Bogdanov - Surgutneftegaz: “Questions about money are not for the general public. Company history Greetings from Surgut

The state company Rosneft, which is actually a monopolist in the pipeline, will have to move. At the end of last week, Transneft President Nikolai Tokarev announced that the Surgutneftegaz company plans to supply up to 9 million tons of raw materials via the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline. In this regard, foreign investors again asked the question: what kind of company is “Surgutneftegaz”, for the sake of which Rosneft itself was moved, and who are its owners?

The state-owned company Surgutneftegaz was privatized in the nineties. However, if other large energy companies, after voucher privatization and loans-for-shares auctions, fell into the hands of bankers who later became oligarchs, then Surgutneftegaz remained under the management of the “labor collective,” which is still headed by the same “red director” Vladimir Bogdanov. True, since that time the company has new owners, but their names are unknown to anyone for certain - the company has never disclosed a list of its main shareholders.

According to the British Financial Times, the last time CEO Bogdanov answered a question about the owners of the company was in 2008. Then he told foreign journalists that he himself did not really know who owned the majority of the company’s shares. They say that he himself has less than 2% of the shares, so he does not even have access to the register of shareholders, Bogdanov explained.

As reported by the Financial Times Vladimir Milov, who until 2002 was the Deputy Minister of Energy of Russia, such a “convoluted” ownership system was created specifically in order to hide the names of well-known officials - shareholders, possibly belonging to the highest echelons of power. “Who actually owns Surgutneftegaz is mystery No. 1 in Russian oil industry"- stated Milov. However, this ownership structure can be explained by two more reasons: the concentration of control in the hands of management and protection from hostile takeovers.

At the same time, unlike Rosneft, which has $70 billion in debt, Surgutneftegaz is the richest oil company in Russia, but its money is divided into different “pockets.” As Vedomosti wrote, there is a whole network of 23 companies, non-profit partnerships and funds affiliated with Surgutneftegaz - either established by it or managed by its managers, including CEO Bogdanov. Are common financial investments in these organizations reach over 1 trillion rubles. Thus, there are more than $30 billion of free funds in the accounts of Surgutneftegaz: the company stores money mainly in dollars, annually earning up to $1 billion in interest. And who owns these billions is unknown.

Kremlin lubricant fund

Western analysts suggest that the money and shares of Surgutneftegaz belong to large government officials, and Bogdanov is simply their “supervisor.” The American New York Times writes that there are rumors among investors that Surgutneftegaz is simply a “lubricant fund” of the Kremlin. What do the participants think about this topic? Russian market shares? “SP” asked about this ChebotarevLab asset manager Yuri Chebotarev.

— Before the attack on Yukos in 2003, several months before the start of the trial, Putin went to Surgut and had a long conversation with Bogdanov, who after that stopped talking about market topics, and talked more and more about drilling rigs and pumps. The fact is that YUKOS was then the first Russian oil company that began to publish full open reporting on its activities, and indicate exactly who owns its shares and what income it has. Thus, YUKOS switched to international reporting standards, and, according to market logic, everyone else should have done the same. But the Kremlin clearly did not like this, and YUKOS was destroyed, and Surgutneftegaz after that became the most closed company on the market.

"SP": - What does this mean?

- It only says that Surgutneftegaz has something to hide about its shareholders and profits - any participant will tell you this stock market. In this regard, it is also worth remembering what happened this year in Cyprus. When did it start there banking crisis, and the deposits of bank clients began to be cut, reports appeared that many Surgutneftegaz accounts were affected. Thus, the international financial elite made it clear to the Kremlin that they know where the money of Russian officials is kept and can easily get it. And judging by the fact that the accounts suffered the most Russian clients, I think it was precisely for this purpose that the Cyprus operation was conceived.

— The share ownership structure of Surgutneftegaz is very tricky - a ring structure: when one offshore company owns a block of shares, and it is owned by another offshore company, which, in turn, is owned by a third offshore company. In general, offshore on offshore, and offshore drives. And given that offshore companies do not disclose information about beneficiaries, no market analyst can calculate who actually owns the shares of Surgutneftegaz and in what proportions. But Western intelligence services are quite capable of finding out the owners, and they know them, so in Cyprus they acted with confidence, knowing who they would hit the main target. And, in general, they did not hide it.

“SP”: — How does the market perceive such closedness of Surgutneftegaz, does it damage its image?

— “Surgutneftegaz” has no image on the stock exchange, exchange players I'm not interested in this company at all. And its shares are used by stock speculators only to hedge risks - they go into these securities, the value of which practically does not change when the market collapses. It is not clear why Surgutneftegaz even lists its shares on the stock exchange; they would make it closed Joint-Stock Company. True, then it would be necessary to at least formally indicate the names of the owners; the reference to the “work collective” would no longer pass.

“SP”: — Why then is Surgutneftegaz so worried about the West that they constantly raise this topic?

— An official, especially a high-ranking one, has no right to do business all over the world, because he has access to insider information and administrative resources. What is happening with Surgutneftegaz is a violation of Western business standards and global rules of the game in the market. Naturally, the global financial elite does not like this, and they will fight this situation to the last. And Cyprus is just the beginning...

Piggy bank of Russian officials

Although Surgutneftegaz officially remained under the control of its “labor collective,” experts point to the company’s connection with the circle of oligarchs who “rose up” after Vladimir Putin became president.

In April of this year, it was discovered that about 40% of its shares, worth $15 billion, had disappeared from the balance sheet of Surgutneftegaz. The only explanation for such a disappearance may be that these shares were sold, but no one knows to whom, and there were no announcements from the company’s management on this matter.

The world market reacted to this situation with, to put it mildly, surprise. As the Financial Times puts it: “Someone should sue, but look what happened to Browder.”

In 2005, a British citizen Bill Browder, the owner of the Hermitage Capital investment fund, having purchased a minority stake in Surgutneftegaz, went to court to get more information about a significant share of shares held by non-transparent structures, and also tried to cancel them. But he was expelled from Russia five days before his lawsuit against Surgutneftegaz was to be heard in court.

True, during the reporting in April of this year, Western analysts had the opportunity to ask the management of Surgutneftegaz a question about the shares, but the company’s management replied that “the law does not require the disclosure of this information.” However, as foreign lawyers note, if the shares were indeed transferred to new owners, then the company is “walking on the edge of an abyss.” Indeed, according to Russian law, if the sale of shares was not carried out in one-time blocks of more than 5%, then disclosure of such information is not required. That is, from a purely legal point of view, Surgutneftegaz operates within the law, but from the point of view of world practice and norms, it clearly ignores them.

One way or another, at a time when all major Russian oil companies are trying to become more transparent, and even hire Western investment banks as PR specialists in order to raise the price of their shares, Surgutneftegaz is moving in a different direction. Although the company trades in valuable raw materials and makes large profits, its shares on stock exchanges are valued even lower than the value of their monetary assets. The story with Surgutneftegaz is a typical example of the distrust of Western investors in Russian economy in general, the publication believes. The reason is the lack of transparency of the company's ownership and actions. For example, investors did not know for a long time that it financed the construction of a submarine base for the Russian Navy in Siberia.

In 23 companies of this “piggy bank”, the money of Russian officials and their close “effective managers” is securely stored. Another confirmation of this is the story cited by the Financial Times. According to a Rosstat report, Krinum, which is based in the village of Barsovo in Western Siberia and, according to its registration documents, provides only janitor services, has 35 billion rubles, or $1.1 billion, in long-term assets on its balance sheet. At the same time, the director of the company - Olga Pustovalova, is also the chief accountant of Surgutneftegaz, which is based half an hour’s drive from Barsovo in the city of Surgut. Over the phone, Pustovalova confirmed to the publication that she is also the director of Krinum, but refused to answer further questions.

According to the Financial Times, Krinum and 22 other similar firms, trusts and organizations located in and around Surgut are “the key to the puzzle” that Western investors and analysts have been agonizing over for a decade. And its solution may provide an answer to the question: who actually owns the fourth largest oil company in Russia?

Photo: ITAR-TASS/ Yuri Belinsky

The richest resident of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, CEO and co-owner of Surgutneftegaz, Russia's third-largest oil company after Rosneft and Lukoil, Vladimir Bogdanov recently won a state prize, the first of his life. The prize in the field of science was awarded to him for “the creation of rational systems for the development of oil, oil and gas and gas and oil fields in Western Siberia.” It was presented personally by President Putin in a solemn ceremony in the Kremlin on June 12, 2017.

Few Russian billionaires can boast of such a high assessment of their work. In the top ten of the Forbes list, no one has a state award, including Lukoil President Vagit Alekperov. Meanwhile, Bogdanov occupies a modest 49th place in the ranking with a fortune of $1.9 billion. He has been included in all Forbes lists since 2004, and the estimate of his fortune has changed slightly, from $1.7 billion to $4.4 billion.

In life, the billionaire is modest and avoids publicity. He was last seen by Forbes in 2004. Then for many years the image of an ascetic was assigned to him, living in Surgut in an ordinary apartment building and vacationing on a budget in Karlovy Vary. Another question from Forbes about whether anything has changed since then remained unanswered. Bogdanova’s receptionist told Forbes that he was on vacation, email throughout the company was disabled “due to the threat of hacker attacks,” and there was no operational communication with the manager.

Bogdanov came to work at Surgutneftegaz PA in 1976, in 1984 at the age of 33 he became the general director of the enterprise, and in 1995 he organized a scheme to buy out the state stake in the amount of 40.16% of shares through loans-for-shares auction. Since then, the company's share capital structure has changed several times, but who its real owners are still remains a closely guarded secret. In its 2016 report, Surgut reports that “the company’s shares are distributed among shareholders, none of whom is the ultimate controlling party or has significant influence.” Bogdanov as to an individual today owns 0.37% of ordinary shares of Surgutneftegaz.

Another secret of Surgut is the astronomical amounts of funds that the company keeps on deposits in Russian banks mainly in US dollars. By the end of 2016, this amount amounted to 2.181 trillion rubles, or $36 billion. This is almost 20% of all deposits of Russian companies in all Russian banks. At Sberbank, Russian companies hold 2.637 trillion rubles on deposits, at VTB - 2.181 trillion rubles (exactly as much as Surgut has accumulated). In all other banks this figure is much lower.

Why does Surgut need so much cash? “We have something to spend on: we are developing new provinces. This money is a safety net: no one knows what will happen to oil prices. We need them so that the team can live peacefully. If the situation of 1998 happens again, what will we do then?” - Bogdanov answered questions from shareholders at the annual meeting in 2013. By that time, Surgut had already accumulated 1 trillion rubles, or $31 billion at the then exchange rate. The price of oil fell by more than half, but the stash remained untouched. On the market, Surgutneftegaz, with accumulated $36 billion, is worth only $20 billion.

The end of the 70s - the beginning of the 80s of the last century - a time of loud slogans: “The wealth of the Tyumen subsoil for the service of the Motherland!”, “Let's give the country more oil!”, “Give us 500,000 tons of oil per day!”... “A million tons of oil, billion cubic meters of gas per day!”

These are the years of the formation of the Union oil and gas industry, unprecedented enthusiasm and growth, and the creation of highly qualified teams of oil workers. Large-scale capital investments, the formation of a scientific school, unparalleled projects for the exploration and development of fields in Western Siberia, the rapid development of the oil production and oil refining industries, enterprises producing oil and gas equipment - these were, without exaggeration, great years for all oil workers. This time would later be called the years of “light” oil.

According to the order of the Ministry of Oil Industry No. 495 of September 15, 1977, production associations were created in Surgut, Nizhnevartovsk, Nefteyugansk.

The production association "Surgutneftegas" included two oil and gas production departments "Surgutneft" and "Fedorovskneft", two departments of drilling operations, construction and installation departments, the trust "Surgutneftespetsstroy", a central base for the rental and repair of drilling equipment, a grouting office, departments of technological transport and Surgut Highway Department.

The territory in which the team of the association was to develop deposits was huge - from the Salym Urmans to the Kholmogory watershed, Lokosovo, Langepas, Noyabrsk, Kogalym, Muravlenkovsky district, Purpe. Hundreds of kilometers of off-road terrain, a complete lack of everyday amenities at the fields and drilling sites, constant problems with logistics - what could those who lived and worked to feel the warm beating of the first oil in the pipe oppose to this? Only courage, endurance, perseverance. And also - creative search, daring engineering and technical solutions, innovation, enthusiasm.

At the end of the 70s, Surgut began to be called the “oil capital of Siberia”; it became the center of development of the North of the Tyumen region. By this time, a powerful electric power base operating on associated petroleum gas had been created in the city, the largest construction industry base in the region had been established, Railway, highways, an airport was built.

Like many enterprises in those years, Surgutneftegaz built social facilities every year - schools, clinics, kindergartens.

In terms of logistics production processes Oil workers were often in a very difficult situation. Fulfillment of the production plan was demanded at any cost, but not everything was obtained to fulfill the plan. On the one hand, there was a planned economy, and on the other, we had to literally grab everything that was given according to funds, orders, and limits. Abroad, equipment was purchased centrally; no one discussed its quality and required volumes with the oil industry.

The lack of proper material and technical support, high-quality advanced equipment, and technology affected both the state of the well stock and the pace of construction of infrastructure facilities, and hampered the development of a repair base, which, due to its remoteness from industrial areas, was simply vital.

And under these conditions, Surgut oil workers constantly increased oil production volumes - in 1984 they reached a record level of 67.5 million tons. And this peak was reached when world oil production was approaching the bottom of the decline, and the rate of production growth in the Russian part of the USSR was clearly stagnant.

In 1992, the reorganization of the oil industry began.

The oil company "Surgutneftegaz" united the oil and gas production enterprise "Surgutneftegaz", the Kirishi oil refinery and a number of oil product supply enterprises in the North-West of Russia.

It was quite difficult in a short time from different both in structure and in technical level enterprises located hundreds and thousands of kilometers from each other, to create a single technological complex that would not only ensure production, processing, and sales volumes, but would operate efficiently and profitably. Surgutneftegaz, having overcome the difficulties of the organizational period, has become a slender, well-managed and efficiently operating vertically integrated company.

Over the years of work in the new economic conditions, the capacity of all enterprises included in the company has significantly increased, their production base has been completely modernized, a detergent production plant that has no analogues in Russia has been put into operation, a search and exploration department has been created - one of the largest in Russia, a corporate research and design complex with powerful scientific potential was developed, its own gas processing complex was created, a small-scale energy development program was implemented based on the construction of gas turbine and gas piston power plants, a powerful oil and gas production complex was created in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), which made it possible to begin industrial production oil in a new oil and gas province. PJSC "Surgutneftegas" has formed into a high-tech energy company.

» beat ExxonMobil Corp. and Royal Dutch Shell Plc, becoming the world's only publicly traded oil company to deliver positive returns to investors following OPEC's November decision to defend its market share and subsequent price collapse, Bloomberg reported. Over the past 15 months, the dividend yield of the company's securities amounted to 18.5%, the agency calculated, while the shares have fallen in price by 14% since November. Thus, the return to shareholders amounted to a total of 6.4%, taking into account dividends reinvested in the securities, the agency indicates. Exxon shares fell 9.4%, but dividend payments softened the decline to 5.4%. Losses on Shell securities amounted to 31%, and the dividend yield was 5.6%, according to Bloomberg data. The rest of the majors are also in the red: Chevron shares have fallen in price by 29% since November 2014, and the dividend yield was 3.75%; Total lost 16.7% of its quote value, and the dividend yield brought investors only 5.8%. Chinese PetroChina lost 47.6% of its share price, and its dividend yield was 2.4%.

Company reserve

Surgutneftegaz only once and unexpectedly bought a 21.2% stake in the Hungarian company MOL in 2009, but sold the stake two years later. “You don’t need to buy me anything. We have everything!<....>It's worse when there is no money. Then you don’t know where to run, where to borrow, at what interest rate,” said the company’s general director Vladimir Bogdanov in 2012.

The reason for the success of Surgutneftegaz is obvious: the company has huge dollar deposits (more than $30 billion - Vedomosti), says GL Financial Group portfolio manager Sergei Vakhrameev. In 2014, Surgutneftegaz earned 846 billion rubles from exchange rate differences; profit according to IFRS increased 3 times to 885 billion rubles. As a result, Surgutneftegaz paid record dividends: 63.2 billion rubles. for preferred and 23 billion rubles. By ordinary shares, reminds Vakhrameev. Dividends on preference shares increased by 3.5 times, for ordinary ones - by 8%. Other Russian oil companies There is no such safety net; as a result, they went into the red in terms of stock returns, like the world's majors. Taking into account dividends, Lukoil lost 27%, Rosneft - 35%, Gazprom - 44%, Vakhrameev calculated.

"Surgutneftegas" is the leader in Russia both in terms of dividend yield and TSR ( total return shareholders), says Aton analyst Alexander Kornilov. The dividend yield of Surgutneftegaz preferred shares since June 2014, when oil prices began to fall, amounted to 37.8%, and TSR – 96%, and for other Russian companies these figures are 4–14.3 and 1.1–53 .9% respectively, he points out.

Bloomberg reveals the owners of 22% of preferred shares of Surgutneftegaz (in total, preferred securities make up 18% of the capital). Among them are Grantham Mayo Van Otterloo & Co, JPMorgan Chase & Co, Blackrock Fund Advisors, etc. “But the beneficiaries of the company are unknown, and I, as an investor, have a question: how long are shareholders willing to share such dividends with minority shareholders? In the event of a further fall in oil prices and devaluation of the ruble, the risk of a revision of the dividend policy also increases,” argues Vakhrameev. In addition, the company has already found itself in a situation where dividends ($1.5 billion) exceeded the annual cash flow(about $1 billion in 2015), the expert points out. Before the fall in oil prices, the company generated $2-3 billion a year, he estimates. But Surgutneftegaz will not have problems with paying dividends: the company can cut investments, withdraw money from deposits, and increase debt, the expert lists. On the other hand, if oil prices start to rise, Surgutneftegaz will record a large loss due to exchange rate differences, so it’s time to sell the company’s preferred shares now, advises Raiffeisenbank analyst Andrey Polishchuk.

The oil concern Surgutneftegaz ranks third in the list of Russian oil producing companies, second only to the state-owned Rosneft and Lukoil. In 2013, the concern produced 61.6 million tons of oil, accounting for 11.7% of the total oil production in Russia. Net profit amounted to 279 billion rubles. (5.97 billion euros), which exceeded the 2012 figures by 51%. In 2013, Surgutneftegaz commissioned several new fields, and in the first five months of this year, oil production increased by another 5%.

All these are good indicators, but this is not the reason why the concern is considered one of a kind, writes DieWelt. In fact, Surgutneftegaz is surrounded by mystery: no one knows who owns this “giant”, and the company is in no hurry to reveal the secret - the real owners are hidden behind an absolutely impenetrable interweaving of various companies and societies.

"Surgutneftegaz" is a private company, its director and co-owner is Vladimir Bogdanov (No. 53 on Putin's clan scheme , business partner of Gangrene - Gennady Timchenko).

Just 12 years ago, Vladimir Bogdanov, who has headed the concern since 1984, said that 70% of Surgutneftegaz shares belonged to “the management and its allies,” but who “these allies” are is unknown.

Since 2002, Surgutneftegaz has not published reports on international standards. A report published in 2013 created even more fog. It turned out that suddenly the company's shareholding dropped from 40 percent to less than one percent, although the total number of shares remained unchanged.

Putin’s December statement did not bring any clarity, in which he noted that many shares of the concern were allegedly in the hands of employees. Experts consider this implausible.

According to political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky, it is Putin who is not interested in clarifying the situation with the oil giant. Several years ago, Belkovsky claimed that Putin controls 37% of Surgutneftegaz. And the method of hiding the owners of the concern may well indicate that Belkovsky was right.

One confirmation of this is the close connection of Surgutneftegaz with Gunvor, owned by Gangrene - Timchenko.

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The history of Surgutneftegaz shows its close ties to a group of businessmen who rose to prominence with Putin's rise to the presidency in 2000. Under his leadership, they reached shining heights - as did their fortunes. Surgutneftegaz shows unusual loyalty to business circles associated with Gennady Timchenko(nickname “Gangrene”, No. 49,56,68 on the Putin clan diagram, Putin’s business partner in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office, one of the 60 ruling thieves in law) .

From its privatization until 2003, Surgutneftegaz sold a significant part of its production through the Kinex trading company, which was owned by a group of businessmen, including Timchenko. In 2003, when Timchenko quarreled with his partners in Kinex, Surgutneftegaz canceled contracts with this trader and began trading through new company TimchenkoGunvor, which later became the third largest trading company in the world, helped by its connections with Surgutneftegaz and Rosneft.

In 2004 and 2005, the head of the hedge fund Hermitage Capital, William Browder, sued Surgutneftegaz, demanding compliance Russian laws O securities, which could lead to the payment of part of the cash reserves (which were smaller at the time, but still significant) as dividends. In November 2005, authorities revoked Browder's Russian visa, a week later Supreme Court The Russian Federation decided the matter not in his favor. Browder said in an interview that the reason for his expulsion from Russia was conflicts with either Surgutneftegaz or Gazprom. And Surgut, according to him, is the most profitable and least expensive company in Russia.

In 1987, Adolf Smirnov, then deputy general director of Kirishinefteorgsintez (known as Kinef), Russia's largest oil refinery, a division "Surgutneftegaz", was responsible for organizing sales of Kinef products. He created a structure called Kirishineftekhimexport, also known as Kinex. Malov was appointed deputy general director of Kinex. Kinex was responsible for the sales of Kinefa petroleum products and the purchase of necessary materials and equipment abroad. In the late 1980s, Timchenko, and then Katkov, also began working at Kinex. Around that time, Timchenko established good relations with Putin, who served as vice-mayor of St. Petersburg... Putin’s deputy at that time was Igor Sechin.

Soon Kinex was transformed into a company separate from Kinef and in 1991 moved to its own office. Kinex was managed by Smirnov, Timchenko, Katkov and Malov (hereinafter in court decision this group of individuals is called "Kinex partners". During the period of perestroika, Kinex's activities brought great profits, especially after the company entered into oil trading. Timchenko, based in Helsinki, worked for the Urals Group (one of the first private structures in the USSR to receive the right to export oil.). Then, acting in the interests of Kinex partners, he established control over the Urals Group business in Scandinavia.

In 1994, Kinex was transformed into a joint stock company. In 1995-1996, Kinef, "Surgutneftegaz" and Kinex were privatized. Kinef became part of "Surgutneftegaz", however, Kinex retained its independence. In 1995, when 51% of Kinex shares were privatized, the shares were transferred to the company's employees, including top managers Malov, Katkov, Timchenko and Smirnov. They increased their shareholdings in 1996, when the remaining 49% of Kinex shares were privatized. ...In 1998, shortly after financial crisis, the company was declared bankrupt and was replaced by a new company, which was named Kinex Group, the only shareholders of which were “Kinex partners”.

In 1989, Nikitin and his father-in-law, a former ship captain, created a consulting company in St. Petersburg. The business was very successful. In 1992, Nikitin earned his first million dollars. In 1992, Malov, in the interests of Kinex partners, suggested Nikitin develop a shipping business jointly with Kinex. Nikitin was asked to create a company that would transport Kinex cargo. The profit from its activities was supposed to be divided in half between Nikitin and Kinex partners. Thus, Kirishi Shipping Company was established in 1992. In 1998, this business was absorbed by Premium Nafta Products ltd (PNP) registered in the British Virgin Islands. Its office was located in St. Petersburg, the beneficiaries of the company were Nikitin, Malov, Katkov and Timchenko, who disposed of Smirnov’s share as his own (Adolf Smirnov died in 2004). As Kinex prospered in the 1990s, Kirishi Shipping and then PNP's business grew rapidly. By the end of the 1990s, the company handled about 1 million tons of cargo per month and chartered about 200 ships per year. The vessels were chartered on the spot market. However, around 2000, Nikitin came to the conclusion that the PNP needed to start taking on long-term leases of ships. This possibility was discussed with Kinex partners.

189. Nikitin also became a partner in the Kinex railway business, which was later transferred to the management of the offshore company Nikolas Invest Corporation. Profits from the business were divided between Nikitin, Kinex partners and Aadu Lukas, who had a share in the project and partially controlled the oil transshipment of the Estonian company Pakterminal (Tallinn). In 1999, Kinex began trading crude oil obtained from the company "Surgutneftegaz"(continuing operations with petroleum products from the Kirishi Oil Refinery), supplies were made through Gunvor Energy, a company registered in the British Virgin Islands. Crude oil was supplied by pipeline to the Kirishi plant, then transported by rail to ports on the Baltic Sea. Both PNB (a shipping company) and a railway company in which Nikitin participated were involved in this business. The beneficiaries of Gunvor Energy were Nikitin, Timchenko, Katkov, Malov, Lukas, as well as Tornbjorn Tornqvist, a friend of Timchenko.

When in 1993 the Gaidar government divided the Russian oil industry into several companies, "Surgutneftegaz" with its fields in Western Siberia, the oil refinery in Kirishi in the Leningrad region was inherited. Soon, real and legal control over Surgutneftegaz was gained by Vladimir Bogdanov, its general director since 1984. With the support of Bogdanov and another famous Soviet oilman, Vagit Alekperov, 35-year-old Komsomol boss Sobyanin became mayor of the oil city of Kogalym in 1991. In 1993, he already became vice-governor of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, the main oil province of Russia.

Former officials of the St. Petersburg mayor's office recall that at that time the Tambov criminal group, which controlled almost all of St. Petersburg and began expanding in the surrounding area, had its eye on the oil refinery in Kirishi. Bogdanov sent Sobyanin to investigate. And it was then that he allegedly met Putin, and he helped him solve the plant’s crime problems.

Sobyanin was generally a partner of Putin and his associate Gennady Timchenko in the St. Petersburg oil business, says political scientist Sergei Belkovsky: Putin and Timchenko provided operational management of the plant, Sobyanin was responsible for supplies. Timchenko's structures began to sell Kirishi products abroad. On this basis, Sobyanin learned to get along well with oil workers. Both Sibneft and "Surgutneftegaz", and Gazprom, and LUKOIL - he built relationships with everyone.