The concept of crimes committed in the economic sphere. The most dangerous areas of criminal economic activity in Russia
CHAPTER 1. Organized crime in
sphere of the world economy
1.1 Organized crime -
the most pressing problem of our time
Crime is one of the greatest - after world and regional wars - dangers for humanity, its democratic, economic and humanitarian development.
Organized crime, which is becoming increasingly widespread in the world, is one of the most pressing problems of our time. No state can consider itself completely protected from this complex social phenomenon.
The growing scale of organized crime poses a real threat to the security of the state and society. In a number of places, criminal groups, taking advantage of impunity, and sometimes the connivance of law enforcement agencies, act more and more brazenly and defiantly, turning vast territories into their fiefdoms, where they control such traditional types of illegal activities as drug trafficking, prostitution, gambling, illegal trade weapons, extortion, etc. Moreover, the economic orientation of their activities is becoming increasingly active, which has covered almost all areas of the country’s economic complex, primarily in highly profitable sectors of the economy.
However, the areas of activity of organized crime in different countries have certain differences.
Thus, in Germany, approximately 50% of crimes committed by organized criminal groups are related to drug trafficking. Statistics also indicate an increase in car thefts over the period 1980-1990. more than 7 times, and crimes related to human trafficking - by 190%.
Along with local criminal groups in this country, certain types of criminal activity are within the sphere of influence of foreign organized crime groups.
For example, Turkish organizations are actively involved in the smuggling of foreigners and drug trafficking. A gang that regularly smuggled Iranian residents across the “green border” between Austria and Bavaria was arrested. The fee for one adult was 1,500 marks, and for a child - 1,000. The criminals supplied the Iranians with false passports and took them through Istanbul, Maribor (Yugoslavia) and Vienna to Munich. According to employees of the Munich special commission for the fight against organized crime, the group organized the illegal departure of many thousands of Iranians to the West, earning more than one million marks.
Turkish criminals often transport narcotic substances, according to BKA, in secret places in passenger cars. Experience shows that drug traffickers, quickly adapting to the conditions of the European market, are developing new ways to conceal drugs.
Yugoslav criminal groups mainly commit crimes against property in Germany. However, recently there has been an increase in the activity of these groups in committing crimes such as forced prostitution, organizing illegal gambling, illegal intermediation in employment, and drug trafficking.
Members of the Italian mafia specialize in Germany in drug trafficking, extorting money from hostages, car theft, manufacturing and distributing counterfeit money, and racketeering among compatriots. Along with this, they are engaged in counterfeiting means of payment. A significant part of the counterfeit banknotes discovered in Germany were made in printing houses and workshops in Italy. To sell them to Germany, Italian organized crime uses family, personal, business and criminal ties with compatriots living in this country.
Polish organized crime groups specialize mainly in vehicle theft. The commission of this type of crime is facilitated by the fact that the distance from Berlin to the Polish-German border is only 70 km. According to the BKA, more than 80% of cars registered in Poland come from Germany and every second of them is stolen.
Russian organized crime groups, according to the BKA, are usually involved in racketeering, concealment of stolen goods, car theft and illicit trafficking in cultural property on the territory of the German state. Smuggling of works of art, non-ferrous metals and other items from the territory of the former USSR is often carried out through Poland. A convenient channel for selling antiques is the organization of “exhibitions and sales”. As a rule, such exhibitions are held in churches under the patronage of church ministers who trust their organizers and are not even aware of the purpose of their appearance in Germany. At one of the exhibitions, held in the church chapel of the city of Xanten, 400 Russian icons were offered to buyers.
There is a tendency for Russian organized crime to search for channels for laundering “dirty” money in Germany. One of these “ideal” places was the gambling business. About 85% of all gambling establishments in Berlin and most of the network of small trade enterprises are controlled by Russian organized groups.
In Japan, the areas of activity of organized criminal groups are to a certain extent identical to those areas that are common in Germany. In both countries, the main areas of criminal activity are drug trafficking, illegal gambling, human trafficking, the spread of prostitution, and extortion of protection money.
At the same time, the Yakuza remained aloof from the trade in hard drugs and firearms for a long time. Today, the drug trade in Japan remains smaller than in Germany: the bulk of the drug trade in this country is made up of amphetamines, while in Germany the leading positions are occupied by opiates (especially heroin), cocaine and cannabinoids. For comparison, here are some numbers. According to Kyuma and Miyazawa, in 1988 there were 57,360 drug offenses reported in Japan, including 29,777 for amphetamines. In the same year, 84,998 drug crimes were registered in Germany, including 25,774 related to heroin trafficking and 48,218 related to cannabinoid trafficking. In 1993, in the old federal states, including the united Berlin, 119,496 crimes were already registered, of which 50,793 were related to heroin trafficking.
Certain differences appear in the illegal gambling business. Thus, in Japan it is based, as a rule, in private apartments, and in Germany - in underground casinos. In addition, a game of thimbles, unknown in Japan, played on the streets, is common here. The mode of trafficking in persons, especially women, is essentially identical in both countries.
Japanese-specific types of organized criminal activity that are virtually unknown in Germany include so-called assistance in civil disputes.
A racket, the income from which in 1988 amounted to 0.55 billion DM. By agreement with the boards of joint stock companies, organized criminal groups ensure a quick and trouble-free, from the point of view of the board, general meeting of shareholders.
1.2 The main goal of organized crime
Main goal organized crime- receiving excess profits. Therefore, from the very first days of its existence, this criminal organization sought by all means to penetrate the business world - business. The multibillion-dollar profits of the kings of coal and steel, the financial magnates of Wall Street, the owners of the largest trading, transport and other companies, like a magnet, attracted the eyes of the mafia leaders.
Bribery and corruption are the most important component of the business activity of organized crime, which is widespread in legal business. However, the fundamental difference is that organized crime cannot function without bribing those in power. This is why bribery is the most important expense item in the criminal world.
Organized crime is looking for and finding new areas of application for its activity and rapidly growing funds. Since the 60s of the last century, US mafiosi began to widely penetrate into such non-traditional areas of activity as the theft of securities and fraud with them, infiltration of banks and insurance companies, organizing false bankruptcies, robbing artists, smuggling cigarettes, manipulating narcotic drugs used in medicine, illegal dumping of toxic waste from chemical and other types of production.
Chicago police officials said criminal elements control much of the pharmaceutical business. Every month the mafia exacts tribute from clinic owners, threatening physical harm or promising assistance in the fight against competitors. In addition, representatives of organized crime force the owners of these clinics to deal with enterprises under the control of the mafia. The underworld controls 50 thousand companies in the United States. Organized crime in the United States was one of the first to engage in “dirty money laundering.”
To summarize the above, it can be noted that the development of organized crime in Germany, Japan, the USA, Italy and a number of other foreign countries was based on prohibited types of services - the illegal sale of drugs, prostitution, pornography, gambling, gambling, racketeering and other types of illegal activities. But in recent decades, it has diversified its criminal activities and is increasingly beginning to engage in a wide variety of activities, which, in addition to traditional ones, include smuggling of illegal migrants, illegal arms trade, theft of cars and their illegal transportation, as well as smuggling of strategic materials and resources.
1.3 Shadow sector of the global economy
Illegal production of goods and services, concealment of income, circulation of unaccounted cash, money laundering, bribes and abuse of official position - these and other manifestations of shadow activities are constant companions of the global official economy.
A single generally accepted concept shadow economy not formulated.
Nevertheless, science and practice have developed a number of criteria for classifying economic phenomena as the shadow sphere:
Carrying out economic activity outside of official control and regulation, with concealment and camouflage of its significant parameters from law enforcement and regulatory authorities;
Receiving economic benefits in the form of misappropriation of economic benefits.
World experience shows that there is a critical mass, after which the shadow economy turns from a departmental problem of law enforcement agencies into a national one.
In total, at least 8 trillion dollars added value annually, without ending up in the accounting reports of enterprises and in the official statistics of both individual states and international organizations.
Thus, in size, the global shadow economy is comparable to the economy of the United States, the country with the largest GDP in the world.
In the second half of the 90s, the shadow economy was equivalent to an average of 12% of GDP in developed countries, 23% in countries with economies in transition, and 39% in developing countries.
In all “post-Soviet” countries, the shadow economy maintains a growth trend: on average from 26% in 1990 to 40% in 1999. According to various studies, in the first half of the 90s, the shadow sector was of greatest importance in the economies of Georgia (43-51% of official GDP), Azerbaijan (34-41%) and Russia (27-46%). Many companies in the territory of the former USSR (even large ones with state capital participation) resort to shadow operations along with completely legal activities in the official economy.
1.4 Specifics of Russian organized crime and reasons for the criminalization of the economy.
When analyzing the emergence of organized crime in Russia, attention should be paid to the fact that the command-administrative management system led to an imbalance in the economy, mismanagement, and weakening control over the level of labor and consumption.
One of the most negative consequences of this process was a widespread shortage, as a natural consequence - the creation of an underground market for goods and services beneficial to dealers and organizers of underground business.
This was the main reason for the development and establishment shadow economy, which laid the foundation for organized crime in Russia.
These processes intensified significantly in the 70s. In the structure of economic crimes, a steady growth trend has been revealed in such a form as the production and sale of unaccounted for products manufactured in specially organized underground workshops. Among the criminal elements, a new criminal category appeared, called tsehoviks. These individuals had an extensive system of connections, including with individual heads of administrative and economic bodies, and created their own criminal environment, developing countermeasures to ensure their safety. Their activities came to the attention of the “authorities” of the criminal environment, who saw here an opportunity to gain easy access to financial resources. And since the “dealers in the shadow economy” had significant profits, they could afford to practically painlessly transfer part of their criminal proceeds to these authorities in order to protect themselves from various types of attacks.
In turn, criminal authorities, being interested in the growth of illegal profits, stood up to protect the interests of these “dealers”, taking upon themselves the functions of their physical protection and carrying out individual assignments (participation in the sale of products, search for raw materials, bribery of officials of the Soviet state apparatus, implementation of counterintelligence activities, etc.). On this basis, shadow economic structures merged with the authorities of the criminal environment.
The expansion of this criminal activity, both regionally and inter-economically, objectively confronted these individuals with the task of distributing spheres of influence and the need for cooperation. Subsequently, crime, acquiring an increasingly mercenary character, formed on the basis of the mentioned fusion no longer a handicraft (elementary), but a technologically progressive (organized) production. In order to overcome the inevitably arising conflicts based on the distribution of areas of activity, criminals have a need for a kind of “arbitrators”, “arbitrators”. In the criminal environment, individuals have appeared who perform functions not related to participation in specific crimes, but who solve purely support tasks. The so-called elite (higher echelons), which actually organizes the criminal environment, has found its place in this “industry.”
It should be noted that the crime rate in the USSR in 1960-1990. was 5-8 times lower than in developed foreign countries, although the trends were the same. A crime wave swept the country in the late 80s and early 90s, peaking in 1992-1993. It was during these years that radical changes took place in the sphere of economic relations. This is the period of the collapse of the USSR, the massive destruction of the bodies of previous control, the privatization of state property, demagogic slogans, legal nihilism, fair and unfair criticism of law enforcement agencies and courts, from which professionals began to leave, and the place of qualified leaders began to be taken by amateurs loyal to the new authorities. As a result, in just two years, the crime rate (per 100 thousand population) rose from 1,463 in 1991 to 2014 in 1993 and began to rapidly approach the indicators of countries with long traditions of market relations, where crime is quite high.
The significant scale of socio-economic changes affected the dynamics and direction of criminal processes in the economy. Their main content was the illegal alienation of state property during privatization and selfish abuses in its management, as well as the illegal redistribution of the produced gross domestic product in favor of the criminal strata, mainly through criminal fraud in the credit, financial and foreign economic spheres, in the monetary and consumer spheres. markets. To a certain extent, this is due to the fact that economic reform was carried out without an adequate mechanism for protecting the state and honest entrepreneurship from illegal attacks.
Ill-conceived economic liberalization and privatization of property led to:
people’s lack of faith in the ability of government authorities to solve emerging problems and the desire of a significant segment of the population to use any, including illegal, solutions to obtain funds;
job cuts, which contributed to the formation of new segments of the population with high crime potential;
the formation of a new layer of owners and entrepreneurs at the expense of businessmen in the shadow economy;
blurring the lines between criminal encroachment on state property and entrepreneurial initiative;
not always legal accumulation of capital - a significant share of property passed to criminal structures or to persons associated with criminals.
Against the backdrop of the development of new economic forms, a weakening of state control over economic transformations in the country and disruptions in the activities of the system of state law enforcement agencies appeared. The consequence of this was the emergence and strengthening of numerous criminal groups, the breeding ground of which was the shadow economy and openly criminal forms of obtaining and laundering illegal income. Shadow economic relations are becoming increasingly widespread, business activity is moving into the shadow sphere, and economic crime is growing. The share of the shadow economy, according to expert estimates, has reached a quarter of the gross national product.
Shadow financial capital is the economic basis (basis) of organized crime, which is supported by “shadow criminals”.
Examples include economic entities of federal and regional significance, such as Novokemerovo Brewery OJSC, acquired by the leader of the criminal community S.E. Shkuratov in 1997; the Alzas marble quarry, acquired by the leader of the criminal community E.A. Chernyshev; OJSC Irkutsk Cold Storage Plant, OJSC Irkutsk Cardan Shaft Plant, OJSC Omsk Oil Refinery and OJSC GAZ.
Based on the foregoing, we can come to the conclusion that a distinctive feature of the emergence and development of Russian organized crime is crime committed in the economic sphere, mainly in its shadow sector.
Criminalization of the economy during the transition period, associated with processes of property redistribution, is typical for many countries. But in Russia, where market reforms were carried out often before the necessary legislation appeared, crime has reached unprecedented proportions.
Until the mid-90s, about 3 million people, who lost their savings for a total amount of about $9 billion
If in 1994 the average global income from the criminal economy reached 100 dollars per capita, then in Russia - 130 dollars while the total annual income from economic crimes made up RUB 38.5 trillion
CHAPTER 2. Characteristics of shadow and
criminal economy of Russia
2.1 Shadow economic activities in
various industries and areas of economic activity
Shadow economic activity in various industries and areas of economic activity is unevenly represented. Thus, according to estimates of the Russian State Statistics Committee, in construction to the shadow sector accounts for about 8% of activity; in trade this figure exceeds 63%.
Economic and legal analysis allows us to highlight as The most crime-prone zones in the economy are as follows:
the financial and credit sector, the criminalization of which is the most dangerous for society, giving rise to the criminalization of all other parts of the economic system;
the sphere of property relations, primarily in the fuel and energy complex, the agro-industrial complex, and the real estate market;
the sphere of foreign economic activity, which is used not only for the rapid criminal accumulation of capital, but is also the most effective means of illegal export of capital through the criminal system of export of energy and raw materials;
The sphere of the consumer market, traditionally a criminogenic economic zone, is strictly controlled by criminal structures that strictly quota the share of sales, set monopoly prices and collect “tribute” both in the form of a share of capital participation and in the form of direct payments for the right to carry out trading activities.
Based on the results of the research, the shadow activities of producers of legal goods and services in these areas can be assessed as follows: economic activity in the foreign economic sphere (up to 55-60% of total trade turnover), in the sphere of market trade (50-55 %), extraction of aquatic biological resources (up to 75%), commercial transportation and leasing (40-45%), rental and sale of real estate (45-50%), consumer services (40-45%).
Among the markets for prohibited goods and services that have developed at present, one can note the illegal market for narcotic drugs, weapons, prostitution, pornography, the market for counterfeit goods, counterfeit securities, and counterfeit currency. These types of illegal markets are already established. The problems of strategy and tactics to combat them have partly already been considered in theory and have found their practical expression.
At the same time, in Russia there is a tendency towards the formation of new types of illegal markets that require close attention from law enforcement agencies. These primarily include the illegal human trafficking market and the illegal transplant market.
The illegal market for human trafficking is closely related to the transplant market. This market includes the transportation of illegal immigrants, women for prostitution, indentured labor for slave labor, domestic workers from developing countries, and children for illegal adoption at enormous cost.
According to experts, international adoption is turning into a profitable multi-billion dollar business.
Another trend in the development of Russia’s criminal economy has been the formation of a shadow political market associated with lobbying and corruption. According to experts, the damage from corruption in Russia annually amounts to 37 billion US dollars. To the amount of any concluded contract, you have to add about 50% of its estimated value for a bribe to officials responsible for processing the necessary documents.
According to some data, at least 70% of municipal employees, 80% of judges and traffic police officers, 40-45% of doctors, 60% of university teachers constantly take bribes. According to official statistics, no more than 4 thousand cases of bribery and commercial bribery are revealed in Russia every year, and only 1,500 criminal cases against 2 thousand bribe-takers reach the court. In reality, no more than three hundred criminals are serving their sentences in prison. Based on this, it is necessary to seriously reconsider the existing optimistic estimates of the latency of this type of offense (according to various estimates, from 80 to 90%).
Incoming operational information indicates that law enforcement agencies are identifying only thousandths of a percent of the entire army of corrupt officials.
All of the above allows us to assert that today in Russia shadow, including criminal activities has deep socio-economic roots, is characterized by high latency, is carried out, in most cases, with the direct participation and control of organized crime, and criminal capital has gained a critical mass.
2.2 System of interaction between organized crime
in the field of economics and shadow economy
Issues of interaction between organized crime in the economic sphere and the shadow economy are characterized as follows:
the proceeds received from the criminal activities of organized criminal groups (drug business, criminal auto business, arms trade, porn business, etc.) are invested in various shadow sectors of the economy (used in the financial and credit sector, construction, oil business, etc.);
money from the shadow economy is used to finance organized criminal groups (contributed to the common fund, weapons and special technical equipment are purchased, etc.);
organized criminal groups are used by shady businessmen to realize economic interests and resolve economic disputes (contract killings, extorting debts, organizing raids on competitors, etc.
Thus, the symbiosis of organized crime and the shadow economy has two directions. Representatives of the shadow economy use organized criminal groups to pursue their economic interests.
In turn, organized crime uses shadow economy operators to:
a) investing financial resources received from illegal activities in legal businesses;
b) financing of organized criminal groups.
All of the above allows us to state the fact that in the system of economic relations a an independent sector of the criminal economy.
The following can be distinguished as part of the criminal economy: elements:
illegal economic relations in the sphere of legal economic activity;
hidden economy - an activity permitted by law that is not officially shown or is downplayed by the entities carrying it out in order to evade paying taxes, making social contributions or fulfilling obligations specified by law;
the sphere of illegal business associated with the production, sale and consumption of goods and services permitted in civil circulation without a license and special permission;
the sphere of illegal business associated with the production, sale and consumption of goods and services prohibited in civil circulation, in which the labor process takes place, and the goods and services produced have market demand (weapons, drugs, etc.);
the sphere of illegal employment;
the sphere of criminal activity, within which criminal proceeds are obtained on the basis of the systematic commission of traditional ordinary crimes;
the sphere of services related to the use or threat of use of violence in economic relations (contract killings, terrorism). The purpose of this type of activity is to forcefully ensure the functioning of the criminal economy, suppress competition and social control by violent methods, through the commission of ordinary crimes. The development of this area is associated with the commercialization of ordinary violent crime;
the sphere of implementation of shadow (informal) norms regulating the sphere of criminal economic activity;
illegal economic relations in the sphere of the political market, political activity;
illegal economic relations in the system of state and municipal services related to the settlement of economic relations, the adoption and execution of economically significant decisions.
2.3 Characteristic features of the shadow
and the criminal economy of Russia
Currently shadow and criminal economy is an integral element of the entire economic system of Russia and is characterized by such features as the spread of hidden employment, tax evasion, capital flight abroad, “black” accounting, shuttle and barter trade, and corruption.
Let us dwell on the most current trends in the development of the shadow and criminal economy of Russia.
Speaking about the widespread prevalence of hidden employment, it should be noted that according to studies, 27% of working-age Russians (21 million people) have an officially unregistered second job, and about half of them are employed in “intermediary activities”, a third - in retail trade, the rest are in the shuttle business. The consequences of underground work are negative for workers. This is due to the lack of guarantees regarding employment, wages and social insurance. The Russian shadow labor market is directly related to the shortcomings of the state’s migration policy. According to the results of recent studies, out of 1 million foreigners entering Russia (mainly from the countries of the former USSR, as well as Vietnam), only 700 thousand leave back, and the remaining 300 thousand remain in the country illegally.
Some steps have already been taken to control the situation in this direction. Thus, at present, a migration card has been introduced in Russia, which will be filled out by all foreigners entering the territory of Russia on planes, trains and other types of transport, which will make it possible to create a special information base in Russia to combat illegal migration.
The consequence of illegal employment is the displacement of legal workers from the sphere of socially useful labor. The total volume of production does not increase, and the official part of it becomes smaller, which leads to a decrease in tax revenues.
Thus, the concealment of economic activity causes a redistribution of income and property through the deformation of tax policy and tax relations. Non-payment of taxes leads, in turn, to deformation of the Russian budgetary sphere, which is manifested in a reduction in state budget expenditures and deformation of its structure. The reduction in budget revenues is the reason for the underfunding of state institutions for regulating the economy (controlling, law enforcement agencies), their weakening and degradation at a time when the need to ensure the rights and legitimate interests of participants in economic relations is strongest. The role of the state in the supply of public goods to the market - education, healthcare, culture, which are financed by 30-50%.
The problem of tax evasion is closely related to the export of capital from Russia and the laundering of “dirty money”. Several tens of billions of dollars have accumulated in the foreign accounts of individuals, from which taxes have not been paid. Hundreds of billions of dollars have already remained in the West as a result of concealing part of export foreign exchange earnings. Most of Russian capital has settled in offshore zones, especially where they are not too interested in their origin. The range of estimates for the value of such amounts is enormous: $160-300 billion. At the same time, many experts estimate the share of truly “dirty” (obtained by criminal means) money to be about $30 billion.
In June 2000, the FATF, an international organization specializing in combating money laundering, added Russia to the blacklist of countries that do not properly combat “dirty” money. Despite all the efforts made by the Russian leadership over the past two years, Russia has not yet been excluded from this list.
After the tragic events that occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001, Western governments sharply intensified the fight against financial flows passing through offshore companies and feeding international terrorist organizations. Today, Western countries are pursuing a fairly strict policy in relation to offshore zones, aimed at ensuring the possibility of control and unhindered access to financial information of international bodies. As part of this policy, it is possible to block funds in offshore accounts until the end of the proceedings, which could lead to the freezing and confiscation of hundreds of billions of dollars belonging to Russian legal entities and individuals.
Recently, there has been a significant impact of shadow and criminal economic activity on the investment process. Hiding normal economic activities from control usually limits the ability to attract resources, especially from foreign investors, due to increased investment risk. Many businesses do not seek to trade in the former Soviet Union because they cannot compete with the illegal activities of organized crime.
Foreign businessmen interested in international trade in oil and raw materials cannot avoid corruption in this area and are forced to pay bribes to officials who have the right to regulate the export of oil and other raw materials.
The high level of business risk in Russia contributes to a specific “natural” selection of investors who are able to adapt to the specific Russian economic environment. These investors are increasingly represented by foreign organized crime, which has investment protection mechanisms and is willing to take risks in a hostile environment. At the same time, legal Western enterprises do not enter the market due to the threat of extortion, as well as the inability to make a profit through legal means.
As we move towards civilized forms of the market, shadow entrepreneurship in our country will acquire forms characteristic of developed industrial countries. Therefore, at present there is a need for a deep economic and legal analysis of the institutions of shadow and criminal business and the development of ways and methods of effectively influencing them, which is one of the main links in building the concept of economic security of Russia.
2.4 Illegal market as a basis
criminal and shadow economy
The basic institution of the shadow, including criminal, economy is the illegal market, which is a set of relations carried out in violation of existing legal norms and bringing together buyers and sellers of goods and services.
By economic content economic goods are distinguished by goods markets, service markets, and work markets.
There are also markets for finished products (services, works) and markets for economic resources (markets for capital, labor, land).
Based on the nature of the goods sold, they are distinguished:
markets for legal, normal goods and services designed to satisfy normal needs;
markets for prohibited goods and services: markets for drugs, weapons; “human desires” - services for the sale of bodies (prostitution), pornography, including child pornography; human trafficking, illegal trade in animals, markets for stolen property, radioactive materials. A special place in this category belongs to the market of criminal services related to the use of violence, the threat of its use, and others aimed at actively influencing the behavior of participants in market relations (contract killings, kidnappings, etc.).
2.4.1 Causes and
development of illegal markets
The reasons for the emergence and development of illegal markets are the following:
the presence of a legal ban on the circulation of goods, the sale of services, the performance of work (narcotic drugs, transplants, stolen property, laundering of criminally obtained proceeds);
the presence of barriers to market access established by law (state monopoly, licensing, age restrictions for minors in the labor market, copyright, intellectual property protection (patent, trademark));
state regulation of prices (establishing maximum prices, limiting profitability, establishing a fixed exchange rate at a level below the equilibrium);
high level of taxation and other costs associated with the fulfillment of statutory obligations;
insufficient rigidity of state control, inability of the state to implement a legal prohibition or compliance with regulatory requirements.
the incapacity of state institutions for regulating the market, ensuring property rights, and contract discipline (for example, the ineffectiveness of the judicial system for resolving disputes and executing court decisions related to the collection of debts gives rise to a market for criminal services for “knocking out” them).
2.5 Types and forms of control carried out
organized crime,
for territories, enterprises,
industries and areas of the economy
The liberalization of the economy and the privatization of state property allowed shadow capital to be legalized and criminal groups to penetrate private business.
They directly took control of many enterprises or made them dependent in various ways on the legal commercial structures they created. Only at AvtoVAZ (Tolyatti) 7 criminal communities with a total number of over 800 people, who completely subjugated the process of production and sale of products, were eliminated. Their criminal income amounted to over 5,000 billion non-denominated rubles annually.
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, more than 40 thousand business entities of various forms of ownership are subject to criminal control, including 1.5 thousand state enterprises, 4 thousand joint-stock companies, over 500 joint ventures, 550 banks, almost 700 wholesale and retail markets.
Organized crime, according to 61% of surveyed employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 75% of employees of business entities, exercises control over enterprises, sectors of the economic complex, areas of economic activity (economic objects) and the territories of the regions in which the respondents work. Only 2% of the former and 15% of the latter noted that such control is not carried out.
Organized crime seeks to establish control over highly profitable enterprises, industries and areas of economic activity. When asked which economic entities are most often under the control of organized crime, the following answers were received in 2000.
The table above shows that the opinion of both groups of respondents coincides with respect to the majority of industries and areas of economic activity that are under the control of organized crime, first of all these include enterprises of the fuel and energy complex, followed by enterprises and organizations of the consumer market, as well as the sphere of foreign economic activities.
Certain differences in opinions are observed in relation to organizations in the credit and financial sector. Apparently, employees of business entities have put this area in first place due to the significant spread of earlier facts of theft of funds through the provision of false advice notes, theft of credit resources, illegal collection of funds from the population at high interest rates with their subsequent appropriation. And although such facts currently occur, they are much less common than before. In addition, the economic and financial activities of enterprises and organizations have now, in contrast to the initial stage of the transition to market relations, shifted to the production sphere, which is why organized crime is taking control of enterprises in these areas.
Nevertheless, this area of economic activity can also be classified as an object of interest for organized crime. A significant influence on its destabilization has the establishment of close cooperation, and in some places - the merger of regional financial and industrial groups with the leaders of large criminal communities, the involvement of the latter in pursuing their own policies in the fight against competitors, the organization of illegal operations at the facilities of the credit and banking sector, in the real estate market and securities, which is a specific form of “laundering” of dirty money for Russia.
The most actively organized criminal groups operate in the fuel and energy complex, followed by the production and illegal trafficking of ethyl alcohol, alcohol, tobacco and other products.
In third place in terms of the level of activity of organized criminal groups are such industries and areas as enterprises and organizations of the consumer market; foreign economic activity; mining, production and use of precious metals and precious stones; budgetary and extra-budgetary sphere. The fourth place is occupied by the sphere of intellectual piracy; banking sector; bankruptcy of enterprises in various industries and sectors of the economy.
2.6 Criminalization of the fuel and energy complex
The high profitability of operations in the fuel and energy complex attracts the close attention of criminal structures to the activities of economic entities in this industry. A steady trend has been identified towards the rapprochement of a number of corrupt government officials and heads of financial structures with the leaders of criminal communities. The last to be established are intermediary firms and buyers of oil, the further use of raw materials and products of their processing is determined, and selling prices are formed. At the same time, the cost of oil and petroleum products is artificially inflated by attributing to this account expenses not related to their acquisition, transportation and sale. Russia's interests are also suffering significant material damage due to the non-receipt of foreign exchange earnings from the sale of oil and petroleum products abroad, which entails a shortfall in the budget of large sums of money.
The analysis shows that the criminalization of the industry is based on the following circumstance.
Oil companies transfer part of the produced oil to the administration of cities (districts, districts) to pay off debts on payments to the budget, and officials of these administrations, in exchange for bribes, transfer it to commercial structures, which transfer the proceeds received from the sale of oil to accounts in foreign banks.
The determining factor in the criminalization of the oil industry is the shortcomings in the legal regulation of registration and licensing of the activities of enterprises involved in the oil business.
2.7 Criminalization of alcohol production
The influence of organized crime is also increasing in the area of illegal production and trafficking of alcoholic beverages. The criminalization of this highly profitable area of economic activity is explained by the loss of the state monopoly on the production and circulation of alcoholic beverages. The possibility of obtaining huge profits in a short time, not controlled by the state, attracts criminal groups. Typical methods of their actions include the production of counterfeit alcoholic beverages and their unlicensed production, obtaining illegal profits from the sale of products using preferential tax and customs duties.
An analysis of the state of the alcohol market showed that the demand for alcoholic beverages remains quite stable and amounts to about 220-230 million US dollars. Domestic market demand for vodka and liqueurs, according to expert estimates, is more than 40% satisfied by illegal and counterfeit products. This indicates that almost half of the alcohol sold is produced illegally, which is largely facilitated by gaps in the licensing system. Licenses to newly organized enterprises are issued without taking into account the level of use of existing capacities and the region’s needs for alcoholic products. Existing capacities at enterprises for the production of ethyl alcohol from food raw materials and alcoholic products are used unsatisfactorily, and at some plants they are less than half loaded. At the same time, the production of alcohol-containing non-food products, the circulation of which is practically not regulated by regulations, is increasing.
2.8 Illegal trafficking in precious metals
A significant portion of precious metals that fall into illegal circulation are stolen from enterprises where they are produced or used in industrial production processes. That is why it is advisable to reveal the model of organized criminal activity in the production and use of precious metals in technological processes, since on its basis a model should be built regarding the sphere of illegal trafficking of precious metals.
The production of precious metals can be carried out exclusively by organizations that have received special permits (licenses) in accordance with the established procedure. There are currently four state-owned refineries and processing plants producing precious metals. In industrial production, gold is most often used, which in most cases is the subject of crime.
The largest thefts of gold were detected at the federal state unitary enterprise "Prioksky Non-Ferrous Metals Plant" (Kasimov, Ryazan region) - the main and largest gold producer in Russia. For several years, over 10 stable, well-conspiracy organized criminal groups operated there, the roles of which were clearly distributed. Each group had its own sales channel, including to neighboring countries and the CIS. As a result, over 300 kg of gold was stolen from the plant. More than 100 kg of precious metal, 300 thousand US dollars, 40 cars, and firearms were confiscated from the criminals.
During the investigation, more than 120 people were brought to criminal liability, 40-45% of whom were plant employees; 15% military personnel who guarded the facility; 10% are organizers of criminal groups; the rest are sellers and resellers of gold from among local residents.
2.8.1 Mechanism of crimes in the production (refining) of gold.
Using the example of thefts committed at this plant, let us consider the mechanism of crimes in the production (refining) of gold. Conventionally, there are four stages:
creation of surpluses or withdrawal of gold from technological operations;
hiding the seized gold in caches on the territory of the enterprise;
removal of stolen gold outside the enterprise;
sale of stolen gold (illegal trafficking).
2.8.2 Creation of surplus or withdrawal of gold from technological operations.
In most cases, excess is created in the smelting and electrolysis area. Certain techniques were used for this.
Raw materials arriving from mines and mining and processing plants (sludge, nuggets, etc.) are checked in the plant's receiving storeroom by a commission based on the number of packages (parcels) and weighed gross. Then the parcels are opened, the gold is weighed (net) and placed in linen bags, which are placed in a paper bag, which is sealed. This bag, together with the document (order for smelting), arrives at the smelting department. Taking advantage of the fact that gold in the smelting room is not weighed again, some smelters removed the seal from the bag without damaging it, stole 1-2 kg of metal (depending on the total weight) and re-installed the seal. Due to the fact that this metal was melted during the next shift, the subsequently discovered shortage was attributed to waste (mercury, quartzite, etc.).
Directly when loading metal for smelting into a crucible (special container), the smelters stole a certain amount of metal (200-500 g), mainly nuggets, which they took out and hid on the territory of the plant. These thefts were committed as a result of negligence on the part of quality control workers, who are required to monitor the progress of loading metal into the crucible, the presence and condition of seals.
After the metal is melted, according to the existing instructions, one ingot is cast, then the quality control worker takes a fiery liquid sample of gold (about 200 g) and pours it into a mold in the form of a washer, from which gold shavings are drilled out. These shavings are sent to the Central Laboratory for chemical (assay) analysis. Based on the analysis data, payments are made to suppliers. Since suppliers determine the sample of shipped raw materials without having a certified laboratory, in the event of differences in the fineness of the metal, claims, as a rule, are not made. The accuracy of assay analysis is +/- 0.05%. Due to the fact that during drilling, chips are obtained from the assay ingot in 4-5 places, the total difference can reach an error of 0.1 to 0.15%. Thus, even if laboratory workers do not deliberately underestimate the sample of raw materials, the error only at the lower limit is 0.1%, which was used to create surpluses.
After taking the sample, the smelter, in collusion with the quality control department employees or taking advantage of their negligence, added not 200-500 g of copper to the crucible (this is done for better extraction of gold from the slag), but 5-10 kg and cast one extra ingot, which he then stole. This theft was facilitated by the fact that the sample was taken only once, the gold content in the bars themselves was not analyzed and comparisons were not made based on the chemical composition. Since the sample quality of the received raw materials according to the supplier and the plant laboratory data, as a rule, differs slightly, it was quite difficult to detect this theft under the existing sampling system.
Under the system that operated at the plant, the smelter independently collected a batch of metal for smelting in quantities from 100 to 500 kg. Since batches of gold of different fineness are melted in a crucible at the same time, the gold content is averaged out, this masked the theft committed at the previous melting. When melting high-grade metal (residues of anodes, defective cathode gold, ears, etc.), the smelter could usually steal from 200 to 500 g.
Similarly, 5-10 kg of gold can be stolen by adding copper to the melt after chlorination and sampling. In this case, an extra ingot is also cast and then stolen. Since in this case the anodes go directly to electrolysis, it is difficult to detect theft by analyzing documentary data (melting order, assay sheet). This can only be done by conducting a targeted check of the chemical composition of the cast ingots before they are placed in the electrolyte baths.
In order to reduce production costs and production costs, smelters, at the direction of the shop technologists, carried out melts with the maximum possible amount of raw materials (up to 500 kg). In one crucible, high-grade gold (90%) and low-grade raw materials - sludge, the gold content of which ranges from 30-60%, were simultaneously smelted. For such melts, it is impossible to draw up accurate metallurgical balances, since the gold content in the sludge is determined very approximately. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the smelters cast several extra ingots with a total weight of 10 to 20 kg, hid them in the melting department, and then took them out using various tricks (a bucket of paint, garbage, etc.). Carrying out such joint meltings was the main condition that contributed to the commission of large-scale thefts of gold.
Experienced smelters specially collected the required amount of gold (5-15 kg) from different melts, cast an ingot and stole it. This was done so that if a stolen ingot was discovered, it would be impossible to determine the specific heat and shift based on chemical analysis.
After receiving smelting, the gold enters the refining (purification) section. Here, anodes weighing 3-4 kg are cast from ingots weighing from 10 to 20 kg, which are then transferred for electrolysis. And it was from the electrolysis site that the largest amount of high-grade gold was stolen.
So, during the season (July-November), 2-3 tons of gold are hung on rods at the same time in electrolysis baths, i.e. 500-800 anodes and approximately the same number of matrices. The electrolysis process (dissolution of the gold anode and transfer of gold through the electrolyte to the cathode matrix) lasts 30-40 hours, which is an average of 4-5 shifts. During the shift, the operator constantly replaces used anodes, removes matrices with cathode gold deposited on them (purity up to 99.95%, average weight 700 - 1000 g). Taking advantage of the fact that it was impossible to determine in which baths the anodes were replaced, the operators stole 1-2 anodes, choosing by color those with the highest gold content. In a similar way, matrices with precipitated gold were removed, and new ones were hung in their place.
The greatest vulnerability of the electrolysis site to theft is explained by the fact that, due to existing technology, the dissolution of the anode occurs unevenly: the upper part, which is not included in the electrolyte, remains intact, the middle dissolves almost completely, and the lower part, as a rule, dissolves only partially, and its remainder falls to the bottom of the bath. When walking around the line and inspecting the baths, the operator selects the remains of the anodes, transfers them to a drum for washing, then they are transferred to the oven for drying, and only after that all the remains of the anodes are weighed, which are then placed in a separate box. After the residues have accumulated to 80-100 kg, they are sent for re-melting into anodes. In this case, it is impossible to determine in which shift and in which operation this or that anode residue was removed. This circumstance was taken advantage of by the operators, who, when inspecting the baths, stole 1-2 leftovers per shift.
During the investigation of criminal cases, facts were revealed when the entire shift of plant operators at the electrolysis site, as well as the smelter and the quality control inspector, participated in the theft of gold by prior conspiracy.
Thus, the main difficulty in identifying facts of theft at gold production enterprises is the continuity of the production process, during which 20-25% of the metal is in constant operation, and therefore it is extremely difficult to establish a shortage.
Hiding the seized gold in
hiding places on the territory of the enterprise.
Depending on the role played by plant workers in the theft process, they are divided into two main groups:
Persons directly working with precious metals. These include precious metals receivers who receive and store incoming raw materials (concentrate, nuggets, etc.); smelters; operators of the electrolysis site. These individuals hide the stolen precious metal in intermediate hiding places: toilet tanks, stairwells and understairs, cracks in columns, walls, near elevators, in the cavities of production equipment;
Support staff - electricians, plumbers, repairmen, builders, workers of other services (QD, regime, laboratory, etc.). This category of workers has access to the production premises of the plant, and remains unsupervised at night and on weekends. Persons working at night and on weekends look for or punch holes (breaks, cracks) in the walls. On the instructions of the group leader, the stolen metal is taken from the intermediate cache and hidden in the main cache. After the required amount of gold (from 3 to 30 kg) has been collected in the cache, the gold is thrown out at a strictly defined time through an opening, a hole in the wall, or a breach into a local area.
In a number of cases, a certain universalization (combination of functions) took place, i.e. one person (operator or smelter) both stole the metal and threw it away. This was largely facilitated by the fact that during the period of massive supply of metal, additional production facilities were used, where there was no video control, or during the period of underutilization of production capacities, these persons were used as support personnel (for garbage collection, repairs, etc.), i.e. e. control over them weakened.
2.8.4 Removal of stolen gold outside the enterprise
At the initial stage of operation of the Prioksky Non-Ferrous Metals Plant, removing gold from the main production was practically no difficulty for criminals. This was facilitated by the fact that the building of the workshop where gold and silver is refined was built according to a design that absolutely did not meet the requirements and conditions for preserving precious raw materials. The production building consists of four blocks with a height of 2 to 5 floors, each over 100 m long, receiving storerooms, smelting departments, and an electrolysis section are located in different blocks, the metal transportation routes are 100-150 m. Due to the fact that the building was built with the participation of the so-called "chemists", the quality of construction and installation work was extremely low: the walls had dozens of unfilled holes, gaps between panels and foundation blocks, some of the panels were replaced with brickwork 1-1.5 bricks thick. Using this circumstance, members of the organized crime group at night or on weekends, when the main personnel were absent from the workshop, looked for cracks or, by knocking out bricks, easily made a hole, masking it with clay and paint. During the investigation, the bulk of such holes were found in the corners of rooms behind columns at a height of 6-18 m, behind the shafts of freight and passenger elevators at a height of 6 to 10 m, at ground level or under a blind area at a depth of 10-15 cm.
Crimes were carried out in the following ways:
using the fact that large window blocks were installed along the entire perimeter of the building, holes were easily made under the frames into which gold stripes, rods, ears, and matrices could be pushed;
in the upper parts of window frames (usually behind a suspended ceiling or in rooms where access is limited), holes were first drilled in the seams through which a glass block was cut out using a hacksaw blade, the seam was masked with clay, and then the block was removed and the metal was thrown into the resulting opening;
from the roof of 4-5-story production buildings at night, gold was thrown using a sling at a distance of up to 60-70 m, immediately beyond the outer fence;
through ventilation pipes of the main diameter, which were laid underground and exited the main production, the criminals penetrated the local area and threw gold through holes pre-punched in the pipes at ground level, after which the gold was picked up and taken out;
Due to the negligence of regime service workers or in direct collusion with them, gold was carried out through vestibules in specially equipped caches made in decommissioned equipment or in equipment that was subject to repair outside the main production, in barrels with paint residues, radiators, bags of garbage and etc. In a number of cases, gold was directly transferred to military personnel (officers and warrant officers) guarding the vestibules.
During the shipment of industrial waste into railway cars, thieves opened the bags without breaking the seals, took out part of the waste and placed an equal amount of gold there. After a visual inspection of the bags by security service workers and control weighing, they were loaded into wagons. The stolen gold was seized while the vehicle was parked at the station.
Workers of a number of auxiliary services, usually from 5 to 6 o'clock in the morning, picked up gold discarded at night near the holes indicated by the leader of the criminal group, then hid it in an intermediate cache located in the territory adjacent to the main production, or immediately took it out.
At a certain period, the main method of stealing gold was its removal with the help of military personnel serving at the goal inspection post. At this time, conscripts were replaced by conscripts, most of whom were local residents. They were personally acquainted with the robbers, often studied together and served in the army, so they easily made contact and were recruited. Two warrant officers were on duty at the post for 12 hours. Taking advantage of the fact that at night the outfit was practically left without control (the check was carried out once at night, and the time was known in advance), they, in violation of the job description, entered the locker room of the main production, where they took the metal at the appointed place, took it out and they hid him in the adjacent territory. And in the morning, after returning from duty, they carried the metal outside the plant, for which they used specially made bags or pockets sewn on the inside of their clothes. Moreover, upon leaving the territory, military personnel were never subjected to inspection. During the investigation, repeated facts were revealed when 10-15 kg of gold were removed at a time in a similar way.
It also happened that the guards let thieves through the checkpoint without inspection; they hid the metal in hiding places in the area adjacent to the workshop and immediately returned to the workplace. To prevent members of his criminal group from being deciphered, one of the servicemen asked his partner to leave his post for 5-10 minutes for a reward (about $1,000).
Often the guards served several criminal groups at the same time, as a result of which they managed to carry out from 15 to 30 kg of gold.
All these crimes were planned in advance by their organizers, who:
worked out the details of the operation from theft to the removal of metal and its subsequent sale;
through members of their groups, they found out the condition and capabilities of technical means (alarm activation, resolution of video cameras, including visibility at night, technical characteristics of the goal control system), the operation of various services - regime and security, etc.;
attracted (recruited) regime service personnel, security personnel, and factory workers;
maintained contact with members of other organized crime groups;
organized a search for caches for storing stolen metal or bought them from another group;
negotiated with other organized crime groups about joint actions;
taking into account the work schedule of the plant workers - members of the group and the military personnel going on duty, the location, time of release, and amount of precious metal were determined;
sold stolen metal outside the region;
provided protection to members of organized crime groups from other criminal groups.
In 60% of cases, the organizers of criminal groups were persons previously convicted of theft, robbery, and local residents who did not work at the plant.
Stolen precious metals are sold mainly to jewelers (more than 20%), persons professionally engaged in the purchase and resale of such metals (about 40%), dental technicians (about 15%), foreign citizens, as well as emissaries of illegal armed groups.
Creation of fictitious intermediary enterprises
as a way to criminalize business processes
One of the most common ways of criminalizing business processes is the inclusion by organized crime of fictitious intermediary enterprises in real commodity and financial flows to commit fraudulent acts.
The use of fictitious enterprises becomes possible due to the imperfection of the current legislation and control mechanisms, which allows organized criminal communities to register, as a rule, using forged documents or under dummies, any number of legal entities of various organizational and legal forms. As a result of this, organized crime has created an entire underground network of structures that play the most destructive role in the Russian economy. Currently, there are about 500-550 thousand of these types of companies that do not report to the tax authorities or present zero balances.
Fictitious business entities have essentially become a universal means of committing crimes in the economic sphere:
in the credit and financial sphere - for carrying out illegal settlement transactions, illegally obtaining credit resources, for cashing out and laundering funds obtained by criminal means;
in foreign economic activity - for the export of capital abroad under fictitious contracts, for carrying out smuggling operations and evading customs duties;
in industry and transport - in order to repeatedly inflate contract prices, leave fictitious intermediaries in the accounts and subsequently appropriate most of the profits, and evade paying taxes to budgets of all levels, false intermediary firms are actively being introduced into real production chains;
when using budget funds - to embezzle financial resources allocated for investment and social purposes;
when selling goods, carrying out work and providing services in the consumer market - for the fraudulent acquisition by organized criminal groups of someone else's property, which constitutes a significant part of registered economic crimes.
2.10 Circumstances conducive to crime
control over territories and economic objects
Thus, both groups of respondents ranked first among the mentioned circumstances the corruption of officials, for whom the most characteristic are “economic” methods of maintaining corrupt connections (bribes, favors, especially favorable conditions for lending, financing, supplies, etc.). Moreover, it should be noted that these connections are intensively maintained with entrepreneurs from all sectors of the economy.
Along with this, both groups noted such circumstances as the weakness of state power, the indifference of power structures to the lives of citizens, the coincidence of interests of the leaders of criminal groups and representatives of the shadow economy in the field of business activity.
2.11 Forms of implementation by organized crime
control over economic objects and territories
So, both groups of respondents believe that the most common forms of control include:
forcing enterprises represented by their managers through members of organized crime groups to carry out various transactions with commercial structures controlled by them;
purchasing shares of enterprises or enterprises themselves with criminal proceeds;
committing illegal business transactions (crimes) through fictitious false enterprises created by organized criminal groups.
Recently, organized crime has been carrying out the following actions to establish control over enterprises:
buys shares of enterprises or the enterprises themselves with criminal proceeds. According to operational data from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, more than a quarter of established criminal communities (and in economically developed regions - up to half) “launder” criminally acquired capital through legal commercial structures by purchasing real estate, controlling stakes in enterprises, investing in various types of businesses (according to experts , taking into account latency this figure reaches 70%);
uses bankruptcy procedures established by law and other schemes for changing ownership and management personnel;
more actively uses the infiltration, through violence or deception, of “their people” into key positions in an enterprise or branch of economic activity;
more actively forces enterprise managers to complete transactions through members of organized criminal groups or through commercial structures controlled by them;
exercises control over enterprises through representatives of government authorities or law enforcement officers.
A combination of these techniques is also used to establish control over enterprises, including banks.
There are 550 banks in the sphere of criminal influence (more than 50% of the total). If earlier attempts to establish such control were carried out mainly through security services or through blackmail (physical or mental violence) of bank managers, now these methods are increasingly inferior to economic methods of seizing power.
The algorithm for establishing criminal control is as follows. First, a controlling stake in a bank that finds itself in a difficult financial situation (often artificially provoked by organizing the theft of loan funds) is purchased. Then “their” people are introduced to the board of the credit institution. And then, using criminal funds laundered through a number of commercial structures, the bank’s authorized capital is increased. Subsequently, when using the organizational structures of this bank, massive financial frauds are carried out.
Thus, the foregoing allows us to come to the conclusion that currently organized crime, in order to control highly profitable enterprises, does the following:
seeks to obtain ownership of these enterprises, for which he buys shares of enterprises or the enterprises themselves with criminal proceeds; uses bankruptcy procedures established by law and other schemes for changing ownership and management personnel;
introduces, through violence or deception, “his people” into key positions in an enterprise, branch of economic activity, in order to dispose of the profits received;
for the same purpose, in a number of cases, it forces heads of enterprises, through members of organized criminal groups, to enter into transactions with commercial structures under their control.
To carry out such actions, organized crime actively uses government officials or law enforcement officers, as well as private security agencies and security services. This area of activity of organized crime is characteristic of its highest, elite layers.
Another direction is related to the implementation of organized criminal activities when committing economic crimes. It is characteristic of the lower strata of organized crime.
2.12 Regional characteristics of organized crime
activities in the economic sphere
The main centers of activity of criminal communities remain the Central, Volga, Volga-Vyatka, Ural, and West Siberian regions.
Let us consider the features of such activities in the economic sphere of these regions.
In the Central Black Earth region, the amount of fraud, illegal entrepreneurship, and bribery is increasing.
Analysis of the data shows that the overwhelming majority of participants in organized criminal groups control small and medium-sized businesses and individuals engaged in private entrepreneurial activities. These are mainly municipal markets, the management of which includes leaders of organized crime groups or their henchmen. The heads of individual joint stock companies use criminal leaders for their safety. There is also a tendency to criminalize the management of large industrial enterprises in the region, as a rule, in conditions of corrupt support from officials of government and executive bodies.
In five of the six regions of the Volga region, an increase in criminal attacks in the sphere of economic activity was noted. The criminal interests of organized crime groups extend to the consumer and commodity markets, the credit and financial system, and foreign economic activity.
The greatest damage to the economic, economic and financial system is caused by the activities of organized criminal groups with interregional and international connections. Extensive connections of such groups outside the Volga region and Russia are used to legalize (launder) dirty money.
Cross-border crime is on the rise. The quantitative growth of transactions with CIS countries is associated not only with changes in market conditions, but also with the difference in the criminal justice systems of Russia and Kazakhstan.
In the East Siberian region, the areas of interest of subjects of organized criminal activity are illicit trafficking in alcoholic beverages, the fuel and energy complex, and misuse of budget funds.
The Far Eastern region has traditionally developed at the expense of defense facilities (aircraft and shipbuilding plants, naval bases and other defense facilities); the economy was dominated by energy and industrial sectors related to the development of natural resources.
This region is characterized by the most stable organized criminal communities: a “thieves’ common fund” numbering up to 1,800 people; groups of criminal “athletes” - up to 200 people; ethnic groups, including Chechen - up to 140 people, Azerbaijani - up to 190 people, Korean - up to 16 people. Recently, there has been an increase in crime among Chinese citizens. The settlement of the Russian Far East by the Chinese is becoming spontaneous. This “expansion” threatens to endanger the region’s endangered flora and fauna, as well as its marine and forest resources.
The processes taking place in the criminal environment indicate that organized crime groups have ever-expanding stable interregional and international connections with organized crime in Japan, South and North Korea, China (not only northern but also southern provinces with offshore zones), and the United States.
Analysis of the current situation in the region indicates a trend towards an increase in the number of thefts of funds in the credit and banking sector, illegal export abroad of capital, strategic raw materials, products of the fishing and forestry industries.
The process of merging organized groups of general criminal orientation with groups operating in the economic sphere continues. A significant portion of shadow capital concentrated in the criminal sphere contributes to strengthening the potential of organized crime in the region. Its integration into the economic sphere is increasing in order to obtain extremely high illegal incomes.
The criminal situation becomes more intense in areas with a high degree of entrepreneurial activity, favorable opportunities for the rapid turnover of financial capital, including illegal capital, to extract high profits (Primorsky Territory, Sakhalin, Kamchatka regions).
At the center of the criminal interests of criminal communities are border areas, places of extraction and processing of fuel and energy resources, seafood, and transport routes. To ensure the safety of their criminal activities, organized crime groups establish connections with representatives of government authorities and management at the regional and federal levels. Currently, there is a tendency towards a gradual transition of commercial structures controlled by organized criminal groups from shadow to legal economic activity.
The main types of illegal activities of organized groups remain extortion of part of the profits from various commercial structures; illegal export of raw materials, materials, seafood abroad; creation of false commercial structures and use of fictitious documents for the purpose of committing thefts; committing fraud when concluding transactions for the supply of products or raw materials; organization of gambling business; prostitution; concealment of various types of income from taxation.
To strengthen their positions and expand their spheres of influence, they establish connections with criminal groups in other regions of Russia and abroad. Of particular interest to criminal groups are offshore zones in South Korea and China, the use of which allows them to freely transfer funds to these zones under the guise of various types of contracts, then transferring them to accounts in foreign banks.
The economy of the West Siberian region is represented by enterprises in the metalworking, mechanical engineering, electronics, forestry, woodworking, oil and gas, chemical industries and until recently traditionally relied on industrial production with a high share of the military-industrial complex.
The geographical location of this region, bordering China and Kazakhstan, and the developed transport infrastructure make it an important strategic hub, which is actively used by organized criminal groups, especially for the transit and distribution of drugs, smuggling and export of various goods and valuables.
There has been a significant increase in the activity of groups involved in the clandestine production of counterfeit alcoholic beverages. The high profitability of illegal operations in the auto business attracts leaders of criminal communities to this type of criminal activity. Organized criminal groups operating in this direction have extensive corrupt connections among government officials and law enforcement officials.
The Moscow region is an economic region with a high concentration of industry and agricultural production, one of the largest scientific centers in the country. The main industries are aviation, electronics, mechanical engineering, light industry, food, printing, and energy. This, as well as the favorable geographical location of the region (direct border with Moscow) and developed transport infrastructure, have become attractive to criminal groups. They show interest in the production and economic activities of the region and make significant efforts to establish control over the most profitable economic sectors.
Theft of funds using forged payment documents, irrevocable receipt and misuse of preferential loans, loans, subsidies, and official abuses of bank managers and employees have become widespread.
The main types of criminal activities of organized crime groups are the most profitable criminal alcohol, weapons, auto and drug businesses, and commercial activities in the distribution of petroleum products.
Having divided their spheres of influence, the groups invest the funds they have in legal businesses, in commercial structures controlled by them, and try not to come to the attention of law enforcement agencies, using for this purpose dummies who have extensive connections in government and administrative bodies and internal affairs bodies. Recently, there has been an increasing trend of consolidation of organized crime groups located near Moscow with organized crime groups in Moscow and surrounding areas.
A number of large economic facilities in the region are under criminal influence, which slows down the development of production, deprives the federal and local budgets of part of their income, scares off investors, and aggravates socio-economic problems. In the absence of proper control in the economic sphere by the authorities and with the corruption of a number of officials, favorable conditions are created for money laundering by criminal groups.
Analysis of the situation in the Moscow region indicates the presence of trends associated with the consolidation of crime and the organization of centralized management of existing organized criminal groups.
The North Caucasus region is characterized by a decline in living standards, lack of social guarantees, and sharp polarization of society. A particularly alarming situation has developed in Dagestan. The main reason for the social and criminal tension here lies in the activities of various clans and leaders of ethnic movements disguised as a struggle for national or religious interests, who, relying on armed support, including criminals, actually rushed to power and financial flows.
Among the main trends are the complete criminalization of market structures and corruption of officials.
Organized criminal groups of both general criminal and economic nature operate in the region. The main share of economic crimes consists of theft, counterfeiting, fraudulent transactions using fictitious documents, dummies and commercial structures in the most significant sectors of the economy - the grain market, oil business, credit and financial system, alcohol business, consumer market.
The factors complicating the situation in the Ural region primarily include the largest transport hubs, the border with Kazakhstan, problems associated with the redistribution of property, and the conversion of military-industrial enterprises.
The presence of a large raw material base, primarily fuel and energy, a large number of enterprises of the military-industrial complex, the transition of large enterprises and entire industries from state ownership to collective and private ownership, the lack of centralized control over their activities determine the functioning of sources of theft and smuggling channels. strategic and other important raw materials, underground workshops for the production of firearms.
The economic potential of the region attracts organized criminal groups with the opportunity to make huge profits in a short time. The process of merging selfish-violent and economic crime is intensifying, which leads to a significant increase in the financial resources at the disposal of criminal groups.
Organized crime strives to increase and legalize its income. Crimes of a violent nature are successfully combined with penetration through corrupt connections into the economy and financial system of the region. The most attractive remain the fuel and energy complex, privatization, the housing and other real estate market, and illegal transactions with strategic raw materials. Using commercial banks, credit and financial structures, and other legal economic structures created or controlled by them, criminal groups provide stable financial support for their illegal actions and attract the necessary forces and resources.
Criminal communities strive by all means to acquire controlling stakes in various enterprises and organizations, to penetrate into foreign economic structures, transferring their activities to the international level. By creating an extensive network of commercial enterprises under their control, they invest money in the most profitable industries and economic structures of various forms of ownership.
The activities of criminal groups are intensifying, organizing control over the territory and providing “protection” to trade, financial and other companies actively engaged in activities in the economic sphere, both in the shadow and legal sectors of the economy.
The conduct of illegal operations by organized criminal groups involves smuggling, the use of fictitious documents, and evasion of taxes and customs duties. Export-import operations and legal business activities serve as a convenient cover for them to commit large-scale fraud with the appropriation of uncontrollable profits, most of which end up in foreign banks, and contribute to the laundering of criminally acquired capital.
Criminal groups easily penetrate the economic and financial activities of enterprises in the fuel and energy complex, where they have already created and operate quite legally various commercial structures and joint ventures. With the support of corrupt officials of government and administrative bodies, the criminal environment influences the choice of hydrocarbon exporters, the formation of selling prices, sales volumes and the distribution of foreign currency and ruble funds received from uncontrolled exports.
The lack of a fully equipped state border with the former Soviet republics determines the interest of criminal communities in the economic smuggling of not only energy resources, but also non-ferrous and rare earth metals, timber, precious stones, strategic industrial raw materials, etc.
In recent years, criminal structures have been paying increasing attention to highly profitable business in the alcohol market, engaging in the smuggling of alcohol, the production and sale of counterfeit alcoholic beverages in underground workshops, as well as the direct theft of alcoholic beverages from manufacturing plants, establishing control over government and commercial enterprises. enterprises specializing in the production and sale of alcoholic beverages.
An important feature of the Russian situation is that organized crime in Russia is rapidly expanding beyond traditional boundaries and invading areas whose criminalization poses a serious threat to international stability and security.
2.13 Causes and conditions of crime in the sphere
foreign economic activity
Reforms in the Russian economy since the 90s have led to imbalances and contradictions, which, by their comprehensive nature, degree of development and force of action, have unprecedented criminal consequences. This applies to both actual economic relations and the economic consciousness of a society in transition.
A deeply deformed economic system with pronounced criminal consequences has formed in Russia. This, in particular, is evidenced by the analysis of typical schemes or formulas of prevailing economic relations that have developed in reformed Russia.
The first formula is as follows: sale of raw materials - receipt of foreign currency earnings - purchase of consumer goods. In accordance with the second formula, economic relations were structured as follows: foreign currency credit - purchase of consumer goods - debt obligations. The disadvantages of using such formulas, which were almost universal in nature, manifested themselves in different ways.
In the first case, the economy was not focused on the development of its own potential, on the introduction of new high-tech technologies, on the demand for the achievements of domestic science. The state of the country's budget became strictly dependent on the level of world prices for raw materials. This means that state policy and the possibility of implementing social programs were increasingly determined by external influences. The use of the first formula, which means the thoughtless sale of irreplaceable natural resources, quite realistically threatens the resource independence of the Russian economy in the 21st century.
As for the second formula, the main result of its implementation is the growing foreign currency debt of every Russian to the world community.
The balance of the chosen options for organizing economic relations for the country, society, the majority of the population was ultimately negative (and life confirmed this), but for a limited circle of people (participants in export-import transactions, corrupt officials who distributed licenses, quotas and benefits at their discretion, etc.) golden rain truly poured down.
It must be emphasized that many of the deformations in the economy of the transition period are associated precisely with foreign economic activity, in particular with its increased criminalization.
This is, first of all, the large-scale flight of capital from a country where millions of people live on the verge of poverty or have become destitute. An important economic indicator - the share of imports in the food supply - reached almost half (47%) in the mid-90s, while the critical value of this indicator fluctuates between 30 and 40%. The share of manufacturing products in exports should be at least 45%, but in Russia it was only 12. Such imbalances entail the strategic dependence of the country’s life on imports, on the will (and often self-will) of foreign partners.
A general indicator of deep deformations and at the same time evidence of the powerful criminal potential of the entire economic system is the rapid growth during the years of reforms shadow economy.
Russian statistical authorities use the Guidelines on the Informal Economy developed by the EU Statistics Office. According to the methodology proposed in it, shadow capital in Russia is estimated at 40-42% of the gross domestic product. The money turnover of the shadow economy ranges from $40 billion to $50 billion, i.e. comparable to the annual federal budget.
Of this, 12% of the shadow economy is accounted for by drug trafficking, illegal weapons trafficking, and prostitution; 11% - for theft of raw materials, unaccounted for products; about 4% - for inappropriate use of budget funds; 9% - for smuggling, understatement of customs duties.
All this is in one way or another connected with foreign economic activity (FEA), the connections of which with the shadow economy can be traced everywhere.
In the shadow economy there are:
unofficial economy, which includes legally permitted types of activities carried out without registration, permits, licenses, within which statistics do not take into account the production of goods and services hidden from taxation, remaining “in the shadows”;
fictitious economy, which includes speculative transactions, registrations, theft, various fraudulent activities related to the receipt and transfer of money; underground economy, which includes types of economic activities prohibited by law, including organized economic crime.
As an objective factor contributing to the increased criminalization of foreign economic activity, it should also be noted that by its very nature it is a highly profitable sector of the economy. It makes it possible, without special costs, large-scale and long-term investments, or serious structural innovations, to receive not just profit, but super-profit. The unique economic situation, in which it was possible to make fabulous profits due to the difference in domestic and world oil prices, served as the basis not only for legal enrichment, but also for various abuses, primarily the pumping (as they say, by hook or by crook) of currency abroad .
If in Soviet times “petrodollars” were consumed by the entire country, and with the money received from the export of oil and gas, grandiose projects were carried out (construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline, cosmodromes, hydroelectric power stations, etc.), the military-industrial complex developed, and economic support was provided to the countries of the “third” world etc., then after the accelerated liberalization of exports, the funds received for the same natural resources began to end up in the pockets of the new owners and were transferred to their personal (or dummy) accounts in foreign banks.
Among the objective factors contributing to crimes, one should mention the very possibility of legal export of capital abroad (under permits and licenses issued by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, by opening resident accounts abroad with the permission of the Bank of Russia, or by providing loans to non-residents).
Until 1995, there was no system of customs and banking control over export and import transactions. Of course, taking into account Russia’s integration into the European and world community and its inclusion in international economic cooperation, this possibility cannot and should not be eliminated. But the fact remains that, not accompanied by strict control and other preventive prohibitive mechanisms, it is used, and very actively, by criminally oriented individuals to carry out smuggling operations, laundering “dirty” money through foreign banks and other institutions, to commit other selfish crimes.
A very significant criminogenic factor in the field of foreign economic activity is the insecurity of the state borders of the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, the same should be said about the customs border. This problem is largely political (as well as legal, organizational and managerial). However, it has a clear economic basis - the lack of money for the creation and proper arrangement of borders. Within a few weeks after the collapse of the USSR, Russia received thousands of kilometers of former administrative borders, the arrangement of which as state borders requires huge funds.
Economic difficulties hampered the operational formation, development and strengthening of the systems of customs authorities, currency control authorities, and other regulatory and control mechanisms; they slowed down the pace of work to create the necessary infrastructure, scientific, methodological and material and technical equipment, personnel training, and solutions to other issues of government activities. structures functionally designed to combat offenses in the area under consideration.
The “dollarization” of the Russian economy has also become a criminogenic factor of an economic nature.
Among the social criminogenic factors are the following:
weakly expressed social orientation of reforms; sharp income stratification of the population, impoverishment, lumpenization and marginalization of a significant part of it; unemployment; failure by the state to fulfill its social obligations to citizens; growth of social conflicts; lack of a balanced and consistent anti-alcohol policy; weakening of family foundations and all institutions of civil society and, as a consequence, the system of social control.
In relation to foreign economic activity, these negative factors manifest themselves in different ways and are generally very specific.
Among those who commit crimes in the field of foreign economic activity, it is unlikely to find many drunken lumpen and outcasts. However, this does not mean that the area in question was completely free from social ills typical of the transition period. Thus, it was the destruction of previous social guarantees, the depreciation of savings, loss of jobs and similar circumstances that forced millions of people (among whom are engineers, teachers, doctors, people with academic degrees) to become “shuttle traders” and engage in foreign trade activities, a considerable part of which is criminalized. It should be borne in mind that the criminal potential of a significant layer of the unemployed is focused more not on traditional ordinary crime, but on the inclusion of organized crime in the criminal business.
In regions with a particularly unfavorable socio-economic situation, cross-border trade, in particular illegal trade, has become the main source of livelihood and a way of survival for many.
Even more noticeable for the sphere of foreign economic activity is the negative significance of the general weakening of social control in the country, the traditional forms of which were rejected, and new ones corresponding to the changed conditions of social life did not arise. For example, popular control was eliminated and public control was significantly curtailed. Both of these types of control were once actively used to combat crime.
Unfortunately, the Russian state, especially at the start of reforms, not only failed to fully realize its anti-criminogenic potential, but both its policies in general and a number of specific actions (and inactions) to a certain extent contributed to the aggravation of the criminal situation.
The beginning of profound transformations in the life of society, which essentially represent a change from one socio-economic formation to another, the inevitable growth of social entropy and disorganization, the transition to market relations, which “were initially pregnant with crime, were not accompanied by the manifestation of political will for decisive and uncompromising opposition And such a will was needed more than ever in the conditions of a market environment, which in many ways took on antisocial and inhumane forms, during the transition to a market that initially began to emerge as uncivilized. In general, sometimes they simply lost the ability to manage important aspects of the transformations and let things take their course. Of course, people who sought to illegally enrich themselves did not fail to take advantage of this, including those who could develop and exploit such a “gold mine” as foreign economics for their own selfish interests. activity.
Without any complex theories and calculations, from the standpoint of elementary common sense, it is now clear: the transformation of property relations, denationalization, privatization, liberation of trade from numerous administrative-command, bureaucratic fetters, reasonable liberalization of foreign economic activity are not only advisable, but also necessary.
The choice of specific options for vital transformations depended decisively on politicians, on authorities, and on the state. Alas, far from the most optimal, and sometimes deliberately flawed, paths were chosen. Such, for example, is voucher privatization, unprecedented in scale and severity of consequences, which essentially became a fraudulent operation carried out on behalf of the state: tens of millions of people were deceived.
In this regard, foreign economic activity did not represent any exception; it turned out to be a very tasty piece of the pie, divided by hook or by crook. On the substantive side, these were economic (more precisely, anti-economic) processes that took place in line with the implementation of a certain policy, the line of the state, decisions made by authorities, the highest officials of the country. Hence the reason to consider them not only in an economic, but also in a political context.
2.13.1 Methodology for committing crimes
when carrying out export-import operations
To successfully carry out such operations, an organized criminal group must first carry out marketing of goods that, in some cases, are in constant demand on the world market, for example, timber, metal in the form of rolled or scrap metal, petroleum products and seafood, and therefore in their export you can get a solid profit, in others you can find out which foreign goods are most in demand in Russia. For these purposes, an organized criminal group must either engage a consultant (for example, in customs authorities, in the business environment), or one of the members of the organized crime group must do this on an ongoing basis. Based on this alone, the specialization of various organized crime groups in a certain type of economic activity becomes clear.
In addition, as a rule, organized criminal groups enter into contracts with foreign partners on behalf of fictitious companies (false enterprises, shell companies, etc.), which are registered using lost or counterfeit passports. This is done so that later, when facts of non-payment of customs duties, non-return of funds in foreign currency and other offenses from abroad are revealed, the perpetrators cannot be identified.
Consequently, members of organized criminal groups (formations) need to find (buy, steal, etc.) a passport with which they can register a fictitious company using front individuals or details of third-party commercial structures.
Next, you need to find funds to transfer as payment for the imported goods. These funds are either borrowed from entrepreneurs or representatives of the shadow economy, or funds obtained by criminal means are used, transferred to the common fund, etc.
When, when transferring funds, the goal of illegal non-return of funds in foreign currency from abroad is simultaneously pursued, a scheme for moving funds through bank accounts is determined, often through banks located in offshore zones. This is done in order to make it difficult or impossible to establish the movement of funds in order to avoid liability. Specialist consultants are also involved in the development of such schemes.
To carry out illegal export transactions, it is necessary to purchase an export product. Many items, goods, products that constitute the object and item of export and are transported across the customs border of the Russian Federation are pre-manufactured at the relevant Russian enterprises of industrial and territorial subordination. Therefore, members of the organized crime group must either buy such goods at these enterprises, or enter into a criminal conspiracy with managers and other persons associated with the production, selection and registration of goods for export.
To conclude a contract and make deliveries during import operations, it is necessary to establish business or criminal partnerships abroad. The establishment of criminal connections is dictated by the following circumstance. As they gain experience in combating smuggling, improve customs technologies, strengthen customs control and tighten sanctions applied to offenders, organized crime groups are forced to attract foreign counterparties to organize border crossings with cargo using fictitious shipping documents produced abroad. Such frauds are usually carried out through persons of Russian origin who act as intermediaries in negotiations with representatives of foreign suppliers abroad.
The same connections must be established with the carrier of goods, and then the declarant must be identified. With these persons, members of the organized crime group must provide a scheme for crossing the customs border of Russia - smuggled or official.
It should be noted that currently there are many “transparent” sections on the Russian state border that allow the free movement of goods and vehicles, bypassing customs control. This is the western section on the Russian-Ukrainian border, where more than 360 roads pass through the Rostov and Belgorod regions, the southern section is on the border with Georgia, the eastern section is on the border with Kazakhstan, which security forces are not able to block. Consequently, members of the OPS must choose a route for moving vehicles across the border and across the territory of Russia, develop an escort scheme or think through tracking methods, sometimes they need to find people who could become guides when crossing the border in unidentified places.
Members of the organized crime group constantly monitor the presence of control at the border and transmit to the carrier information about the border section and the time of its unhindered crossing, using modern means of fax, radiotelephone, paging, e-mail, etc. There are known facts when the organizers of the smuggling of goods into Russian territory notified their accomplices by fax about specific border crossing locations, taking into account existing “connections” at the posts.
2.13.2 Criminal connections of members of organized crime groups
with customs officials.
When choosing the official route to cross the border, members of an organized crime group, in order to reduce the payment of customs duties, can establish a criminal connection with customs officials.
In one case, it was established that members of an organized crime group drew up contracts on behalf of fictitious legal entities for the purchase of batteries from foreign suppliers, which began to arrive at the addresses of companies located in Riga specified in the contract. There, the accomplices repeatedly shipped batteries through a certain company and sent them to the companies specified in the contract. At the same time, the invoices reflected the actual number of batteries and their actual cost. From Riga the goods were sent to customs posts in Moscow, where they were cleared through customs and released into free circulation.
Upon arrival in Moscow, the trucks with the cargo were met by Terekhov, who exchanged the genuine invoices for false ones, corresponding in numbers to the real ones, but containing false information - they significantly underestimated the quantity and cost of the cargo. It was on the basis of false data that the cargo was declared, cargo customs declarations were filled out, and customs duties were calculated. In total, the customs documents underestimated the number of batteries received by 26,321 units in the amount of 7,867,321,410 rubles.
The commission of this crime became possible as a result of corruption of customs authorities, as evidenced by the following circumstances.
Direct paperwork at customs was carried out by proxies of the defendants, who paid money to employees of customs terminals for drawing up customs declarations for them on the basis of false invoices. These documents were accepted by customs inspectors unconditionally, despite the fact that the forged invoices did not contain stamps and marks from the Pytalovskaya customs office, located on the state border of Russia. The cargo in the vehicles was not counted by inspectors at Moscow customs posts.
The following categories of customs officials most often contribute to abuse during foreign economic transactions:
head of the customs post;
cargo release inspectors;
employees of the customs value control and currency control department;
delivery control department employees;
specialists in tariff and non-tariff regulation;
employees of the customs clearance and customs control department.
Performing long-term illegal operations is also possible if there is a conspiracy between the owners of temporary storage warehouses (TSWs) and customs warehouses with unscrupulous participants in foreign trade activities and customs officers. Based on the provisions of customs legislation, goods arriving at a temporary storage warehouse and having undergone a brief declaration at border customs checkpoints are considered to be under customs clearance, the final stage of which is the determination of customs duties payable and the release of goods under the declared customs regime. This circumstance is actively used by members of organized crime groups to commit fraud with documents and cargo.
To this end, they take the following actions:
goods received at the temporary storage warehouse are not reflected in the accounting documents;
part of the goods registered at the temporary storage warehouse is stolen and sold without paying customs duties;
owners or employees of temporary storage warehouses, in collusion with the owners of the goods, replace tax-intensive goods with others.
Temporary storage warehouse employees may participate in falsifying documents for the purpose of illegal customs clearance. Organizing such customs clearance at a temporary storage warehouse with the participation of its managers and employees is a fairly common crime, the commission of which involves the presence of various options, when the replacement of reliable documents with fictitious ones is carried out at the warehouse itself by its employees or secretly outside the warehouse.
When delivering goods to a temporary storage warehouse, its employees, if there are no customs officers there, must send a notification about this to the customs authorities. However, unscrupulous warehouse owners often ignore this requirement. Thus, the warehouse manager (director), accounting workers responsible for the accuracy of inventory records, including in electronic form submitted to internal customs, storekeepers (usually the shift supervisor) and other persons are involved in criminal activities.
In order to reduce the payment of customs duties, an understatement of the customs value of goods is often used. The customs value declared by the declarant and information related to its determination must be based on reliable, quantifiable, objective and documented information. Therefore, together with the state customs declaration, the declarant submits to the customs authority a declaration of customs value and accompanying documents. The latter is an annex to the relevant customs declaration and is not valid without it.
To confirm the declared information on customs value, the declarant must also submit:
invoice (invoice), bank payment documents (if the invoice is paid) and other payment and/or accounting documents confirming the cost of the goods;
insurance documents, if any, depending on the terms of delivery.
The set of documents on the basis of which the customs authorities determine the customs value, along with those listed, includes:
a customs inspection report containing a detailed description of the goods, allowing one to determine the commercial value and classify these goods in accordance with TN VED CIS;
documentation on the technical characteristics of goods, including information on the basis of which a certificate of conformity is issued (technical data sheets, instructions on the use of goods, etc.);
conclusions of the customs laboratory on the physical, chemical, quality and other characteristics of the goods.
To obtain additional information, customs authorities may request other documents. In the absence of the necessary information, customs authorities have the right to use the information they have (price information on similar goods, including those contained in catalogs of trading companies and other directories) with appropriate adjustments.
In order to reduce customs payments, members of organized crime groups usually falsify the required documents by either manufacturing them or falsifying them, and for this they need to purchase various forms, make fake seals or stamps, justify the cost of goods to the customs authorities, etc.
To reduce the amount of customs duties, other methods are also used. These include incorrect indication of customs regimes; substitution of documents for imported goods; movement of goods not under your name; code statement TN VED for goods that have similar consumer characteristics; movement of goods and vehicles under the guise of humanitarian aid; illegal use of customs duties benefits; non-declaration, false declaration or non-delivery of goods to the customs authorities of destination; pseudo-export; false export, use of unscrupulous carrier companies following the TIR procedure. Let's reveal some of them.
Smuggling and evasion of customs duties by incorrectly indicating customs regimes can be committed practically when using any customs regime that involves full or partial exemption from customs duties, in particular the regimes of processing, temporary import (export), customs warehouse, destruction, export ( import), transit.
Under the guise of goods sent for processing outside the customs territory, goods can actually be exported for release into free circulation. For example, petroleum products, supposedly sent for processing to make gasoline, are sold abroad, and imported goods that have nothing to do with petroleum products are imported into Russia as compensation. Only part of the exported goods can be processed, and the rest is sold, after which compensation goods are imported, the amount of which is significantly less than what should have been received when processing the entire volume of transported goods.
Violators also use the customs processing regime in the customs territory of the Russian Federation to smuggle goods under the guise of processed products. This mechanism often underlies tolling operations, when Russian raw materials are used instead of foreign ones, and the processed product is exported abroad without taxation under the guise of tolling.
Smuggling may be disguised by the use of a regime of temporary import (export) of goods - instead, goods are freely sold by unscrupulous participants in foreign trade activities on the territory of Russia without paying the appropriate customs duties.
To commit crimes using these methods, members of an organized crime group need to purchase funds, goods, resolve the issue of their movement, and carry out other actions.
Often crimes are disguised by false use of the customs destruction regime. They are committed, as a rule, in collusion with customs officials, since due to Provisions on the customs regime for the destruction of goods approved by order State Customs Code of Russia dated January 10, 2000 No. 3 (as amended by order No. 316 dated March 30, 2001), appropriate documents must be drawn up for goods transported across the customs border of the Russian Federation. However, after this, the goods are often sold without paying customs duties for a certain remuneration to customs workers.
Non-delivery of goods is carried out, as a rule, with the participation of carriers, in collusion with whom are participants in foreign trade activities and employees of temporary storage warehouses. Recently, schemes have been used where the goods are reloaded onto another vehicle or stored before the vehicles arrive in the customs control zone. In this case, the carrier is presented with documents drawn up with the participation of unscrupulous temporary storage warehouse owners, confirming the closure of the delivery procedure.
2.13.3 False export of excisable goods
The essence of this type of crime is that some companies, usually “one-day” companies, issue transportation documents for sending goods from near or far abroad countries in transit through the territory of the Russian Federation. Customs clearance documents reflect the transit movement of goods through the territory of Russia to a fictitious company located in the territory of one of the CIS countries, and the goods remain on the territory of Russia in free circulation without paying the necessary customs duties.
To commit illegal actions in this manner, members of an organized crime group need to register a fly-by-night company and find a carrier who would deliver the goods not to the destination indicated in the documents, but to the one named by the members of the organized crime group. In addition, goods imported into the country from the customs office located at the border checkpoint (customs office of departure) are sent under a delivery control document under customs escort or under customs security to the customs office in whose area of activity the recipient of the goods is located (customs office of destination), or to the customs office of entry abroad. To conceal the fact of non-export of cargo outside the Russian Federation, offenders enter into a conspiracy with customs carriers, and in the case of customs escort, with customs officials in order to issue a delivery control document without delivering the cargo to a border post for export and bribe specialists who have the opportunity to enter false information. information into the electronic delivery control database.
After the goods have been released into the customs regime “for free circulation” or have entered the customs territory of Russia, members of the organized crime group must temporarily find warehouses where they can be stored for a short time without customs clearance to store or transship the goods. Sometimes warehouses of certain (criminal) companies are rented for this purpose. Then it is necessary to resolve the issue related to the sale of goods by its purchaser, which can be either a wholesale or a retail buyer.
Criminal communities, having significant funds, have the opportunity to widely use vehicles and communications, large covered warehouses, guarded closed parking lots, which allows them to carry out large-scale illegal operations.
Organized crime communities usually have well-established operational information. This is done either by monitoring the actions of customs and law enforcement agencies, or by bribing customs officials, who themselves inform members of the organized criminal group about their inspections of vehicles transporting imported goods that were received both smuggled and official, but did not undergo customs clearance. Thus, the Moscow operational customs together with the FSB of Russia, the police and the border service, as part of the annual Caravanavto event, carried out a special operation aimed at suppressing the illegal circulation of goods. Customs officers paid their main attention to highways, checking heavy vehicles. However, after an hour of work, the route quickly became empty, since the smugglers had established an exchange of relevant information.
Then customs officers changed their tactics and began to check those organizations for which there was operational information that they provide warehouse space for storing goods not cleared through customs. At the same time, criminal communities systematically engaged in falsifying customs documents came to the attention of customs officers. During the operation, 13 car dealerships, 25 companies engaged in foreign economic activity, and 34 temporary storage warehouses were inspected. The value of the detained goods amounted to about 245.5 billion rubles. (for comparison: in the previous operation, goods worth 187 billion were detained).
During the second operation, employees of the capital's operational and truck customs detained a car that arrived from Hamburg (the sender was the ShVA company, the recipient was the Protek company) in the territory of the warehouse of Gross JSC. According to customs documents, the cargo was supposed to consist of canned beer. As it turned out, the car was delivered to the Gross warehouse and unloaded there, bypassing customs control. While checking the warehouse, customs officers found a huge amount of alcoholic beverages: domestic and imported vodka, Moldovan wines, and canned beer. There were no customs documents for all the goods, the value of which was more than $2 million.
2.13.4 Car theft and sale
A number of organized crime groups specialize in the supply of foreign cars to Russia, both stolen in Russia, various foreign countries, and legally acquired.
When stealing and selling cars, roles are distributed between members of an organized crime group, one part of which steals cars, the other part carries out their illegal transfer, the third part is legal, the fourth part looks for buyers, the fifth part produces or acquires counterfeit documents for vehicles, the sixth part ensures the execution of documents. and obtaining the necessary marks on them at the customs of Lithuania, Belarus, Russia, the seventh - carries out other necessary actions for the sale of cars.
Members of the organized crime group have to purchase or falsify false forms of vehicle registration certificates, forms of certificates-invoices, certificates from the traffic police of Belarus or Ukraine, which contain impressions of seals and stamps necessary to cross the customs border, other documents:
having marks from the customs authorities of Belarus on the release of goods for free circulation, in case of movement of vehicles through this republic;
identifying the vehicle itself (vehicle passport, certificate and documents with marks from traffic police authorities on deregistration of the vehicle);
confirming ownership and value of the vehicle - invoice, bill of sale, purchase and sale agreement, invoice, etc.;
identifying the identity and powers of citizens moving the vehicle (passport, power of attorney, etc.).
There are often cases when a complete package of fictitious documents is presented for a car, executed at a high professional level using modern office equipment and printing equipment.
When new documents are produced, the numbers of the body, chassis, and engine are changed, the verification of which by the State Traffic Safety Inspectorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, with the appropriate agreement of the members of the organized crime group, is carried out superficially. Moreover, some traffic police officers, for personal gain, violate job descriptions by not actually verifying the numbers of the specified units.
It is also necessary to resolve the issue of registering these vehicles with the traffic police, often even before purchasing them. According to the survey results, traffic police officers most often contribute to the commission of abuses in the field of foreign economic activity by:
assistance in accompanying cargo;
assistance in registering smuggled foreign cars;
connivance when crossing the customs border bypassing customs posts;
falsifying responses to requests for registration of foreign cars in another region.
Consequently, one of the conditions for the implementation of criminal intent to commit crimes in the field of foreign economic activity is the existence of a conspiracy between an indefinite number of persons, the distribution of criminal roles and income. Moreover, the logic of the criminal actions of organized crime groups is similar to the logic of ordinary business, adjusted for the illegality of their commission.
2.14 Characteristics of tax crime
Tax crime cannot be recognized as a fundamentally new socially dangerous social and legal phenomenon for Russia. At various times, to one degree or another, the fight against criminal violations of tax legislation was carried out, which in some years became extremely acute. For example, in 1922 in the RSFSR, 20,572 people were convicted of evading government duties and taxes. These figures are still the highest in the history of domestic taxation.
It should be noted with regret that the formation of the modern Russian tax system is accompanied by a significant increase in the number of tax crimes and offenses.
According to various estimates, in the Russian economy from 25 to 40% of the gross domestic product is created in the shadow sector of the economy, the vast majority of which is not covered by taxes. According to the Ministry of Finance of Russia, due to the concealment of income and objects of taxation, 30 to 50% of taxes are not received annually from the consolidated budget of the country. As a result of this, law-abiding taxpayers, and these are mainly legal commodity producers, make contributions to the state treasury in the form of taxes amounting to about half of the gross domestic product. On average, it turns out that about one third of the gross domestic product is allocated to the budget.
Tax evasion is widespread, widespread and is the main reason for non-receipt of taxes into the state treasury.
The real scale of tax crime is, to one degree or another, evidenced by the following indicators:
Significant gap between official and real incomes of the population;
The obvious difference between the consumption expenditures of individual citizens (purchasing large volumes of foreign currency valuables, real estate, cars, furnishings and expensive services) and their declared income;
Hidden employment of the population (the presence of a significant number of workers in enterprises that are not registered with the tax authorities or that carry out illegal business activities);
Increase in the volume of cash in non-bank circulation (use of “black cash” in settlements with other enterprises, wages);
Exacerbation of the crisis of non-payments, consisting in the inability or unwillingness of organizations to pay money with other economic entities within the framework of commercial activities (the predominance of barter transactions, the use of bills and other securities in settlements), as well as with the budget (offsets, payment in kind);
A decrease in tax collection, observed even during the period of expectation of a seasonal increase in tax revenues to the budget;
The size of the budget arrears is increasing at a significant rate from year to year;
Increasing the volume of capital illegally exported abroad (opening accounts in foreign banks, acquiring companies and securities abroad).
CHAPTER 3. Suggestions for improving efficiency
fight against organized
economic crime
The criminal redistribution of property in the 90s and the penetration of organized crime into all spheres of life in Russian society require increasing the efficiency of the state and law enforcement agencies, which is still inadequate to the current criminogenic situation, as evidenced by the results of a survey of experts from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. When asked about the effectiveness of the fight against organized crime in the economic sphere, 56% of respondents consider it low, 31% consider it average, and only 2% consider it high.
Among the circumstances that make it difficult to identify and solve crimes committed by organized criminal groups, the following can be noted:
lack of special laws to combat organized crime, protect witnesses, etc.;
imperfection of criminal legislation;
imperfection of criminal procedural legislation;
shortcomings in the interaction of law enforcement agencies with each other;
shortcomings in interaction between law enforcement and regulatory authorities;
corruption in law enforcement agencies;
pressure from government structures.
One of the key problems of modern economic policy, requiring urgent measures to solve it, is overcoming the criminalization of the economy.
In order to counter the expansion of the influence of organized crime of an economic nature, various organizational, legal and other measures are required.
Employees of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs ranked the first four places:
strengthening control over the implementation of business transactions;
tightening the liability of enterprise managers for offenses;
ensuring financial control over the income of individuals;
increasing the efficiency of law enforcement agencies in identifying and solving crimes.
Employees of business entities prioritized increasing the efficiency of law enforcement agencies in identifying and solving crimes. Next come tax cuts; tightening the liability of enterprise managers for offenses; strengthening control over business operations.
Based on this, we can conclude that to increase the effectiveness of the fight against organized crime in the economic sphere it is necessary to restore order in business operations and increase the efficiency of law enforcement agencies.
The most preferred areas of combating organized crime in the economic sphere include:
restriction of the activities of “legal” enterprises and organizations controlled by organized criminal groups (their liquidation, revocation of licenses, seizure of bank accounts, etc.);
identification and neutralization of leaders (managers) of organized criminal groups carrying out criminal activities in the economic sphere;
bringing to criminal responsibility members of organized criminal groups for “background” crimes (carrying weapons, drug possession, etc.).
To increase the efficiency of law enforcement agencies, it would be necessary to expand the possibilities of applying incentive measures to persons who assist law enforcement agencies in the fight against organized crime in the economic sphere, in particular:
introduce into legislation the institution of “deals with a criminal,” i.e. exemption from criminal liability and its protection for providing evidence of the criminal activities of active participants and organizers of criminal groups and criminal communities;
provide for the possibility of exemption from criminal liability for participation in a criminal organization in connection with active repentance (active assistance to law enforcement agencies in uncovering the criminal activities of the group).
Along with the above, it would be advisable to provide in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation:
the possibility of law enforcement officers speaking in court as a “word witness”;
the possibility of questioning witnesses in a closed court session;
the possibility of questioning witnesses without disclosing their personal data;
institution of the "chief witness";
conducting interrogations as witnesses of persons identified during operational-search activities until the initiation of a criminal case, as well as conducting examinations before the initiation of a criminal case.
The shadow economy has become a problem not only for law enforcement agencies, but also for the entire state as a whole. Therefore, there is a long overdue need to develop a set of measures to influence the shadow economy.
When developing such a set of measures, without denying the need for forceful measures, priority should be considered a change in general economic conditions, improvement of legislation, elimination of legal gaps, all “economic nonsense” that makes entrepreneurial activity unprofitable and doomed. Such a set of measures could be based on the idea of integrating the shadow and legal economies, allowing, within certain limits, such measures as a tax amnesty, the use of financial indulgences, and the repatriation of capital.
List of used literature:
Nikolaenko S., Lissovolik Y., Mac Farquhar R. “Shadow economy in Russian regions” 1997. M., 1998.
Luneev V.V. Crime of the XX century. World, regional and Russian trends. M. Norma, 1997.
Verin V.P. Crimes in the economic sphere. - M., 2001.
Vorobiev I.A. “Organized crime and the fight against it in Germany” - M.: All-Russian Research Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, 1996..
Sieber U. Organized crime in Japan and Germany. - M.: Russian Legal Publishing House, 1999.
Magazine “Tax Bulletin”, N 7, July 2002 “Criminological characteristics of tax crime”
Secondly, the core of the criminal economy is, on the one hand, large-scale criminalized economic activity (belongs to the first subsystem “criminalized economy”) - that is, such legal economic activity that is inextricably linked and combined with violations of the criminal law or other in words, with the commission of economic crimes (Chapter 22 of the Code of the Russian Federation). On the other hand, there is criminal economic activity carried out by illegal criminal business structures (in the areas of drug trafficking, etc.) and belonging to the second subsystem “illegal economy”.
Thirdly, the functioning of the criminal economy is unthinkable without the use of non-economic methods of competition and obtaining excess profits. In the “first subsystem”, criminalized entrepreneurship is characterized by the achievement of illegal advantages in competition through the use of various types of fraud and other criminal acts related to deception and breach of trust - commercial fraud, false entrepreneurship, illegal entrepreneurship, deliberate and fictitious bankruptcy, concealment of income from taxation, etc.
In the “second subsystem”, within the framework of the illegal economy, for these purposes, criminal communities use the power tools of imposing monopoly power for “their” business structures operating in the official (legal) economic system in the markets of raw materials, production, circulation, and in the field of credit and banking activities etc. For example, according to the internal affairs bodies, retail trade in the Russian consumer market is almost completely under the strict control of criminal structures. In addition, forceful methods are used to impose clearly unprofitable or enslaving commercial transactions on business partners (including the sphere of the legal economic system of the state), business contracts etc.
At the same time, it would be a serious misconception to associate the criminal economy with the legal economy, the officially operating system of management. The first cannot be called an economy (economy) in a strict sense. It is not a clearly structured hierarchical economic system, but at the same time it has absorbed its individual features, formally borrowing a number of segments. The criminal economy is characterized by such characteristics as fragmentation of sectors and industries existing within its framework, discreteness and, as a rule, short period of operation of individual business structures, spheres and types of economic activity, the presence of transitional structures combining criminal and legal types of economic activity, high dynamics horizontal flow of capital, etc. The criminal and legal economies have a close, inextricable mutual connection and conditionality. These properties are manifested primarily in the fact that even the second subsystem of the criminal economy (“illegal economy”) cannot exist in a regime of complete autarky and inevitably resorts to the services of the infrastructure of the legal economic system. For example, for the purpose of laundering “dirty” money, official channels of money circulation, the existing credit and banking system, the real estate market, etc. are usually used, or for these purposes “their own” business structures, banking and other organizations are specially created in the legal economic system .
The criminal economy is a special sphere of application of labor, has its own “labor resources”, a unique mechanism of reproduction and movement of capital, specific patterns of the formation of supply and demand, equilibrium market price, transaction costs etc. Finally, it has its own system of values and goals.
Everything related to the specifics and patterns of evolution of the criminal economy cannot but be the object of scientific interest of criminology. Criminological science here should not act as a kind of detached observer, passively examining the events that have taken place, or simply stating obvious facts. From the role of a statistician, she must move to the mode of “working proactively”, to an active forecast of the main trends in the development of the criminal situation in the sphere of market economics, must develop a reliable methodology for countering the development of the criminal economy, suppressing and (or) eliminating factors that determine the strengthening of its position in society , displacement of criminal relations from the space of legal economic activity. This requires studying the phenomena of the criminal economy from the perspective of a systemic method, covering the entire set of endo- and exogenous connections and interdependencies inherent in it. Integrity systematic approach will allow us to consider the object under study from two sides, as if in two dimensions: by internally dividing the object itself into elements, properties, functions, and in correlating it with the external environment. Its future in the 21st century will largely depend on the ability of modern criminological science to expand the boundaries of its own research, attract the tools of related scientific disciplines and internalize it.
The first study of criminal economics was done by A.A. Krylov. He introduced the very concept of “criminal economy” into theoretical circulation and gave its subsequent definition: “Criminal economy is a complex system of criminal socio-economic relations and real-material actions for the production, distribution, exchange and consumption of material goods and services.” He also describes the criminal economy as organized, self-interested, nonviolent lawlessness.
The term “criminal economy” is commonly used, which is defined as an ineffective sector of economic activity associated with the criminal redistribution of income and the financial situation of citizens through robbery, assault, theft, and extortion.
A. Nesterov and A. Vakurin give the following definition of criminal economy: “...criminal economy is a specific national economic structure, a method of management that is designed to guarantee a certain, relatively small group of people in excess of earnings, income from illegal activities, income from the use of “holes” "in legislation".
This concept, according to their concept, covers actions in the economic sphere that fall under certain articles of legislation, that is, economic crimes and crimes. This also includes organized crime, corruption and pushing through bills beneficial to the lawless world.
Thus, the consciousness of the criminal economy has space only from a formal legal position. In accordance with the logic of this understanding, the entire shadow economy is being introduced into the criminal economy.
The formal legal approach, according to the creator, is missing for an adequate understanding of the nature and criminal and shadow economy and needs to be added and expanded. The criminal economy, especially in Russia and other countries with an undeveloped market system, should be considered from a broader criminological perspective.
From this point of view, the criminal economy includes economic affairs, economic activities, the main characteristic feature of which is social danger.
The criminal economy covers economic and socially dangerous acts of 3 types:
criminalized, entailing criminal liability in accordance with current legislation;
non-criminalized, but entailing legal liability in accordance with the norms of other branches of law;
non-criminalized and not entailing legal liability (gaps in legal regulation).
When identifying the non-criminal shadow economy sector, the following judgments should be taken into account.
Only economic activities that are directly related to the production of ordinary goods, the provision of normal services, the performance of normal work and that contribute to the creation of GDP can be classified as non-criminal, shadow.
The non-criminal sector of the shadow economy can specifically include activities that could not be started or continued under the current tax and regulatory regime.
It is necessary to take into account the multiplier effect of growth in production and, consequently, tax revenues, as a result of spending shadow income in the legal economy.
Given the trivial usefulness of this or that business from the point of view of public needs in certain markets, illegal methods are the decisive factor in ensuring competitiveness and, forming an undertaking or deciding to improve it, which most honest entity is obliged to use them (for example, various “dark cash” schemes " - unaccounted cash). The price level is determined mainly by firms using tax evasion schemes, and it is almost impossible to legally enter such an area.
In general, to assess the level of crime in the shadow economy, it is advisable to take into account very fully both its economic efficiency and usefulness, as well as its destructive impact. The question arises: “If legal requirements are fully implemented, and taxes and payments are fully paid, then given the current economic situation, what part of economic activity will be less competitive and profitable?” It is in this share that the shadow criminal sector should be found. The question can be formulated in a more general form: “To what extent and what part, the spheres of the shadow economy associated with the violation of the legal prohibition, ensure the survival of the social organism?”
With the criminological approach, the object of analysis is not only the owner’s activity, but also the rating scale of this activity, embodied in the legal system. This uses the more powerful aspect of socio-economic efficiency.
It should also be noted that the use of one approach or another is determined by the nature of the economic system and the quality of the economic regulation system.
The formal legal approach is completely justified in the conditions of a stable, well-functioning system of legal regulation of the economy, the highest development of its universities and limited country intervention in economic life. This is the situation in most industrialized countries. Most public the right types business and other economic activities can actually compete when applying fair competition methods. In the shadow economy, criminal influence is exerted by actors or outsiders.
In a situation where the country is weakened and does not have a normal institutional environment in the economic sphere, the use of criminal methods becomes one of the decisive reasons for competition and survival. Most economic entities turned out to be outside the legal framework. In such a situation, the official-legal approach is not constructive and must be supplemented by the most comprehensive economic and criminological one.
The division of the shadow economy into the criminal and non-criminal sectors cannot be speculative. It implies a whole analysis of specific areas in specific conditions.
The expressed judgments are not intended to be the final conclusion of the difficulty. They are intended to outline its most significant contours and provoke the search for a solution, the reasoning of which needs constant re-checking in the conditions of developing reality.
The criminal economy also includes professional crime. It is understood as a type of lawless activity that is a source of livelihood for the subject, requires the necessary knowledge and skills to achieve the final goal and determines certain contacts with the anti-public environment.
The second criterion means that its composition takes into account the following types of activities:
firstly - related to the use of institutions of the legal economy, legal, legislative and judicial power for criminal purposes;
secondly, syndicalized forms of organized lawless economic activity;
thirdly, types of socially harmful economic activities generated by the dysfunction of public institutions and therefore of a public nature;
fourthly, the activity of creating, interpreting, implementing and using informal norms of illegal economic behavior.
The use of these criteria presupposes the exclusion from the sphere of the criminal economy of random, isolated, spontaneous, situationally executed actions of an economic nature.
1. Features of modern economic crime in Russia.
Modern Russian economic crime is characterized by certain special individualities and development trends. The most significant ones include the following.
High degree of latency of economic crimes. The level of latency increases or, by the latest measure, does not decrease, the exposure of crimes and the detection of offenses does not increase.
Thus, the latency of fraud is estimated to be 65, official theft - 925, bribery - 2935, extortion - 17500, robbery - 34, robbery - 58, theft of property - 152 (if registered offenses are taken per piece, then the latency of individual types of crimes will be the following numbers).
Rapidly improve the methods of criminal attacks. There is a removal of primitive crime from the economic sphere and its replacement by sophisticated, intellectual crime. This is evidenced, in particular, by the steady decrease in the share of so-called “traditional” property crimes (thefts, robberies, robberies).
Criminals will soon adapt to new types, forms and methods of entrepreneurial activity. They actively use the emerging market conditions and information technologies for criminal purposes. The number of crimes committed in the field of big technology (computer crime, network crime, crime in the field of individual wireless communications) is increasing, using special knowledge in the field of monetary and economic activity, in the process of professional activity.
As an example, it is allowed to cite large-scale theft of foreign currency funds using false bank documents, falsification of securities, criminal use of electrical means of access to a bank account, office equipment (fax modems, duplicating machines);
Active role in the commission of crimes by organized criminal groups. The crimes committed in their role differ in the more effective preparation, commission and concealment of thefts. They perform a constant search latest sources purchase and sale, sale of stolen property, ability to expand criminal activity.
According to this Ministry of Internal Affairs, in Russia there are about 80 thousand members of organized criminal groups, under whose control are about 40 thousand business entities, including 1.5 thousand state-owned enterprises, 4 thousand joint-stock companies, over 500 joint ventures, 550 banks and 700 wholesale and retail bazaars Merging of economic and common crime. Increasing competition for appropriation in excess of earnings is accompanied by violent attacks - arson, criminal explosions, murders for hire (contract killings) of officials of rival organizations, law enforcement and other municipal bodies. The ineffectiveness of the judicial system provokes the use of criminal and violent methods of debt collection. There are many other manifestations of this process that accompany the penetration of organized crime into the economy.
Strengthening the interregional and transnational nature of economic crime. This desire takes place in the fact that, firstly, foreign economic relations are used to legalize illegal income, and secondly, criminals use the infrastructure of global money markets to carry out criminal attacks. As an example, we can note fraudulent transactions on the Internet and criminal network activities.
Creation of an effective system for legalizing proceeds acquired from criminal activities. Laundered funds are introduced into the national economic circulation, invested in business, and illegally exported abroad.
Features of certain types of economic crimes Malfeasance. Over the past few years, there has been a strong increase in malfeasance. The statistics reflect a general trend towards a tougher fight against economic crime. The share of official crimes in the total number of economic crimes is relatively small - a little more than 10%. However, due to the highest latency and the special subject of the crime official they pose an increased danger to society.
One of the most common and dangerous official crimes is taking a bribe.
Bribery, along with other official offenses, is characterized by an increased social danger. This follows from the following data.
According to expert assessments, losses from corruption in the field of government orders and procurement often exceed 30% of all economic costs for these items.
Illegal entrepreneurship and false entrepreneurship. There has been a constant increase in recent years in such offenses as criminal entrepreneurship and false entrepreneurship. These data reflect the most profound processes associated with the growth of the shadow economy, as well as the activities of organized lawless groups using shell companies for the criminal cashing out of foreign currency, theft of credit resources from commercial banks, and the commission of other dangerous crimes. These trends also reflect the mental insistence of businessmen on the acquisition of short-term results, doubts about the monetary system and avoidance of excessive tax burden. One of the circumstances of the current situation is the lack of an effective system of assistance to honest entrepreneurship.
Modern theft by fraud, embezzlement and waste. In the structure of economic crime in recent years, the most common are thefts committed by fraud Article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, embezzlement and embezzlement of entrusted wealth Article of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
Of all crimes against affiliation, the largest increase was typical for fraud. It should be taken into account that no criminal cases were opened for all cases of fraud in the financial and credit sector. And general fraud in the field consumer market remains latent to a significant extent.
2. Factors of criminalization of the Russian economy
The degree of economic crime is influenced by a complex set of reasons, among which political, economic and legal ones are more significant. There are also reasons such as organizational, psychological, medical and technical.
The political causes of economic crime include: the instability of the political regime, the illogicality of criminal policy, the lack of infrastructure within interstate borders after the collapse of the USSR, the alienation of the population from the management of municipal affairs and control over the system of measures to combat crime.
Economic factors: the highest level of differentiation of the population in terms of earnings; non-functionality of socio-economic universities; the country's continuous decline and its inability to guarantee regulation of the economy; macroeconomic imbalances, a significant municipal sector of the economy, ineffective tax policy and other fundamental factors.
Organizational and legal factors:
insufficiently effective coordination of the efficiency of the bodies of inquiry, preparatory investigation, court and prosecutor's office;
insufficient resource supply law enforcement agencies;
high micro-turnover of law enforcement officers. A large percentage of the total number of employees are employees with up to 3 years of experience. The share of employees who have worked for more than 5 years gradually decreases with increasing length of service, i.e. There is an outflow of highly qualified workers into commercial, and from time to time, criminal structures.
reducing the social and legal energy of the population;
lack of a system for protecting eyewitnesses and victims (they were often subjected to intimidation and bribery);
low efficiency of audit (audit) control;
lagging behind the legal framework for combating crime from its configurations and others.
Economic crimes- these are criminal acts committed in the sphere of production, distribution, consumption of goods, services, incl. associated with the illegal use of official status: theft, consumer deception, violation of trade rules, violation of state price discipline, tax evasion, etc.
Criminal economy- these are actions in the economic sphere that fall under certain articles of legislation, i.e. economic offenses and crimes.
This includes organized crime, corruption, and lobbying for bills beneficial to the underworld. This is a specific economic structure, a way of managing, which is designed to provide a certain, relatively small group with additional income, income from criminal activity, from the use of “gaps” in the legislation.
The criminal economy covers economic and socially dangerous acts of three types:
criminalized, entailing criminal liability in accordance with current legislation;
non-criminalized, but entailing legal liability in accordance with the norms of other branches of law;
non-criminalized and not entailing legal liability (gaps in legal regulation).
The most dangerous areas of criminal economic activity in Russia
Shadow economic activity in various industries and areas of economic activity
criminal economy
Shadow economy (hidden economy)- economic activity hidden from society and the state, outside state control and accounting. It is an unobservable, informal part of the economy, but does not cover it all, since it cannot include activities that are not specifically hidden from society and the state, for example, the home or community economy. Also includes illegal, criminal types of economy, but is not limited to them.
Shadow economy- these are economic relationships between citizens of society, developing spontaneously, bypassing existing state laws and social rules. The income of this business is hidden and is not a taxable economic activity. In fact, any business that results in the concealment of income or tax evasion can be considered a shadow economic activity.
The shadow economy can be divided into the following main enlarged blocks: unofficial, fictitious and underground.
Unofficial (figuratively called “gray”") the economy covers legal, permitted types of economic activity, which are especially common in the service sector (apartment renovation, medical care, provision of housing in resort areas, etc.). However, income recipients hide them from taxation.
Fictitious (“white-collar”) economic activity As a rule, this is done by the management of enterprises and officials in those countries where the public sector of the economy is significantly developed. Persons with access to public property enrich themselves by inventing illegal means (subscriptions to the implementation of tasks and plans, fraudulent methods of obtaining money, theft of material resources, etc.).
Underground (“black”) economy- This is an activity prohibited by law. These include: drug trafficking, smuggling, counterfeiting, human trafficking
UDK 343.9 BBK 67.51
V.V. Kolesnikov
CRIMINAL ECONOMY IN THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC CRIMINOLOGY: CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE
Abstract: Criminal economy is part of the shadow economy associated with the implementation of criminal economic activities and criminalized economic activities. The criminal economy has a number of characteristics. It includes two large subsystems: the “criminalized economy” and the “illegal economy.”
Key words: economic criminology; economic crimes; corruption; criminal economy.
CRIMINAL ECONOMY IN THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC CRIMINOLOGY: CONCEPTAND STRUCTURE
Summary: Criminal economy is a part of the shadow economy related to carrying out criminal economic activity and criminalized economic activity. Criminal economy has a number of features. It includes two large subsystems: “criminalized economy” and “illegal economy”.
Key words: economic criminology; economic crimes; corruption; criminal economy.
To achieve the necessary depth of research into crime in economics and verify the conclusions obtained, one should start by searching for a worthy methodological approach. At the same time, it is important to remember the call “Let’s agree on terms!” Its author, Rene Descartes, believed that in this case “half of human disputes would disappear”! In economic criminology there is still no such agreement; each author or group of authors offers their own understanding and formulations, even statistics take into account “vague” indicators such as “economic crimes”1, etc., as a result, in this “field” Eclecticism and entropy continue to reign.
Colleagues who are familiar with our works know that in many works -
Starting, perhaps, from the monograph “Economic Crime and Market Reforms: Political and Economic Aspects” (1994), I tried to present my own understanding of the essence of the criminal economic phenomena being studied, to formulate appropriate approaches to their analysis and construction of definitions, based on the search and use of objective criteria , lying in the fabric of socio-economic relations. How original and deep they are is for the reader to judge. Today, summarizing this experience, we can try to present in a brief, abstract form the terminology that characterizes the phenomenon of the criminal economy. Note that all the terms that will be discussed were primarily previously formulated in our
1 It would be interesting to know the name of the author of such a “delightful” formulation, under which, if desired, almost all crimes can fall, since the subjects committing them can be revealed to have self-interest, and therefore the notorious “economic orientation.” The word “direction” itself is least suitable for characterizing economic crimes (or any other, apparently); the formulation “crime of an economic nature” would be more appropriate, although no less amorphous... However, our attitude to the definition of economic crime has long been formulated in a number of works, including textbooks on criminology (1998; 1999; 2007).
works (a list of selected works is given at the end). In addition, ontological ideas are given mainly within the boundaries of the accepted theoretical concept and ideology of the St. Petersburg International Criminological Club. Methodologically, I proceeded from the understanding of the phenomenon of crime proposed by the President of the Club, Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Law, Professor D.A. Shestakov: “Crime is the property of a person, a social institution, the society of a particular country, a global society, to reproduce many acts dangerous to people around them, manifested in the relationship of crimes and their causes, amenable to quantitative interpretation and predetermining the introduction of criminal law prohibitions.”
Below we will talk about the features of economic criminology as a special branch of criminological knowledge, then about the criminal economy itself as an object of its theoretical interest. And only then will attention be paid to crime in the economic sphere, or economic crime.
Economic criminology is a branch of criminological science that studies criminal phenomena and processes in the economy. The scientific apparatus of economic criminology is formed depending on the approach used - a narrow or broad interpretation of the phenomena under study. So, in the first case, the object of economic criminology can be economic crime in the traditional criminological understanding, in the second, accordingly, economic crime, presented as a result of criminal economic activity and appearing on the surface of phenomena in transformed forms - forms of criminalization of the economy and criminalization of economic relations, or even criminal economy. The choice of the second option will require economic criminology to significantly strengthen the exogenous epistemological component and can turn it into a serious interdisciplinary scientific branch of fundamental knowledge about the mechanism and patterns of reproduction of criminal economic activity in the subsystems of the legal and criminal economy. The implementation of such a task is possible in the future only through the unification
the efforts of specialists in various fields of knowledge - criminologists, lawyers, specialists in the field of criminal, civil and other branches of law regulating economic relations, economists, philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, etc.
Determining the object of research in economic criminology is of fundamental importance, and it is better if its search takes place on a conventional basis. The use of an expanded approach allows us to highlight the criminal economy as an object of research, and in its composition, accordingly, two subsystems: criminalized economic activity and criminal economic activity, which form the core of both the criminal economy itself and the phenomenon of criminal economic activity.
The subject of economic criminology is a specific system of social relations that develop as a result of the reproduction of criminal economic activity. At the same time, social relations determined by the genesis of the criminal economy, or, accordingly, criminalized and criminal economic activity, are subject to study. In a narrow interpretation, when the object of economic criminology is economic crime, the subject of this branch of criminological science can be understood as the study of a specific system of social relations, the reproduction of which is determined by the genesis of economic crime.
YES. Shestakov notes that economic criminology studies the genesis of economic, including organized, crimes, analyzes various aspects of economic life, economic contradictions, crisis phenomena that determine criminal behavior. According to the author, this branch illuminates the process of criminalization of the economic sphere of Russian society, which began in the depths of the so-called mature socialism and accompanies, if not constituted, the essence of all socio-political transformations of post-communist Russia up to the present time.
The function of economic criminology is reproduction and theoretical
systematization of objective knowledge about the criminal aspects of economic reality. It is implemented by solving a number of central problems of economic criminology. Three classes of problems of economic criminology as a scientific branch of social knowledge can be distinguished: epistemological problems, ontological problems and applied problems. The epistemological tasks of economic criminology consist, first of all, in the study of the possibilities of knowledge and theoretical interpretation of the patterns of criminal behavior and criminal activity in the sphere of economic life of society, in the study of the conditions and criteria for the reliability and truth of the knowledge obtained. The successful solution of this class of problems depends not least on the choice of methodology - the principles of construction, forms and methods of scientific knowledge.
The ontological tasks of economic criminology consist in the formation of scientific knowledge that gives a holistic, objective understanding of economic crime as a special form of social existence, its patterns and significant connections with other areas of social reality. The applied tasks of economic criminology consist in the theoretical substantiation of the policies of society and the state in the sphere of control over economic crime, countering the criminal economy and minimizing criminal phenomena and processes in the economic life of society and the state.
The theoretical and practical significance of economic criminology is associated with the definition of the subject and object of research and is determined by the implementation of its function, the achievement of goals and objectives. For the development of economic criminology as a scientific field, the formation of its system is of great importance. In what form the system of economic criminology can be presented or, in other words, the composition and order of consideration of the problems it investigates, is a separate problem that has yet to be solved by researchers.
For economic criminology, one of the key methodological issues is the attitude of science to the content of the concept of economic crime. The central problem here is to define
boundaries of the social phenomenon “economic crime”; Options for solving this problem will be shown below.
So, in the broad interpretation of the criminological branch of “economic criminology”, it is the criminal economy that should act as the object of research of this science.
Criminal economy is part of the shadow economy associated with the implementation of criminal economic activities and criminalized economic activities. The criminal economy has a number of characteristics. Firstly, it includes two large segments, two subsystems: “criminalized economy” and “illegal economy” (or “criminal economy itself”).
The functioning of the criminal economy is based on the use of prohibited types of business activities or the widespread use of non-economic methods of competition, as well as unequal exchange and appropriation of economic benefits, funds and assets, as well as rights to them in order to extract excess profits. For criminalized entrepreneurship, operating within the framework of the first subsystem “criminalized economy”, it is characteristic to achieve illegal advantages in competition through the commission of economic crimes - the use of various types of fraud, criminal acts associated with deception and breach of trust: commercial fraud, false entrepreneurship, illegal entrepreneurship , deliberate and fictitious bankruptcy, concealment of income from taxation, etc.
In the space of the second subsystem of the criminal economy, the “illegal economy,” as non-economic methods of competition, criminal communities use the forceful tools of imposing monopoly power for “their” business structures operating in the official, legal economic system in the markets of raw materials, production, circulation, and in the sphere of credit and banking, etc. - extortion, blackmail, threats, raiding, contract killings, etc. The named force methods are used to
solving various problems of “economic order”, i.e. to impose on business partners (including the sphere of the legal economic system of the state) clearly unprofitable or enslaving commercial transactions, economic contracts, etc., to establish and maintain monopoly high prices for goods and services, the production of which is controlled by criminal structures, etc. In other words, the use of non-economic methods of competition to obtain excess profits is an inherent property of the criminal economy within the framework of the functioning of its second subsystem and is often used by organized crime to support “their” business structures operating in the legal sector of the economy.
From an institutional perspective, the criminal economy in its most general form represents the mutual connection and conditionality of a certain institutional structure (elements of which for the legal economy are predominantly destructive), a system of specifically deformed social relations that cause dysfunction of legal social norms in society, and economic activity affected by criminalization or purely criminal.
However, the criminal economy should not be identified, or more precisely, compared with the legal economy, the officially operating economic system. Both substantively and structurally they have significant differences. The criminal economy cannot be called an economy (economy) in the strict sense of the word, since it is not
represents a certain clearly structured hierarchical economic system; it only inherits its individual features, formally borrowing a number of segments. The criminal economy is characterized by such characteristics as the fragmentation of sectors and industries existing within its framework; discreteness and, as a rule, short period of operation of individual business structures, areas and types of economic activity; the presence of transitional or convergent structures that combine criminalized, criminal and legal types of economic activity; high dynamics of horizontal capital flow; higher rate of profit with significant transaction costs due to high criminal risks; obvious desire to achieve market equilibrium through its own system of equilibrium price formation; a special system of recruiting and personnel management; the presence of a specific organization of the risk insurance system due to corruption of government bodies and law enforcement agencies; etc.
So, it is important to remember that the phenomenon of criminal economics absorbs a mass of phenomena that individually characterize its particular properties and outside of which it cannot be understood in the form of a certain system. Such phenomena include “criminalization of the economy”, “criminalization of economic relations”, “criminalized economic activity”, “criminal economic activity”, “economic crime”, “organized economic crime”2, “corruption”3, “shadow law”, etc. .
2 I was lucky enough to conduct one of the first studies of this phenomenon - in 2000, I received a grant from the American University (Washington, USA) through the St. Petersburg Center for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption (it was headed by Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Law, Professor B. V. Volzhenkin). The final work “The Phenomenon of Organized Economic Crime” (2.5 pp) was published in 2001 on the Center’s website - URL: jurfak.spb.ru/centers/traCCC/article/kolesnikov1.htm. This work formed the basis for such publications as: Kolesnikov V.V. The phenomenon of organized economic crime // Economic security of Russia: political guidelines, legislative priorities, security practice. Bulletin of the Nizhny Novgorod Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. 2002. No. 2. P. 32-43; Kolesnikov V.V. Organized economic crime and criminal economy // Scientific notes of the Institute of Law. 2002. No. 9. St. Petersburg: SPbGUEF, 2002. P. 49-60.
3 This phenomenon in the context of the analysis of the criminal economy should be considered within the boundaries of the so-called business corruption, the essence of which is manifested in the unlawful selfish interaction of business and government, corrupt entrepreneurs and corrupt officials. This view
Criminalized economic activity is the officially permitted economic activity of legal business structures or individual entrepreneurs, within the framework of which crimes of a predominantly economic nature are committed. Simply put, this is the activity of legal business structures associated with the commission of economic crimes. Criminalized economic activity - along with criminal economic activity - is an immanent part of the criminal economy.
Criminal economic activity is criminal activity committed in the economic sphere. This activity is initially prohibited by law and is usually associated with the production, sale and consumption of socially destructive, socially dangerous economic goods (goods and services). This includes such types of criminal economic activities as drug trafficking, business in the illegal trade in weapons and other prohibited goods, business in pornography and prostitution, business in human trafficking, business in the illegal trade in human organs, etc. Criminal economic activity - along with criminalized economic activity - is an immanent part of the criminal economy.
Criminalization of the economy is a state of the economy that is characterized by the processes of criminalization of the economic system in general and the criminalization of economic relations in particular. Due to the spread of criminal economic behavior in the national economy. The criminalization of the economy is associated, on the one hand, with the commission of economic crimes by legal business entities, i.e. characterized by the presence of criminalized economic activity, on the other hand, with criminal activity of illegal business entities prohibited by law, which is defined as criminal economic activity.
Sky activity. Not to be confused with the traditional criminal law concept of criminalization.
The criminalization of the economy covers not only the activities of various organizational and legal structures (enterprises, companies, organizations, banks, exchanges, etc.), as well as economic management bodies at all levels, but also affects the institutional fabric of the national economy - the system of social connections, norms and relations, and means the spread of criminalized and criminal economic behavior in society. In this regard, both economic crime and prohibited criminal economic activity are increasing; on the one hand, the army of economic criminals and criminal business entities is growing in number, and on the other hand, the totality of entities that have become victims of criminal activity in the economy. Criminalization as a social phenomenon looks like the result of the genesis of the symbiosis of economic crime and criminal business, criminalized and criminal economic activity.
It is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of criminalization of the economy and criminalization of economic relations, while the second concept is essentially absorbed by the first.
Criminalization of economic relations is the process (and result) of criminal deformation of the system of economic relations existing in society due to the spread of criminal and criminalized economic activities in their space, the implementation of criminal business and the commission of economic crimes. The entire system of economic relations can be subject to criminalization: relations in the spheres of production, exchange, distribution and consumption of economic goods, relations of ownership and appropriation, social and labor, organizational, economic and managerial relations, relations between labor and capital, etc. Domestic experience of the total spread of criminal phenomena in the reform
corruption phenomena are not only the most widespread (according to the INDEM Foundation, business corruption accounts for almost 99% of the annual capacity of the corruption market), but also poses a particular threat to national security, since it undermines the fundamental principles of organizing a civilized market economy.
controlled economy of the 1990s showed that the criminalization of economic relations can become universal. This phenomenon is called the “general criminalization of economic relations.”
The criminalization of economic relations is part of a more general phenomenon - the criminalization of the economy, and in conjunction with it acts as one of the reasons for the emergence of the phenomenon of the criminal economy.
Economic crime is a category that occupies a special place in the system of economic criminology. Economic crime, a phenomenon considered as one of the objects of economic criminology and the content of criminalized economic activity, does not yet have an unambiguous interpretation both in the scientific literature and among practitioners. This is an obvious fact. Therefore, it is extremely important to highlight such of its features and characteristics that would have objective criteria. To do this, it is necessary - yes, positivist lawyers will not be offended (that’s how they were taught!..) - to abandon the use of such epithets as “illegal”, “illegal”, etc. They look like an integral attribute of the formal legal approach to formulating definitions of any concepts in the fabric of legal analysis, but they do not bring us one step closer to understanding the essence of the phenomenon of economic crime.
As noted above, the central problem in determining the content of the concept of “economic crime” is determining the boundaries of this social phenomenon. In one of the possible approaches, all crimes that affect (“encroach on...”) any types of economic relations that develop both in the economic sphere and outside of it can be classified as economic. However, such an exaggeratedly broad interpretation of the key category blurs the boundaries of the subject and object of study of the science of “economic criminology” and is unlikely to be acceptable for criminological analysis. With another version of the approach, it is possible to define clearer spatial boundaries: “consider economic crimes committed only in the economic sphere.” In this case, the economic category will include-
These include both criminal acts committed in the process of direct economic activity (business crimes, crimes in the sphere of entrepreneurship) and those not related to it, but committed within the boundaries of a functioning economic system. And we will be forced to call economic crimes, for example, such crimes as theft in production committed by hired workers (criminal misappropriation of money, inventory and other assets of the enterprise, etc.), crimes against the labor rights of citizens, official crimes, etc. These may also include crimes such as, for example, misappropriation or embezzlement of state property entrusted to the head of a state-owned enterprise or a ministry official, etc. In this regard, B.V. Volzhenkin noted that the very name of Chapter 22 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation does not seem very successful, and recommends turning to the title of the corresponding chapter of the Model Criminal Code for member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (adopted on February 17, 1996 by the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS) - “Crimes against the procedure for carrying out business and other economic activities."
Finally, with the third possible approach, only those crimes that are committed only in a key segment of the economy, business system, associated with making profit, can be classified as economic, that is, in the sphere of economic activity, the sphere of entrepreneurship. With this approach, only criminal acts of business entities themselves, committed directly in the process of economic activity, will be taken into account. In relation to the conditions of a market economy with a developed sphere of entrepreneurship, it is this version of the approach to defining the boundaries of the concept of economic crime that should be considered the most preferable.
As a result of using this approach, it becomes possible to formulate the special properties of this phenomenon. Firstly, it should be noted that economic crime in a market economy takes the form of crime in the sphere of economic activity. Secondly
Firstly, crime in the sphere of economic activity is predominantly crime in the sphere of entrepreneurship; In this regard, it is important to add one more feature related to the fact that such crimes are committed precisely by subjects of entrepreneurial (economic) activity. Thirdly, the content of the term economic crime is directly related to the concept of illicit enrichment. Enrichment is a transformed form of profit. Illegal enrichment is the goal, the driving motive of criminal acts in the economic sphere and can be understood as such behavior (activity) that ensures the satisfaction of the material needs of some subjects of economic relations to the detriment of the satisfaction of the material needs (and, of course, related economic interests) of other subjects , that is, by reducing the level (degree) of satisfaction of the latter. This definition corresponds to the well-known concept of Pareto efficiency and, in addition, shows another immanent sign of this crime - the non-equivalence of exchange.
Economic crime in its most general form can be defined as a specific, transformed form of economic activity that is carried out in the sphere of entrepreneurship by its subjects with the aim of achieving illegal enrichment. Or: economic crime is a transformed form of economic activity carried out in the sphere of entrepreneurship by its subjects using methods that ensure the achievement of illegal enrichment. However, the term “illegal enrichment” is extremely subjective and may be interpreted differently in the legislation of different countries.
therefore, it should be replaced with a synonym that has an objective criterion. This could be the concept of exchange equivalence. As a result, we can give a more precise definition: “Economic crime is a transformed form of economic activity carried out by its subjects for the purpose of illegal enrichment by violating the principle of equivalence of exchange.”
In this case, illegal enrichment in the fabric of social relations manifests itself on the surface of phenomena in its essentially objective form of socially unjust enrichment, which undermines the fundamental principles of a market economy - the imperatives of equivalence of exchange and freedom of competition. Thus, “illegal enrichment” or “socially unjust enrichment” are equivalent in essence to the concept of “inequivalence of exchange” and become synonymous with the destroyer (eliminator4) of the freedom of the market foundations of modern civilization. This gives economic crime the status of a phenomenon representing, on the one hand, a special social danger, on the other hand, a significant threat to the national economic security and the legal order of economic relations. In this regard, strange (to put it mildly) are attempts to make economic criminals, delinquent businessmen, a privileged caste of offenders to whom lenient penalties can be applied, or even removed from criminal punishment with imprisonment as a result of compensation for damage and etc.5
But the sphere of extra-legal economic relations, including in the space of criminal economic activity -
4 From the term “eliminate” - eliminate, liquidate.
5 Let us recall the permanent history of liberalization of criminal legislation, which, of course, requires special in-depth scientific study and impartial social understanding. By the way, the latest package of proposals, prepared by the business community for transmission to the President of the Russian Federation and voiced by Ombudsman B. Titov, delights with its cynical simplicity - it contains, in particular, a request-demand to expand “relaxations” for business from the standpoint of applying criminal repressive measures - to expand the list of eligible under the already lobbied and enacted Art. 76.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (exemption from criminal liability in cases of crimes in the sphere of economic activity) of “economic compounds” and change the approach to compensation for damage - now, under a number of “entrepreneurial” articles, they are exempted from criminal liability if damage is compensated in a fivefold amount, B. Titov and Co. propose to reduce compensation for damage to its actual value
criminal economy, is regulated by the so-called “shadow” law, the essence of which in my own interpretation will be given below.
“Shadow” law is a set of informal norms and rules operating in the shadow economy. “Shadow” law is a parallel regulatory system, ensuring the functioning of the shadow sector of the economy and the activities of subjects of shadow economic relations. The features of shadow law are determined by the complex structure of the shadow economy itself, which includes the shadow (non-criminal) segment itself and the criminal economy, consisting of two subsystems - criminalized economic activity and criminal economic activity. Each of these segments has its own specific regulation through “shadow” law.
Thus, criminal economic activity is carried out primarily in a normative space, formed in accordance with the traditions of the subculture of the criminal environment, where so-called concepts operate instead of the norms of law or morality accepted in society. Criminalized economic activity is associated with the commission of economic crimes by legal business entities, due to which “shadow” law operates here, determined by a gross violation of the norms of the official legal system regulating business activities in the legal sector of the economy. In addition, predominantly for legal business structures created by organized crime, it is typical to commit not only
economic, but also other criminal crimes that use non-economic methods to maximize profits and achieve victories in competition - racketeering, blackmail, extortion, threats, the use of violence, contract killings, etc.
“Shadow” law, which regulates the activities of entities in the non-criminal segment of the shadow economy, is least capable of generating negative external effects for the functioning of the official legal system regulating economic relations in the country. The fact is that the existence of this segment is mainly due to the shortcomings of the legal economy and the corresponding legal regulation and is designed to smooth them out. We are talking about the so-called damper effect, which is inherent in this segment and manifests itself especially during difficult periods of economic development, when the shadow economy becomes for part of the population the only possible or vital additional source of income, allowing them to survive rather than make super-profits. Such shadow activities are associated with the performance of various types of hired labor or small business (including those carried out in the form individual entrepreneurship), which are not prohibited by law, but do not receive official registration and registration - private transportation, tutoring, repair, construction and other types of work, provision of various services, etc., carried out without official registration, obtaining licenses, patents, etc. p. As a result of such labor or entrepreneurial activity, the state does not receive the required tax deductions. However, in
values without a multiple increase (the Ministry of Economic Development proposed reducing the fine multiple to two); In addition, it is proposed that for certain economic crimes of minor and medium gravity (for example, under Articles 180, 194, 199 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) for the first violation not to introduce criminal punishment at all (!), but to bring to criminal liability “only in the case of a repeated offense, committed within a certain period of time after the first.” See: Milyukova Ya. Putin will be told about the strongest pressure on business in recent years // Official website of RBC. URL: http://www.rbc.ru/economics/ 10/05/2016/573206eb9a7947241a9af2e6. The question arises, the more dangerous is a thief who commits theft for the first time - after all, he causes material damage to his victims that is fundamentally incomparably smaller, simply scanty, compared to the damage from the crimes of a delinquent businessman?! So, following the logic of the liberalizers, the lobbied legal innovation should also be extended to this category of criminals (and perhaps to some others?), otherwise the most important constitutional principle of equality of all before the law and the court will inevitably be violated? O tempora, o mores!
In this area, the shadow economy to a certain extent compensates people for the loss of income and standard of living due to economic crises and other social disasters, while official institutions fail to cope with these tasks.
Why does “shadow” law pose a particular threat to society and the state? This is due to the fact that its norms “fix” in the shadow economy the admissibility and acceptability of violating the fundamental system-forming principles on which the framework of a free market economy rests - the principles of equivalence of exchange, equality of subjects of economic relations, freedom of competition, trade, pricing, etc. For example, in the segment of criminalized economic activity, fraud, which underlies almost any economic crime, becomes the main non-economic tool of competition and extraction of excess profits, as well as ensuring illegal enrichment on this basis. At the same time, law-abiding economic entities find themselves the losers, which destroys the entire scheme of the existence of legitimate economic relations in the country and undermines the thousand-year-old foundations of the economic world order. Thus, “shadow” law is the worst enemy of a unified normative order in society.
However, in the non-criminal segment of the shadow economy, in certain historical periods, the so-called compensatory “shadow” law can operate - a system of norms and rules that compensate and smooth out the shortcomings of legal regulation established in the legal economy of the country. If in a legal economy the legal and fiscal regime does not provide real incentives for entrepreneurship or work, or even makes them economically meaningless, the subjects of these relations are forced to “go into the shadows.” The well-known Peruvian shadow economy researcher Hernando de Soto (lat. Hernando de Soto) argues that the more ineffective the state is in the legal sector, the more intense this transition is.
This phenomenon is sometimes called “escape from official rules.” According to
Soto, there is a system of relative benefits and costs of compliance by citizens with the norms of the legal legal system. At the same time, high costs force some citizens to come under the jurisdiction of “shadow” law, and others to withdraw their capital abroad. This reduces investment opportunities in the country and slows down economic development. However, the price of extralegality, i.e. compliance with the norms of “shadow” law, in turn, can also be high. The latter is due to uncertainty regarding the use of property rights and the protection of contracts, the difficulty of access to credit, insurance and investment resources, and the inaccessibility of legal legal instruments. In this regard, an important feature of “shadow” law is that in the shadow economy, mainly in the criminal segment, it is impossible to officially consolidate property rights and legal protection contracts by law. Therefore, shadow and criminal capital strive to legalize and acquire official legal status.
The particular value of a legal legal system for economic development and welfare growth is that, through equal and immediate access of all citizens to a functioning justice system, it facilitates transactions and makes contracts reliable. “Shadow” law is flawed in this regard. Moreover, “shadow” law has another significant systemic flaw, which is a powerful limiter for the growth of the shadow economy - it is not able to solve the problem of free access to legal means of investment, pooling of property and resources, sharing of responsibilities, long-term development and accumulation of wealth.
Corruption is an integral factor in the evolution of the criminal economy. The concept of corruption was first legally defined in Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 273 of December 25, 2008 “On Combating Corruption” (clause 1 of Article 1): “a) abuse of official position, giving a bribe, receiving a bribe, abuse of power, commercial bribery or other illegal use by an individual of his official position contrary to the legitimate interests of society and the state for the purpose of
obtaining benefits in the form of money, valuables, other property or services of a property nature, other property rights for oneself or for third parties, or the illegal provision of such benefits to the specified person by other individuals; b) committing the acts specified in subparagraph “a” of this paragraph on behalf of or in the interests of a legal entity.”
In the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation”, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 683 of December 31, 2015, corruption is included among the main threats to state and public security (clause 43).6
For criminological analysis, the study of, firstly, corruption as an economic phenomenon, and secondly, business corruption as its dominant part is of particular importance.7 In this sense, corruption is of criminological interest both from the standpoint of describing its special properties, determinant factors and the nature of the consequences , and in order to find effective countermeasures.
What is corruption as an economic phenomenon? Let's start with the fact that corruption is a specific latent form of socially unauthorized relations of exchange, redistribution and appropriation of economic goods, funds, securities and assets, as well as rights to them. It is implemented through the rent-seeking behavior of officials and the search for benefits on their part by introducing administrative barriers and restrictions for civil society actors. Corruption limits economic freedom, freedom of competition and access of citizens and businesses to national resources, undermines the foundations of the equivalence of exchange relations and the principle of fairness of distribution relations in society.
Corruption is a non-economic form of providing advantages in competition for business entities that have corrupt connections with officials. Corruption reproduces the conversion of power into property and capital, ensures the initial accumulation of capital for corrupt officials and strengthens the foundations of the plutocratic form of the political regime, etc.
The approach to the analysis of corruption as an economic institution allows us to formulate criminologically important conclusions that are important for anti-corruption policy and national security strategy: the corruption model of economic and state management provides two opposite vectors of development - on the one hand, maximizing personal benefits for corrupt officials (officials) and corrupt officials (business entities), on the other hand, minimizing the efficiency of resource use for the state and citizens, leading to an absolute or relative decrease in the level of national wealth and public welfare.
The economic approach to combating corruption is important both for criminologists and for the legislator himself who determines anti-corruption policy. In general terms, the concept of combating corruption is quite clearly formulated in the Federal Law of December 25, 2008 No. 273-FZ “On Combating Corruption” - clause 2 of Art. 1: “activities of federal government bodies, government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, bodies local government, civil society institutions, organizations and individuals within the limits of their powers: a) to prevent corruption, including the identification and subsequent elimination of the causes of corruption (prevention of corruption); b) by identifying
6 Let us note that in the previous edition of the “Strategy” “criminal attacks related to corruption” were named only “one of the main sources of threats to Russia’s national security.” See: paragraph 37 of the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020”, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 537 of May 12, 2009.
7 Considering corruption as an economic phenomenon or, in other words, an economic institution, implies a primary study of precisely that part of it, which we call “business corruption.” The emphasis on studying business corruption is justified both in connection with its share in the total annual capacity of the corruption market, and as a result of the particular danger of its negative external effects for ensuring law and order in the economy, society and the state.
prevention, suppression, detection and investigation of corruption offenses (anti-corruption); c) to minimize and (or) eliminate the consequences of corruption offenses.”
The essence of the economic approach to combating corruption is, on the one hand, to influence risks by tightening the conditions for corrupt officials and corrupters (increasing the likelihood of identifying and punishing offenders, toughening penalties associated with imprisonment, confiscation of property and loss of rights ), on the other hand, creating advantages for those representatives of officials and business who honestly and law-abidingly engage in their professional activities. Nobel Prize winner in economics Gerry Becker said that the economic approach to crime is amazingly simple, it is that people decide whether to commit a crime or not by comparing [their expected] benefits and costs of crime. In other words, everyone who intends to commit a crime first compares for themselves the possible benefits (English benefit) and potential costs (English expected cost) of the future act. Becker emphasizes that cost-benefit analysis is the main way to understand why some individuals or groups are more likely to commit crimes than others; The economic approach assumes that people act rationally, focusing their behavior on benefits and costs - taking into account all ethical, mental and other aspects that determine their behavior.
The imperative rule applies: “If the benefits of crime increase or the costs of crime decrease, then crime increases.” The reasons for the increase in benefits in relation to corruption are that the ease of making corrupt transactions increases, the size of bribes for corrupt officials and the size of preferences and benefits received in return for corrupt officials increase, etc. The reasons for reducing costs are that the likelihood of detecting a crime and being convicted of it decreases, the severity of punishment decreases, and moral standards are eroded.
To solve the problem of combating crime, it is necessary to effectively
act on the system of benefits and costs under consideration: minimize the benefits from crimes and maximize the costs from them for the criminals themselves. This is the essence of the economic approach to combating crime and corruption. Since corruption is a more complex criminal phenomenon compared to most acquisitive crimes of a common criminal nature (thefts, robberies, robberies, etc.), the impact on the system of benefits and costs here requires an extraordinary justification.
In addition to measures to directly influence criminal benefits and costs, the system of state and municipal service itself should be criminologically verified so that in its fabric the conditions and causes that determine corrupt behavior are minimized. In accordance with the approach generally accepted in world practice, based on the concept of G. Becker, it is important, on the one hand, to create conditions for state/municipal employees under which there is a powerful system of legal material incentives, social and other benefits and guarantees, which together provide the unconditional attractiveness and profitability (in a broad sense) of engaging in this type of activity. On the other hand, at the same time it is necessary to form a clear system of high liability (disciplinary, administrative, civil, criminal, as well as financial, property and reputational), which would minimize the likelihood of committing illegal acts of a corrupt nature.
This practice of an economic approach to combating corruption usually underlies the anti-corruption policy strategy of the so-called Western countries (although it should not be idealized either), but has not yet been fully comprehended and mastered in our country. Although, in fairness, it should be noted that, judging by some statements and practical steps, our leadership has, in fact, a similar understanding of the problem. Here, for example, is a quote from a pre-election article by V.V. Putin: “We will act consistently, meaningfully and decisively. By eliminating the fundamental causes of corruption and
punishing specific corrupt officials. Creating motivation for those people who are ready to serve Russia faithfully. As a result, we must ensure that reputational, financial, material and other risks make corruption unprofitable. Here it is useful to look at the anti-corruption practices of European countries - they know how to monitor such things.”
This is an example of a typically economic approach to combating corruption offenses. And the implementation in practice of an anti-corruption strategy and several national anti-corruption plans - what is this if not the creation of a whole system of risks for those who intend to engage in this illegal activity? Of course, such a system is still far from ideal, but the measures taken and being taken are confirmation of the line of an uncompromising fight against an extremely dangerous social phenomenon.8
In addition to the above terms, there are many others that, to one degree or another, reflect any particular properties of the phenomenon of criminal phenomena in the economic space and allow us to highlight its special facets. These include, for example, terms such as “objects of the criminal economy”, “subjects of criminal
financial economy”, “factors of determination of criminal phenomena in the economy”, “conditions and reasons for committing economic crimes”, “classification of economic crimes”, “laundering of dirty money”, “conversion of criminally obtained funds into property and capital”, “ ways to legitimize subjects of the criminal economy”, “the law of inversion of criminal capital and their subjects”, “a system for combating criminal phenomena in the economy”, “economic optimization of the fight against crime”, “economic theory of crime and punishment”, “economic approach to combating crime and corruption "etc.
The conjugation of these terms with those that I described above is important; an analysis of their entire totality in mutual connection and interdetermination is needed. This, we would like to hope, will help in the future to solve the problem of constructing a full-fledged conceptual apparatus of the branch of criminological science itself, “economic criminology.” I encourage my colleagues, especially young ones, to join this work! Indeed, despite certain circumstances, the relevance of forming the foundations of economic criminology and conducting relevant research in its fabric remains extremely high.
SELECTED WORKS BY V.V. KOLESNIKOV ON THE TOPIC.
Fundamentals of economic criminology / Crime among social subsystems. New concept and branches of criminology / Ed. Doctor of Law, Prof. YES. Shestakova. St. Petersburg: Legal Center Press, 2003. 353 p. - pp. 186-258.
Economic crime and market reforms: political and economic aspects. St. Petersburg: Publishing house SPbUEF, 1994. 172 p.
Crime in the sphere of economic activity. Monograph. St. Petersburg: University Foundation, 2000. 273 p. (co-authored with V.M. Egorshin).
Economic development and crime / Modern problems and strategy for combating crime. SPb.: St. Petersburg Publishing House. state University, Publishing House of the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg. state Univ., 2005. 592 p. - P. 266-351.
On the phenomenon of criminalization in the economic life of society and its understanding in theory / Economic theory on the threshold of the 21st century - 2. M.: Yurist, 1998. 768 p. - pp. 748-760.
8 Of course, it should be added that the success of such a struggle largely depends on the solution of a number of general systemic problems in our society: further implementation of the principles of separation of powers, the rule of law and the constitutional provision on the equality of all before the law and the court, accountability and control of power by society ; development of the foundations of civil society, independent media; formation and/or strengthening of institutions of electoral democracy, reputation, property, competition (economic and political), etc.
Methodology for developing a strategy and tactics to counter the criminalization of the Russian economy / What is “criminalization of the economy” and how to fight it? M.: Economics, 2011. 631 p. - pp. 489-556.
Economic theory of law / Economic theory of the shadow sector of the economy, crime and the effectiveness of countering it: training manual. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg YuI (f) AGP RF, 2015. 100 p.
Economic model and criminal law regulation // Russian magazine legal research. 2015. No. 1 (2). pp. 186-195.
Economic criminology: criminological security as a public good // Criminology: yesterday, today, tomorrow. 2015. No. 37 (2). pp. 16-35.
Criminology. Textbook for law schools. St. Petersburg: Lan Publishing House, 1998. - Chapter 17. Crime in the sphere of economic activity (co-authored with B.V. Volzhenkin and V.M. Egorshin). pp. 280-315.
Criminology. Textbook for law schools. St. Petersburg: Publishing house "Lan", 1999. - § 4 of chapter 4. Economic criminology. pp. 53-60; Chapter 18. Crime in the sphere of economic activity (co-authored with B.V. Volzhenkin and V.M. Egorshin). pp. 334-374.
Criminology: Textbook for law schools. SPb.: MIEP; SPbIGO; Book House LLC, 2007. - Chapter 11 “Criminological characteristics and prevention of economic crime.” pp. 320-360.
Private criminology: Textbook / Ed. ed. Doctor of Law Sciences, prof., honored. activities Sciences of the Russian Federation D.A. Shestakov. St. Petersburg: Publishing house of R. Aslanov “Legal Center PRESS”, 2007. Chapter 2 “Economic crime” (co-authored with S.V. Stepashin). pp. 49-138.
REFERENCES
1. Becker G.S. The Economics of Crime // Cross Sections. 1995. Fall. P. 8-15.
2. Borisov O.A., Kolesnikov V.V. The phenomenon of corruption as a threat to national security // Russian criminological view. 2007. No. 2 (10). pp. 149-158.
3. Volzhenkin B.V. Crimes in the sphere of economic activity (economic crimes). St. Petersburg: Legal Center Press, 2002. 641 p.
5. Kolesnikov V.V. Corruption as a social phenomenon and a special type of exchange relationship // Proceedings of the St. Petersburg Legal Institute of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation. 2001. No. 3. P. 277-289.
6. Crime among social subsystems. New concept and branches of criminology / Ed. Doctor of Law, Prof. YES. Shestakova. St. Petersburg: Legal Center Press, 2003. 353 p.
7. Soto E. de. The mystery of capital. Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails throughout the rest of the world. Per. from English M., 2001. 272 p.
8. Soto E. de. The Other Way: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. M.: Catallaxy, 1995. 320 p.
9. Shestakov D.A. Criminology. Crime as a property of society. Short course. SPb., St. Petersburg University. Publishing house "Lan", 2001. 260 p.
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2. Borisov O.A., Kolesnikov V.V. Fenomen korruptsii kak ugrozy natsional"noy bezopasnosti. . Rossiyskiy kriminologicheskiy vzglyad - Russian criminological outlook. 2007, no. 2 (10), pp. 149-158.
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6. Prestupnost" sredi sotsial"nykh podsistem. Novaya kontseptsiya i otrasli kriminologii. . Pod red. d.y.n., prof. D.A. Shestakova. SPb.: Yuridicheskiy tsentr Press, 2003, p. 353.
7. De Soto H. Zagadka kapitala. Pochemu kapitalizm torzhstvuet na Zapade i terpit porazhenie vo vsem ostal "nom mire. . Per. s angl. M., 2001, p. 272.
8. De Soto H. Inoy put": Nevidimaya revolutsiya v tret"em mire. . M.: Catallaxy, 1995, p. 320.
9. Shestakov D.A. Kriminologiya. Prestupnost" kak svoystvo obshchestva. . Kratkiy kurs. SPb., Sankt-Peterburgskiy universitet. Izd-vo "Lan"", 2001, p. 260.
Vadim Vyacheslavovich Kolesnikov - doctor economic sciences, professor, senior adviser to justice, honorary worker of higher professional education of the Russian Federation, honorary professor of the St. Petersburg International Criminological Club, head of the department of general humanitarian and socio-economic disciplines of the St. Petersburg Law Institute (branch) of the Academy of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation (St. Petersburg, Russia); e-mail: [email protected]
Vadim Vyacheslavovich Kolesnikov - doctor of economics, professor, senior counselor of justice, honorary worker of higher education of Russia, honorary professor of Saint-Petersburg International Criminology Club, head of the department of humanities and socio-economic disciplines of Saint-Petersburg Law Institute of Academy of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation (Saint-Petersburg, Russia); e-mail: [email protected]