. In case of placing an additional issue in full, the authorized capital credit institution should have increased by 25%.

On December 22, 2014, the Bank of Russia decided to rehabilitate the Trust National Bank, which at that time occupied 28th place in terms of net assets. Otkritie Financial Corporation Bank was appointed as the sanator. The Central Bank decided to rehabilitate Trust Bank with the participation of an investor, based on the Deposit Insurance Agency’s assessment of the capital shortage in the amount of 67.8 billion rubles. The entire reorganization procedure was estimated at 127 billion rubles, of which the regulator provided 99 billion in the form of a DIA loan for financial assistance to Trust, and additional credit The sanatorium bank received 28 billion to cover the imbalance between the fair value of the bank’s assets and liabilities. Already in December 2015, Kommersant wrote about the Otkrytie holding’s application to the DIA for additional funding for the rehabilitation of Trust, since during the rehabilitation the volume of the previously announced “hole” increased. According to press reports, the holding needed another 47 billion rubles to the previously received 127 billion. According to the financial recovery plan, FC Otkritie was supposed to complete the merger of Trust by the end of 2020.

On August 29, 2017, the Bank of Russia decided to implement measures aimed at increasing financial stability Bank FC Otkritie, within which it was planned that the regulator itself would participate as the main investor using Money Management Company "Fund for Consolidation of the Banking Sector", which is under the control of the Bank of Russia. On December 11, 2017, the Bank of Russia officially became the owner of over 99.9% of the shares of FC Otkritie Bank.

On March 15, 2018, a temporary administration represented by FCBS Management Company was introduced at Trust Bank for a period of six months. On March 20, 2018, the Central Bank decided to reduce the authorized capital of Trust to one ruble. At the same time, it was previously repeatedly reported that on the basis of the Trust, a bank of “bad” debts should be created, to which the “bad” and non-core assets of B&N Bank, Otkritie, Rost Bank, AVB Bank, Promsvyazbank would be sent. Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Vasily Pozdyshev confirmed at a meeting with journalists the information that the bank of “bad” debts will be created on the basis of the Trust license, and made it clear that the bank may subsequently surrender banking license and will perform new functions in the status of a private equity fund.

In July 2018, on the basis of Trust Bank, the creation of a bank of non-core assets was completed. The key stage in its formation was the legal and operational merger of Rost Bank JSC with Trust Bank. By the end of 2018, it is expected that Otkritie Special Bank JSC will join the structure. Since May 14, 2018, the owner of more than 99.9% of the shares of Trust Bank is the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

The bank's head office is located in Moscow; as of July 1, 2018, its regional network included three branches (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladimir), one additional and 35 operational offices. In the first half of 2018, the branch in Cherepovets was transferred to the status of an operational office. On September 30, 2018, the bank announced the closure of its branch in Vladimir. The bank's own network of ATMs is insignificant, but a wide network of ATMs of Otkritie group banks is available to customers. According to the latest available data, the bank's headcount at the beginning of 2018 was 2,226 people (a year earlier - 3,994 people).

Today, the main task of Trust Bank is to work with problematic and non-core assets and actively manage the portfolio to increase the level of cash return.

The list of bank services for individuals currently include bank cards (Visa and MasterCard), demand deposits, mortgages, payments, remote banking, and online travel services. However, in September 2018, the bank announced the termination of the development of retail business. Services for corporate clients are provided by RKO. At the same time, in terms of lending, only loan repayments are currently offered.

From the beginning of January to the beginning of September 2018, the net assets of the credit institution increased 2.3 times, amounting to 1.4 trillion rubles. In the passive part of the balance sheet, growth was financed by loans from the Central Bank. The bank's capital, calculated according to the Central Bank's methodology, continued to decline: its negative value during the period under review increased from 192.2 billion to 675.2 billion rubles. During the corresponding period, assets increased mainly in investments in the capital of other organizations, a portfolio of securities and loan portfolio legal entities

Due to the fact that the bank is currently undergoing a financial rehabilitation procedure, 90.2% of its liabilities at the beginning of September 2018 were formed by loans attracted from the Bank of Russia (at the beginning of 2018, loans from the Central Bank were not included in the liabilities of the credit institution). The share of client funds in liabilities as of the reporting date barely exceeded 4%, of which 3.2% were deposits of individuals. The bank's capital shows a negative value (-675.2 billion rubles according to the Central Bank's methodology as of the reporting date).

As of September 1, 2018, the structure of assets was dominated by a portfolio of securities with a share of 31.2%. The loan portfolio occupied a slightly smaller share - 30%. Investments in the capital of other organizations amounted to 23.4%, the portfolio of issued interbank loans - 3.6%, highly liquid assets - 0.4%. Other assets accounted for another 11.3%.

The loan portfolio during the period under study grew by more than one and a half times due to corporate loans, which by the reporting date formed 81% of the total portfolio. The remaining retail portion of the portfolio is predominantly represented by consumer loans. Level of overdue debt in total portfolio is 46.3% (at the beginning of 2018 - 43.3%). 53% of the portfolio (40.7%) is provided with reserves. In the industry structure of corporate loans, according to reporting at the beginning of July 2018, about half of the portfolio was formed by “other types of activities.” A significant part of the portfolio of legal entities also accounted for loans provided to non-resident legal entities (including rights of claim under agreements for the provision of funds), as well as “real estate transactions.”

The securities portfolio - 439.9 billion rubles, increased by 71.4% during the period under review. The portfolio is 69% made up of investments in bonds, and the rest is made up of stocks. The majority of securities are held by corporate issuers. A significant portion of all investments is reserved: as of the reporting date, total reserves exceed 60% of total investments in securities. Intramonthly turnover of the securities portfolio demonstrates uneven dynamics.

In the interbank lending market, the bank previously acted as a net borrower, but since 2018, intra-monthly borrowing volumes have gradually decreased to an insignificant amount, and in July - August the bank increased its placement turnover to 680-760 billion rubles (mainly in Russian banks).

For January - August 2018, the bank's loss amounted to 72.5 billion rubles, for 2017 - 145.2 billion rubles.

Supervisory Board: Ksenia Yudaeva (chairman), Mikhail Zadornov, Ilya Bakhturin, Alexey Moiseev, Mikhail Irzhevsky, Alexey Simanovsky, Elena Titova.

Governing body: Alexander Sokolov (chairman), Artem Kirillov.

Trust Bank survived the defeat of YUKOS, survived the legal battle with Rosneft and emerged from the financial crisis. What shape is he in now?

Bruce Willis squints at Russians wandering through the snowy streets. The inscription on the poster: “Trust” - it’s like me, only a bank.” They say that the leading actor in “Die Hard” could have received about $2 million for this advertising contract. Another $2 million (estimated) cost the placement of billboards with Willis in 170 Russian cities - wherever Trust offices are open. Did the ad work? Chairman of the Board of Directors and main owner of Trust, Ilya Yurov, really hopes so. The bank even ordered a special study, which confirmed that the image created in the movies by Willis is liked by Russian citizens. This image is what the banker needs to show: “Trust” is a reliable bank for ordinary people.

Trust, one of the top 30 Russian banks, is an organization with a difficult fate. Seven years ago, the former settlement bank of the Yukos oil company managed the impossible: to distance itself from the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, in which Yurov was at one time a defendant. Then the bank had to pay off the claims of the state-owned Rosneft. Moreover, the crisis that he survived, despite the loss of almost 30% of his deposits after the collapse of financial markets in September 2008. All this was not in vain. In April 2009 and summer 2010, the rating agencies Moody's and Fitch assigned the bank ratings indicating its financial weakness.

A strategic investor could help the bank get out of a difficult situation. But the search for such an investor has been going on for five years, and the results are not yet visible. And if Yurov does not solve this problem in the near future, Trust will have a hard time.

The current “Trust” is the result of the merger of two structures, former bank"Menatep St. Petersburg" and the Trust and Investment Bank (DIB), part of the industrial group of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. After the crisis of 1998, when the Menatep bank collapsed, its branch network and part of the assets were transferred to the subsidiary Menatep St. Petersburg, and DIB became the settlement bank of YUKOS. By that time, Yurov held the position of head of the treasury of Bank Menatep.

Khodorkovsky noticed a promising employee back in 1994, when Yurov, following an advertisement in a newspaper, came to apply for a job at Menatep Bank. Before this, a graduate of the Faculty of Economics of the Moscow Aviation Institute managed to work at the largest investment company in France, Compagnie Parisienne de Reescompte (CPR). The corresponding line in his resume helped him successfully pass the interview. “You can’t even imagine the extent of that financial illiteracy. A person who simply spoke English could already make a career. “I entered Menatep like a hot knife into butter,” recalls Yurov.

He worked as an economist in the marketing department, and a year later became head of the analytical department. From the second month of work, the young banker prepared analytical reports personally for Khodorkovsky. Five years later, the owner of Menatep invited Yurov to head the DIB. Yurov was then just hatching the idea of ​​creating an investment bank on the financial market scorched by the crisis, and Khodorkovsky approved this plan.

“We managed to create a public debt market,” Yurov sums up the results of the first years of work. In 2002 and 2003, DIB (renamed Trust Investment Bank) was first in the rating of bond underwriters according to the website Cbonds.info. In 2002, the bank organized 18 bond issues for 12 issuers for almost 10 billion rubles. In 2003, there were already 20 issues for 15 issuers for 12.3 billion rubles. Trust accounted for over 10% of the corporate bond market. Among the bank's clients at that time were the largest companies - MGTS, Rusal, Megafon, as well as the governments of the Moscow region, Moscow and Yakutia.

Things were going well, and the bank's managers became partners with YUKOS shareholders, purchasing 30% of Trust from the Menatep group by 2001. Investment Bank Trust never stopped servicing the enterprises of the Menatep group, gaining access to cheap money at their expense. Almost half of the bank's funds under management came from the enterprises of the Menatep group, says Yurov.

In 2002, the bank noticed that a consumer boom was beginning, which meant that lending to the population would grow. To start a retail banking project, the Menatep group had all the necessary resources: 48 branches of the Menatep St. Petersburg bank and access to cheap funds. Yurov came with this idea to Khodorkovsky, but he was not enthusiastic about the proposal. The case was new, it was quite difficult to calculate the risks. The negotiations ended on their own in the summer of 2003, when one of the main owners of the Menatep group, Platon Lebedev, was arrested. “It’s obvious that the Menatep group had no time for this,” Yurov admits. Soon the bankers themselves had a hard time.

Throughout 2003 and 2004, employees of the Trust Information Security Bank were dragged for interrogations. Of course, they were aware of all the financial affairs of the oil company. Meanwhile, clients left the bank one after another. When AFK Sistema revoked the mandate for a major bond issue transaction, Yurov realized that he was losing business. In fact, he recalls, the meeting at Sistema presented him with a difficult choice: either sell his 30% stake in IB Trust and start all over again, or try to get out from under the rubble of YUKOS.

It was a great pity for the time spent on creating Trust, Yurov recalls. And their ambitions kicked in: Yurov and his partners were just over thirty, and they believed that there were no problems that could not be solved. They took a risk that is now called a “gamble.” It was necessary to get money to buy out a 70% stake in Trust IB and 100% of the shares of Menatep St. Petersburg Bank. “We knew many investment bankers in the West. Friends contacted us - fairly high-ranking people from ING Bank - and said: if we come to an agreement with the Menatep group, they are ready to give us money,” says Yurov.

But reaching an agreement with Menatep shareholders was not enough. The flywheel of the “YUKOS case” was spinning up more and more. In this situation, Yurov, who actually headed the settlement center of the disgraced company, decides to independently develop the banking business left over from Menatep. What guarantees did he have?

Yurov does not like to remember how he managed to get out of the “YUKOS case.” “It was a difficult time from an emotional point of view,” he admits. At the second trial in the “YUKOS case,” it was mentioned that Yurov was among the defendants in the oil theft case, in which Khodorkovsky and Lebedev received 13.5 years in prison at the end of last year. At one of the court hearings, prosecutor Gulchekhra Ibragimova said: the head of Trust is accused of participating in the legalization of 7.27 billion rubles received from the sale of stolen oil from Tomskneft, Yuganskneftegaz and Samaraneftegaz. Yurov was indeed involved in the case as an accused, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev’s lawyer Vadim Klyuvgant confirmed to Forbes, but then his case was separated into separate proceedings, and his fate is unknown to Klyuvgant. Yurov himself claims that he never had the status of an accused. In February 2010, the banker appeared in court in the case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev as a witness called by the prosecution. “Sometimes a suspect or accused can become a witness when he fulfills certain conditions set by the investigation. This happens in practice, although not often, it’s a kind of informal deal with the investigation,” says lawyer and former deputy head of the legal department of YUKOS Svetlana Bakhmina, who spent 5.5 years in prison.

Be that as it may, the transaction itself for Yurov’s purchase of banks in 2004 took place surprisingly quickly. Yurov and his partners met twice with shareholders - Leonid Nevzlin, Yuliy Dubov and Mikhail Brudno. We had to bargain a little - Yurov’s team wanted to buy the Menatep St. Petersburg bank for a symbolic amount of $1. Yurov says that it was difficult to evaluate the bank in a different way, in which 80% of liabilities were formed at the expense of the Menatep group. Menatep shareholders were not enthusiastic about this proposal. They agreed that both banks were being sold for $100 million (Their total capital at that time was about $300 million)

The buyers paid part of the amount, $30 million, immediately, and for another $70 million, credit notes secured by bank shares were issued with the help of ING. The deal with the shareholders of Menatep was concluded on May 7, 2004, and in the same year the bankers paid them off in full, and within another three years they paid off the debts on the credit notes, says Yurov. Bank Menatep St. Petersburg was renamed National Bank Trust. In November 2008, the banks were united under this brand.

After the purchase banking assets“Menatep” Yurov’s team tried to stay away from the previous owners and disgraced colleagues. A typical story is that of one of the co-owners of the bank, Oleg Kolyada, the former chairman of the board of Trust National Bank. In August 2006, he left his post at the bank, in September he sold his share to Yurov, and in December he was arrested in the case of theft in 2006 from Tomskneft, which was previously part of Yukos, of funds intended to pay off debts to the tax authorities. Kolyada was accused of participating in the withdrawal of 5.93 billion rubles through the Trust National Bank using a bill of exchange scheme.

Kolyada received 7.5 years in prison, and two years later he accused investigators of conspiring with the bank’s shareholders, who forced him to sell shares at a reduced price. Yurov rejects all claims of his former friend.

The banks moved to their partners along with a bunch of problems. Yurov said that the retail bank Menatep St. Petersburg was unprofitable, and besides, YUKOS shareholders, by agreement, withdrew their funds from it - about $300 million. In investment business there were some difficulties. Simply put, clients fled.

“Previously, our clients were the largest Russian companies. And then we took our suitcases and went to cities and towns,” says Yurov. The bank tried to offer services to attract financing to second-tier companies. In 2004, Trust placed bonds of Novatek for 1 billion rubles. And in 2006 - the retailer "Dixie" for 3 billion rubles. But Yurov failed to reach the previous level. Since 2004, judging by the composite rating of Cbonds underwriters, Trust has declined significantly. In 2004, he took 17th place among the organizers of bond issues; in 2005 and 2006 he did not rise above 20th.

The bank's management made a mistake by continuing to play on the same field, Yurov's former employees say. As a result, time was lost to develop the retail business. “And then domestic monsters like VTB entered the market for investment banking services, and Trust quickly lost its leading position,” says Viktor Shringel, vice-president of Investment Bank and a former employee of one of the Yukos divisions.

The retail project was launched in 2006. Trust began lending to small and medium-sized businesses and households outside Moscow, where competition was lower. In the regions, loans at high rates were then taken out more willingly than in the capital. Even now, when many banks have canceled additional loan fees, Trust continues to charge them. For example, according to the Frank Research Group, which conducted a study in 2010 credit products Russian banks, effective rate credit program“Trust” “Money Now” is 79–92% (depending on the loan term) against 21.9% declared. The network of 48 branches in 39 cities of Russia has grown to 200 offices in 170 cities.

It seemed that calm times had come for the bank. Employees often saw Yurov, a candidate for master of sports in boxing, walking through the corridors of the bank with a sports bag on his shoulder. Potential buyers began to take a closer look at Trust. At the end of 2006 - beginning of 2007, AFK Sistema wanted to buy it. Sistema planned to merge Trust with the Moscow Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which belongs to it. In 2008, negotiations were underway with BNP Paribas. In both cases we did not agree on the price. The shareholders of Trust wanted to get about $900 million for the bank. AFK Sistema offered $450–500 million. Yurov now describes the situation somewhat differently: “Both us and Sistema did not think that there was an economic reason for the merger.”

New problems appeared in 2008, when the financial crisis coincided with claims against the bank from the Rosneft company. This story has been going on since 2001. Then IB Trust issued a loan of $57 million to the Samara company Tekhtransstroy, a friendly regional administration. According to the bank's security service, 25% of this company then belonged to the son of the regional governor, Alexei Titov (he denies any connection with the company). At the same time, the regional government became the guarantor for the loan, and YUKOS itself vouched for the region. In essence, YUKOS, through its bank, issued a loan to the Samara company that could not be repaid.

It is not surprising that in 2003 the borrower stopped paying. The bank applied for the fulfillment of obligations to the first guarantor - the administration of the Samara region. Officials refused to comply with it, and Trust wrote off the money from YUKOS accounts. It is unlikely that anything would have come of this case if the owners of YUKOS and the bank had remained the same. But by the end of 2003, management had already changed in the oil concern, and the company sued Trust. The bank failed to recover money from the regional administration, and it lost the lawsuit with Rosneft, which received YUKOS assets, in 2008. By that time, due to fines for the use of money, the amount of claims had increased from $57 million (about 1.7 billion rubles at the 2001 exchange rate) to 2.5 billion rubles. Trust managed to agree to write off 500 million rubles, and within a year the bank paid off the oil workers.

Where did he get the money? In the spring of 2009, the first mass advertising campaign of Trust was launched - loans and deposits were promoted by showman Vladimir Turchinsky (when he died suddenly at the end of 2009, the advertising had to be removed). The bank then paid up to 18% per annum on ruble deposits. Today, Bruce Willis convinces clients of the bank’s reliability, and rates are still at high level- up to 9.2% per annum in rubles. Result: from January 2009 to November 2010, the volume of private client deposits in the bank increased from 16.5 billion rubles to 74.3 billion rubles.

However, there was a side effect. The rapid growth of deposits at high interest rates and the need to pay Rosneft's claim alerted analysts from rating agencies. They considered that the bank had an unstable deposit base, and besides, a bad loan portfolio. In the summer of 2010, Fitch downgraded Trust's rating to CCC - "a fairly high possibility of default." After this, Trust terminated the contract with Fitch. “They are making unprofessional assessments of the bank's balance sheet. Before the default, Mezhprombank had a rating higher than that of Trust,” explains Yurov.

Back in April 2009, Moody’s downgraded Trust’s long-term deposit rating by two levels at once - from B2 to Caa1 (“significant weakness of the bank”) - and has not changed it since then. The Trust's financial performance is far from brilliant. In 2008, Trust recorded a loss under IFRS of 3.2 billion rubles, says Moody’s analyst Vladlen Kuznetsov. In 2009 - 755 million rubles. In 2010, when many banks improved their financial performance, Trust was unable to become profitable. In the first half of the year, the loss amounted to 1 billion rubles. “Next year, according to the business plan, we plan to earn 2.5 billion rubles,” says Yurov. The bank's problems are reflected in the current rating, Kuznetsov believes. According to him, one of the main problems is in the loan portfolio. About 30% of corporate loans are considered risky - they may be subject to late payments. Yurov disagrees here too: “Our entire corporate portfolio is normally serviced loans.”

Half of the bank's liabilities are formed from household deposits. But what quality are these deposits? Kuznetsov believes that among Trust’s investors there may be “yield hunters” who fell for the high stakes. “These types of deposits are usually very volatile, which can lead to liquidity problems. During a crisis, such depositors are the first to flee banks. They may begin to leave even in quiet times, because more interesting offers will appear or because deposits in general are gradually becoming less profitable.”

According to Yurov, a strategic investor could correct the situation. Every cloud has a silver lining: Rosneft's lawsuit allowed the banker to get acquainted with the top management of the oil company. In January 2009, representatives of Rosneft, Yurov claims, themselves proposed to consider the possibility of creating a partnership. One of the ideas is to transfer a controlling stake in the Trust to Rosneft in exchange for shares in the All-Russian Regional Development Bank (RRDB) and the Far Eastern Bank (73rd and 101st in terms of assets) owned by Rosneft.

Yurov seized on this idea. He does not hide the fact that he would like to work for Rosneft the way he previously worked for YUKOS: “For us, such a partnership is an opportunity to change our business orientation, to return to the idea of ​​a universal bank. It's like in the movie "Back to the Future". Yurov describes the contours of this future: “For a private bank to become a universal player and not a niche one, it needs to become nationalized. We have established a good relationship with the state company. We can take and jump from the development of Trust as it is to the paradigm, relatively speaking, of Gazprom Bank.”

The only hitch: everyone Forbes spoke with considers Yurov’s project a utopia. “It’s hard to imagine a state-owned oil company that is interested in a retail banking project. It’s like attaching bunny ears to a hippopotamus,” sneers Evgeniy Nadorshin, former chief economist of Trust Information Bank, and now chief economist of a consulting company in the field commercial real estate Jones Lang LaSalle. Yurov retorts: “They also told me in 2005 that we would not be able to get out from under YUKOS. I will understand that the process is over when the other side tells us about it.” Rosneft refused to comment on the progress of the negotiations.

Negotiations have been ongoing for two years, but there are no results yet. Perhaps because Yurov went against the grain. Today oil companies are getting rid of non-core business, since the income from it cannot be compared with the income from oil trading, says Alexey Buzdalin, chief expert of Interfax-CEA. Yurov did not sell the idea of ​​retail to Khodorkovsky eight years ago, much less will he sell it today to the board of directors of the state-owned Rosneft, bankers believe.

If the business does not work out, Trust can only hope that hunters for profitable deposits will remain faithful to the brand that Bruce Willis advertises.

Reputation management and crisis communications consultant.

From “Menatep” to “Trust” or what to do with someone else’s reputation?

In the shadow of YUKOS: what should a bank that no one trusts do? The effect of the YUKOS case, which ended with the sale of the company's main assets, was like an ocean storm in terms of the degree of destructiveness for the business of its owners - the Menatep group. Businesses that had any connection with YUKOS began to be assessed by the market as unreliable, and the fear “this could happen to anyone” canceled out all the efforts the company had previously spent on building a strong reputation. Thus, the once positive reputation of YUKOS turned into a threat of serious financial losses for its owners, the Menatep group, who had to look for ways to save their other assets that were quickly losing trust and value: the banks IB Trust and OJSC Menatep SPb.

The ability of the Menatep group companies to fulfill their obligations to shareholders and clients, in the light of the development of the YUKOS case, raised logical doubts. The banks belonging to the group suffered the most from this. The arrest of the chairman of the board of directors of a Menatep subsidiary, Platon Lebedev, as part of one of the cases against YUKOS and the initiation of criminal cases against the Menatep St. Petersburg bank in 2003 completely undermined the reputation of the Menatep brand. This immediately manifested itself in an increase in the interest of law enforcement agencies and a decrease in the ratings of international agencies with a vague prospect of an increase depending on the resolution of criminal and tax claims against Menatep SPb. In fact, the Menatep group not only suffered losses associated with the YUKOS case, but also faced the need for additional investments in banks, the market confidence in which became less and less, the longer Menatep tried to revive it.

Initially, in the struggle to save its banking business, the Menatep group reorganized its assets into a financial holding company of the same name, which included the investment bank Trust, OJSC Menatep SPb, the non-state pension fund Progress-Doverie and management company“Trust Capital”. The ownership rights to both banks were first partially, and then completely, sold to a team of managers led by Ilya Yurov, who was responsible for the future of the newly acquired assets. The strategy of Yurov’s team as managers, and then owners, of Trust and Menatep SPb banks pursued two main goals:

- “detuning” from the Menatep brand and connections with YUKOS (change of management and names of banks);

Working with the image and reputation of banks (inviting a foreign specialist, conservative management policy, active communication with the media, disclosing a new ownership structure).

Considering the fact that the members of the new team of managers of the banks “Trust” and “Menatep SPb” were their co-owners, their direct interest in the speedy restoration of previous business volumes ensured the readiness for the necessary degree of dedication to the business started in critical conditions.

To be with “Menatep” or not to be? To be - not for long.

The management of the Menatep Group holding clearly understood that the root of the problems of Trust and Menatep SPb was their proximity to the parent company, and through it to YUKOS. The concerns of foreign shareholders, the arrest of a key person, and the persistent interest of law enforcement agencies created serious pressure on the management of banks. And although formally “Trust” and “Menatep SPb” were part of the holding, Yurov’s team understood that sooner or later the “link” to “Menatep” and, consequently, to YUKOS, would become a stumbling block in the development of the holding because of the associated brands threats of instability and dependence on negatively-minded influential structures. And the sooner Yurov’s team could draw a conditional line in the eyes of the public between banks and the Menatep brand, the higher the chances of saving the business.

A striking example of the development opportunities for banks in the event of dissociation from the Menatep brand and its connection with YUKOS was the increase long-term rating Standard&Poors of Trust Bank to the level of Alfa Bank in the fall of 2003. At the same time, a series of searches are taking place in the offices of a member of the same holding, Bank Menatep SPb, as a result of which a criminal case will be opened against the bank in the winter. And all this despite the fact that both banks were managed, in fact, by the same team of managers, and both boards of directors were headed by Ilya Yurov. The difference between the banks and the reason for the misadventures of Menatep SPb was that it was clearly unaffiliated with the disgraced company - YUKOS.

The first step towards disassociation from the Menatep brand at the management level was taken when the boards of directors of both banks of the holding were “staffed” by Trust managers, and the reshuffle in the management of the banks ended with the replacement of the only remaining representative of Menatep SPb - Chairman of the Board Dmitry Lebedev - member of the board of directors of both banks Oleg Kolyada. Thus, the only thing that formally connected the banks with Menatep after all the internal reshuffles was the name of one of them.

In addition to internal changes, Yurov’s team worked on building a new image for banks. Since the main reputational risk for Trust and Menatep SPb remained the impact of the situation around YUKOS, which was actively discussed in the media, Yurov’s team developed a number of key messages for clients and investors. The main topic of external communications was the reorganization of the banks’ work, aimed at ensuring that the influence of the “YUKOS case” on the work of both banks did not increase, but weakened. In his statements, Ilya Yurov paid special attention to the principles of transparency in the work of banks, the willingness of shareholders to invest in their development programs, and even mentioned long-term plans to enter an IPO in 2-3 years.

Regular appearances by the management of banks Trust and Menatep SPb in the media pursued two main goals as part of the strategy of dissociation from the Menatep brand. First of all, demonstrate the willingness of shareholders and management to invest in the long-term development of banks: the stated development strategy for 3 years and the signing of an implementation contract electronic system to improve the competitiveness of retail banking products and services. The fact that the management and shareholders of banks made such long-term and costly decisions should have made the general public understand that, despite the difficult situation, the desire and opportunity to invest in business development have only increased, which means that there is no threat of banks not fulfilling their obligations.

The second goal of Yurov’s team’s communications strategy was to show the general public that the situation around YUKOS, despite all its seriousness, was not perceived by bank management as an evil fate. Ilya Yurov himself has repeatedly emphasized that the YUKOS case is more likely to attract interest to Trust and Menatep SPb than to harm their reputation.

Colleagues and Varangians will help in a crisis.

The specificity of the banking business, including investment banking, is that its basis is trust, which is difficult to gain and measure, but easy to lose. And the speed and degree of loss of trust in the banking market largely depends on how much a reputable source disseminates positive or negative information about the bank’s work and how the bank itself reacts to it. Moreover, information disseminated by the bank itself, although necessary, is not in itself the basis for assessing the bank’s position in the market. Rather, it is intended to be verifiable using data from independent sources.

Some of the most influential independent sources of information on the performance of banks are rating agencies and the management of other reputable banks in the market. The former determine the reliability of banks, and the latter compete and collect information about each other. The team of managers of the banks “Trust” and “Menatep SPb” had to deal with the contradictory reaction of rating agencies and “colleagues” in the industry to the events taking place around the Menatep holding.

When the investigative committee of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs published a statement about the initiation of a criminal case against Menatep SPb for tax evasion, the bank’s ratings from the international agencies S&P and Finch, which, to the delight of Yurov’s team, remained unchanged for three months, fell sharply. The wording of the claims against the bank was too reminiscent of the claims against YUKOS. Information about tax claims and a drop in ratings dealt a serious blow to the holding’s reputation, since the loss of trust of one of its members invariably led to a decrease in trust in the rest, and consequently to direct financial losses.

In particular, the reputation of Trust Bank, whose investment activities involved operating significant sums of money, clients entrusted to the bank. And since client portfolio“Trust” in 2003 consisted of a small number of large clients (a third of the amount of deposits for 10 clients), the loss of even one of them could cause serious problems with the bank’s financial obligations.

Unexpectedly, industry analysts and representatives of other banks saved Trust and Menatep SPb from public indignation. In light of the YUKOS case, claims against banks should have caused a clearly negative market reaction, since information about tax evasion by a financial structure poses a serious threat to the funds of clients and shareholders entrusted to it. However, whole line industry analysts and executives of large banks have publicly stated the practice of many banks using legal schemes to optimize tax payments. The financial director of the International Bank of St. Petersburg even noted that without the use of such schemes, many banks would not be able to survive in the existing conditions.

Low level of public trust in government agencies turned out to be useful for Yurov’s team, especially in light of the approaching time for the reports of the banks “Trust” and “Menatep SPb” on the results of the year. A potential scandal in the media associated with another “fact of dishonesty” of banks of a well-known holding company was, in fact, extinguished before it even began. Moreover, it was “extinguished” not by those involved in tax prosecution, but by their competitors. And they did this not at all out of industry solidarity. Simply bringing to an end the case of non-payment of taxes by Menatep SPb would mean the potential possibility of filing similar claims against most Russian banks.

And yet, repelling “external attacks” alone was not enough to restore the reputation of Trust and Menatep St. Petersburg. The end of 2003 was approaching - the time for revealing the not very brilliant results of the banks' struggle to get out of the shadow of YUKOS. And the bank development strategy announced in the fall by the end of the year required confirmation and publication of specific steps. The current situation rather required a crisis response plan, the public adoption of which, along with the benefits for the holding, would strengthen the image of banks in the eyes of the public and banking market players as victims of a crisis situation, which, instead of working for clients, are engaged in their own salvation. Had such an image high chances provoke customer outflow and further aggravate financial difficulties“Trust” and “Menatep SPb”.

To avoid the destructive effect of good intentions, the arrival of a new chief managing director, Chris Evans, at Menatep SPb was immediately commented on by himself. Evans noted that he came to the bank not as a crisis manager, but as a specialist with experience in resolving complex situations in the banking business; specifically - to redirect the bank's efforts to attract customers. Evans' restructuring strategy included introducing a new hierarchy, segmenting products by customer audience, and standardizing internal procedures to avoid duplication of effort. The program was commented in detail for the media by representatives of the bank in order to avoid misinterpretation and create positive expectations from the work of the bank under the new command. Evans's arrival at Menatep SPb was considered by bank management not only as a management decision, but was also used as an image move to reinforce the public's belief that the bank was investing in its development and was determined to reach a new level of work.

The arrival at the end of the year of a new managing director with a clear strategy for restructuring the business of Menatep SPb came at a very opportune time as a positive counterbalance to the unenviable results of the bank’s activities in 2003 (a decrease in assets by 0.4%, customer funds by 26.5%, balance sheet profit by 50 %). To ensure the most positive market perception of the processes taking place in banks, the financial management of Menatep SPb and Trust published not dry data, but their vision of the dynamics of the bank’s work. The essence of the communications of the bank management was that the performance indicators for the year were due to the restructuring process, and not to any wrong decisions, and in the current situation with the persecution of YUKOS and Menatep SPb, they can be considered an achievement.

Such statements would hardly reassure the public if they came only from bank management. However, for the second time, industry analysts and bankers began to speak out in defense of the reputation of the banks “Menatep SPb” and “Trust”, who spoke positively about the results of the banks’ work in the conditions created around the holding. The decrease in individual deposits, in their opinion, could occur not only as a result of the loss of clients, but, say, as a result of optimization of the bank’s activities. And the ratings, they say, rather reflected the loss of market positions of banks, and were not the reason for this.

Such “solidarity” was explained by the specifics of the current situation. The public activity of the management of Menatep SPb and Trust and the announced plans for serious strategic investments against the backdrop of the persecution of YUKOS and tax proceedings against Menatep SPb turned the banks in the eyes of the public from losers into “martyrs” trying to survive in difficult and independent times. them in harsh conditions. In addition, there was no confidence that a similar situation would not repeat with any other bank.

“Menatep SPb” is sold - long live “Trust”!

Against the backdrop of ongoing tax and criminal proceedings, reductions and recalls international ratings, jumps in YUKOS capitalization depending on court decisions to the company, market capitalization banks of the Menatep holding decreased. During the second half of 2003, the total assets of IB Trust and OJSC Menatep SPb decreased by almost half, and private deposits by almost a third. As a result of consideration of proposals for the purchase of controlling stakes in IB Trust and OJSC Menatep SPb, at the end of 2004, the property rights were purchased by the management of the two banks. The sale of the banking business was a forced measure for the Menatep Group holding, since, despite the efforts of the new management of the banks, they were steadily losing value as assets.

The repurchase of shares in Trust and Menatep SPb allowed the new owners to complete the disassociation from the Menatep brand, which began with the change in the composition of the boards of directors of banks, and set a course for restoring the reputation of the banks. Ilya Yurov’s team began the “restoration work” by changing the name of OJSC “Menatep SPb” to the National Bank “Trust”. The unification of bank names was followed by a series of detailed comments by Ilya Yurov for the media regarding the new ownership structure of banks and their further work. The main emphasis in communications has shifted from responding to “attacks” from the external environment to announcing the results of positive changes in the operating structure of banks and, now final, the independence of the results of the banks’ work from the outcome of the YUKOS case.

Shortly before the new year, Ilya Yurov announced the start of serious work on the reputation of Trust banks - investment and retail. According to bank management, separating the activities of the two Trusts will ensure focus and quality of work with clients and partners. Owners, unencumbered by lawsuits and problems of affiliated structures, for whom banking business is a priority and not an additional activity, have the opportunity to rebuild the reputation of banks anew. Whether they succeed or not, time will tell.

What nationality is National Bank Trust March 28th, 2014

Sanctions against Russian banks, blocking of Visa and Master Card cards for Russians, pressure on Russian financial institutions, refusal of visas, threats to block accounts and other little joys from the United States and the European Union. These guys cannot forgive Russia for their statements about the illegitimacy of the Kyiv government and the desire of the Crimeans to join the Russian Federation. But at the same time, they carry out their sanctions very carefully and selectively. So that, God forbid, someone socially close does not suffer, who is friends with the same revolutionary Ukraine and is not particularly tense about Russia.

Examples? Please.

There is such an amazing financial structure under the self-explanatory name of the National Bank “Trust”. There are national dignity, national treasure (I’m not talking about Gazprom), but the Trust national bank is, perhaps, completely exclusive. But a very, very strange exclusive. If you noticed, the face of Trust National Bank is none other than the tough guy Bruce Willis, who receives millions of dollars from the bank for participating in an advertising campaign. But this is only a distant hint.

Let's take a look at some of the mysterious circumstances of today, and then remember the days gone by.

So, in December 2013, President Putin announced that Russian companies with foreign jurisdiction would be deprived of government support, including loans from Vnesheconombank. The President demanded that companies registered in offshore companies pay taxes according to Russian schemes. According to him, companies registered abroad should also be denied access to the execution of government contracts and contracts of structures with state participation. “If you want to enjoy benefits, state support and make a profit while working in Russia, register in Russian jurisdiction,” Putin emphasized.

Many oligarchs immediately began moving their structures from their favorite offshore sites to the not-so-kind Russian soil. However, some, to put it mildly, gave up on the president’s demand, realizing that they have someone and what to hide behind if something happens.

Thus, the Trust National Bank diligently reports everywhere that it belongs to three Russian bankers - Ilya Yurov, Nikolai Fetisov and Sergei Belyaev. Moreover, he even describes the shares as percentages. We check, and here a piquant detail emerges: that the ownership of Trust Bank to the three above-mentioned characters is somewhat simplified.

In fact, the Trust National Bank is one hundred percent owned (attention!) by Cypriot offshore companies. As they say, big greetings to President Putin. And only then, part of the shares of these companies belongs to Yurov, Fetisov and Belyaev.

Don’t believe that a large Russian financial structure, where thousands of Russians keep money, is the property of offshore companies? themselves:

The main shareholder of the bank is currently UK TRUST CJSC (Russia) - 98.27%, 68.65% owned by the Cypriot offshore TIB Holdings Ltd (the main owners of TIB Hodings are Ilya Yurov - 31.71%, Sergey Belyaev and Nikolai Fetisov - 21.14% each).

Another 6.40% of the capital of CJSC Management Company TRUST belongs to Neaspal Investments Limited (Sergei Belyaev belongs 40% UKNeaspal Investments Limited)AndWinsala Investments Limited (Nicholas Fetisov belongs 40% UKWinsala Investments Limited).AND 9,60% UK Company « UK » belongsZaploma Investments Limited (Ilya Yurov belongs 40% UKZaploma Investments Limited).

Here is a diagram showing who owns 100 percent of Trust National Bank and how. It is quite clear from it that the “national” bank has nothing to do with the Russian Federation. Except perhaps for the names of offshore owners.

And as a nice addition. The most “national” bank “Trust”, it turns out, in 2007 sold 8.92% of its beloved bank to the American bank Merrill Lynch. Investment bank Merrill Lynch is one of the world's leading traders with billions of dollars in turnover. The attitude of the Americans from Merrill Lynch towards Russia can be understood from their opinion in the recent report “Given the developments in Ukraine, the EU may think about diversifying hydrocarbon supplies in order to reduce dependence on Russian gas.” These are the partners in the US of the offshore-national bank "Trust", positioning itself as a "Russian financial structure".

But that’s not all. National Bank "Trust", as it turned out, is doing quite well in Ukraine. And under the new self-proclaimed government, the health of the bank is improving by leaps and bounds.

So, the Ukrainian PJSC Bank Trust is represented in 13 regions of Ukraine. The owners of the bank are the same, but, of course, again through offshore structures.

According to the Chairman of the Board of Trust Bank PJSC N. Golub, after the political events in Ukraine, “the bank continues to operate in normal mode- attracts deposits and increases the loan portfolio. We ended February with a profit (!!!).” It is especially interesting that during the period of the seizure of power in Kiev, Trust Bank “suddenly” planned to open eight new branches in different regions of Ukraine, and two of them, in Krivoy Rog and Nikolaev, should be operational by the end of this month. It seems that after the victory of Euromaidan, Trust Bank truly straightened its shoulders in Ukraine.

And now it partly becomes clear why no sanctions against Russia will ever be applied to, say, the offshore-American-Ukrainian " National Bank"Trust".

The current owner of Trust is Ilya Yurov
With former owner Platon Lebedev

To be continued. And there will be no less interesting facts from the past years of Trust Bank. And this office has a very amazing history.