Otp bank is at risk. How to understand that your bank is at risk
These are bad times for retail banks: in the first half of 2014, almost all major players showed losses, and three came close to the minimum on capital requirements. If the banks cannot solve this problem on their own, they will have to attract investors or rely on government assistance.
Reserves eat into earnings
Eight of the nine retail banks in the top 100 by assets have already released their 1H 2014 financials. international standards(IFRS), Renaissance Credit Bank Russian standards(RAS). All these nine banks in the last few years have annually increased deductions to reserves by one and a half to two times. Thus, in January-June of this year, Orient Express transferred 19.864 billion rubles to the reserves, and for the same period in 2013 - 11.784 billion rubles, Russian Standard - 23.346 billion rubles. against 16.468 billion a year earlier, HCF Bank - 27.339 billion rubles. against 21.975 billion. The growth of reserves led to the fact that seven credit institutions suffered losses in this half of the year: for example, the loss of Orient Express amounted to 3.45 billion rubles, Svyaznoy Bank - 3.835 billion rubles, HCF Bank - 4.018 billion rubles ., "Russian Standard" - 4.758 billion rubles.
“Losses of retail banks are caused by two factors. The first is the aggressive growth of loan portfolios in recent years, which has meant an increase in risk appetite and the involvement of new clients who do not have credit history. The second factor is the strong dependence of retail banks on the economic situation in the country - while the economy is growing, they are very profitable, but when the recession begins, they are the first to suffer losses, ”Irina Velieva, Deputy Director of Standard & Poor’s Financial Institutions Rating, tells RBC.
At the same time, analysts interviewed by RBC believe that the problems for retail banks have just begun. “At present, the GDP growth rate is declining, the incomes of the population are falling. This leads to a reduction in demand for loans from individuals and an increase in risks in retail lending. The problem of the population’s debt burden was discussed last year, and now those who previously serviced loans without problems will stop paying, ”said the deputy CEO Interfax-CEA Alexey Buzdalin. The situation with the incomes of the population is clearly not going to improve in the near future, adds BCS analyst Olga Naydenova.
Where to get capital
Losses are eating into banks' capital: in the first seven months of this year, capital adequacy ratios fell for eight out of nine banks. At the same time, three have already approached the minimum (10%): Svyaznoy Bank (10.73%), Renaissance Credit (10.17%) and Trust (10.25%). Although, for example, Trust has this figure below 11% for more than two years.
“The situation with capital adequacy is under constant monitoring. The Bank has never violated capital requirements and will not violate them in the future. For many years we have deliberately kept the capital adequacy ratio within the limits allowed by the regulator of 10-11%, since we consider this the most effective in terms of return on capital and the maximum ratio of working assets to capital. Of course, we will not allow the standard to be reduced below 10%, ”a Trust representative told RBC.
Trust is not the only one to take it easy. Representatives of most retail banks told RBC that they are not very worried about the decline in capital, but if necessary, they can turn to parent structures. Georgy Chesakov, President of OTP Bank, said that the bank has no plans to raise capital yet, as it expects conservative growth. “If we decide to accelerate growth, we will need additional capital. In this case, we will turn to the shareholders,” he said.
The press service of the HCF Bank also said that so far there is enough capital, but in which case the bank can always apply for the support of the "mother". “HCF Bank has one of the highest capital adequacy levels among retail banks, which ensures financial stability and the absence of the need to carry out additional capitalization even in the event of its further reduction. We also note that HCF Bank is a key asset of the Home Credit group and the parent company has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to provide support to the bank. Financial crisis 2008-2009 is one of the examples of this,” commented the press service of the HCF Bank.
Russian Standard can also count on the support of the shareholder. In this bank, RBC previously reported that it complies with all the standards and requirements for capital adequacy, however, if necessary, the bank's shareholder is ready to provide the necessary support.
"Renaissance Credit" has repeatedly asked for the help of the group. This bank regularly receives financial assistance from the shareholder in small tranches; from the beginning of this year to August 1, the bank has already received 5.4 billion rubles. The further fate of the bank in relation to the capital adequacy ratio, the chairman of the board of the bank Alexei Levchenko declined to comment.
However, not everyone has the opportunity to apply for significant shareholder assistance. So, Svyaznoy Bank has been looking for an investor for more than two years, and so far without success. It can be seen from the statements that in the first half of this year, the main shareholder of the bank, Maxim Nogotkov, capitalized it in the amount of 200 million rubles, the bank's losses for the same period amounted to 3.8 billion rubles. “The bank's recapitalization fully meets our needs in terms of maintaining standards and our modest plans for portfolio growth in 2014,” a representative of the bank's press service answered a question from RBC whether the shareholder plans to further increase capital.
The press service of the Orient Express Bank told RBC that they plan to maintain the level of capital by reducing operating costs, dealing with overdue debt and issuing subordinated bonds, as well as increasing Tier 1 capital.
Case in the portfolio
The problem in the banking sector that has arisen now is different from the situation during the 2008 crisis, when there were problems with liquidity. “Now the banks are experiencing problems with capital. And it is not very clear where to look for this capital. In order to meet the capital adequacy ratio, banks need to either recapitalize, or become profitable, or sharply reduce their loan portfolio. Most of the banks have chosen the latter path,” says Veliyeva.
According to Alexey Buzdalin, in order to increase the capital adequacy ratio by 1 percentage point, it is necessary to reduce the loan portfolio by 10%. Six out of nine banks reduced their loan portfolio by 8.6-18% in the first half of the year. Renaissance Credit reduced it by only 0.6%, while TCS Bank and Trust increased it by 1% and 7.9%, respectively.
“Some players are now trying to move into neighboring segments, to change their profile to more affluent clients,” says Olga Naydenova from BCS. HCFB Bank went down this path last autumn. A bank representative told RBC that the loan portfolio is beginning to show the first signs of stabilization. “Loans issued after the second half of 2013 are of the best quality, and they already account for almost half of our portfolio. As the quality of the portfolio recovers, we expect a decrease in reserves and an improvement in profitability,” he said. Bank "Trust" is also almost all last year and at the beginning of this year tightened the risk policy, in particular in the segment of POS and express lending. According to the representative of the bank, since the second quarter of 2014, early-stage arrears have been decreasing. More recently, TCS Bank also announced a reorientation to a less risky segment.
There will be no disaster
“The fate of retail banks depends on how long and how strong the downturn in the economy will be. But given that they all survived the crisis of 2008, which was very stressful, I think they will survive now. In extreme cases, the state can come to the rescue, as it was before, by providing loans through VEB. If more serious problems arise, it is also possible,” Veliyeva believes.
Although the director of banking ratings at Expert RA, Stanislav Volkov, sees the option of reorganization as unlikely. “Retail loans are more likely to be purchased than corporate loans. If a retail bank is forced to leave the market, then most likely it will leave in a civilized way - by selling itself to another player. Large banks, of course, will find it harder to find an investor, and will have to give the bank at a big discount. On the other hand, if the shareholders want to get something, they will have to agree to these terms as well. Since they will not see anything during the sanitation. The only way to “earn money” during reorganization or bankruptcy is to withdraw assets,” he explained. The expert also added that while purchase and sale transactions are frozen, but as soon as the situation with the dynamics Russian economy clear up, there will be new deals.
According to Veliyeva, one retail bank from the top 100 can shake the fortunes of its competitors. “All of them will lose confidence on the part of depositors, which will lead to a significant outflow of funds from the population from this group of banks. In addition, other banks may reduce their interbank lending limits,” she says. Naydenova from BCS believes that the bankruptcy of one of the retail banks is unlikely.
At the same time, Stanislav Volkov believes that neither the sale of the bank nor its reorganization will have a significant impact on the market. “In such situations, the reputation of banks in front of depositors, if undermined, is insignificant. There will be no catastrophe,” he concluded.
Are depositors able to determine on their own that their banks are in trouble? Forbes found out what they should pay attention to first.
At the end of the summer of 2013, a couple of months after the appointment of Elvira Nabiullina to the post of head of the Bank of Russia, representatives of the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance and the government gathered for a meeting. His topic was the upcoming large-scale revocation of licenses from banks. Nabiullina got a difficult economy, her predecessor Sergei Ignatiev, resigning, made a loud statement: in 2012, $ 35 billion was illegally withdrawn from Russia, and more than half of the transactions were carried out by companies directly or indirectly related to each other.
Who controls the pipe through which money is withdrawn from the country, Ignatiev did not say, he did not name the banks involved in dubious transactions, although the Central Bank had all the data.
Nabiullina had a simple choice: either leave everything as it is and then bear responsibility for the continued outflow of capital through semi-criminal channels, or start a purge.
At the meeting, according to a Forbes source in the government, it was decided not to accept any high-ranking "walkers" whoever came to ask for a particular bank - shareholders, depositors, top managers. For the special operation, two directions of impact were identified: banks engaged in illegal operations, and credit organizations with “drawn” assets. Doubtful transactions include, first of all, cashing out (how the cashing out business works - read in the investigation “Cash Transfer” in the April issue of Forbes) and the withdrawal of money abroad, and “drawn” assets are a birth injury of the Russian banking system. Most often, the balance turns into a soap bubble if the bank lends to the business owners. Perhaps the most famous case of a bank with "drawn" assets is Sergei Pugachev's Mezhprombank, after the fall of which the question hung in the air: where was the Central Bank looking?
Ignatiev preferred not to make sudden movements and helped banks with loans to avoid noise and crisis. Nabiullina behaved differently, and when bankers reached out to her with complaints about the looming crisis, she stubbornly repeated: there is no crisis, do not fool your head.
The first salvo was fired on September 30, 2013, when the Central Bank revoked the license from Pushkino Bank for non-compliance with the anti-money laundering law. But the real bomb was the news about the revocation of the license from Master Bank, bankers and clients only shrugged their hands in surprise. “We have been talking about the bank’s problems for a long time, but we didn’t have concrete facts, the news about the revocation of the license took us by surprise,” Alexander Dzerneiko, managing partner of Ginza Project, said on the day the license was revoked, the company kept a bank account. The volume of payments to depositors of the Master Bank in the Deposit Insurance Agency was estimated at 30 billion rubles. Together with payments to depositors of Pushkino Bank, the amount exceeded 50 billion rubles, which is about a fifth of all funds that were in the DIA insurance fund at the time the license was revoked from Master Bank. The monetary authorities issued a statement that the DIA would not require additional capitalization, but at the same time allowed the agency to take loans from the Central Bank. “We will give as much as the DIA needs,” says a source in the government for Forbes. “They will exhaust the Central Bank loan, we will place the deposits of the Ministry of Finance.”
The revocation of the license from Master Bank caused a panic among depositors of small banks, as a result of which several more credit institutions lost their licenses, unable to cope with the outflow of deposits. Pavel Shitov, co-owner of Smolensky Bank, told Forbes that when the panic began, in Smolensk they just issued an advance on bank cards and people laid siege to branches and ATMs. "Smolensky" could not withstand the onslaught.
“After the revocation of licenses from Pushkino Bank and Master Bank for violations of banking legislation, a number of medium-sized banks (including Smolensky Bank, Project Finance Bank and Solidarity) experienced liquidity problems due to an outflow of deposits,” wrote rating agency Fitch in early December 2013. The banks rated by the agency had no liquidity problems, although some banks experienced an outflow of deposits in November 2013. Among the latter, Fitch named Russian Universal Bank, Rosbank, Chelindbank, Russian Standard, Home Credit and Finance Bank and OTP Bank. According to Fitch, the beneficiaries of the panic were large banks - Sberbank, VTB Group, Gazprombank and Unicredit Bank.
Could depositors themselves determine that their banks were in trouble? What should they be paying attention to? At the request of Forbes, the Expert RA rating agency calculated several indicators, their combinations may indicate that the bank has problems. Coefficient current liquidity(Н3) shows to what extent assets with a maturity of up to 30 days cover the corresponding liabilities in terms of maturity. When calculating it, deposits of individuals with more than 30 days left to maturity are not taken into account, although they can be withdrawn ahead of schedule. Because of this, a bank with a low (below 60%) H3 ratio and a high (over 60%) share of individual deposits in liabilities may not be ready for depositors to panic. For a bank with a large share of household deposits, it may also be dangerous to maintain an instant liquidity ratio (H2) below 25%. Among the hundred largest banks, there is not one that has a lot of deposits and little liquidity (Table 1). In other words, the largest banks are able to withstand a moderate panic of depositors. Fitch, for example, claims that the banks it rates can withstand a 20% deposit outflow.
Dmitry Miroshnichenko from the Center for Development Institute at the Higher School of Economics uses a different indicator to assess the behavior of bank depositors, namely the average time spent on deposits. This period shows how many months later, at the current rate of withdrawal of deposits, depositors will take all the money. Too short a period compared to the average market value may indicate manipulations with reporting, too long - indicates the presence of several large clients, which, most likely, are the bank's shareholders. If a critical situation arises, such funds can be quickly withdrawn, which means that the bank will be insolvent. Miroshnichenko considers twofold or more to be a strong deviation (Table 2).
What other indicators can indicate that not everything is safe in the bank? For example, a high share of overdue debt, as a rule, indicates a risky credit policy of the bank in the past. However, if the interest margin allows a margin to cover losses from risky credit policy, then the bank can feel great even with high delinquency. If the level of overdue debt is high (more than 5%, according to RAS reporting) or is growing rapidly, and the interest margin is low (less than 4%), the bank is at risk. In the first hundred there are banks with high level arrears and an interest margin of less than 4% (table 3).
Elena TOFANYUK
Tables for the article can be viewed.
Since 2013, the Bank of Russia has been applying the practice of revoking licenses from unscrupulous commercial banks. Absolutely any bank can get under liquidation if its head conducts a risky credit policy.
If the bank does not have enough liquid assets to fulfill its obligations, it falls into the liquidation risk group and is blacklisted by the Central Bank of Russia.
What is a bank blacklist?
The black list of banks is a kind of list of commercial credit organizations that the Bank of Russia has taken under its supervision. Simply put, the black list includes those whose license the Central Bank can revoke.
Officials claim that there is no official blacklist, but experts know of some credit institutions that have big problems. Thus, the black list is not a clear list of banks whose licenses will be revoked 100% by the Central Bank, it is more like a rating of unreliable banks, which is compiled by experts based on the announced warnings from the Bank of Russia.
The Central Bank of Russia will never issue official information about the future liquidation of banks or those on the verge of bankruptcy, as this may lead to a sharp outflow of deposits.
List of banks that may soon have their license revoked
In the near future, about 50 banks may lose their licenses. The following credit institutions were included in the unofficial black list:
- OOO KB "Agrosoyuz";
- PJSC Asia-Pacific;
- PJSC AK AktivKapital;
- PJSC JSCB "Accent";
- LLC BCC-Moscow;
- JSC "Bank Voronezh";
- FPK "Garant-invest";
- OOO KB "Kansky";
- LLC "MBA-Moscow";
- LLC "Bank Orange";
- JSC CB Tula Settlement Center;
- JSC "GreenComBank";
- OOO KB "European Standard";
- JSCB "Inkarobank";
- JSC CB Interprombank;
- JSC "Interprogressbank";
- JSC "Kemsotsinbank";
- LLC CB "Creditinvest";
- LLC CB "Credit Express";
- JSC AKB "Krylovsky";
- LLC CB "Lightbank";
- JSC "Nefteprombank";
- ZAO NovakhovKapitalBank;
- LLC CB Neclix-Bank;
- Pir Bank LLC;
- PJSC "Plus Bank";
- LLC "PromTransBank";
- PJSC CB PFS-Bank;
- PJSC NKB "Radiotechbank";
- JSC "RTS-Bank";
- JSC "Runetbank";
- LLC CB "Russian Trade Bank";
- OOO KB "Sinko";
- JSC "Solid";
- PJSC CB "Spurt";
- PJSC KB Sputnik;
- PJSC ICB "Stavropolpromstroybank";
- PJSC "Taganrogbank";
- JSCB "Teksbank";
- JSCB "Tender-bank";
- JSC "Tembr-bank";
- PJSC "Uraltransbank";
- JSC "Export-Import".
This list is not a list of banks subject to liquidation, however, the Central Bank conducts special monitoring of these organizations.
Main reasons for license revocation
Only the Central Bank of the Russian Federation can revoke a license from a credit institution. Home organization, which controls the entire banking of our country, analyzes the suspicious activity of an unreliable bank and makes a decision based on the facts obtained during the inspection.
If the decision to revoke the license is based on sufficiently strong evidence, then the situation cannot be corrected - the bank will be liquidated.
The main reasons for license revocation are as follows:
- Breaking laws Russian Federation and requirements of the Central Bank;
Money fraud: fraud, money laundering, financing of terrorism or crime; - Gross errors in reporting, providing false information, hiding existing sources of income;
- Failure to fulfill the obligations to the bank's customers: how individuals, and legal (refusal to pay a deposit or repay a loan);
- Investing in risky assets: shares or bonds of unreliable dubious organizations;
- Decrease authorized capital below the level set by the Central Bank;
- decline own funds banking organization for any reason.
If at least one of the reasons is revealed during the audit of the Central Bank, the financial institution may lose its license to carry out activities.
Find out also the latest data on inflation in Russia. This is extremely important for those who are planning long-term cooperation with the bank (opening a deposit, obtaining a mortgage).
09.10.2017
The share of non-performing loans is not the most important indicator in terms of assessing bank risks
During a press tour to the Moscow office of OTP Bank, Sergey Kapustin, Deputy Chairman of the Management Board of the company, told regional journalists how not to make a mistake when choosing a bank and why risk managers should not be considered villains.Sergey, why does a bank need a risk manager at all?
And really - why? Indeed, in the view of many, it performs the function of a sort of beech, which only interferes with the business to work, prohibiting the issuance of risky loans. In fact, a good risk manager helps the business rather than hinders its development. The task of a risk manager is to correctly assess the quality of an asset in order to make a decision on the possibility / impossibility of issuing a loan or setting a risk limit.
And what are the difficulties here?
For a long time we lived with the feeling that the risks we take on counterparty banks are small. Even when the regulator came to check us for asset quality, he mainly paid attention to loans issued to clients from the non-financial sector. And at the same time, he did not always take into account the fact that banks and legal entities sometimes place money in other, not very reliable financial institutions. This year the paradigm has changed. Now we have an internal rule: when analyzing a potential borrower, we pay attention to where he has current accounts, how great is his risk of losing money if they are stored in a bank, which theoretically could have their license revoked.
What parameters does the risk manager focus on when assessing the risks of counterparty banks?
First of all, we evaluate the cost of risk - we analyze what profit the loan portfolio brings, and compare it with average rates. If profitability loan portfolio significantly below the market average, this may indicate a low quality of loans. The share of non-performing loans in itself is not the most important indicator in terms of assessing the bank's risks. Much more important is the cost of risk, that is, the cost of the annual additional formation of reserves for bad loans. For example, according to the results of the first half of the year, the cost of risk in our bank amounted to only 7.9%.
And yet, what amount of bad loans is considered a norm for a bank?
What is important is not the share of problem debt in absolute terms, but the ratio of risk and return. If in some segment of lending the bank's cost of risk reaches 10%, while the average rate on such loans is at the level of 30%, then this is considered quite a normal state of affairs.
That is, the share of overdue debt does not mean anything to you, as a risk manager, in fact?
Right. Because this parameter is easy to manage. The bank may write off part of the overdue portfolio. A 100% reserve is formed on it, which is deducted from the organization's profit, and the delay disappears from the balance sheet. This overdue loan can be sold, or its share can be reduced by issuing a large volume of new loans. Therefore, it is wrong to say that if one bank has a delay of 20%, and the second has 5%, then the quality of the portfolio of the second is higher. A low delinquency rate can sometimes only indicate that the portfolio of this bank is simply cleaned regularly. Well, according to RAS, only the amount of overdue payments is considered overdue, and according to IFRS, the entire loan, the payment of which is overdue. Therefore, for a risk manager, IFRS indicators are much more important.
Has the Russian lending market recovered after the last crisis and how is it developing today?
In Russia, the cycle of crises is shorter than in a number of countries. Crises come to us with enviable regularity. If a bank uses effective crisis-resistant risk management strategies, this allows it to exist without problems for a long period. And if it starts issuing low-margin or high-risk loans both at good times and at economically difficult times, then such a bank may simply not have enough equity capital, that is, it will be at risk. Under such conditions, we observe an increase in the activity of the regulator. For example, since January of this year, new law, regulating the activities of collectors, which limits contacts with clients. Or, for example, the introduction of a number of restrictions on the debt load of the client is now being discussed. The state thus wants to protect the population from too aggressive conditions of banks. But if a consumer urgently needs a loan, which no one gives him due to the restrictions being introduced, then he is forced to go to receive money on the black lending market. Therefore, a serious discussion is currently underway between the banking sector and the regulator regarding restrictions on the payment burden.
If we talk about the current features of the lending market, I would note a sharp decline interest rates and, consequently, a reduction in banks' margins. There are fewer incoming flows of good customers, people are not thinking about loans as actively as in 2011.
Have there been fewer loans?
Now the market has already caught up with the volumes that were before the crisis of 2014. In terms of the volume of loans issued, June of this year even exceeded the same period of the 14th.
The last month everyone has been hearing problems that have happened with enough big banks. How do you even distinguish good bank from bad?
Friends often ask me this question too. Of course, it would be easier to recommend only our bank to them. But in order to maintain objectivity, one has to say something good about others as well. (Smiling.) When deciding where to keep your savings, it is first of all important to pay attention to the volume and stability of the bank's real business, to assess its income, expenses and profit. Of course, for a non-specialist in the field of finance, this is difficult to do. But you can, for example, track the indicator of the cost of risk and delay according to IFRS. The rating of the bank from international rating agencies is also important.
How many rumors will not appear in the near future: and what Bank Uralsib is closing in 2020 and Home Credit Bank will close soon and Russian Standard Bank has already closed and Vostochny Express Bank is closing in 2020. Such conversations are more a consequence of the client's unpleasant experience in the bank than plausible statements.
Judging by the reviews and comments of users, the banks are to blame, even if the client himself overdue the payment or signed an unprofitable agreement with an overestimated loan interest. Yes, banks take advantage of financial illiteracy and arrogance of clients, but let's be honest: we ourselves are to blame for our troubles.
How to understand that the bank will close
Often determine which of the credit financial institutions closes, leaks from the Central Bank of Russia help, namely:
- news of the upcoming license revocation of financial institutions,
- rumors about the introduction of an interim administration,
- downgrading of rating agencies that are directly subordinate to the Central Bank of Russia,
- problems with getting cash from ATMs and cash desks of financial organizations, etc.
The Central Bank as a mega-regulator has much more leverage and forecasting tools than we used to think. Using the example of organizations that make up ratings, one can already guess about the problems of the bank or about the attitude of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation towards it. They don’t just cancel licenses, this is preceded by clear events: poor reporting by credit organizations, “holes” in the balance sheet, the flight of directors with capital abroad, difficulties in obtaining cash, etc. Therefore, when assessing the possible bankruptcy of a bank, evaluate the likelihood of revocation of the license on the above points.
List of reliable banks for 2020
Below we give a forecast of which banks will not close in 2020 in Russia. The list was compiled on the basis of the deposits of each bank, the network of branches, the volume of assets and loans issued. The rating will be useful, first of all, to depositors in bank deposits.
Bank rating by assets:
- Sberbank of Russia
- GazPromBank
- VTB 24
- FC Otkritie
- RosselkhozBank
- Alfa Bank
- Bank of Moscow
- National Clearing Center
- UniCredit Bank
It is unlikely that the listed banks will close in the near future. Mergers are possible, but the license of these banks will certainly not be revoked. It is noteworthy that in terms of profit rating the list of banks remains the same, with the exception of the National Clearing Center, ousted by RosBank.
From this list strong commercial bank Alfa-Bank stands out, the bank's management has no plans to close this year, besides, this bank is in the top three in terms of turnover Money at ATMs - right after Sberbank and VTB.
Rating of banks on consumer loans:
- Sberbank of Russia
- VTB 24
- GazPromBank
- RosselkhozBank
- Bank of Moscow
- Alfa Bank
- RaifFaisenBank
- RosBank
- HCF Bank
- Eastern Express Bank
In this list, we see loans issued to ordinary users for consumption. Looks apart among the giants of the market Orient Express. Whether the bank closes in 2018 or not, we will wait and see, but we must carefully read loan and deposit agreements, monitor the financial statistics of banks, including the ratio of loans and attracted deposits.
Full list of banks
It is not easy to predict the closure of banks in Russia in 2020, the list of unreliable banks changes every 2-4 weeks. We will share statistics, on the basis of which you yourself will decide whether the bank will go bankrupt in the near future or not.
Bank reliability rating by assets
| Place | Bank | Capital, million rubles |
| 1 | SBERBANK OF RUSSIA | 1945905833 |
| 2 | VTB | 948588518 |
| 3 | VNESHECONOMBANK | 368584340 |
| 4 | GAZPROMBANK | 333854635 |
| 5 | ROSSELHOZBANK | 217650802 |
| 6 | VTB 24 | 178226766 |
| 7 | ALFA BANK | 175492362 |
| 8 | BANK OF MOSCOW | 161241774 |
| 9 | UNICREDIT BANK | 129894505 |
| 10 | FC OTKRITIE | 120347672 |
| 11 | ROSBANK | 115723340 |
| 12 | RAIFFEISENBANK | 103022027 |
| 13 | PROMSVYAZBANK | 59255680 |
| 14 | CITIBANK | 56344583 |
| 15 | MDM BANK | 55073976 |
| 16 | KHANTY-MANSIYSK BANK OPENING | 46766584 |
| 17 | BANK "SAINT-PETERSBURG | 46358807 |
| 18 | CREDIT BANK OF MOSCOW | 43847588 |
| 19 | URALSIB | 43442887 |
| 20 | HCF BANK | 42799327 |
| 21 | RUSSIA | 40552281 |
| 22 | AK BARS | 38961154 |
| 23 | RUSSIAN STANDARD | 38919484 |
| 24 | NATIONAL CLEARING CENTER | 37861245 |
| 25 | NORDEA BANK | 32884937 |
| 26 | ING BANK (EURASIA) | 31803253 |
| 27 | SVIAZ-BANK | 30072189 |
| 28 | OTP BANK | 27875411 |
| 29 | ZENITH | 26041511 |
| 30 | ABSOLUT BANK | 25940565 |
| 31 | REVIVAL | 24366352 |
| 32 | SME BANK | 24203509 |
| 33 | EASTERN EXPRESS | 23975208 |
| 34 | BINBANK | 23604038 |
| 35 | MOSCOW INDUSTRIAL BANK | 23347403 |
| 36 | MTS-BANK | 23034031 |
| 37 | CENTROCREDIT | 22365230 |
| 38 | RUSFINANCE BANK | 21468541 |
| 39 | ROSEVROBANK | 21174183 |
| 40 | SOVCOMBANK | 19974792 |
| 41 | GLOBEX-BANK | 19491904 |
| 42 | PETROCOMMERC | 19486998 |
| 43 | TCS BANK | 18544242 |
| 44 | TRANSCAPITALBANK | 17511470 |
| 45 | OBVERSE | 17056782 |
| 46 | NORTHERN SEA ROUTE | 16918862 |
| 47 | CREDIT EUROPE BANK | 16729973 |
| 48 | DEUTSCHE BANK | 16633272 |
| 49 | VNESHPROMBANK | 16225135 |
| 50 | VANGUARD | 15332684 |
| 51 | TATFONDBANK | 15015233 |
| 52 | RUSSIAN CREDIT | 14832971 |
| 53 | Deltacredit | 14815839 |
| 54 | YUGRA | 14721565 |
| 55 | RUSSIAN CAPITAL | 14195154 |
| 56 | BANK OF TOKYO-MITSUBISHI UFJAY (EURASIA) | 13705000 |
| 57 | BANK CREDIT SUISSE (MOSCOW) | 13547018 |
| 58 | UBRIR | 13014328 |
| 59 | MIZUHO CORPORATION BANK (MOSCOW) | 12687309 |
| 60 | INVESTMENT TRADING BANK | 12515944 |
| 61 | BANK ROSGOSSTRAH | 12468960 |
| 62 | ASIA PACIFIC BANK | 12375681 |
| 63 | RENAISSANCE CREDIT | 11973535 |
| 64 | INTESA | 11951626 |
| 65 | J.P. MORGAN BANK INTERNATIONAL | 11854580 |
| 66 | HSBC BANK (RR) | 11698156 |
| 67 | COMMERZBANK (EURASIA) | 11679538 |
| 68 | ZAPSIBKOMBANK | 11309207 |
| 69 | SKB-BANK | 11219725 |
| 70 | NATIONAL SETTLEMENT DEPOSITARY (NCO) | 11187390 |
| 71 | PERESVET | 11173648 |
| 72 | SUMITOMO MITSUI RUS BANK | 10824762 |
| 73 | NOVIKOMBANK | 10406528 |
| 74 | NOTA-BANK | 10305648 |
| 75 | SETELEM BANK | 10193181 |
| 76 | EUROFINANCE MOSNARBANK | 10161096 |
| 77 | LOKO-BANK | 10157816 |
| 78 | BFA BANK | 9263375 |
| 79 | PROBUSINESS BANK | 9117174 |
| 80 | CENTER-INVEST | 8974752 |
| 81 | TOYOTA BANK | 8862692 |
| 82 | VOLKSWAGEN BANK RUS | 8774530 |
| 83 | RN BANK | 8698937 |
| 84 | FUNDSERVICEBANK | 8651110 |
| 85 | NATIONAL RESERVE BANK | 8557474 |
| 86 | UNION | 8320551 |
| 87 | SURGUTNEFTEGAZBANK | 7934867 |
| 88 | SVYAZNOY BANK | 7541645 |
| 89 | SUMMER BANK | 7517221 |
| 90 | MOSCOW MORTGAGE AGENCY | 7446504 |
| 91 | METCOMBANK | 7280143 |
| 92 | KUBAN CREDIT | 7216444 |
| 93 | EXPOBANK | 7072251 |
| 94 | METALLINVESTBANK | 6945672 |
| 95 | BNP PARIBAS | 6927725 |
| 96 | CHELINDBANK | 6852935 |
| 97 | CHELYABINVESTBANK | 6846837 |
| 98 | UNIASTRUM BANK | 6825478 |
| 99 | SOVIET | 6588398 |
| 100 | MERCEDES-BENZ BANK RUS | 6432118 |