The problem of sustainable existence of insufficiently efficient or suboptimal technical standards and economic institutions has become one of the central problems in institutional economics over the past 20 years.

Two main reasons can be identified that stimulate interest in these problems. Firstly, these are practical tasks, among which the analysis of technical standards, often based on not the most effective solutions, and, most importantly, the problems of establishing market (and semi-market) economies in developing and former socialist countries stand out. A typical example is the title of De Soto’s famous book “The Mystery of Capital. Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails throughout the rest of the world.” Secondly, the very long existence of ineffective standards and institutions contradicts the optional, but nevertheless almost generally accepted position of neoclassical economics about the ability of a competitive market to “choose” the optimal solution. These problems are posed most acutely and clearly by the concepts of QWERTY effects and path dependence (see below). The reasons most often cited for long-term deviations from the optimum are random factors and stochastic processes, routines and habits of people, incomplete rationality of actors, primarily the limited rationality of G. Simon, general laws of development complex systems. The article, within the framework of system analysis, examines the processes of formation and destruction of standards and institutions. The main idea of ​​the first part of the article is the similarity of the concepts listed in the first part of the title; on its basis, the second part of the article evaluates the prospects for growing sustainable institutions in Russia.

I. The concepts of QWERTY effects and path dependence belong to the field of institutional economics and characterize the dependence of technical standards and institutions on the path (trajectory)

Tsirel Sergey Vadimovich, Doctor of Technical Sciences, senior researcher at the Institute of Mining Geomechanics and Mine Surveying, JSC "VNIMI", St. Petersburg, Russia.

development. In 1985, P. David proved that the generally accepted keyboard layout of "QWERTY" printing devices was the result of the victory of a less effective standard over more effective ones, and the choice was determined primarily by specific, rather random, circumstances at the moment of choice, and subsequently changing the standard became impossible due to -at very high costs. Further study of QWERTY effects showed their widespread use in all branches of technology (video recording standard, choice of railway gauge, etc.). Many economists have taken the presence of QWERTY effects as a refutation of the assertion of classical economics about the mandatory selection of the most efficient option during competition, and even as an argument in favor of a centralized state economy.

The concept of "path dependence" extends path dependence to a wider class of phenomena - economic institutions, understood as "the rules of the game in society, the restrictive framework that organizes relationships between people." Both concepts (often viewed as two manifestations of the same effect) emphasize the persistence of ineffective standards and institutions and the difficulty (sometimes impossibility) of changing them. The significance of path dependence effects for later development is the subject of heated debate, but the prevailing view is that these effects are widespread.

At the same time, in works devoted to standards (QWERTY effects), the randomness of instantaneous selection and high price its changes; In works devoted to institutions, the attention of researchers is focused on the connection of a new choice with history, national identity, and the interdependence of institutions (path dependency and path determinacy). In terms of random processes, this difference can be formulated as follows: the choice of standards has the features of a non-stationary Markov process - the point at which the choice is made is determined by the entire previous trajectory, but the choice itself depends less on previous states than on the incidental circumstances of the moment of choice; the choice of institutions is understood rather as a process with long-term memory - the previous history of institutional changes not only determines the situation at a given moment, but it also has a significant impact on each subsequent

Sedov's law or the law of hierarchical compensation does not relate to economics, but to cybernetics and general systems theory, which played a significant role in the formation of the concept of "path dependence". This law, proposed by the Russian cyberneticist and philosopher E.A. Sedov, develops and refines Ashby's well-known cybernetic law on necessary diversity (economic applications of Ashby's law are developed in the works of S. Beer and S. Hodgson). Ideas E.A. Sedova actively promotes and develops A.P. Nazaretyan, therefore we will use the formulation of Sedov’s law given in Nazaretyan’s book:

In a complex hierarchical system, the growth of diversity at the top level is ensured by limiting diversity at previous levels, and, conversely, the growth of diversity at the lower level [of the hierarchy] destroys the top level of the organization.

It seems to us that the very formulation of Sedov’s law clearly indicates its closeness to the concepts of “QWERTY effects” and “path dependence”. Of course, we are talking about proximity, not identity, “QWERTY effects” and “path dependence” are not special cases of Sedov’s law, and Sedov’s law itself covers a wider range of phenomena than the concepts of institutional economics. However, the area of ​​their intersection, in our opinion, is so large that a meaningful interpretation of “QWERTY effects” and “path dependence” in the concepts used in Sedov’s law is possible. From this interpretation of the considered concepts of institutional economics, two important consequences can be drawn.

1. Unification of standards or institutions occurs when the total diversity at the levels where competition occurs and at higher levels based on these standards (or institutions) becomes excessive.

2. The destruction of a single standard (institution), the growth of diversity at the lower levels occurs when the diversity of the upper level turns out to be insufficient (in accordance with Ashby's law) for the functioning of the system.

Now let's look at both consequences in more detail. It follows from the first corollary that standardization becomes necessary when a high level of diversity of products, standards or institutions using a given standard is achieved (P. David’s story about the victory of the QWERTY layout over alternative ones can be read from this angle). At the same time, a standard on top of which is built the maximum variety of standards and products that use it has a great chance of displacing the rest. Of course, there is no reason to believe that this advantage will necessarily be given to the standard with the best consumer properties. The willingness of authors and supporters also plays a significant role this standard To commercial risk(the release of goods based on a standard that has not become generally accepted), the success of an advertising campaign, the use of dumping, and, finally, just a coincidence.

One of the main reasons for the low probability of choosing a standard close to the optimal one is the small number of attempts. The establishment of an equilibrium price in the market occurs by trial and error during the execution of a very large (at most infinite) number of transactions. A single transaction, both due to various situational and subjective circumstances, and the limited rationality of the participants in the transaction, cannot lead to an equilibrium price. Therefore, if there are only a few transactions with a certain product, then no one will insist that the price has reached an equilibrium state; It is obvious that, as a rule, there will be significant deviations from the equilibrium price.

The number of completed attempts to establish a new standard is obviously limited. Often the picture for choosing a new standard looks like this. First, several attempts are made to establish completely ineffective standards, then a fairly effective standard is established, which is either not adjusted at all or is adjusted a small number of times. Another, no less common case is the automatic transfer of an old standard to a new, sometimes fundamentally different, class of goods, i.e. choice as a comparison of options is not made at all. Therefore, achieving an optimal standard is not the rule, but the exception. In rapidly developing areas (for example, in the field software for personal computers), where diversity at the upper levels grows rapidly, the choice of standard occurs faster, which reduces the number of attempts and increases the role of additional factors. Naturally, along with this, the likelihood of choosing a standard that is not the most effective even in the short term increases.

It is quite possible that a situation will initially occur where two (or, less commonly, several) standards will be selected at once. However, again due to Sedov’s law, this leads to excessive diversity, and such a state turns out to be unstable. There are two most likely ways out of this situation. The first, described in the works of P. David and other researchers of QWERTY effects, is the victory of one of the standards and the marginalization or complete disappearance of the rest. The second way out is the attenuation (in the limit - complete cessation) of competition between standards, the collapse of the single market into two, and the formation of two separate technological niches. (but the third standard - airships - remained to exist only in the form of projects and prototypes). It can also be assumed that the increase in the total number of hierarchical levels and technological niches, as well as the speed of their addition, gradually leads to a decrease in diversity at the very top levels of the hierarchy, as indicated by the wave of mergers of large corporations in the most modern branches of technology.

The second corollary describes the situation of destruction of the standard. Let's look at several aspects of this process.

A crisis of a standard (institution) can take two forms. Firstly, at a certain stage (for example, due to changing consumer preferences or a sharp increase in the price of a necessary resource), it turns out that the established standard does not provide the necessary diversity at the upper (upper) level of the hierarchy. The solution may be to increase diversity at lower levels, one of possible options(although not the most common) is to resuscitate discarded marginalized standards. Another, less revolutionary solution is to extend (if possible) the standard itself - for example, introducing new structures into existing programming languages. Note that in rapidly developing areas of technology, along with the increasing likelihood of the adoption of suboptimal standards, the likelihood of their adjustment also increases.

The second, more catastrophic, form of crisis lies in the loss of effectiveness of all levels built above the established

current standard. As with the first form (if it is impossible to expand the standard), the solution is to transfer diversity to the lower level. However, here we are no longer talking about adding diversity, but about restructuring the entire system.

It is quite obvious that there are powerful obstacles to restructuring the system, related both to the customs and habits of people, and to high costs (one of the main theses of the concepts of QWERTY effects and path dependence). As a rule, system restructuring occurs only when critical situations are reached ( good example is the behavior of people during environmental crises). The introduced analogy with Sedov’s law clarifies that the force of resistance increases when diversity disappears at the lower level and great diversity reaches the upper levels, and, conversely, decreases when alternative standards are still preserved at the lower level, and diversity at the upper levels has not received much development. An example very close to ours is the relative ease of exiting such an institutional trap as the “barterization” of commodity exchange; in Russia, along with barter, monetary forms trade (in national and American currencies), and barter itself has little conduciveness to the formation of stable and diverse institutions of upper-level commodity exchange.

A very interesting question is at what level of the hierarchy, near or far, the growth of diversity will occur and where a way out of the created conflict will be found. The most obvious answer would be to state that best option the exit should be at the level where the choice error was made (or which of the previously made choices turned out to be erroneous in the changed situation). However, in most cases, no one knows this for certain, and the only effective output (we are talking about the effective, not the optimal) is the exception rather than the rule. Therefore, in our opinion, the choice of level is primarily influenced by two circumstances. Firstly, both due to the conservatism inherent in people and based on minimizing costs, the level closest to the very top receives advantages. Secondly, naturally, the greatest chances are those solutions that are most ready for use at a critical moment. The final result depends on all factors and a number of incidental circumstances (as is known, at critical moments, the role of chance is especially great) and can differ fundamentally in different situations.

Although up to this point the word “institutions” was in brackets after the word “standards,” the presentation was primarily concerned with standards. We will try to show that the formulated consequences of the analogy with Sedov’s law have no less to do with path dependence than with QWERTY effects. As examples, let us consider the most general case of competition between centralized and democratic forms of social organization and, naturally, the experience of Russia.

Before considering such general examples, it is necessary to dwell on one more difference between the transformation of standards and institutions. Standards at higher hierarchical levels mainly develop and specify the basic standard; in contrast, after the approval of a new institution at the upper (and even at the same) level of the hierarchy, not only institutions are formed that develop the basic one, but also anti-institutions that, to one degree or another, restore the status quo or, at least, limit the scope of the new Institute. The emergence of anti-institutions, “orthogonal to the meaning of the game,” which do not develop, but destroy it, is most likely during an “institutional revolution,” when formal institutions are massively introduced that are incongruent with the rules and stereotypes of behavior familiar to a given society." Anti-institutions (primarily associated with corruption, patron-client relationships, etc.) prevent the formation of a rigid hierarchical structure; at the same time, on the one hand, they soften or even neutralize alien institutional innovations, and, on the other hand, they do not allow “congruent” institutions to take extreme forms and slow down the divergence of institutional ones. systems. When the basic institution that gave rise to the emergence of anti-institutions is destroyed, the destruction of anti-institutions is delayed and/or does not occur fully; in the future, in different situations, anti-institutions can either collapse after the basic institution, or become the basis of a new choice.

Returning to our example, we can draw a very bold, although quite obvious, analogy between the dichotomy of centralized and democratic forms of organization in traditional and modern societies and the dichotomy of “tribe vs. chiefdom” in archaic pre-state societies. As many historical and anthropological studies show, in primitive societies there were repeated transitions from less egalitarian to more egalitarian forms of organization and back, depending on changes in living conditions (for example, climate change) or on the individual properties of leaders. One of the reasons for such ease of transitions, in our opinion, is the small number and vagueness of institutional superstructures (the next hierarchical levels) above tribal or chieftaincy institutions. On the contrary, with the emergence of states and numerous institutions of traditional societies, such a transition is becoming increasingly difficult. If in Ancient Sumer (according to some sources and in the Old Kingdom in Egypt) large fluctuations in one direction or another were possible, then in the future transitions become increasingly rare. With the exception of the Osternization of Byzantium and the Maghreb countries, we do not know of a single indisputable case of transition. Even the processes of Westernization of Japan, Turkey or Taiwan that are taking place before our eyes cannot be considered complete, and sociological and political scientific assessments of the political and economic institutions of these countries differ significantly from each other. Some exceptions are countries with a poorly formed and unstable system of institutions (otherwise, countries and regions with a sparse institutional environment or border civilizations with the dominance of chaos over order), primarily Russia, in which cyclical variations of the institutional system are possible.

The ability of this mechanism to generate cycles relates not only to the evil infinity of failed Russian reforms and counter-reforms, but also to a wider range of phenomena. It seems to us that the generation of cycles is most characteristic of those areas where there is least reason to talk about development, understood in this case as the building of new hierarchical levels. An important example is the Chinese dynastic cycles. During the cycle, changing circumstances - population growth, decline in the authority of the ruling dynasty, divergence of social practice and previously chosen institutions, etc. - led to the ineffectiveness of the main institutional system, an increase in the diversity of institutional systems at the lower level (semi-legitimate and completely illegitimate alternative systems and anti-institutions were often implemented in illegal and corrupt forms) and the destruction of the empire.

Similar, although less pronounced, cycles are characteristic of other agricultural empires. The second example is the change of artistic styles, for example, in European art, periodic variations (with a period of about half a century) of styles in music and painting.

These two examples represent two different types of loops. In Chinese dynastic cycles, the predominant form is the destruction, during a short period of turmoil, of the conditions that prevent the effective functioning of the previously chosen institutional system, the destruction of anti-institutions and alternative institutional systems, and the repetition of the previous choice. The repetition of the previous choice cannot be fully explained by the restoration of the conditions under which the choice occurs (for the choice at the point of bifurcation may depend on negligible factors that are not repeated exactly from cycle to cycle), and even by the richness and diversity of the institutions of the upper world that survived during periods of decline and turmoil. level; An important role is played by the non-Markovian aspect of path dependence - the dependence of choice on previous states and cultural traditions. When artistic styles change, at the beginning of each cycle a new choice occurs, usually different from the previous one - anti-institutions and repulsion from cultural traditions take precedence over attraction.

At the same time, with both types of cycles, although various reasons, changes in most cases have little or no effect on the lower levels of the hierarchy. However, we should talk about obstacles, and not about completely blocking the opportunity »_/ »_/ / 1 *_/

restructuring the entire system. On the one hand, changes in external conditions and the depth of the crisis can be so great that changes in only the upper levels of the hierarchy do not generate effective exit strategies; the alternative to deep changes is not evolution, but decay. On the other hand, institutions (largely due to the softening effect of anti-institutions) do not have such rigidity as technical standards and, especially, the genetic mechanism of inheritance in biology. Changes at the upper levels, to one degree or another, are transmitted down and transform the institutions of the lower levels of the hierarchy; and the structure of the hierarchy of institutions itself is not so obvious - we can talk about a consensus among various researchers regarding the existence of a hierarchy of institutions, but not in

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regarding its specific structure. With a certain degree of idealization of the real historical process, the Osternization of Byzantium can be cited as an example of perestroika through gradual shifts transmitted from upper to lower levels; in other cases of radical transformation (for example, during European modernization or the Osternization of North African countries), catastrophic periods of crises or violent destruction of the upper levels of the hierarchy of institutions are more noticeable.

II. In light of these considerations, the series of failed Russian reforms and counter-reforms can be understood in two complementary ways. On the one hand, one can assume that the cycles of Russian history occupy an intermediate position - periods of strict centralization and authoritarian power are replaced by periods of relative democracy, but the former clearly dominate and at the same time demonstrate a diversity more characteristic of artistic styles than Chinese dynasties.

Another interpretation, in our opinion, more adequate, connects the instability of Russian institutions and institutions with the preservation of diversity at the lowest levels of the hierarchy. The themes of the duality of Russian culture and the Russian split, the confrontation between Westerners and Slavophiles, localism and authoritarianism, the high value of collectivism (community, conciliarity) and the atomization of society, etc., from Chaadaev to the present day, occupy the minds of Russian social scientists and publicists. The many forms of schism and opposition can be interpreted as excessive diversity at the lower levels of the hierarchy preventing diversity at the upper levels of the hierarchy and the formation of effective institutions.

Thus, countries with unstable institutions at the lowest hierarchical levels, on the one hand, include countries located at early stages development of civilization (primarily sub-Saharan Africa), and, on the other hand, developed border civilizations (primarily Latin American countries and Russia). To denote the opposition of countries with established and unsettled institutions at lower levels of the hierarchy, we propose to introduce the concepts of “cold” and “warm” societies.

Cold societies (closest to this definition Western countries and countries of Southeast Asia) are those societies where they have agreed on the general rules of the game (no matter what they are called - laws, customs, traditions, sacred commandments, etc.) and no longer need to establish personal relationships to resolve standard situations. Warm societies are those where people, on the contrary, were unable to agree on general rules and are forced to compensate for the lack of general rules with personal relationships (including those of a corrupt nature) or temporary draconian rules and a virtual mystical connection between everyone and the leader. The lack of effective law forces one to permanently turn to its primary sources, including ideas about justice, therefore justice, often understood as universal equality of income and even equal lack of rights, occupies a high place in the scale of values. And at the same time, the absence of a regulator of justice (law, custom, etc.) very often leads to greater injustice and greater wealth stratification than in warm societies. Currently, it is even possible to specify a formal economic criterion for identifying warm societies - a Gini coefficient value > 0.45 (the only exception to this rule is Hong Kong with its specific economy). If you try to compare this opposition with the classical opposition West vs East, then it is easy to notice that the opposition West vs East characterizes primarily the type of institutions, and the opposition “cold societies” vs “warm societies” rather characterizes the number of institutions and their stability.

From these considerations it follows that the economic and political institutions of Russian society are fluid, unstable, and subject to numerous restructurings. However, such a thesis contradicts the thesis expressed by many researchers about the existence of rigid basic structures of Russian society (for example, the “Russian system”, the institutional matrix X, etc.). Most often, these basic structures include an authoritarian system of government, a centralized redistributive economy, collectivist traditions, etc. To understand the meaning of the contradiction that has arisen, let us consider each of these structures in more detail.

1. Authoritarian or totalitarian paternalistic power as the core structure of not only the state, but also the entire life of the country is most often called the main invariant of the Russian institutional system. It's hard to argue with this statement. And yet we will try.

Firstly, it is easy to notice that all the historical examples on which this thesis is based relate to rural and illiterate Russia. In urban Russia (conventionally, starting from the 50s-60s of the twentieth century), there was first a significant softening of Soviet power and subsequently its collapse. The formed (or emerging) post-Soviet government can hardly be called liberal-democratic, but it is also very far from Soviet totalitarianism and even the authoritarianism of the autocratic monarchy. Thus, this thesis has both civilizational and stage components, which are currently very difficult to separate.

Secondly, a combination of four closely related conditions:

The desire of any authorities to increase their powers;

The need for authorities to increase their powers when people are unable to independently agree among themselves (or, in any case, the greater ease of assigning these powers than attempts to develop civil structures);

The absence of institutionalized resistance to the appropriation by authorities of those functions and powers that could be handled by non-governmental structures if they existed and functioned effectively;

Latent or learned from personal experience people's knowledge of their inability to negotiate with each other without the help of authorities leads to the formation of authoritarian power, regardless of the existence of previous authoritarian regimes and their traditions. Thus, the sources of authoritarianism in Russia are not only (and perhaps not so much) dependence on the path traveled and cultural traditions, but to a large extent an independent mechanism that generates a new authoritarianism, more or less independent of the previous one. This is confirmed by the already mentioned diversity of forms of Russian authoritarian power, which fundamentally distinguishes Russia from the countries of the East (primarily China), which in each cycle reproduce similar or even

2. Non-market centralized economy. A general global trend in recent decades has been the transition from redistributive economies to market ones, or at least a sharp increase in the share of the market sector, even in countries with a long tradition of centralized economies. Russia is no exception to this rule; even the growth of government intervention observed in recent years is simultaneously accompanied by various economic innovations of the liberal direction.

In our opinion, the change from traditional types of consumption to modern ones plays an important role in this process. In the roughest approximation, the needs of traditional society were reduced to a limited set of similar goods for mass consumption of the lower classes and exclusive goods for prestigious consumption of the elite. The production and exchange of both goods in traditional societies could be ensured both in a market and in a centralized economy. The main limitation on the possibilities of centralized commodity exchange was not so much the expansion of the list of consumed goods or the number of ingredients and tools in their production, but the individualization of consumption of the general population and stochastic changes in their tastes - the influence of fashion. More precisely, it was the combination of these processes that became the critical limitation on the capabilities of the redistributive economy. Unpredictable, stochastically changing consumer tastes impede long-term planning of production and distribution of goods, but do not reduce the effectiveness of the adaptive mechanism of market competition. On the contrary, it is precisely when the individuality of choice and fashion are combined that the advantages of a market economy are most manifested. In fact, if all people blindly followed fashion, then the most powerful corporation (including the state one) with greatest opportunities advertising its products and shaping fashion would easily supplant its competitors. On the contrary, if the choice of each person were strictly individual, then there would be a fundamental possibility of assessing the distribution of people according to types of preferences and planning the release of goods in accordance with this distribution. Thus, the continued commitment of a significant part of the Russian population to centralized state economy opposes her non-

efficiency in modern world.

3. As has been repeatedly noted, the current atomization of Russian society, the complete absence of neighboring communities, calls into question the tradition of considering Russian society to be collectivist, cathedral and communal. It seems to us that there is no deep contradiction between the communalism or collectivism attributed to the people (and its high place in the hierarchy of values) and the current atomization. When compared with Western societies today, we quite clearly see three components of the structure of Russian society: the first component is personal relationships instead of formal ones in standard situations, the second component is the inability to agree among themselves to solve more complex problems, the absence of civil society and the third component is lack of independence, habit obey and rely on authority. Previously, in the era of strict authoritarian regimes, there was simply no place for the second component, in which society’s inability to self-organize could manifest itself; the first and third directly connected, not even in a joint, but in an overlap, which created the illusion of special collectivism. It seems to me that legal collectivism and the oppositional, illegal collectivism opposing it, both together, were largely the product of complete lack of freedom, a consequence of the intersection of the fields of the first and third components. When a gap formed between them, a void was exposed, and in it the disunity of Russian society, hitherto masked both by total control itself and by specific forms of counteraction to it, became clearly visible. At the same time, the absence of state support, and civil structures force people to seek to overcome dependent stereotypes; people's ability to act independently (often illegally) turned out to be much higher than apologists for the collectivist nature of Russian society believed. It is very characteristic that in various surveys people choose to characterize themselves either as dependent paternalists, in need of care, or, on the contrary, they strive to appear as Henry Fords.

Therefore, if we are looking for the most stable invariants of the institutional system of Russian society, which remain valid to this day, then, in our opinion, we should first of all pay attention to other features associated with its sparseness and

instability, and also repeatedly described in the literature:

Replacing the general rules of the game with personal relationships;

Massive failure to comply with laws, both by subjects and authorities (including disrespect for the concept of property and simply theft);

Bad laws, often not even laws, but threats and wishes;

Distrust of any authority other than the highest (distrust of intermediate authorities, increased rejection of any obvious authority other than the central authority);

Corruption and widespread shadow economy.

In support of this list, one can cite the famous words of Saltykov-Shchedrin that “the severity of Russian laws is softened by the optionality of their execution” and the no less famous words of Herzen that “a Russian, no matter what his rank, circumvents or violates the law wherever it is can be done with impunity; the government does exactly the same.”

Therefore, there is no reason to assert that Russian society unconditionally accepted the institutions of authoritarian power and did not resist the attack on its rights - resistance constantly existed, but it took forms leading not to democracy, but to anarchy and chaos. In other words, the alternative to the institutions of authoritarianism was not democratic institutions, but various shadow anti-institutions, which not only softened the practice of applying cruel laws, but also destroyed the very functioning of any public and state institutions, the lowest levels of the hierarchy of the institutional system. Maintaining the basic rules of the game and building institutions at the upper levels in these conditions was carried out by draconian measures, including the issuance of cruel decrees, the literal and strict implementation of which was in principle impossible. For example, in Peter’s “Military Articles” the death penalty was provided for in 200 cases, however, despite the cruelty of the reign of Peter I, in most cases “the threat of death was an imaginary threat, the execution of which was not intended by the legislator himself at the time the law was issued.” Naturally, the issuance of such rules ultimately leads to even worse implementation of laws and even greater corruption. In addition, it is quite obvious that such legislation and legal proceedings do not achieve their main goal - promoting law-abidingness and reducing the crime rate; the instability of legal norms, disproportionately cruel punishments and arbitrary pardons, inevitable if the norm is too harsh, equally contradict the principle of the inevitability of punishment and do not contribute to the education of legal consciousness.

Partially, the weakness and sparseness of the institutional system explains even the most “authoritarian” features of Russian society - the lack of independence of people and special respect for the highest authority. The ineffectiveness or lack of legal, formalized means of protection forces people to either look for workarounds provided by anti-institutions and turn as clients to those who are especially successful in this, or appeal to the very source of power, which has the right to repeal laws or remove specific people from under their jurisdiction. It should be noted that the younger generation, who grew up after Soviet rule, as a rule, demonstrates greater independence than the older ones.

Summing up what has been said, we are inclined to conclude that the system of institutions emerging in Russia is, first of all:

Market economy with extensive but unsystematic government intervention;

Lack of civil society;

Widespread shadow economy and corruption

It fully corresponds to the current state of Russian society, and one can hardly expect significant progress in the cultivation of new effective institutions in the near future. Moreover, if under different, even the most democratic, slogans a new elite comes to power and tries to implement its reforms, then, apparently, after some time the previous situation will be restored.

Of course, the difficulties of growing effective institutions modern society in Russia are in no way a reason to stop efforts - all societies, even with the most stable institutions, once went through periods of institutional chaos and the formation of their institutions and returned to a similar state in eras of institutional revolutions. But it should be borne in mind that there is no reason to expect quick success.

As for the analysis of the functioning and development of institutions of the public administration system, here, thanks to neo-institutionalists, such problems as Path Dependence (track effect) and QWERTY effects are being updated.

The name of the Path Dependence theory is usually translated in Russian literature as “dependence on previous development” or “rut effect.” She pays attention to institutional change and the role of institutions in technical change.

QWERTY effects in modern scientific literature refer to all sorts of relatively ineffective but persistent standards that demonstrate that “history matters.”

These effects can be detected in two ways:

1) either compare technical standards that actually coexist in the modern world;

2) or compare implemented technical innovations with potentially possible, but not implemented ones.

Although the modern economy has long been globalizing and unifying, in different countries The world continues to have different technical standards that are incompatible with each other. Some examples are well known - for example, the differences between left-hand (in the former British Empire) and right-hand traffic on the roads of different countries, differences in railway gauge or in electrical transmission standards.

Unfortunately, QWERTY effects did not only appear in the relatively early stages economic history, they manifest themselves in the era of scientific and technological revolution.

The theory of dependence on previous development and those close to it Scientific research By alternative history based on the metascientific paradigm of synergetics - self-organization of order from chaos. According to the synergetic approach, the development of society is not strictly predetermined (according to the principle “nothing else is given”). In fact, there is an alternation of periods of evolution, when the vector of development cannot be changed (movement along an attractor), and bifurcation points at which the possibility of choice arises. When “QWERTY economists” talk about the historical randomness of the initial choice, they consider precisely the bifurcation points of history - those moments when any one possibility is chosen from a fan of different alternatives. The choice in such situations almost always occurs under conditions of uncertainty and instability of the balance of social forces. Therefore, during bifurcation, even very minor subjective circumstances can turn out to be fateful - according to the principle of Lorentz’s “butterfly effect”.

The victory of the initially chosen standards/norms over all others, even comparatively more effective ones, can be observed in the history of the development of institutions. Prior dependence for institutions is likely to be quite similar to prior development dependence for technologies, since both are based on the high value of adaptation to some common practice (some technique or rules), so that deviations from it become too costly.

If when describing the history of technical innovations they often write about QWERTY effects, then within the framework of the analysis of institutional innovations they usually talk about Path Dependence - dependence on previous development.

In the history of the development of institutions, manifestations of dependence on previous development can be traced at two levels - firstly, at the level of individual institutions (legal, organizational, political, etc.), and secondly, at the level of institutional systems (especially national economic systems ).

As a matter of fact, any example of technological QWERTY effects necessarily has an institutional background, because it is not technologies that compete, but those organizations that use them. Let's say, the victory of the narrow gauge standard over the more efficient broad gauge standard is the victory of the less efficient (at least by this criterion) D. Stephenson's company over its more efficient but less successful competitors.

Thus, the application of the theory of dependence on previous development to the political-economic history of institutions allows us to see their opportunity costs and thereby draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the choice made at bifurcation points socio-economic development.

Foreign literature on Path Dependence emphasizes the multiplicity of factors that give rise to it. If the discoverers of QWERTY effects paid main attention, in the traditions of neoclassics, to the technical causes of this phenomenon, then D. North and other institutionalists paid attention to the social causes associated with people's activities.

In addition, it is necessary to pay attention to such effects as the “coordination effect” - the benefits from the cooperation of some agents with others (in this regard, it is necessary to point out low costs (including transaction costs) for those following generally accepted standards, and high ones for “Robinsons” ).

The next factor is the growth of returns to scale (the use of any standard is more profitable the more often it is used). The most trivial one - the factor of dependence on previous development - also allows for a non-trivial institutional interpretation: norms as social capital can also become obsolete. But it is much more difficult to change them than physical capital. In modern studies of the causes of Path Dependence, attention is increasingly paid to cultural factors - mentality, education and social harmony.

Question 3. Practical value and prospects for using BIT in public administration .

As for the practical value and prospects for using BIT in the field of public administration research, we can note, firstly, the theory of coordination and the need to analyze transaction costs.

The analysis of transaction costs provides an original theoretical basis for solving the problem of comparative effectiveness of institutional forms of coordination of interactions. According to the new institutional theory, each such form, as well as the level of coordination, has its own, special configuration of transaction costs. Thus, based on the works of Williamson and Powell, “ideal” management structures were identified that could theoretically be present in executive authorities: hierarchy, corporation and network.

However, keep in mind the differences between the private and public sectors. The main difference is that the original management structure in public sector is hierarchy. There are situations in which it is possible to conclude contracts, but, as a rule, the activities of counterparties are strictly controlled. And while in the private sector inefficient producers will most likely be forced to leave the market, in the public sector, where political support plays a big role, ineffective management structures can exist for quite a long time. Thus, the theory of transaction costs needs to be adapted to the specific characteristics of

cams of public sector organizations, especially if it is intended to analyze internal structure organizations.

In this regard, the first thing that needs to be done is to define the concept of transaction in the context of the provision of public services. As a rule, the result of the work of executive authorities is the developed legal acts, projects, and decisions on a certain range of problems. Thus, for executive authorities, the main criterion for a transaction is the delegation of tasks. That is, a transaction in executive authorities is the transfer of a task from one employee to another. As a rule, one of the employees occupies a higher level on the hierarchical ladder, but this is not prerequisite. The processes that have been taking place in the field of public administration over the past 20–25 years have provided researchers with an extensive field for conducting not only theoretical but also empirical research: since the 1980s. Various countries are undergoing gradual reforms in the public sector. Already by the mid-1970s. the need to search for alternatives to the hierarchical management structure in executive authorities became obvious. In the 1980s Under the so-called new public management, executive branch organizations began to be viewed as corporations to be managed by professional managers. In the 1990s. this model of public administration was supplemented with “market elements”, which suggested, for example, the possibility of outsourcing some functions performed by government bodies; in the 2000s Network elements began to be actively introduced into public administration.

Thus, by comparing management structures in government organizations, it is possible to identify ideal types and present their characteristics.

Taking these features into account in the process of reforming administrative and public administration, it is possible to achieve a more efficient use of market instruments by saving on costs specific to each form of coordination, which is extremely important for the modern managerial program of administrative reforms.

The most important conclusion that the theory of transaction costs comes to is that the combination of different types of transactions with different mechanisms for managing them is not accidental. Each class of transactions corresponds to a special class of regulatory structures that ensure their execution with the lowest transaction costs.

In addition, the new institutionalists proposed a number of basic concepts and concepts; some of them raise more questions than answers, and most require further theoretical development and empirical substantiation.

This is governance as network cooperation up to the formation of a “fragmented and disarticulated state” (network institutionalism): how the universality / fragmentation of social and political orders relate to each other; a type of leadership that provides symbols and meanings for those in and outside the control network; embeddedness (including the adoption of new technologies (technology enactment)3) – what are the institutional consequences of the formation of “electronic governments”; legitimacy (in particular, organizational), which, as some researchers believe, is more important than efficiency - what is the institutional meaning of legitimacy and is institutional efficiency possible; bounded rationality following the logic of fitness - how it relates to political choice, etc.

It is obvious that the results of institutional research, despite the inevitable and sometimes obvious inconsistency, are very significant. Of course, the institutional approach did not and could not become a universal paradigm applicable to the study of any problems.

Despite all the costs, institutionalists of almost all schools managed to update previous ideas about politics, public administration, the political-administrative process and political actors at the micro, macro and mega levels.

Self-test questions:

1. Characterize the main directions of neo-institutionalism.

2. What are the methodological and theoretical prerequisites of NIT?

3. Describe the main provisions of the new institutional theory of public administration?

4. How productive is it to use the theory of transaction costs NIT in the practice of public administration?

5. What are the fundamental differences between New Managerialism and the New Institutional Theory of Public Administration?

6. What is the role of Path Dependence, QWERTY effects in public administration?

In the last decade, the development of Russian economic science has been marked by the growing popularity of the institutional paradigm. However, there is one area of ​​economic research by domestic social scientists that is still poorly affected by institutionalism - economic history.

The interpretation of institutions as consciously and/or spontaneously emerging “rules of the game” naturally raises the question of how and why these rules change. Proponents of the new economic history in the spirit of D. North emphasize the conscious choice of norms, institutional design and export of institutions. But there is another side to the problem of institutional variability - institutional inertia, which prevents the selection, design and export/import of institutions. These aspects became the main object of study of the new school of economic history. We are talking about something that arose in the 1980s. theory of path dependence, “dependence on previous development”, the foundations of which were laid by American economists and historians P.A. David and B.B. Arthur.

The ideas of “modern economic history” are widely known abroad, but in Russia, unfortunately, they are known much less well than they deserve. Meanwhile, the problem of path dependence is one of the “Russian” questions that our intellectuals have been thinking about for more than one century. Everyone knows the “unsolvable” problems like “why is Russia not America?” or “why do we want the best, but it turns out as always?” But the essence of the problem of path dependence can be expressed by the question: why in the competition of institutions quite often “bad” institutions (norms, standards, etc.) defeat “good” ones? This problem includes an analysis of both the stable Russian identity and the failures of attempts to abandon it in favor of a seemingly more effective system of socio-economic institutions. However, despite the enormous relevance of the path dependence paradigm for Russia, only a few people are engaged in it, and even translated literature on this topic is almost absent. Only the Economic Bulletin of Rostov State University systematically publishes publications on this topic.

An interesting field for creative discussion among economists, historians and sociologists was a symposium specifically dedicated to the problem of path dependence, held in the spring of 2005 at the State University Higher School of Economics (see [Scientific... 2005]), as well as a parallel Internet conference.

The discussion of dependence on prior development has gone through a number of stages. It all started with an “amusing story” about a typewriter. Then similar phenomena were discovered in the history of other technological standards. Then the discussion moved from the analysis of technological standards to the analysis of purely institutional rules/norms. Currently, the concept of path dependence has grown to a relatively independent unorthodox theory.

R.M. NUREYEV, Y.V. LATOV
What is path dependence and how do Russian economists study it?

There are actually quite a few analogues of the phenomenon called “path dependence” in institutionalism. Even in the neoclassical Walrasian equilibrium model there is already a time operator that explains how the equilibrium price is “groped.” The same stage-by-stage changes are reproduced in the well-known web-like model of equilibrium. In microeconometric studies of an applied nature (R. Blundell), a phenomenon called “state dependence” is considered. Neo-Keynesians who study the problems of rigidity of nominal variables examine price rigidity, explaining this phenomenon, in particular, by “menu costs” and theories of “ effective rate wages." The concept of hysteresis, which has become widespread in macroeconomics, focuses on the inertia of changes in macrovariables. All these concepts explain why in reality there is a smooth adaptation of certain variables, they emphasize the importance of time as an economic category and the possibility of temporal inconsistency of events.
In contrast to these theories, the concept of “dependence on the previous trajectory of development”, studied in new economic history, considers the problem of the development of the economic system as a whole, the rigidity of which is ensured by the relative immobility of internal institutional structures.

From our point of view, several explanations can be given for the phenomenon under study. Let's introduce them.

1. Path dependence is easily explained in terms of systematic approach . Thus, one of the representatives of modern institutionalism, Geoffrey Hodgson, in his book “Economic Theory and Institutions” puts forward the position that any socio-economic system is built on a combination of two principles: the “predominance principle” and the “admixture principle”. The “principle of predominance” is associated with the presence in it of a certain dominant economic structure. The “admixture principle” is based on Ross Ashby’s “law of requisite diversity,” according to which it is the internal diversity and complexity of a system that allows it to respond to the challenges of the external environment and maintain its stability.
Systematicity presupposes the presence of levels, hierarchies, statuses, and relatively rigid horizontal and vertical connections. As long as accumulated quantitative changes do not lead to changes in quality, the system remains internally stable and self-reproducing. The principles of building sustainable socio-economic systems were successfully described by K. Polanyi: symmetry, centrality, autarky. Last condition It also ensures the external stability of the system: the system cannot be too open; to a certain extent, it must be self-sufficient. In the French theory of agreements (L. Thévenot, Boltyanski), the following principles of subsystem functioning are highlighted: autonomy, system integration, interaction.
Complex socio-economic systems are built according to the “matryoshka principle”: higher-level systems include second-level systems, etc. Such a structure is equilibrium as long as it promotes the survival of each of the levels. This is ensured due to the presence in it of relatively conservative elements, such as resources, and to a lesser extent, knowledge and technology, which, unlike resources, are more mobile.

2. Path dependence is explained by the presence dominant subsystems , aimed at reproducing existing collective behavior patterns. Power in society belongs to the layer that has a more valuable resource. The value of a resource is historically given and determined by the ratio of its usefulness and rarity. Resources that have a higher alternative value bring rent to their owners, which is partly spent on creating rules of the game that secure rights to a given resource (for example, limiting entry into the industry for competitors), and partly on creating discriminatory rules of the game = favorable conditions for the elite. More valuable rights create higher incomes, which are partially used to reproduce, strengthen or increase these rights. A closed loop arises, from which, according to D. North’s theory, it is possible only through a breakthrough in knowledge and technology, which will change the relative value of resources. Such a breakthrough requires its own institutional environment, focused on innovative production rather than innovative redistribution activities.

3. Path dependence explained features of the interaction of formal and informal institutions. If formal institutions with varying degrees of success can be implanted from an alien environment, then informal ones, as a rule, grow on their own soil, although this soil can also be abundantly fertilized by interested and well-paid sowers (thus, a significant role in promoting norms of social behavior, morality and living standards are played by the media). Formal rules either consolidate informal regulations, providing them with legal guarantees (in this case, the “lag” is objective), or are created as an alternative to destructive informal norms (here possible different variants interaction - up to conflict), or arise as an initiative (import or institutional design). Next comes the process of mastering, learning, overcoming resistance, and deformalization of formal rules. Underdeveloped formal institutions in combination with strong informal institutions (to a greater extent) and some marginal formal norms (to a lesser extent) can give rise to institutional mutants. After which all that remains is to repeat the aphorism: “We wanted the best, but it turned out as always.”

4. Path dependence explained incrementality of any changes . "Nature doesn't make leaps." You can’t wake up healthy and rich in one day. And even the adoption of a law takes some time for new norms to work. And this requires a lot of accompanying organizational changes, the development of new complementary and expanding rules of a lower order, their mastery, abolition or adjustment of other rules.
A good historical example of such a “revolution” of rules is the adoption in 1995 of the law on central bank, who declared his independence from the government. The separation of monetary and fiscal powers is considered one of the most important institutional reforms of the period of market transformation. central bank stopped lending to the budget deficit, a transition to “civilized” methods of financing the latter was announced through the placement of government debt bonds. In order for the new rule to work, the Central Bank was forced to make the first deviation from market ideology - it established a corridor exchange rate(thereby eliminating an important competitor to the GKO market and creating a special favorable environment for government borrowing). The second retreat was made when the Central Bank of the Russian Federation itself began to buy government bonds on the secondary market, so that by the time of the August crisis of 1998, government debt bonds already accounted for 46% of its assets. That is, the previously practiced direct financing of the budget through loans from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation was replaced by a more complex hidden financing scheme, which reproduced the previous idea only in a more veiled form. We wanted the best, but it turned out worse.
Another interesting example demonstrates how a dysfunctional bankruptcy law, “adjusting” to the existing institutional environment, became very effective. First Russian law bankruptcy was supported by very complex procedures, providing for the rehabilitation of the enterprise in 60% of cases. It was of little interest to business and in most cases was initiated by the state. The second law “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)”, which came into force on March 1, 1998 (and the third law is currently in force - 2002), significantly changed the situation - in 80% of cases of application it made it possible to initiate bankruptcy proceedings without any special proceedings with the debtor (it is enough to provide data on three months of debt), with minimal participation of the state. As a result, a real opportunity opened up for business to benefit from the law, and the law began to work, turning into a convenient way of redistributing property, replacing the previously existing informal mechanisms for this redistribution.

5. Path dependence explained the presence of networks and sustainable organizational structures. In addition to production and technological networks, described in detail in the literature, there are also social networks - integrated into the network of communications and accumulated social capital. One of these negative networks is corruption, which assumes that a person who finds himself in a bureaucratic structure, no matter how initially noble principles he is guided by, is forced to behave in a certain way in order to remain in it. In these networks, the boundaries between political rent and bribes, that is, rent in its naked (uncivilized) form, may be blurred. Capitalized political rent forms a specific asset of the bureaucrat, which even received its own name - “administrative resource”. This resource determines the bureaucrat’s ability to create electoral barriers and implicit rules; for this, one must occupy a certain position in the network and have status. In turn, the value of the “administrative resource” is determined by the imputed income - the political rent of the bureaucrat.
The concept of “power-property” is interesting, in which power and property are considered as two complementary status goods, the combination of which may also give a synergistic effect. From our point of view, for these goods there is a kind of exchange that determines their relative value at a given point in time. It would be interesting to trace what cycles, “waves” exist in these metabolic processes. According to the universal law, the marginal utility of accumulated power decreases (although there are possible turning points here when quantity turns into quality) - just like property, which means that some kind of institutional equilibrium is possible, ensuring equality of the marginal benefits of two status goods. However, since in reality the functions are not continuous (it is impossible to achieve an optimal combination of property and power due to their infinite fragmentation, and there are direct prohibitions on combining business and government activities), the system works through the mechanism of “revolving doors”, that is, it realizes itself through rotation of business and politics. The most successful ones who fall into the cycle move up the hierarchical ladder, while the less successful ones get stuck at the door.

6. Path dependence explained the effect of conjugation of institutions .

7. Path dependence can be considered as dependence on past experience. Any system accumulates "historical memory". This memory can form a certain attitude towards certain actions or events if people consider them “by analogy” with previous events. So, in Russia, due to sad experience the functioning of structures like MMM, Chara, Khoper, the fundamentally good idea of ​​mutual investment funds was discredited, while in other countries they proved their worth and occupied a worthy niche in the market economy. By analogy, the population is now skeptical about any innovation related to collective investment. Activity pension funds, insurance companies, mortgage loans are viewed through the prism of past negative experiences.

8. Path dependence explained features of human behavior. Oddly enough, this sounds, first of all, the rationality of individuals, when their goal is to achieve an acceptable guaranteed result at a minimum of costs. Any innovation is associated with large one-time investment costs, uncertainty, irreversibility, waste of time and resources on creating an adequate infrastructure (dissemination, promotion of the idea), overcoming resistance from old structures, and training costs. In addition, there really is a lag in understanding the problem, developing a solution, and a lag in impact. All this causes inertia in behavior. The aversion of the majority of the population to risk is also of great importance - a guaranteed less profitable option may be more attractive than a high-risk (probabilistic) more profitable option. The degree of satisfaction a person receives from acquiring a cup is much lower than the degree of frustration from the loss of the same cup (D. Kahneman). People are afraid to live in an era of change and do not wish others to live, even if these changes promise better things in the future. Thus, if “shock therapy” had not occurred in the country, which brought most of the population to the brink of survival (just remember the significant delays in wages in the early 90s against the backdrop of collapsing inflation), a layer of “forced” would not have formed in Russia for a long time. entrepreneurs, which can rightfully be called the majority of entrepreneurs of the 90s.

05.18.05 Explanation of path dependence from various positions (