The White House is considering possible measures to reduce government spending. The head of the Ministry of Economic Development, Alexey Ulyukaev, proposed refusing to pay maternity capital. The authorities found out how effective the program to stimulate demographic growth was.

On August 26, by order of the Prime Minister, a commission was created to optimize and improve efficiency budget expenditures. As part of this commission, the Minister economic development Alexey Ulyukaev sent a letter to its chairman, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, with a proposal to abandon the uniform reduction of all state programs. Instead, targeted reductions are proposed, in particular the completion of the maternity capital program, which, according to the ministry, will save up to 300 billion rubles. in year. In the opinion of the Ministry of Economic Development, the program only shifts the birth calendar - it encourages families to give birth to their second and subsequent children earlier than they would have done without additional government support measures.

The All-Russian Popular Front, through the mouth of the co-chair of the central headquarters, Olga Timofeeva, accused the ministry of professional incompetence. In the media, the proposal from the Ministry of Economic Development quickly evolved into “Ulyukaev demanded.” Deputy Prime Minister for Social Affairs Olga Golodets announced the extension of the issuance of maternity capital beyond December 31, 2016, when the program ends. In a long-running discussion, Golodets proposed expanding the list of purposes for using capital, adding to the existing three “investments in agricultural business or in the employment of mothers.” In an absentee dispute with the minister, the Deputy Prime Minister was supported by the press secretary of the Russian Prime Minister, Natalya Timakova: “Currently, the issue of abolishing maternity capital is not on the government’s agenda. The Prime Minister considers proposals for a possible reduction in this program inappropriate and untimely.” The discussion died down for a while.

The era of maternal capital in Russia began at the very end of 2006. In the pre-New Year week, the State Duma, the Federation Council and President Putin adopted, approved and signed the 286th federal law, which established additional measures state support families. The law introduced the term “maternity (family) capital” - funds from the state budget, which the country issued through a pension fund in the form of a certificate to several categories of citizens. Firstly, for women who gave birth to their second child after January 1, 2007. Secondly, for women who gave birth to their third and subsequent children in the new year, if they have not received a certificate before. The same measures applied to adopted children. The law stated “family” in parentheses, since not only women can receive the certificate. In addition to women, men who were the only adoptive parents of their second and subsequent children can become owners of long-term money. Moreover, they are not necessarily Russian citizens: a father or adoptive parent, in the event of termination of the right to receive maternity capital by a citizen of the Russian Federation (death, deprivation of parental rights, commission of a crime against a child), can receive a certificate in her place, regardless of the color of his passport. In case of termination of rights on the part of the father, a child under 23 years of age receives a certificate himself.

You are allowed to spend money on improvement living conditions, children's education and the funded part of mothers' pensions. The same law established the size of maternal capital - 250 thousand rubles, as well as the need for it annual indexation. This year, for the first time, the state indexed capital to an accuracy of half a ruble. Its size is now 429,408 rubles. 50 kopecks

In many societies, the birth rate, having reached a certain critical minimum point, began to rise again

At first glance, the introduction of maternity capital did not become a turning point in demographic situation in our country. In the 21st century, it was not as pessimistic as previously imagined. Since 2000, the birth rate in Russia has been growing steadily, increasing over the past 14 years, according to Rosstat, from 1215 thousand to 1901 thousand births per year, by as much as 56%. If we take into account that the population of Russia, despite the positive dynamics of the 2000s, continued to decline until 2010 (the deep demographic failure of the nineties was not overcome immediately), then the total fertility rate, that is, the number of births per 1 thousand inhabitants, reveals an even more significant increase - almost 60%. What is the reason for such impressive growth, and is it related to the emergence of maternal capital?

It is widely believed that with material and technical progress, the birth rate is naturally declining, and developed countries are literally doomed to depopulation. This view has merit, but only to some extent. In many societies that pioneered the path of depopulation (France, the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries), the birth rate, having reached a certain critical minimum point, began to rise again, gradually approaching the replacement level (just over two children per woman). The experience of this kind of partial demographic restoration has already been accumulated by a significant number of developed countries. However, it is Russia that stands out among them with the highest rates of maternal renaissance.

In addition to the pace, Russia can also boast of the duration of the observed rise - with minor fluctuations, the birth rate has been growing for the fifteenth year in a row. This year, as the results of January-August published by Rosstat show, the positive trend continues.

It is curious that most Western European nations that entered the stage of such restoration stumbled over the global financial and economic crisis, as a result of which the level reached by 2008-2010 still remains unsurpassed. In contrast, in the post-Soviet space the crisis, although it was more severe economic consequences, practically did not affect demographics. Apparently, our people, accustomed to more severe blows of fate, did not take the fluctuations in the global market situation seriously and did not begin to adjust their parental plans.

Russia demonstrates unprecedentedly high rates of demographic revival

If in England, France or Sweden the birth rate approached its minimum in a smooth, evolutionary way, then in our country the decline acquired a revolutionary character due to the shock of radical social changes. It is not surprising that post-Soviet nations, after a deeper failure, are gaining height more steeply. We assume that our sociocultural stereotypes could not change much in the short period of reforms, but were only crushed by the weight of economic and psychological circumstances. Therefore, it is more correct to compare the pace of demographic restoration in Russia with Ukraine or Belarus rather than with countries Western Europe. However, here too the comparison confirms the phenomenal nature of Russian growth. If we do not take into account the jumps in the birth rate that took place after difficult wars, when husbands returned to their families, then a 60 percent increase in the birth rate in peacetime is an indicator that claims to be a world record.

In modern Russian society, there is a popular stereotype that the increase in the birth rate observed in Russia, if not entirely, then to a very significant extent, is ensured by migrants. However, we must take into account that the largest centers of immigration to Russia - Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan - have long been no longer distinguished by high demographic indicators. The modern birth rate in these countries is close to simple reproduction and is less than a quarter higher than in Russia. The birth rate of the Chinese, another nation featured in the migration phobias of their compatriots, has recently become lower than the domestic one (we emphasize: we are, of course, talking about a comparison of relative figures - births per 1 thousand population, and not an absolute comparison of the more than billion-strong PRC and 143 million Russian Federation). Even in the case of the absolutely incredible complete replacement of the indigenous population of Russia with visitors from these countries, it is not only impossible to ensure a 60 percent increase, unique in world practice, but in general it is quite difficult to guarantee any noticeable increase in the birth rate. After all, we must take into account that due to the labor nature of migration, men in this environment significantly predominate over women, which does not contribute to a high birth rate per 1 thousand people.

Contrary to stereotypical phobias, we can safely say that the driving force behind the demographic revival of the 2000s and 1900s is not migrants, but Russians and peoples close to Russians in sociocultural stereotypes. This is indirectly, but very eloquently, evidenced by the regional analysis of the changes that have occurred (see map).

In the groups where the birth rate grew at a rate above average, regions with a predominantly Russian population absolutely predominated (with the exception of Mari El and Tuva). Such obvious epicenters of migration attraction as Moscow and the Krasnodar Territory find themselves in the lagging group, and the Moscow Region, although it has crossed the average line, looks rather modest.

The birth rate grew at the slowest rate in the North Caucasus. Contrary to popular belief, this region also experienced a demographic crisis in the nineties, although in a much less acute form than central and northern Russia. Today we are witnessing a process of convergence of family guidelines between the Slavic and Caucasian peoples. If in the group of regions with a predominantly Russian population the birth rate on average has already exceeded the level of the pre-reform 1990, then in the group of republics of the North Caucasus, traditionally distinguished by having many children, the overall fertility rates range from 70 to 95% of the 1990 level. The differences between the sizes of Russian and Caucasian families are no longer as contrasting as they used to be. The total fertility rate between the respective regions now differs by about one and a half times (in contrast to the more than double gap in favor of the North Caucasus in the early nineties).

There was no reduction to 97% of the 1999 level in 2013, because not only the number of women changed, but also the intensity of births

Again, we emphasize: we are comparing growth rates, not achieved level fertility. In terms of the number of births per 1 thousand people, the North Caucasus republics are still ahead central regions, which nevertheless today are closing the gap with them. A more accurate picture would be provided by comparing not general, but total fertility rates, that is, not the number of newborns per 1 thousand inhabitants, but the number of children per woman, but the authors do not have such data broken down by region.

Thus, Russia is demonstrating an unprecedentedly high rate of demographic revival, which cannot be attributed to migration or the contribution of regions with traditionally high birth rates - the locomotive of the maternal renaissance is the regions with a predominantly Russian population.

The entire period of demographic revival in Russia can be divided into two equal time periods of seven years: before the introduction of maternity capital (2000-2006) and after (2007-2013). The objective conditions for demographic growth during these periods were not the same. In 2000-2006, the number of women of childbearing age in the country increased, as children of the last Soviet demographic boom of 1982-1988 entered adulthood. In 2007-2013, the number of potential mothers began to decline, as a small generation of girls born at the end of perestroika and at the height of “shock therapy” (1989-1995) reached adulthood.

Based on these data, demographers of various schools and directions predicted that starting around 2010, the birth rate would begin to fall in Russia. The head of the Center for the Study of Population Problems of Moscow State University Valery Elizarov, the director of the Institute of Demography at the Higher School of Economics Anatoly Vishnevsky, his deputy Sergei Zakharov, Associate Professor of the Department of Sociology of Family and Demography of the Faculty of Sociology of Moscow State University Viktor Medkov and others wrote about this.

Based on data from the 2001 and 2010 all-Russian censuses, as well as age-specific birth rates in 2000 published by Rosstat, several conclusions can be drawn. If the frequency of births per woman remained unchanged throughout the entire period under consideration, and only the number of potential women in labor had changed, then in 2006 the number of children born would have reached 106% of the starting level in 1999 (about 1290 thousand people). Such an increase would be explained by an increase in the number of potential mothers from the Soviet baby boom generation of the mid-80s. However, by 2013, the number of children born would have decreased to 97% of the 1999 level (1,180 thousand) - this is 20-25 years later, the echo of the demographic failure as a result of the collapse of the USSR would reach us.

However, the real frequency of births depends not only on the extensive factor (the number of women of fertile age), but also on the intensive factor, that is, on the frequency of births per woman. If there is a shift in society from the ideal of a one-child family to the ideal of a two-child family, or vice versa, this radically affects the birth rate.

In fact, the reduction to 97% of the 1999 level did not occur in 2013, because not only the number of women changed, but also the intensity of births. Our “woulds” regarding the number of births turned out to be rejected by reality. As we now know, neither in 2010 nor in 2012 did the pessimistic forecasts of demographers come true. On the contrary, the Russian birth rate continued to grow, and in 2013, for the first time in the entire post-reform era, it exceeded the death rate, providing our country with natural population growth.

In 2006, the country's birth rate increased by 22% compared to 1999. 6% of this growth is provided by an extensive factor - an increase in the number of women. The remaining 16% falls on the intensive factor, that is, on the increased frequency of births, in other words, on the desire not to limit oneself to one, but to give birth to a second and third child.

In 2013, we expected a decrease in the number of births due to a decrease in the number of women. But the birth rate, on the contrary, increased sharply - by 56%. It turns out that the increased intensity of births not only provided a 56% increase compared to 1999, but also compensated for the predicted three percent decrease. In total, the frequency of births per woman compared to 1999 reached 159% in 2013. An additional 59% compared to the year of the historical minimum is provided solely by an increase in intensity, and not by quantitative factors. In 2006, the role of the intensive factor was expressed in only a 16 percent increase. It turns out that the sum of the factors that increase the frequency of births (in everyday language - increasing the number of children in our families) acted approximately four times stronger in 2013 than in 2006.

It is obvious that after the introduction of maternity capital, the intensity of births increased significantly. Moreover, the role of the intensive factor at this time turned out to be almost four times more significant than in the period without maternity capital. As a result, in 2007-2013, the birth rate grew even faster than in the previous seven-year period, despite the reduction in the maternal generation. This is a serious preliminary argument in favor of maintaining the social measure we are discussing.

Of course, based on the above, it cannot be argued that the introduction of maternity capital was the only or at least the main reason for the increase in the birth rate in 2007-2013. But it is even more reckless to declare that economic stimulation did not bring the expected effect, resulting only in a shift in the birth calendar. Those who reduce the effect of maternal capital to a calendar shift imply that the children born should have been born anyway, only a little later, so in the end we will not get any real increase in the birth rate, and from the point of view of the demographic future, the issuance of almost 430 thousand . rub. for a family - a waste of money.

The share of second and subsequent births, judging by the estimated data from Demoscope weekly and the Ministry of Labor, increased from approximately 42.3% to 51.5% of the total number of births from 2006 to 2012 alone. In absolute numbers, this means an increase from 625 thousand to 980 thousand, or more than one and a half times. Let's assume that the experts from the Ministry of Economic Development are right in explaining this increase in the birth rate with a calendar shift. In this case, over almost eight years of operation of the demographic program for payments of maternity capital, more than one and a half times more women should have made repeat visits to maternity hospitals. That is, to the eight expected annual groups of women giving birth (who would still decide to give birth at the designated time, even if there were no maternal capital), more than four more such groups should be added, made up of those who, without maternal capital, would postpone their second birth for later. To complete more than four of these cohorts would require more than a four-year shift in second birth plans nationwide! But this is physically impossible, since the difference between the average age of birth of the first and second child at the time of the introduction of maternal capital was slightly less than five years and, for physiological reasons, could not be reduced by more than three to four years. Even if, thanks to the incentive of family capital, second children were born after the first in an assembly line order, already in the sixth year of the program the resource of one and a half growth would have been exhausted (six planned annual cohorts would have visited maternity hospitals plus three extra planned ones, who arrived there as a result of the maximum physiologically possible compaction of the calendar childbirth). Consequently, from 2012, growth would be replaced by a rapid decline in the birth rate, because all desired second children have already been born prematurely. However, we are not seeing any reduction this year and cannot even predict for the next one. This means that maternity capital stimulated “original”, “above-plan” births, and did not bring the planned ones closer, as the Ministry of Economic Development believes. And therefore, 300 billion rubles. per year are not spent on fun with a wall calendar, but actually allow maternal capital to be converted into human capital.

Moreover, a calendar shift would inevitably lead to a younger age of the average birth. In reality, the opposite picture is observed: women in labor in Russia are aging. According to the Foundation social insurance Russian Federation, during the period of maternity capital, the average age of mothers increased from 26.6 to 28.2 years. In the age group from 35 to 40 years, the birth rate is growing twice as fast as the average for the entire maternal cohort. This suggests that there is not a shift of the calendar forward, not an early birth ahead of schedule, but the implementation of long-awaited and constantly postponed plans has finally begun, allowing many mothers to jump on the last carriage of the departing train at the end of their fertile age. If not for the improvement social conditions Without government support, these deferred hopes would never have come true.

Sociological studies conducted in 2013 by Rosstat also make it possible to assess the role of maternal capital in these changes. In a survey of Russian families of all ages, 6% of all married couples surveyed reported that the issuance of this benefit had a decisive influence on their decision to have a child. The share of 6% looks insignificant, but in absolute numbers nationwide it grows to 1,800 thousand people. The total birth rate in 2007-2013 exceeded the level achieved in 2006 by approximately the same number of children. Approximately the same number of children ensures Russia's superiority in the pace of maternal renaissance over its sisters - Belarus and Ukraine.

After the introduction of maternity capital, the birth rate accelerated in the country. And this happened not due to a shift in the birth calendar, but due to a real increase in the number of children born per woman. For the first time in the past 20 years, the two-child family model gained a noticeable advantage over the one-child family; the total number of second and subsequent births exceeded the number of first ones. In the excess of the number of second and subsequent births over the first, the role of maternal capital is obvious.

We fundamentally did not consider the issues of the ethics of this cancellation and the very ethics of posing the question. But even a rational view shows that maternity capital turned out to be an effective social measure.
Vladimir Timakov, Alexey Tokarev

Push. There are countless Tajik migrants in the Sverdlovsk region. They reproduce strongly, all of them are either citizens or have a residence permit. disingenuous statistics, IMHO.

Since 2000, the birth rate in Russia has been growing. If in 1999, at the bottom of the historical minimum, only 1,215 thousand people were born in the country, then in 2013 the Fatherland could rejoice at 1,901 thousand newborns. If we count in relative figures (the number of births per 1000 inhabitants), we have already returned to the pre-reform level of 1990.

It is impossible not to notice that Russia’s demographic successes correlate with its economic dynamics. In 1998, our country reached the extreme point of economic decline, reducing per capita income by almost half compared to pre-reform. Since then, the standard of living of the population has increased significantly and surpassed the best Soviet indicators. However, it is impossible to directly link quality of life with fertility. For example, in former socialist countries of Eastern Europe- such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the eastern lands of Germany - have significantly exceeded the previous standard of living, but it has not been possible to restore the birth rate of twenty-five years ago.

In recent years, Russia has become one of the demographic leaders in Europe, surpassing in the number of births per 1000 inhabitants not only Italy, previously famous for its large families, but also countries with a traditional Muslim culture: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Did the introduction of such a measure as maternity capital play a role in Russia’s demographic revival?

During the seven-year period 2000-2006, before the start of maternity capital payments, the number of births reached 1,479 thousand people, increasing on average 38 thousand per year. This is explained by compensatory growth after a deep failure: people realized their family plans, postponed due to the crisis of the nineties. In addition, during this period the cohort of potential mothers increased significantly, as girls born in 1982-87, during the last Soviet demographic boom, reached adulthood.

In the next seven years (2007-2013), such favorable demographic conditions were not expected. The number of potential women giving birth began to decline, and experts predicted a decline in birth rates starting around 2010. However, in fact, during the “seven-year period of mother capital” the growth only accelerated. The average annual increase was over 60 thousand births - one and a half times more than over the previous seven years!

According to research conducted by Rosstat in 2013, about six percent of Russian families surveyed admitted that their decision to have a second child was made taking into account the expected payment of maternity capital. On a national scale, six percent looks very significant - approximately 1.8 million newborns. This figure almost exactly coincides with the total increase in the birth rate after 2006 and indicates the high efficiency of maternal capital.

The survey included married couples of all ages, from newlyweds to very old people.

True, this effect has regional uniqueness. In the first years after the introduction of the new social measure, the largest payments were made in territories with a traditionally high birth rate (Dagestan, the Chechen Republic, etc.). Since every family has the right to receive maternity capital for the birth of a child of any order, except for the first-born, but only once, then, starting in 2007, in regions with many children, certificates were issued for second, third, and even seventh children. Then the demand for maternity capital in the North Caucasus began to decline: having received a certificate for the second birth, the family had already lost the right to the same material support for subsequent children.

On the contrary, in the Russian provinces, which have experienced the deepest demographic crisis, payments to family capital are increasing year by year. For families who have main question planning: to have or not to have a second child? - obtaining a birth certificate for 429 thousand rubles is often the main argument. It is not surprising that the birth rate in the regions of Siberia, the Urals, the Russian North and the Volga region is now growing at an accelerated pace. The pre-reform level has already been surpassed by Novosibirsk and Yekaterinburg, the Altai and Krasnoyarsk Territories, the Vologda, Kostroma, Nizhny Novgorod, and Tomsk regions - in total about thirty regions with a predominantly Russian, formerly, as a rule, small population. It can be stated that the gap in fertility between the Russian north and the Russian south has decreased noticeably over the past decade, including due to the equalizing effect of maternal capital.

But for Moscow, the effect of using birth certificates is doubtful. Given the high cost of real estate in the capital, it is impossible to solve the housing problem at the expense of maternal capital. This is probably why the birth rate in Moscow is noticeably lower than the Russian average: 11.3 births versus 13.3 births per 1000 inhabitants. The positive demographic indicators of the capital are formed solely due to the successful age structure, due to the constant influx of provincial youth.

It seems that Moscow needs a different model of demographic policy. But in Russia as a whole, the use of maternity capital should be recognized as a successful social measure, most effective in previously depressed areas.

In the course of conducting seminars on pension reform, the site aims to reveal the full potential of the currently available ways for an active citizen to increase the size of his future pension capital.

Such instruments for increasing capital include:

Let's consider how they can use the tool " maternal capital" - state support for families with children - mothers of two or more children. The implementer of this state function is Pension Fund Russia.

1. The concept of maternity capital

2. The procedure for obtaining maternity capital

3. Possibilities of using maternity capital

1. The concept of maternity capital

Maternal (family) capital is funds from the federal budget transferred to the Pension Fund of Russia (PFR) in order to support families with children.

Maternity capital can be used to improve the living conditions of families, obtain education for children, or for the formation future pension mother.

According to Federal Law No. 256-FZ of December 29, 2006 “On additional measures of state support for families with children” (hereinafter referred to as 256-FZ), maternity capital is intended for families who, in the period from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2018 a second child has appeared (or a third child or subsequent children). We are talking about both the birth and adoption of the second, third and subsequent children (hereinafter referred to as the second child).

Recipients of maternity capital can be:

• a woman who has Russian citizenship and has given birth to (adopted) a second child;
• the father (adoptive parent) of the second child in the event of termination of the woman’s right to maternity capital in accordance with 256-FZ;
• a man who has Russian citizenship and is the sole adoptive parent of a second child;
• a child (children in equal shares), if he is not yet an adult or is studying in an educational institution, but not older than 23 years, upon termination of the right to maternity capital from the father (adoptive parent) or a woman who is the only parent (adoptive parent) in the established law cases.

According to 256-FZ, the amount of maternity capital is reviewed annually taking into account the growth rate of inflation. However, in 2017 its size was not indexed and remained at the level of the 2016 size of 453,026 rubles. For persons who have already disposed of part of the funds, the amount of the remaining amount should also increase to take into account inflation.

The process of obtaining this state benefit can be divided into three stages:

1) obtaining the right to maternity capital: the appearance of a second child in the family in the period from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2018;

2) obtaining a state certificate for maternity capital: the period for applying for a certificate is not limited;

3) disposal of a state certificate for maternity capital: the period of disposal is not limited.

2. The procedure for obtaining maternity capital

The right to receive maternity capital can be used once.

To confirm the right to receive maternity capital, a state certificate for maternity capital (hereinafter referred to as the certificate) is issued. There is no time limit for applying for a certificate after the birth of your second child.

To obtain a certificate you must do the following:

1) issue a birth (adoption) certificate for the child at the registry office;

2) submit to the Pension Fund an application for the issuance of a certificate and certified copies of:

• a document identifying the applicant and his place of residence;
• documents confirming the birth (adoption) of children;
• a document confirming the Russian citizenship of the child (children) born (adopted) after January 1, 2007;

3) wait by mail for notification of the issuance or refusal to issue a certificate. The period for reviewing documents is one month from the date of their submission;

4) obtain a certificate from the Pension Fund of Russia.

3. Possibilities of using maternity capital

Maternity capital funds can only be received by bank transfer.

To use maternity capital, you must submit an application to the Pension Fund for the disposal of funds (part of the funds) of maternity capital.

Maternity capital funds can be used for the following purposes:

1) improvement of housing conditions: acquisition (construction) of residential premises and repayment of a housing loan;

2) education of the child (children) in any Russian educational institution;

4) purchase of goods and services intended for social adaptation and integration into society of disabled children.

Maternity capital funds can be disposed of no earlier than three years from the date of birth (adoption) of the second child. An exception is the use of funds to repay a loan for the purchase (construction) of residential premises.

Maternity capital funds can be disposed of in full or in parts, directing it to various purposes. You can also manage the capital partially first, and dispose of the rest later.

Also in the fall of 2016, certificate holders (regardless of how much time had passed since the birth of the second child) had the opportunity to receive a one-time payment from it in the amount of 25,000 rubles (or in the amount of the actual balance, if it is a smaller amount). The application must be submitted no later than November 30, 2016.

If a woman did not manage maternity capital before retirement, she has the right to take these funds into account as part of pension savings when assigning her a funded pension.

Maternity capital funds can be used for the formation (hereinafter referred to as pensions) of the mother. In this case, maternity capital funds are included in its composition.

Pension savings can be accounted for and invested in both the Pension Fund and (NPF). Based on the results of investing pension savings, investment income is accrued.

Maternity capital funds (or part thereof), initially aimed at forming a pension, can be redirected until it is assigned for other purposes.

The procedure for directing maternity capital funds to form a pension to a non-state pension fund provides for the following actions:

1) obtaining a certificate;

2) conclusion with a non-state pension fund (NPF) and submission to the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation of an application for transfer to this fund;

3) submission to the Pension Fund:

• applications for the disposal of capital (direction of funds (part of the funds) for the formation of a pension);
• certificate;
• OPS insurance certificate of the certificate holder;
• identification document, place of residence of the certificate holder.

Within a month, the Pension Fund makes a decision to transfer funds to the NPF, after which the transfer is carried out within a month.

Thus, if other family issues are resolved, maternity capital can become a tool for increasing the mother’s future pension.

According to this program, women who gave birth (adopted) a second child or subsequent children after January 1, 2007 are entitled to additional financial support from the federal budget. These funds (maternity capital) are provided to the mother in the form of a certificate when the second (or subsequent) child reaches the age of three. According to legislators, a woman can use this certificate in a strictly defined way - invest in the construction of housing, in the education of one of her children, or in the funded part of her own pension.

Everything would be fine, but in reality, getting this capital is not so easy. The outgoing year was marked by several major scandals in the regions. Thus, in the Ulyanovsk region, officials did not warn mothers about their right to government money or missed the deadline for issuing the certificate. In Tatarstan, Pension Fund employees forced parents to bring not only certificates from the registry office, but also the birth certificate of the applicant herself, which many no longer retained. In addition, maternity capital ceases to be indexed at the time of receipt of the certificate. The family received it in 2010 - instead of 250 thousand rubles it will be 310 thousand. But no more. So it’s unlikely that there will be enough for preparatory courses for college for a child: in a few years, inflation will leave a penny of wealth. And now the amount is only enough for country house 200 kilometers from Moscow. Little nasty things

In 2010, children for whose birth families are entitled to maternal (family) capital reached the age of three. This means that the reform, which at one time caused a great public outcry, is beginning to become a reality. And of particular relevance is the question of how the expected effects of the maternity capital program relate to the practical results of the initial functioning of this project.

In the summer of 2011, the “Gender Studies” program (European University in St. Petersburg) with the support of the Foundation. Heinrich Böll conducted a sociological study on this issue. During the study, 19 interviews were collected with mothers and married couples who have the right to use maternal (family) capital. Interviews were conducted in Volgograd, St. Petersburg, Moscow and Leningrad regions. The study involved people with different numbers of children in the family (from 2 to 4 children), with different levels of education (from secondary to higher) and income. This article is devoted to a discussion of the results of the described project.

Maternity capital: content and criticism

The starting point for the introduction of the maternity capital program was the message of Russian President V.V. Putin to the Federal Assembly on May 10, 2006. In this speech, the president identified the demographic problem (population decline) as the most acute problem of the country. Putin associated her decision, first of all, with stimulating the birth rate, namely, with the introduction of measures of state support for young families (primarily women) who decide to give birth to a child.

Do maternal capital and child benefits somehow encourage a woman to become a mother? - Maternity capital had little influence on a woman’s decision to give birth. However, in the regions, significant assistance can be provided at a time when a woman must devote all her energy to caring for a child and cannot earn money herself. This is when the baby is between one and a half to two years old. Therefore, an increase in child care benefits at this age can be a positive factor, and in some cases, a decisive one. The fact is that there are cases where women, even after a caesarean section, were forced to look for work because they could not feed the child on benefits. Other measures, e.g. one-time benefits, according to our observations, are not very effective. Svetlana Rudneva: “Only one woman out of ten refuses an abortion”

The President declared the need for an integrated approach to state assistance to families. The set of innovations he proposed included an increase in child care benefits up to 1.5 years, compensation for the costs of preschool education of children, and the development of reproductive healthcare. At the same time, maternal capital was named as the main measure designed to encourage women to have at least two children.

The essence of the proposed measure was as follows: a woman who gave birth to a second (or subsequent) child in the period from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2016, receives a “maternity capital” certificate from the state. The size of this capital in 2006 was 250 thousand rubles, and by 2011 it was indexed to 365,700 rubles. Once the child reaches three years of age, the mother can use this certificate strictly in accordance with legally defined areas of spending (to improve her own living conditions, for the education of her children, or for the funded part of her own pension). Although in regulatory documents this measure of state support was defined as family support (the official name of the program sounds like the “maternity (family) capital” program), its actual recipients were women-mothers. The father received the right to dispose of maternal capital only in exceptional circumstances - in the event of the death of the mother, deprivation of her parental rights, or her commission of a crime against the child.

Soon after its introduction, this reform became the center of public debate. The concerns of liberal-minded experts were related to the fact that monetary payments in the declared amount were not sufficient to encourage middle-class families to have children. Already at the start of the program, two hundred and fifty thousand in maternity capital could not serve as a significant help for purchasing an apartment (in Moscow, this amount could buy about 5 square meters of living space) or paying for a child’s education. Economists warned that the assistance promised by the state would seem attractive only to low-income segments of the population, and an increase in the number of births in this group of families would ultimately lead to a number of social problems.

Another feminist-oriented line of criticism focused on the gender aspects of the ongoing reform. Its supporters emphasized that by addressing its programs primarily to mothers, the state thereby consolidates the traditions of Soviet social policy, when the woman was presented as the main agent of child care and the passive object of care by the paternalistic state. The fact was also problematized that by giving priority to monetary measures to support parents (including maternity capital), the authorities thereby avoid solving more pressing issues of family policy - reforming children's healthcare, accessibility of preschool educational institutions and so on.

In 2008–2009, under the influence of criticism, as well as in the context of economic changes, a number of additions were made to the maternal (family) capital program. In connection with the global financial crisis Families faced with the need to pay off mortgage loans were allowed to use maternity capital to cover the mortgage immediately after the birth of a second or subsequent child. Citizens were also given the right to receive a one-time payment of 12,000 rubles from maternity capital. In addition, fathers received the right to use maternity capital to improve their living conditions, if a loan agreement, and they are in a registered marriage with a woman who has the right to maternity capital.

These innovations, however, did not remove the claims previously made against the program: the main recipient and manager of the funds remained the child’s mother; the list of areas in which maternity capital can be spent has not been expanded; its amount remained incomparable with market prices for housing. Next, we will look at what role the maternity capital program actually played for families with children, and also how justified the criticism leveled against it was.

What do they spend it on?

When analyzing the attitude of families to the maternity capital program, we were interested in two main questions: what choices do citizens make within the framework of the opportunities offered by the state and how this measure of state support relates to the reproductive and economic strategies of parents.

The answer to the first of these questions in general can be found in statistical materials concerning the use of maternity capital funds. Thus, according to official data from the Ministry of Health and social development Russian Federation, for the period from January to September 2010, the Pension Fund accepted 27 thousand applications for the transfer of maternity capital funds to consumer accounts. Most of these funds (about 24 thousand applications) were spent on purchasing housing and improving living conditions. Another 2.8 thousand applicants decided to use a certificate for maternal (family) capital to pay for their children’s education; only 210 applications were submitted to transfer certificate funds to the funded part of the mother’s pension.

In addition, the ministry’s report traces two interesting trends: 1) demand among the population for “anti-crisis” changes in the maternity capital program (in 2009–2010, 239 thousand applications were submitted for repayment of mortgage loans; 90% of families with a certificate received payments at his expense); 2) the overall low level of use of funds from this program (by the fall of 2010, slightly more than 11% of the total number of families with appropriate certificates used maternity capital funds in the main areas of spending). By turning to the interviews collected during our project, we will try to clarify the observed distribution.

So, the most significant area for spending maternity capital for citizens seems to be improving their living conditions. " Housing problem”, in general, is characterized by them as one of the leading factors that young families weigh when deciding to have children. At the same time, the participants in our study say that they have certain (quite high) standards for housing. The ideal is an apartment with several rooms (a separate room for each family member), located in a “good” area with developed infrastructure (a kindergarten and a clinic located next to the house). In order to achieve this ideal, citizens are ready to accumulate all the resources available to them - support from parental families, other relatives, friends; assistance at the place of work; loans from banks; government support programs.

Maternity capital is one of the elements (usually not the most essential) of such a complex scheme aimed at improving living conditions. At the same time, due to the presence of bureaucratic barriers and frequent changes in social policy, government support turns out to be the resource that is most difficult to count on and the use of which is most difficult to control. Thus, for some families, the maternity capital program appeared as a lucky break that allowed them to pay off the balance of their mortgage loan. For other families who tried to include it in advance in their plans to purchase a home, it acted as the weakest and most unpredictable link in the financial chain, a link that jeopardized the completion of the transaction to purchase an apartment. For example, one St. Petersburg resident interviewed (Konstantin, 43 years old) talked about how, due to a delay in the transfer of maternity capital, his family’s receipt of another, larger one was suspended. social benefits, at the expense of which it was planned to buy an apartment. As a result, Konstantin, who contacted the prosecutor’s office to resolve this issue, came to the conclusion that “this certificate, it is just a piece of paper (...) it cannot be bought for money.”

Thus, the opportunity to use maternity capital to improve housing conditions gives rise to the following actions by its owners:

1) using maternity capital as a lucky chance to cover part of the mortgage. It is important that this, the most common, method of using maternity capital is not strategic (and was not initially provided for in the law). Mortgages in the vast majority of cases were issued by families before the introduction of the maternity capital program. Accordingly, although the new measure of state support eased the financial burden of the family, it did not play any significant role in the decision to purchase housing and the related decision to have a child.

2) planned use of maternity capital to purchase a house/apartment. This situation is characterized by the perception of microfinance as one of the types of resources involved in the purchase of housing. Although, compared to the support of the parental family or credit loans, this resource is the least significant; access to it is usually described by our citizens as the most problematic. The lack of clear legislative mechanisms for action in a number of difficult situations and bureaucratic delays often disrupt families’ plans to use microbiology to improve their living conditions. The way out of such difficult situations is often to turn to “shadow” schemes (for example, paying bribes to officials). It should be noted here that many families who are considering the opportunity to spend maternity capital on improving their living conditions, after weighing the possible obstacles and costs, ultimately decide not to do so.

The second most popular area for using maternity capital funds (in terms of volume - less common) is the education of children. Middle-class families view the development of their children's cultural and social capital as an important component of the parental role. In this context, education is a priority area of ​​family spending. However, although many parents in our study invest significant own funds in preschool education of the child (visiting his/her clubs, sections, classes with tutors), they do not plan to use maternal capital for these purposes. There are two main explanations for this.

Firstly, parents reject the option of using maternity capital for higher education children due to the fact that the instability of the ongoing social policy and the current changes in the education system do not allow them to make long-term plans. Secondly, citizens who themselves studied for free generally expect their children to receive a free education. In case of his complete transition on a paid basis, families do not consider maternity capital as a possible means to solve the problem.

Those of the respondents who did use maternity capital for their children’s education invested it in the child’s preschool education (kindergarten, creative clubs, etc.). Choice this option was determined for them by distrust in the stability of the state policy and the desire to receive the promised support “here and now.” Families who chose this path note that there are a number of difficulties that arise when trying to spend maternity capital for educational purposes. First of all, such difficulties are associated with the insufficient development (sometimes simply absence) of institutional mechanisms for using certificate funds in this regard. As a result, citizens are faced with the need to independently collect information about the specifics of legal procedures, as well as overcome bureaucratic barriers. Here is what one of the women tells us who managed to use MK funds to pay for a commercial kindergarten:

“I don’t even know who came up with the idea that we could pay for the kindergarten in this way. I asked this question to this commission. They said: “Yes, but we don’t know anything yet.” Then they found out somewhere. And even before me, one mother from our kindergarten managed to formalize this. That is, my documents were sent again, and it was easier to demand the necessary documents for this” (Galina, 37 years old, St. Petersburg).

The third direction of using maternity capital is related to the investment of these funds in the funded part of the mother’s pension. However, this path is usually not taken seriously by families - the previously noted distrust in the stability of the ongoing social policy and a series of changes in the pension system prevent citizens from making such long-term plans.

Continuing the topic, it should be noted that the liberal criticism expressed during the introduction of the reform was justified. For a significant portion of citizens, the amount provided under this program is indeed too insignificant to be able to improve their living conditions or pay for their children’s education. According to one of the interviewed mothers, based on real prices on the market, maternity capital can be used to purchase 5 square meters of housing. Since the eldest daughter of our interlocutor did not enter a university in a budget department, the woman thought about investing maternal capital in her child’s education. However, according to her calculations, the amount of the certificate would only be enough for two and a half years of study at one of the universities in St. Petersburg.

As a result, parents who do not have sufficient additional resources and do not trust the opportunity to invest maternity capital in a pension choose the “deferred use” strategy. Maternity capital turns into a “piece of paper” for them, which is poorly taken into account when forming the family’s economic plans and can be used only in case of a favorable combination of circumstances. “This is not capital - this is a piece of paper about capital!” - this is how a young mother from the Moscow region described this situation.

Citizens in a similar situation note that they would be happy to spend maternity capital funds on other urgent family needs that are not provided for in the law on additional measures of state support - apartment renovation, purchase land plot, payment for the child's treatment. The existence of such a need, as well as doubts about the stability of state support, force them to think about ways to illegally cash out maternity capital. Although none of the respondents themselves resorted to “shadow” schemes for using maternity capital, this practice they are usually well aware of it from the experience of friends or from the media. It is often associated with obtaining a loan from a bank secured by maternity capital and the subsequent fictitious “purchase” of dilapidated housing for this money (a sufficient number of companies have appeared in our country to help carry out this operation, however, citizens often carry out it on their own - “buying” housing from relatives or friends).

Summarizing the above, we can highlight the following main strategies for using maternity capital:

1) to improve housing conditions, which is available only to families with additional sources of financial support;

2) to cover a mortgage - a situational measure added to the law for a certain period and has no strategic significance;

3) for the education of children; and in most cases, avoiding long-term planning, parents invest capital in preschool education child;

4) “deferred use”, in which families doubt the feasibility of one direction of spending declared by the state, but at the same time do not have additional resources to use microcredit for other legitimate needs;

5) “deception of the state” - attempts to illegally cash out maternity capital, associated with the desire to solve pressing problems and distrust of government policy.

In this situation, the most popular and, in fact, non-strategic way of using maternity capital is to receive a lump sum at its expense. cash payment(12,000 rubles). These actions correlate with families’ general perception of social policy, which can be summarized in the phrase “take everything you can from the state, here and now.” The following words sound like a refrain in the interview: “It seems like they introduced a withdrawal of twelve thousand. Naturally, we immediately took it off, because, as they say, there’s at least a tuft of wool from a black sheep” (Polina, 35 years old, Volgograd). However, it is obvious that the resulting “tuft of wool” is not a significant increase in family budget. This money, incommensurate with the costs of raising a child, “goes towards diapers,” according to most parents.

The described difficulties in using maternity capital, small amount Given this measure of state support, lack of faith in the stability of the ongoing social policy leads to the fact that families do not take into account maternal capital when discussing decisions about the birth of children and their number. In general, citizens approve of support for motherhood and parenthood as principles of social policy. However, our research shows that the horizon of citizens’ orientation towards assistance from the state is significantly limited. The respondents are aware of the variability of the existing family policy and cannot count on it in the long term, so they try to “take everything while they give it” (in the short term). Otherwise, citizens prefer to rely on themselves and their family, on all kinds of available resources, including their own skills, personal and professional experience, the ability to individually “fight” the system in the interests of the family and child, overcoming numerous barriers in formal and informal ways.

The material was prepared within the framework of the Gender Democracy program of the Foundation. Heinrich Böll.

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