Chapter 3. Nikolai Ryzhkov - the man who stole the Soviet ruble So, the anti-alcohol decree was a volley on the economy, but ... this was not enough. First of all, the economy and society is a living organism, and living organisms are not easy to kill. They change and

Look at the paradox of the capitalist economy: in the country of X there are bricks, concrete, land, working hands, smart heads, in a word, there is everything to build many, many residential buildings that the population needs. At the same time, almost no houses are being built. Ask why? And there is no investor! - they will answer you.

Guys, to build a house you don't need money, but bricks. Since you have bricks and the houses you need are not being built, it means "something is wrong in the conservatory."

But what about market investments? - you ask. The answer to this question is in our history.

In Stalin's times, industrialization was carried out with the almost complete absence of market investment. Domestic opportunities for market financing were very scarce, and foreign countries were in no hurry to help. As A. Zverev wrote in the book “Notes of the Minister” (Finance): “The Communist Party rejected the possibility of obtaining foreign loans on extortionate terms, and the capitalists did not want to give us “human” loans.” According to some estimates (1, 2), Western loans accounted for about 3-4% of capital investments during the first five-year plan (and later it was no longer necessary), so they did not play a special role.

At the same time, industrialization took place at a fantastic pace.

Market investments (received by the state at the expense of the grain monopoly) during industrialization: the first five-year plan, the first year = 38%, the second year = 18%, the third year and beyond = 0%! Industrial growth: the first five-year plan = +1500 new factories and enterprises, the second five-year plan = +4000 new factories and enterprises. This is some kind of nightmare for a liberal market economist: investment is reduced to zero, while the economy grows and grows.

How did it work financial system how the financiers managed to build a system without an "almighty investor".

During the credit reform of 1929-30, a two-circuit monetary system was built in the USSR. Non-cash and cash were mutually non-convertible. Non-cash money ensured the functioning of construction, industry, Agriculture regardless market demand-supply. Cash provided market transactions.

In fact, it was an economy with two different types of money, the functions of which were different. Cash could perform all the generally accepted functions of money within the country, but the applicability of this money was actually limited to retail trade.

The functions of non-cash money have been cut - they have been taken away from the function of accumulation and the function of creating treasures. In the conditions of a socialist economy, which does not aim at making a profit, these functions turned out to be simply harmful. Deprived of these functions, non-cash money could only work within the framework of the socialist segment of the economy. Outside this segment, non-cash money simply did not exist. They were useless to steal because they could not be spent on the market. They cannot be bribed for the same reason. This money could be used only for its intended purpose - to ensure economic transactions between enterprises.

Due to the fact that the industrial (non-cash) and market (cash) monetary circuits were isolated from each other, the country could invest in its own development as much non-cash money as needed and as far as physical capabilities allowed. Non-cash money was simply poured into the economy when it was needed and withdrawn from the economy when it was no longer needed. At the same time, there could be no inflation, no rise in prices, in principle, because non-cash money could not flow into the market circuit where cash was used.

There is such a myth, supported, among other things, by such an economist as Valentin Katasonov, that in the USSR there were two (three or four - if you add more money for foreign trade operations) contour monetary system - cash and non-cash, which, supposedly, between themselves did not intersect and therefore did not create inflationary pressure on the market for goods and services.

In the book of Gusakov A.D. and Dymshits I.A. "MONEY CIRCULATION AND CREDIT OF THE USSR", Gosfinizdat, 1951, we read:
"A prerequisite for planning monetary circulation is a clear distinction between the spheres of non-cash and cash circulation taking place in the socialist economy. Thanks to this distinction, the Soviet state is able to directly determine those monetary and settlement relations for the maintenance of which cash is needed.
Cash turnover covers the following areas of monetary relations: payments by enterprises and organizations to the population (wages, cash payments of collective farmers for workdays, pensions, etc.); payments by the population to state and cooperative enterprises and organizations for goods and services; payments to the financial system (taxes, loan installments, loan repayments for individual housing construction, deposits in savings banks, etc.); payments by some groups of the population to other groups of the population mainly through collective farm trade. A strict distinction between the sphere of cash and non-cash circulation does not exclude, however, the close relationship between these areas. . The funds of enterprises and organizations for sold products are credited in a non-cash manner to their settlement and current accounts with the State Bank. The issuance of funds from these accounts for payment wages made in cash. However, despite such a close relationship between cash and non-cash payments, non-cash payments cannot have a direct impact on the amount of money in circulation. "

Was it really so, and if so, what was the expression of this "clear delimitation of the spheres of non-cash and cash circulation"?

All settlements between organizations were carried out in non-cash form, and settlements with citizens - in cash.
And isn't that the case now?
Aren't organizations now limited in their use of cash in purchases?
Yes, now the population can buy goods and services plastic cards- it seems like for non-cash, but are they those non-cash that are used in settlements between organizations? Obviously not, since this money is kept by citizens on special - their personal - accounts. That is, in fact, they are also withdrawn from their turnover between organizations, these are also not completely non-cash.

Now consider the next part of this statement - about different monetary contours: "non-cash payments cannot have a direct impact on the amount of money in circulation."

Here it is necessary to clarify what is considered the consumer market and what is considered the money supply in circulation.
Under Soviet rule, this was the market for services and goods intended for consumption by the end user - the people. It was these goods and services that were bought with cash.

What is this market like today?
Today, we include ALL goods and services in this market, which, in addition to those intended for the population, also includes those intended for organizations.
That is, if today the consumer market has become much wider, then money for it includes both cash and non-cash.

And then, under the Soviet regime, it would be more correct to keep track of money according to the total market - for the population and for organizations, but since this was not the case, and prices were set centrally - and the concept of "funds" arose - the very shortage of goods for organizations that needed to be distributed administratively.

That is The main difference between the money and commodity markets of the USSR was that each of them was artificially divided into two seemingly unrelated markets: consumer and corporate.

The same is true with regard to the money supply: should it be considered only cash, or also non-cash money?

That is, ultimately, the question of whether there really were two independent monetary circuits in the USSR comes down to whether cash could be used for the needs of the enterprise instead of non-cash money, and could goods and services of the consumer market be purchased with non-cash money?
Under the method of self-financing existing in the USSR, organizations had the right to sell surpluses of their products for consumer market. Naturally, for cash. This applied not only to enterprises in the agricultural sector, but also to industry. Were there any restrictions on the nomenclature? And organizations could use their proceeds as they saw fit." ..organizations are given the right to directly spend part of their cash proceeds within the established norms on current urgent needs".

"The preparation and execution of the cash plan is entirely related to the preparation and execution of the credit plan. Both plans are approved by the government at the same time."

"... The credit plan provides for the movement of funds both in the form of cash and non-cash payments, the latter, although they prevail in size, but not separated from cash transactions . The cash plan shows only the turnover of cash.

"... cash planning [ cash flow accounting] is not an isolated action related only to the sphere of monetary circulation, it is fully based on the entire system of national economic planning and is one of its forms. And this is natural, because the successful fulfillment of the cash plan depends entirely on the fulfillment of various indicators of the national economic plan . Thus, the fulfillment of the income part of the cash plan, the decisive item of which is the receipt of trade proceeds, depends primarily on the fulfillment of the plan for retail turnover by state and cooperative trading organizations. The implementation of the expenditure part of the cash plan is mainly determined by the amount of cash issued to pay wages, which in turn depends on the fulfillment and overfulfillment by socialist enterprises of their production and financial plans . At the same time, underfulfillment of the plan in terms of quantitative and qualitative indicators usually entails overspending on the wage fund and corresponding negative consequences for the national economy. It is clear that the same circumstances have a decisive influence on the progress of the credit plan."

"Cashless payments and cash transactions are various forms unified system cash settlements . Moreover, both of these forms of calculation are constantly intertwined: cash turnovers become a source for non-cash payments, and these latter are transferred to cash .

Thus, trade, entertainment, household and other enterprises and organizations serving the population hand over their proceeds to the State Bank, which credits it to the accounts of these organizations; in the future, these receipts serve as a source for non-cash transfers to suppliers and financial authorities. Suppliers, on whose accounts non-cash payments have been received, receive cash from the cash desks of the State Bank to pay wages, pay for agricultural preparations and for other needs. Similar cash received by bank transfer to the accounts state budget from socialist enterprises, serve as a source for the payment of pensions, benefits and other payments to the population, made in the form of cash. "

I believe that there are no fundamental differences in the use of cash and non-cash money between the Soviet version and the current one . Accordingly, and there is no reason to assert that there were two contours then, but today they are not.
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Material on the same topic - The myth of the two-circuit monetary system under Stalin -

Russia has invaluable experience in building an efficient economy

Today, the monetary systems of all countries of the world are arranged as follows: in Western countries, in the total money supply, approximately 90% is accounted for by non-cash money, and only 10% is cash, in the Russian Federation the ratio is approximately 70 to 30.

As you know, cash is banknotes issued central bank. Plus some small change. Non-cash - records on paper, and today almost exclusively electronic media They are also called deposit money. They are released commercial banks in the form of loans that are placed on bank accounts (deposits). At the same time, cash can be transferred to non-cash form, and non-cash money - in cash. That is, in the modern monetary (“market”) system, two circuits are interconnected.

And now let's try to compare this system with the Soviet system of the 30s-60s. of the last century, during which the maximum growth of the industrial economy was achieved, about which so much is said today.

Prior to this period, in the 1920s, when the “New Economic Policy” (NEP) was carried out in the USSR, the monetary system was “market” and, like today, included cash and non-cash payments. When the decision was made to begin the industrialization of the economy, it became clear that the "market" monetary system could not, unfortunately, ensure the implementation of five year plan adopted in 1928.

Even during the NEP period, there were active discussions in the party and state leadership of the USSR about what sources and at what pace industrialization should be carried out. The "new opposition" (first of all, in the person of its main ideologist N. Bukharin) actually sabotaged the Stalinist plan for accelerated industrialization, offering a path for the "natural", "organic" development of the country's economy. The algorithm that she proposed is something like this:

a) support the small commodity producer, which will increase the standard of living and effective demand of the population;

b) citizens will buy more and more goods and services, and producers will accumulate profits and gradually invest it in the construction and modernization of enterprises;

c) at the same time, citizens will save more and more of their income; the saved part through the credit system will be transformed into long-term loans for the construction and modernization of industrial enterprises;

d) after a certain period of time, an industrial economy will be created in the country.

Everything is logical. The only thing that did not suit me was the “period of time”. This process could take decades, or even a century. In a hostile environment, the USSR could not afford such a luxury. Sometimes in discussions they recalled the English industrialization, the so-called " industrial revolution". It happened in a relatively short period of time, about half a century. But in the case of England, the source of the industrial revolution was the primitive accumulation of capital in the form of merciless plunder of the colonies. At Soviet Union such an option simply could not be.

Therefore, it was decided not to “tie” industrialization to the savings of the population and the profits of industries producing consumer goods. And rely on non-cash money that is not related to the sphere of consumption of goods and services by the population.

Non-cash money in the USSR was intended primarily to create and develop industries for the production of means of production.

That is, machines, equipment, vehicles, metal-cutting, weaving, woodworking and other machines. As well as raw materials, energy carriers, building materials, components and semi-finished products necessary for the production of means of production and consumer goods. The production of means of production was called a group of industries A. There was also a group of industries B - the production of consumer goods (food, light, furniture pharmaceutical industry, production of household appliances, etc.).

The main thing was that the products of the group of industries A did not have the status of a commodity. Why? Because in the case of free purchase and sale of the products of the group of industries A, the products could turn into capital. That is, as a means of obtaining unearned income, or profit. This is the key moment of the economic transformations of that time. We usually focus on the technical and economic side of transformations (the creation of industrial enterprises), but less often think about their socio-economic side. And it is very important, its essence lies in the complete eradication of capitalism, the possibility of exploiting man by man, obtaining unearned income, profit.

But if there is no product, then it is logical to assume that there is no money. And we're talking about non-cash money "Stalin's economy." The fact of the matter is that the expression non-cash money in this case should be put in quotation marks.

In all sectors of the economy (not only groups A, but also groups B), not market, but distribution relations were established.

We are talking about the very distributive relations that today are pejoratively called "administrative-command economy."

But this distribution was not a manifestation of voluntarism, it was carried out on the basis of five-year and annual plans for the development of the national economy.

Plans were developed on the basis of intersectoral balances. The key departments involved in organizing the distribution of resources were the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, Gossnab, and the State Bank of the USSR. IN " economic problems socialism in the USSR” (1952) Stalin clearly articulated the essence of that economy. And then, in his speeches and articles, he explained in more detail why the means of production cannot be a commodity. They are distributed by the state only among their enterprises. They are not sold even to collective farms that had a different form of ownership (tractors and agricultural machines were not transferred directly to collective farms, but to state machine and tractor stations - MTS). That is, the state, as the single and sole owner of the means of production, after transferring them to one or another enterprise, in no way loses the right of ownership of the means of production. And the directors of enterprises that have received the means of production from the state are only authorized states responsible for the safety of the means of production and their use in accordance with the plans for the development of the national economy.

In general, the "Stalin economy" in its structure partly resembled the largest national and transnational corporations, consisting of many subdivisions, between which there are no usual "market" relations.

They are a vivid example of the "administrative-command economy", because the distribution of resources between departments is carried out on the basis of decisions emanating from the leading center. Accounting for the movement of resources within the corporation is carried out on the basis of the so-called "transfer" prices, which may have little to do with market prices. Everything is tuned to maximize the "integral" result. The fundamental difference between the "corporation of the USSR" and the usual capitalist corporation is that the first is "imprisoned" for the implementation of some "higher" goals (social, military, scientific, technical, cultural), and the second in all cases has as its goal the maximum profit for its owner or group of shareholders. Just as the loss of at least one of the divisions of a corporation from the administrative-command vertical can cause great damage to the entire corporation, so in the "corporation of the USSR" the emergence of any centers of "commodity-money relations" could lead to consequences that are difficult to predict. Such was the strict, and somewhere even the harsh logic of the "Stalinist economy." Perhaps the only exception to its rigid rules was foreign trade. If the products of the industries of group A were exported, then they became goods that had a market price. But this center of "commodity-money relations" was reliably isolated from the entire economy thanks to the state monopoly. foreign trade and the state currency monopoly.

Thus, non-cash money did not have such a "classical" function as a medium of exchange. They could not even be called a measure of value (the first "classical" function of money). They were a kind of conventional unit, with the help of which planning was carried out for the distribution of all types of resources in the economy, accounting and control of their use, and the discipline of contractual relations between enterprises was maintained. For example, violation of contracts for the supply of a product by one enterprise to another could lead to such that the second enterprise did not accept (approved) the payment requirements of the first. As a result, the first did not receive non-cash funds to its bank account. And this in Stalin's time was considered as a serious "state of emergency". It was a fairly clear mechanism of distributive relations.

One can recall the years of "war communism", when there were also distributive relations. But then the enterprises received the necessary money from the People's Commissariat of Finance, regardless of the fulfillment of tasks and their obligations to other enterprises. As a result, the economy of that period fell into complete decline.

As for cost accounting, Stalin explained that under socialism there is a special cost accounting. If under capitalism unprofitable enterprises are closed, then under socialism they can be both profitable and unprofitable. But the latter will still not be closed. If the enterprise cannot pay for the acquired means of production, then it pays for them at the expense of the budget or (in some cases) at the expense of a loan from the State Bank or special bank. Stalin stressed many times that self-financing under socialism is needed for control, accounting, calculation, and balancing. And although in 1932 a law providing for bankruptcy was adopted in the USSR, however, before the start of the war, not a single enterprise went through a complete bankruptcy procedure.

The main means of correcting the situation at enterprises, in the event of serious violations, were administrative-party penalties, and the last resort was the replacement of directors. That is, the directors were responsible for their violations and mistakes not with a ruble, but with their positions.

Although in the "Stalinist economy" there were such concepts as "wholesale market", "wholesale prices", they were also conditional. The so-called "wholesale prices" were calculated according to the cost method, by summing up all the costs of living and materialized labor in conventional units, called the "non-cash ruble". No profits were accrued within the Stalinist system. It was the real, material result that was important. And from the cost indicators of the plan and reporting, the indicator of cost reduction (production costs) was in the first place. An anti-cost mechanism was incorporated into the "Stalinist economy". By the way, accounting and control was also manifested in the fact that there was a very strict discipline in terms of accounting.

It is today that accountants can "draw" any balance sheets, hiding any theft and mismanagement. And in the "Stalinist economy" accounting rules were very strict and unambiguous, and the balance sheets had to be reduced "penny for a pretty penny."

Perhaps the most complete and interesting about the double-loop monetary system of the "Stalinist economy" was written by an economist from Kazakhstan, Kurman Akhmetov. Not so long ago, his book "Asymmetric Economy" was published in Kazakhstan in Russian. There are some interesting numbers there. At the beginning of the first five-year plan, almost half of the surplus product received from agriculture was used to finance industrial development. It should be noted that in the USSR at that time about 80% of the population was rural, only it, according to the "new opposition", could really be a source of accumulation (investment). Meanwhile, by the end of 1932, this figure dropped to 18%, and a year later it fell to almost zero. At the same time, by 1937 the total industrial production increased in comparison with 1928 by almost 4 times. It turned out a paradoxical thing: investments through agriculture were reduced to zero, while industrial production increased several times.

As K. Akhmetov rightly points out, it was possible to achieve such, at first glance, completely incomprehensible, results using a method that has not yet been used in the history of the economy: the money supply was divided into cash and non-cash parts.

After the credit reform of 1930-1931. The State Bank of the USSR became the sole issuer of non-cash money. By this time, commercial banks, which in some volumes were engaged in the issue of non-cash credit money have already been eliminated. There were a few special banks that were engaged in long-term lending to enterprises. Their resource base was formed mainly at the expense of the state budget.

State Bank of the USSR in the course of the credit reform of 1930-1931. acquired the status of a monopoly in the field of short-term lending, it also became a single settlement center that served enterprises, the state budget, and special state banks.

All "horizontal" settlements between enterprises, bypassing the State Bank, were prohibited. First of all, commercial credit, which was widely used during the NEP period, was banned.

Credit resources that came in the form of non-cash funds to the accounts of enterprises had as their source funds from the state budget and those temporarily free funds that enterprises placed on the accounts of the State Bank. If these two sources were not enough, then the State Bank resorted to issuing an additional mass of money.

For 1931-1935 as a result of the issue, the increase in non-cash money supply as a result of the issue of the State Bank amounted to 5.2 billion rubles, its volume increased by 2.25 times. Let's take 1938 as an example. Credit investments of the State Bank of the USSR in National economy as of January 1 of that year, they amounted to 40.7 billion rubles. These investments for 14.5 billion rubles. (35.3%) were covered by attracted funds of the economy in bank accounts, by 12.8 billion rubles. (31.2%) - budget funds, and 13.6 billion rubles. was covered by issuance. It turns out 1/3 of all credit investments of the State Bank. Considering that the State Bank was actually a subdivision of the People's Commissariat of Finance, the additional emission of money can be seen as a means of covering the state budget deficit. It remains debatable whether this issue was "covered" or "uncovered". New loans from the State Bank were issued for specific projects, the return on which was expected in future periods. Some analogy can be found in the current scheme of so-called "project financing" (a loan secured not by property, but by a project that can provide cash income in the future); in conditions " market economy Such a scheme is considered extremely risky. In the "Stalinist economy" there were more than once failures in the delivery of projects and the return of funds on loans. But such failures did not lead to defaults of either the enterprise or the state. They quickly docked with the help of maneuvering financial means states. The non-cash issue of the State Bank was carried out on the basis of the country's credit plan, which was linked to the country's general economic plan and the state budget.

The circulation of non-cash money in the "Stalinist economy" can be compared with the circulation of blood through arterial and venous vessels. And cash circulated in the capillary system - in the retail market for consumer goods and services.

Cash turnover has practically been reduced to the turnover of cash income and expenditures of the population. It passed mainly through the cash desks of state and cooperative enterprises and organizations and through the cash desks of the State Bank of the USSR.

For the labor invested in the Stalinist system, each citizen was provided with a set of vital benefits. This set itself was defined achieved level production and labor productivity. At the first stage, the task was simply to provide all working people with bread and basic foodstuffs. Then clothes, housing, then education, medicine, household appliances, and so on as the system develops. In the "Stalinist economy" in the first place were specific goods and their specific quantities (kilograms, pieces, units), and money was secondary.

The State Bank of the USSR was in charge of issuing cash and planning its circulation. Since 1930, the compilation of cash plans of the State Bank of the USSR began in conjunction with the balance sheets of cash income and cash expenditures of the population and the cash plans of enterprises. The planning of monetary circulation has ceased to be limited to the general determination of the amount of money in circulation and its indirect regulation. It became direct and covered the main cash flows, which were reduced mainly to cash payments for wages, procurement and from the accounts of collective farms, as well as to the return of this money through the trading network and through financial activities state (taxes, loans).

The main task of Gosplan, NKF and Gosbank was to support purchasing power cash ruble, to prevent its depreciation, inflationary growth in prices on the consumer goods market.

During the years of the first five-year plan, there was indeed an accelerated increase in the mass of cash, which lagged behind the saturation of the market with consumer goods. The situation stabilized in 1932-33. Despite some depreciation of the cash ruble, the real incomes of citizens during the years of industrialization increased markedly. Regarding the topic of balance commodity market and the cash supply in the "Stalinist economy", then it deserves a separate discussion.

Now I would like to draw attention to the fact that very strong barriers were put up between the non-cash circuit and the cash circuit of monetary circulation. Businesses were allowed to cash out only those amounts needed to pay wages and travel expenses. And one more little thing. For many years (decades) of the existence of a double-circuit monetary system, cases of illegal "cashing out" in the USSR can be counted on the fingers. Were there any thefts of socialist property? Were. But 99% of all thefts were for such types of property as raw materials, unaccounted for industrial products (“guild workers”), agricultural products, etc. There were even (albeit rarely) attacks on cashiers in stores and even collectors, who stole cash. But stealing non-cash money by converting it into cash was as difficult as, say, robbing Fort Knox. Even if some meager “leaks” from the circuit of non-cash circulation did occur, the persons who received cash had no chance of acquiring means of production with them, which could become a source of unearned income. The life of such underground millionaires was very similar to the life of Alexander Ivanovich Koreiko or Ostap Bender (after he received the coveted million).

Thanks to the creation of a two-circuit monetary system, it was possible to create a generally unique economic model. This is how the Kazakh economist K. Akhmetov expressed this uniqueness: “The decision to divide the money supply into two independent spheres - cash and non-cash - was, no doubt, brilliant. It allowed the country in the shortest possible time to go through a path that, with the normal development of processes, would have taken several centuries (at best). Such a solution of theoretically absolutely insoluble problems was the only possible one in those specific historical conditions, with those production resources that were available, and at that level of technical development. This solution was not found immediately, but empirically, empirically. The financial system created in the USSR had no analogues in history. It came into such striking contrast with all the experience accumulated by economic science by that time that it took a whole ideological, and not scientific justification for its implementation.

As a result, the principles of the Soviet financial system were so camouflaged with ideological constructs that they are not really understood to this day.

A breakthrough in the economy led to a complete change in its structure and the creation of an appropriate financial system. He set such a direction of development, in which the economy does not develop in accordance with the growth of personal consumption, but, on the contrary, consumption grows following the increase in the possibilities of the economy ”(K. Akhmetov. Paradoxical financial system of the USSR // newspaper Svoboda Slova (Kazakhstan), 2008 , Nos. 1-3). In some form, Akhmetov's thesis about the accelerated development of the economy in relation to the growth of consumption corresponds to the most important official principle of the "Stalinist economy", which is called "advanced development of a group of industries A in relation to a group of industries B".

After M. Gorbachev came to the leadership of the country, the final phase of the destruction of the two-loop system of money circulation began. Under the pretext of “improving material incentives for workers,” decisions were made at the party and state levels that allowed transferring part of the non-cash funds of various enterprise funds to the material incentive fund, and transferring money from it into cash. However, two decades before Gorbachev's "perestroika", a rehearsal was held under the name "Kosygin-Lieberman reform". It weakened the barrier between non-cash and cash circuits of monetary circulation (not to mention the fact that it strengthened the cost-based nature of the economy). First, businesses were focused on profit as a key indicator. Secondly, they were allowed to transfer part of their profits to material incentive funds. All this supposedly was supposed to stimulate labor activity and reduce production costs. And in the course of "perestroika" the dam between the two circuits of monetary circulation was finally destroyed. In 1989, the famous economist V.M. Yakushev wrote: “Rubles in relations between enterprises do not play the role of money, but of accounting units (“accounting money”), with the help of which the exchange of activities is mediated and labor costs are recorded. We have two types of money: "labor" and "accounting" and this is our reality. They cannot be mixed, and even more so, translated “countable” into “labor”. Employees of planning and financial bodies unwittingly take into account this difference and insist that money from other items of expenditure should not be transferred to material incentive funds.

But this difference is not recognized by commodity-oriented economists, and instead of understanding why practitioners do this, they accuse them of thoughtlessness and ignorance, forgetting that practice is the criterion of truth.

Now “accountable” money began to be abundantly transferred to the material incentive funds. And the result is that the financial system is practically disorganized.”

The cashing out of "countable" money became the main source of initial accumulation of capital for those who would later receive the title of "new Russians" and "oligarchs". Take, for example, the same M.B. Khodorkovsky. He received his first millions through the so-called NTCM (Scientific and Technical Center for Youth Creativity), a network of such centers began to be created throughout the country. All "creativity" came down to the fact that, according to the new legislation, enterprises could transfer money from their bank accounts to the account of the STCM for various kinds of "scientific and technical developments." Money from the accounts of the STCM was cashed out. In fairness, it should be said that not only Mikhail Borisovich made money on this "creativity", but also the directors of enterprises that remained unknown.

Today we live in the realm of the "market economy" and we observe almost unlimited convertibility of money from cash form to non-cash and vice versa.

Only when, through some Russian bank several billion rubles will be cashed out, the Bank of Russia raises a fuss and the performance begins to deprive the bank of its license.

And no control by the Central Bank or Rosfinmonitoring can stop this thieving, criminal activity.

Such conversion serves the circulation of capital between the "white" and "grey" (or even "black") economy, this is the essence of the current Russian capitalism. The money coming through various legal channels to the accounts of "white" enterprises is then converted into cash and goes into the "shadow", where you can get a higher rate of return. The money received in the “shadow” then has the following fate: some of it is returned to the accounts of “white” enterprises (there are many ways to legalize it); part goes to bribes (only cash works here); part goes to wages in "envelopes" or to hire immigrants (the latter, as you know, do without ATMs); some goes to completely legal bank accounts of participants in such schemes (i.e., “to your loved ones”).

In order to put an end to this chronic disease, to stop the plunder of the people's property, it is necessary to prohibit (or at least strictly regulate) the conversion of non-cash and cash money.

Introduce a two-circuit system of monetary circulation. Strengthen this measure by introducing bans on the free cross-border movement of capital (such movement of capital today also contributes to the plunder of our wealth). This is the minimum task.

And the maximum task is to start on the basis of such a two-circuit system and taking into account the experience of the "Stalinist economy" the second industrialization of Russia. I have already quoted K. Akhmetov. I will quote again. Our Kazakh colleague believes that no tax tricks, no methods of activating bank lending, nor (all the more so) foreign investment will not bring his Kazakhstan out of the crisis in which it found itself as a result of "market" reforms. Only a return to a two-circuit monetary system will help: “The need to reorganize the financial system is now clear to any serious researcher. How will this work in practice? A simple example. Now everyone knows that our energy sector is in critical condition and threatens to collapse in the next two years. The authorities are trying to save the day by inflating tariffs endlessly. But the money raised is still not enough. In fact, our population will never be able to finance domestic energy - they have too little money. Therefore, tariffs should not be increased, but reduced. And the financing of the energy industry should be undertaken by the state through special financial channels, strictly isolated and intended only for specific purposes. The funds of the population should be withdrawn exclusively for the remuneration of workers in the industry. The same applies to heat, water, gas supply, infrastructure and much more. And to shoulder all the costs on the shoulders of the population is meaningless and useless - it still will not pull them. In this case, we will not save the economy, and we will ruin the population,” Kurman Akhmetov believes.

Today it is often said that Russia continues to exist thanks exclusively to the Soviet legacy. This refers to the material and technical base - factories, hydroelectric power plants, railways, mines, explored deposits, etc. It's right. But we also have another heritage - invaluable experience in building an efficient economy. And the need to use this experience will grow every year.

Valentin Yurievich Katasonov - professor, doctor economic sciences, Chairman of the Russian Economic Society. S.F. Sharapova.

Special for the Centenary

Look at the paradox of the capitalist economy: in the country of X there are bricks, concrete, land, working hands, smart heads, in a word, there is everything to build many, many residential buildings that the population needs. At the same time, almost no houses are being built. Ask why? And there is no investor! - they will answer you.

Guys, to build a house you don't need money, but bricks. Since you have bricks and the houses you need are not being built, it means "something is wrong in the conservatory."

But what about market investments? - you ask.

The answer to this question is in our history. In Stalin's times, industrialization was carried out with the almost complete absence of market investment. Domestic opportunities for market financing were very meager and foreign countries were in no hurry to help. As wrote A. Zverev in the book "Notes of the Minister" (finance) : "The Communist Party rejected the possibility of obtaining foreign loans on extortionate terms, and the capitalists did not want to give us "human" loans." According to some estimates (1, 2), Western loans accounted for about 3-4% of capital investments during the first five-year plan (and later it was no longer necessary), so they did not play a special role.

At the same time, industrialization took place at a fantastic pace.

Market investments (received by the state at the expense of the grain monopoly) during industrialization: the first five-year plan, the first year = 38%, the second year = 18%, the third year and beyond = 0%! Industrial growth: the first five-year plan = +1500 new factories and enterprises, the second five-year plan = +4000 new factories and enterprises. This is some kind of nightmare for a liberal market economist: investment is reduced to zero, while the economy grows and grows.

How did the financial system work at the same time, how did the financiers manage to build a system without an “almighty investor”.

During the credit reform of 1929-30, a two-circuit monetary system was built in the USSR.

Non-cash and cash were mutually non-convertible. Non-cash money ensured the functioning of construction, industry, and agriculture, regardless of market supply and demand. Cash provided market transactions.

In fact, it was an economy with two different types of money, the functions of which were different. Cash could perform all the generally accepted functions of money within the country, but the applicability of this money was actually limited to retail trade. The functions of non-cash money have been cut - they have been taken away from the function of accumulation and the function of creating treasures. In the conditions of a socialist economy, which does not aim at making a profit, these functions turned out to be simply harmful. Deprived of these functions, non-cash money could only work within the framework of the socialist segment of the economy. Outside this segment, non-cash money simply did not exist. They were useless to steal because they could not be spent on the market. They cannot be bribed for the same reason. This money could be used only for its intended purpose - to ensure economic transactions between enterprises.

Due to the fact that the industrial (non-cash) and market (cash) monetary circuits were isolated from each other, the country could invest in its own development as much non-cash money as needed and as far as physical capabilities allowed. Non-cash money was simply poured into the economy when it was needed and withdrawn from the economy when it was no longer needed. At the same time, there could be no inflation, no rise in prices, in principle, because non-cash money could not flow into the market circuit where cash was used.