In 1992, the implementation of the program for Russia's transition to a market economy began under the leadership of the government, headed by Boris Yeltsin (combining this position with the presidency until June 1992), and most importantly, the Deputy President for Economic Policy (then First Deputy and Acting Prime Minister) Yegor Gaidar. In December 1992, Gaidar, under fire of criticism, was dismissed and replaced by Viktor Chernomyrdin. But the basis of the economic system he created in 1992 has survived to this day.

Economic and ideological justification for reforms

The economic crisis in the USSR began in the late 1980s. At the same time, projects to transfer the Soviet economy onto capitalist lines began to be proposed as a way out of the crisis. This included not only the abandonment of the state production plan and the transition to market pricing, but also the privatization of many public sector enterprises. Stagnation in the public sector became obvious in the early 1990s, although there is still no clear opinion about its reasons: were they purely economic or also political.

Opportunities for private entrepreneurship appeared under M. S. Gorbachev. Some attribute the economic difficulties of the last years of the USSR to the fact that state enterprises began to sell their products through the private sector, which, without producing anything, began to receive speculative profits. Inflation increased markedly in the last two years of Gorbachev's rule, and the standard of living of the majority of the population fell. At the same time, the first legal Soviet millionaires appeared. [C-BLOCK]

Gaidar’s reforms generally continued the line that had emerged under Gorbachev, only they were radical and proceeded at an accelerated pace. At that time, there was a discussion in society and in political circles about how to carry out the clearly overdue transformations. The most famous program (alternative to Gaidar’s) for the transition to capitalism was the famous “500 days”, prepared by a team of economists under the leadership of academician Stanislav Shatalin and Grigory Yavlinsky and proposed to the leadership of the USSR under Gorbachev in 1990. This project was supported by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Ryzhkov and approved in September 1990. However, its implementation was never started due to political reasons. In addition to the fact that “500 days” provided for implementation on the scale of the entire Soviet Union, the last leadership of the USSR clearly lacked the political will to implement unusual plans. Since August 1991, Yeltsin set a course for the Russian Federation to secede from the USSR, and they never returned to the “500 days” project.

Yeltsin, who loved decisive action, was clearly impressed by Gaidar’s willingness to carry out large-scale economic modernization, stopping at nothing. Before his appointment to the government, Yegor Gaidar headed the economic block in the leading publications of the CPSU - the Kommunist magazine and the Pravda newspaper. Back in the 1980s, he formed a critical attitude towards the economic teachings of Marx and the activities of his Soviet followers. But his acquaintance with alternative economic theories was narrow (it could not have been otherwise under Soviet conditions) and selective. In particular, opponents subsequently pointed out to him that he compiled his program according to the recipes of one American economist, Milton Friedman, known for his monetarist concept, which by the early 1990s had already become archaic. Gaidar continued to blindly follow this theory.

Key reforms and their features

The basis of the reforms were: free market pricing, privatization of the public sector, abolition of the state monopoly on foreign trade and the fight against the state budget deficit by saving on social spending. The key point was the liberalization of commodity prices, announced on January 2, 1992. As a result, in one month average retail prices soared by 345%, and annual inflation amounted to 2500%. Retail turnover fell by half over the year, which clearly showed a decrease in the purchasing power of most of the population.

On June 11, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation adopted a state privatization program. According to it, small enterprises could be sold into private hands, and large ones could be transformed into open joint-stock companies. At the same time, so-called vouchers were introduced, which every citizen of the Russian Federation could purchase from the state for 25 rubles, at the rate of one voucher per person. The voucher had its nominal value fixed - 10,000 rubles, i.e. that share of federal property that fell on one citizen. Vouchers were promoted as an opportunity for every citizen to participate in the privatization of state property. In fact, these financial documents have become a type of shares that are freely traded on the stock market. Their real market value was negligible, and most citizens simply sold them off. And immediately speculators appeared who began to buy them from the population in huge quantities. Several thousand vouchers in one hand already represented a real amount for which one could buy a stake in the enterprise.

Gaidar's innovations marked the beginning of the formation of a large private sector in the Russian economy, the creation of large corporations with mixed public-private capital, sharp social stratification and the formation of a class of business oligarchs closely associated with government agencies and government orders. In short, these reforms laid the foundation for the socio-economic system of modern Russia.

Positive and negative ratings

Rector of RANEPA Vladimir Mau believes that in disputes about the meaning of the economic model proposed by Gaidar, the parties mainly start from two unprovable judgments: Gaidar destroyed the economy and robbed the people, or the economy was destroyed by the communists before Gaidar, and he built it again. It is clear that such discussions will lead nowhere and will only stop when this economic model itself, for some reason, ceases to be a reality.

Specific complaints against Gaidar relate to what happened under him and after him, throughout the 1990s, to the real drop in production (by 45% per decade), as well as to the fact that the middle class, which was declared to be the main interested in reforms, never emerged under Gaidar . On the contrary, the majority of those who, based on their income, could have been classified in this class in late Soviet times and formed its basis in market conditions, during the period of Gaidar’s reforms slipped into the category of paupers. Historian Yu. P. Bokarev believes that Gaidar’s reform had such consequences because it did not take into account the realities of modern post-industrial society and did not set as its goal the transition to it, but was inspired by ideas drawn from the books of economists of the old industrial era. The free privatization of apartments cannot be credited to Gaidar, due to the fact that the law on this was adopted by the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation back in June 1991.

Yeltsin's decree of January 29, 1992 on complete freedom of trade softened the negative social consequences of Gaidar's reforms. Citizens who could barely make ends meet were given the opportunity to feed themselves and their families during those difficult years by selling part of their property.

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“Gaidar reforms”: strategy and stages

The main ideologist of the new government course and the first deputy prime minister, as well as the minister of economy and finance, was E. Gaidar, in June 1992. By decree of President B. Yeltsin, he was entrusted with the duties of Chairman of the Russian Government. Along with E. Gaidar, A. Shokhin, appointed Deputy Prime Minister for Social Affairs, A. Chubais, Chairman of the State Property Management Committee, took an active part in the development and implementation of a program of radical reforms based on the Western model of development,
P. Aven - Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, V. Lopukhin - Minister of Fuel Industry and Energy, V. Mashits - Chairman of the Committee for Economic Cooperation with the CIS Countries, etc. The peculiarity of this “government of reforms” was that almost none of the new ministers had practical experience in public administration and economic management. The new government gave priority to the tasks of transitioning the economy to market methods of management. Its most important activities included price liberalization for the bulk of goods and services; liberalization of foreign trade as one of the most important means of filling the market with goods and moving towards an open economy; financial stabilization - suppression of inflation, tightening of credit, monetary and financial policies, strengthening of the national currency; radical structural reforms – privatization, forcing bankruptcy of unprofitable industries and a number of others.

Price liberalization – this is a partial or complete abolition of state price regulation; transition to price formation on the free market. Liberalization of foreign trade- Thisremoval or easing of any restrictions in economic relations between countries.Privatization - transfer to private ownership of state or municipal property (land plots, industrial enterprises, banks and other financial institutions, means of transport, communications, mass media, buildings, shares, etc.) for a fee or free of charge.

These transformations, carried out in the national economy by the government of E. Gaidar until December 1992, were called “Gaidar reforms” in the scientific and historical literature.

From the very beginning, reformers refused to develop and implement the so-called. The “soft” concept of market reforms, in contrast to the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and China, they took a path that included strict monetary and fiscal policies without controlling prices and incomes.

The reforms were initially of a conflictual nature. They were aimed at overcoming the country's socio-economic crisis, but through a quick and radical change in the entire previous economic system.

E. Gaidar’s economic reforms were carried out with an empty treasury, in the absence of a minimum consensus in society regarding the reforms themselves and the corresponding “balance” between the legislative and executive powers. This led to friction and constant conflicts, which hampered the consistent implementation of planned activities. Consensus - a method of making management decisions on the basis of general agreement and the absence of fundamental objections from the majority of interested parties.

In addition, mistakes were made in carrying out the reform itself, there was an underestimation of objective factors of economic development and an exaggeration of spontaneous, market mechanisms for regulating the economy. In the field of economic policy, priority was given to the choice of a general strategy for carrying out reforms to the detriment of developing tactics and developing specific mechanisms for implementing decisions.

The government, which began reforming the Russian economy, was also confident that the price of reforms would not become too high, and that things would be “worse and difficult” for Russians for about six months. “It will be difficult for us,” Boris Yeltsin said on December 30, 1991, “but this period will not be long. We are talking about 6-8 months.” He promised to achieve economic stabilization and gradual improvement of people's lives by the fall of 1992.

The initial measures of the government of E. Gaidar and the reform option he chose, which had dire consequences for the well-being of the population, are divided into three stages.

The first stage, designed for one to one and a half years, is liberalization. It began in January 1992; all decisions made during this period to stabilize the economy can be attributed to decisions of an orthodox nature, since the state was removed from regulating the production process and prices. At this stage, it was planned to quickly implement the liberalization of prices and foreign economic activity, strict fiscal and monetary policies, as well as privatization, which could provide a competitive environment in the market and create a multimillion-dollar layer of owners.

The second stage, covering a period of two years, is stabilization. It was assumed that at this stage the decline in production would stop, monthly inflation rates would decrease, the national currency exchange rate would stabilize, and the socio-economic standard of living of the population would increase.

The third stage, scheduled until the end of 1995, is the investment stage. It was associated with the transition to an active investment policy and the achievement of financial stabilization.

In order to implement “shock” reforms, the government developed specific programs based on relevant Presidential Decrees. Among them: “Program for Deepening Reforms” (July 1992); the “Three Year Reform Plan” drawn up by the government at the end of 1992 in such a way that it could be realistically monitored and updated annually; program “Development of reforms and stabilization of the Russian economy for 1993-1995.” (August 1993) and others. All of them included a number of measures in the spirit "shock therapy" focused on the creation of market mechanisms, the development of competition and entrepreneurship.

However, programs "shock therapy" which included measures of a market nature, in the form as they were originally outlined by the government of E. Gaidar, were carried out until December 1992. On December 12 of the same year, the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies of Russia dismissed the acting. Prime Minister E. Gaidar. Two days later, V. Chernomyrdin was appointed to his place, and on December 31 he signed a government decree on state regulation of prices. Some members of V. Chernomyrdin’s government began to demonstratively distance themselves from Gaidar’s “three-year reform plan.” There was a temporary setback in the “Gaidar reforms”, although the general direction of movement towards the market was preserved. Policy "shock therapy" did not lead to the expected results, and the “cost” of reforms for society turned out to be much higher than the reformers expected.

Thus, from the above it follows: firstly, one of the most important conditions for the formation of a new economic system in Russia was politics "shock therapy"; secondly, the government of E. Gaidar adopted a radical version of economic reforms, a rigid model of market reforms; thirdly, the main directions of “Gaidar’s reforms” were: price liberalization, liberalization of foreign economic activity, privatization, tight monetary and financial policies.

Material index
Course: The Beginning of Radical Reforms (1991-1993)
DIDACTIC PLAN
Socio-economic policy
“Gaidar reforms”: strategy and stages
Price liberalization
Liberalization of foreign economic activity
Carrying out privatization
Agrarian reform
Regional economic policy
Social politics
Political process

Assessments of the work of the government of that time are directly opposite and agree on only one thing: Gaidar and his team liquidated the Soviet economy. Only some call it destruction, others call it liberation.

Journalist Yegor Gaidar(head of the economic policy department in the Kommunist magazine, head of the economics department of the Pravda newspaper) became deputy chairman of the Russian government for economics on November 6, 1991. From November 11, 1991, he moved from post to post there - Minister of Economy and Finance, Minister of Finance , first deputy chairman of the government. And on June 15 he was appointed acting prime minister. Gaidar was dismissed on December 14, 1992 after the candidacy of the new prime minister was approved - Viktor Chernomyrdin. But this was not the end of the reformer’s stay in the government structures. From September 18, 1993, he was First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and from September 22, 1993 to January 20, 1994, he was Acting Minister of Economy.

“When Gaidar came, there was no longer an economy,” recalls Rector of RANEPA Vladimir Mau(in 1991-1994 - adviser to Gaidar). — Gold and foreign exchange reserves amounted to $30 million. Journalists didn’t believe it and wrote “30 billion” everywhere. At the same time, the claims to prosperity created by the oil boom of the 70s were very great. 80% of the urban population demanded no deficit. But with a threefold drop in oil prices in the 80s, it was impossible to ensure the same consumption without reforms.”

“The economy was still functioning,” objects historian Evgeny Spitsyn. “However, economic ties weakened, and their severance was provoked by the Gaidarites themselves. Yes, Gaidar formally came to power in November 1991, but in fact it belonged to Yeltsin and his entourage since August. And the economy in this team was led by people from Gaidar’s circle. The shortage was caused in advance by a widely circulated promise to lower prices.”

In November - December 1991, there were lines for everything: bread, meat, sausage, vodka, vegetables... Cards were introduced by region. At the end of November 1991, Gaidar outlined the government's action plan: to release prices and wages with a tough financial policy. That is, don’t give money to anyone.

From January 2, prices for almost all goods (except bread, milk, alcohol, as well as utilities, transport and energy) were freed. A value added tax of 28% was introduced. Import restrictions were lifted and a zero import tariff was established. And on January 29, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On Freedom of Trade”: enterprises and citizens were given the right to conduct trade, intermediary and purchasing activities without permits.

“This decree led to a gradual saturation of the market and an increase in inventory in retail,” believes economist, member of the Expert Council under the Government of the Russian Federation Vadim Novikov. - We need to return it. The state is now preventing the buyer and seller from finding each other.”

“GDP in the 90s collapsed by 45%, production by 60%, investments decreased by more than 5 times,” assesses the consequences of the reforms Vladislav Zhukovsky, economist, member of the presidium of the Stolypin Club. “But crime has increased 5 times, the number of diseases has increased hundreds of times. In the 90s, about 70% of Russians were poor, and approximately 90% were poor. The middle class was destroyed, and the opportunity to enrich itself was given to a narrow circle of “insiders.” Gaidar and his team had the task of destroying the economy and then distributing enterprises through voucher privatization and loans-for-shares auctions to the “right people.” And also personal enrichment. If Gaidar had been allowed to complete the reforms, then the standard of living in Russia would have been equal not to Honduras, but to Zimbabwe. But still, the result was a monopoly economy. We took the worst of the capitalist and Soviet systems - what we got was a gangster, oligarchic, bureaucratized scoop. Gaidar is gone, but his work lives on.”

Edition: History of Russia: XX century. A guide for applicants to universities

§ 2. Russian economy in 1992–2002.

Reforms of E. T. Gaidar

The economy of post-perestroika Russia and the constitutional structure of the country had to come into line with the new political system, which implied a transition to a market economy, demonopolization and privatization of enterprises, the creation of a class of private entrepreneurs and owners, and strengthening the power of the president. At the V Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation (October 1991), Boris Yeltsin came up with a program of radical economic reforms, providing for the liberalization of prices and wages, freedom of trade and privatization. Given the current difficult economic situation, deputies generally approved the program and even gave the president additional powers to implement it. The economic reform program, developed by Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian government E. T. Gaidar, provided for the liberalization of prices, and then the privatization of the public sector of the economy. The threefold increase in prices expected in 1992 (in 1991, compared to 1990, prices increased 2.6 times) was planned to be compensated by 70% with social benefits, an increase in wages, pensions, and scholarships. After a year of implementation of the reform, society should have felt the first positive results.

On January 2, 1992, Russia took the first step towards a market economy: pricing was no longer regulated, trade became free. According to E. Gaidar’s plan, this was supposed to return money to the role of a spontaneous regulator of prices and production, and lead to the destruction of the monopoly of intermediaries in the trading network. However, underestimation of the monopolization of production, as well as the government’s self-removal from control over price formation, led to their uncontrollable surge at the beginning of the year. In January 1992, prices increased by 1000–1200%, and by the end of the year they increased no less than 26 times. At the same time, wages increased in 1992 only 12 times. The reform did not provide for the indexation of savings deposits of the population, which led to their immediate depreciation. The government's hopes for large-scale foreign exchange assistance from the West did not materialize either. Under these conditions, the Yeltsin-Gaidar government was unable to fulfill the promised social guarantees when carrying out reforms. The main positive result at the initial stage of reform was the rapid filling of stores with goods, the elimination of product shortages and queues.

In February 1992, the government published a memorandum on economic policy for 1992. The main goal was to stabilize the financial system, create a deficit-free budget by ending subsidies to unprofitable enterprises and industries, and reducing social payments to the population. It was assumed that the stabilization of Russia's finances would lead to an increase in foreign and domestic investment in the Russian economy. The document also noted the advisability of freely setting energy prices and bringing them to world levels by the end of 1993. The release of prices with their stabilization in subsequent months and the saturation of the market created the preconditions for the second stage of reforms - the privatization of the public sector of the economy. The proposed reform program received the support of Russian President B.N. Yeltsin.

The reduction in government subsidies to enterprises in the winter and spring of 1992 (to reduce the level of inflation, according to E. Gaidar’s plan) met with resistance from the directors’ corps. Although industrial products became much more expensive, most enterprises, including the oil and gas industries, turned out to be unprofitable after price liberalization. This was explained both by an increase in tariffs for the transportation of goods and energy, as well as by a drop in consumer demand and a targeted reduction in government orders. The problem of mutual non-payments has worsened. By June 1, 1992, their amount reached about 2 trillion rubles. Directors of enterprises insisted on receiving a preferential government loan with further coverage of debts on mutual settlements. This point of view was supported by the Supreme Council and the Central Bank of Russia. On June 28, 1992, the Central Bank provided such a loan to enterprises. New financial resources not backed by goods and services entered circulation, increasing inflation. The collapse of industry was prevented through loans and a new round of hyperinflation. The average growth rate of the money supply in the second half of 1992 increased from 11.4 to 28% per month.

The government of E. Gaidar (he has been acting prime minister since June 1992) saw a way out of this situation in replacing government subsidies and loans with foreign investments, as well as investments from private individuals. Thus, the key issue became the privatization of the public sector. According to the scheme developed by the Russian State Property Committee headed by A. Chubais, two main options for privatization were outlined. The first of them provided for preferential acquisition by employees of about 50% of the shares of their enterprise. The second option is the acquisition by enterprise employees of a controlling stake of 51% under more stringent conditions. But in both cases, a significant part of the shares was concentrated among the directors. The remaining shares were put on open sale to Russian citizens in exchange for special privatization checks.

On August 19, 1992, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin issued a decree “On the introduction of a system of privatization checks in the Russian Federation.” On October 1, 1992, the issuance of vouchers (privatization checks) to the population at a nominal value of 10 thousand rubles began (voucher privatization).

In 1992, 24 thousand enterprises, 160 thousand farms, and 15% of the retail network were transferred to private ownership. As a result, 40 million nominal shareholders appeared in the country, while most of the enterprises came under the control of financial groups that bought vouchers from the population. Privatization completed its task halfway: by creating a layer of owners, it turned out to be economically ineffective and did not produce the expected growth in investment. Criticism of the government intensified, which was unable to stop the decline in production and the impoverishment of the population (about 44% of Russian residents were below the subsistence level). The decline in production in the country during the first nine months of reforms amounted to about 20%. At the end of 1992, in terms of national income, Russia was at the level of 1976, in terms of consumption structure - at the level of the 1960s. All this contributed to the development of a social crisis and led to a decline in the popularity of Gaidar’s government.

In such conditions, the president decided to change the composition of the government, which since December 1993 was headed by V.S. Chernomyrdin. The first period of Russian economic reforms, called the “Gaidar reforms,” has officially ended.

Economic development of Russia in 1993–1996.

In 1993, the government moved away from previous ideas about the role of state intervention in the economy, no longer absolutizing the free market. The new course in the economy was determined by V. S. Chernomyrdin, a representative of the oil and gas complex. During these years, the government took more into account the interests of Russian industry, especially export industries that replenish the budget with foreign currency. It was announced that the goals of the Cabinet of Ministers in 1993 were financial stabilization, reducing inflation to 5% per month, and supporting domestic producers.

On February 8, 1993, the “Civil Union” was registered in Russia - a centrist movement associated with industrial circles and created by A. Volsky. One of his program points was the requirement for the state to take measures aimed at supporting its industries. The Chernomyrdin government tried to establish contacts with such organizations, demonstrating its readiness to return to partial state orders. At the same time, it had to take into account the much more radical (liberal-market at that time) views of the Russian President and resist pressure from parliament, which advocated a full return to the system of state procurement and state lending. The political confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of government in 1993 narrowed the government's initiative and hindered its effective work.

Despite a number of measures taken, production continued to decline. The only positive results of the year include a significant reduction in inflation rates. Compared to 1992, it decreased by 2.8 times. Meanwhile, these results should not be exaggerated: over the year prices have increased almost 10 times. The Chernomyrdin government also failed to stop the continuing decline in industry. The production level in 1993 was 59.8% of the 1990 level. 7.8 million people were unemployed (10.4% of the country's active population), and unemployment figures continued to increase.

Following the results of the parliamentary elections in December 1993, in which pro-government and pro-presidential movements gained only about 1/3 of the votes, the President somewhat adjusted the economic policy of the Chernomyrdin government. In 1994–1997 Some sectors of the domestic, primarily mining, industry felt state support.

Compared to the first years of reforms, due to increased state regulation of economic processes, the rate of inflation decreased slightly, and the rate of decline in production also decreased. In 1994, the dynamics of price growth compared to 1993 decreased by 3.1 times. However, financial stabilization was never achieved, as shown by the scandalous cessation of the activities of MMM JSC, Chara, Russian House Selenga, Tibet, Vlastelina and other financial pyramids that skillfully used rampant inflation for fraudulent purposes; “Black Tuesday” on October 11, 1994, when the dollar exchange rate increased by almost a third during the day - from 3081 to 3926 rubles.

Government economic policy in 1995–1996 was focused on export industries. Russia's trade surplus in 1996 amounted to about 40 billion rubles. Economically prosperous areas specializing in export industries (gas, oil, metal) began to appear in the country. The country's largest financial and industrial groups (FIC) were formed on the basis of fuel and industrial enterprises. Among them are Interros (ONEXIM Bank, Norilsk Nickel, Novokuznetsk Metallurgical Plant), Lukoil (7 oil producing enterprises, 23 oil refineries, 3 financial and investment companies), etc.

Most regions of Russia, not connected with the oil and gas complex, production and export of raw materials, still remained in a deep economic crisis. The decline in industrial production in the country as a whole was about 4% per year. The reduction in production volumes compared to the Soviet period reached 60–65% at the end of 1996, which was higher than during the Great Patriotic War. It was not possible to create a stable financial system in the country; salaries for public sector employees were delayed for up to two years.

Economic development of Russia in 1997–2000.

On March 6, 1997, in the annual message to the Federal Assembly of President B. N. Yeltsin, the beginning of a new stage of liberal socio-economic reforms was announced. Among the priority areas of the renewed government, which soon included B. Nemtsov and A. Chubais as deputy prime ministers, were the development of a program to reduce the budget deficit and pension reform, the elimination of wage arrears by December 31, 1997, and the fight against corruption.

However, the work of the new government was reduced mainly to regulating financial and tax flows within the country. Among the most important decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers are the sequestration of the 1997 budget in the social part, Russia’s entry into the Paris Club of creditor countries, the placement of new Eurobond loans and State short-term obligations, and a new stage of privatization, primarily of the fuel and raw materials industry. Attraction of additional financial resources ($6 billion in foreign loans versus $2 billion in 1996), the cessation of financing of the military campaign in Chechnya, proceeds from privatization, and the policy of austerity social austerity made it possible, according to official data, to achieve an increase in gross domestic product in Russia by 1% per year. the first half of 1997. It should be noted that there was rapid growth in production in light industry, amounting to more than 9%. This was the first real success in the modern history of the Russian economy during the entire post-perestroika period. It should, however, be noted that the increase was achieved through the massive attraction of investments and loans, which meant an increase in government obligations to external and internal creditors.

Inflationary processes remained a serious problem. In August, preparations began for the implementation of monetary reform. It began with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 5 “On changes in the face value of Russian banknotes and the scale of prices.” Since January 1, 1998, the Russian ruble was denominated 1000 times. This measure contributed to the strengthening of the national currency and the stabilization of economic processes.

The rating of the Chernomyrdin-Chubais government began to grow. Considering the most important task to ensure the continuity of the transfer of state power, Boris Yeltsin decided to use the situation to prepare for future presidential elections. On March 23, 1998, Chernomyrdin and Chubais were dismissed. They were replaced by the young reformer S. Kiriyenko.

For the new prime minister, the pressure of internal and external debt on the country's economy became increasingly obvious. Costs for its maintenance amounted to 13% of all federal expenditures in 1996, 24% in 1997, and 30% in 1998. The new government tried to implement tougher economic policies, including higher tax rates and trade duties. This approach led initially to an increase in prices (by 10%), and then to the deepest financial collapse in the modern history of Russia. The day of August 17, 1998 actually marked the financial bankruptcy of Russia: the depreciation of the national currency and, as a consequence, the inability of the state to pay external and internal debts. The government and the Central Bank of Russia announced the devaluation of the ruble and the beginning of a review of state debt obligations, including a moratorium on payments on loans received from non-residents of Russia (for a period of 90 days). The financial crisis entered the stage of uncontrolled price increases, which more than quadrupled in a short time. The situation of the overwhelming majority of the country's population, including the middle strata of society, has deteriorated again. Under these conditions, the resignation of the Kiriyenko government became inevitable.

According to the Russian State Statistics Committee, the number of the country's population with incomes below the subsistence level reached 33 million people in August.

On September 11, the Russian government was headed by E.M. Primakov, setting a course for stabilizing the economy. Active support for domestic industry and agriculture was announced. Income tax rates for citizens have been increased, with a simultaneous reduction in the taxation of industrial investments and VAT. The weakening of the tax burden on the “real economy” (Primakov’s figurative expression, meaning manufacturing industries), along with a reduction in imports to Russia (caused by the fall of the national currency), contributed to the revival of domestic industry. This government policy received parliamentary support.

Measures were also taken to strengthen the national currency. Thus, stricter control was introduced over the activities of exporters - they had to sell 75% of foreign exchange earnings on exchanges. Stricter customs regulations were introduced. Along with the rise in world oil prices, this contributed to the payment of external debts and the attraction of funds into the country’s economy.

For the first time, there has been a real reduction in government spending on apparatus. During the first half of 1999, Russia's economic situation stabilized. However, the approaching presidential elections dictated their terms, and Primakov's government resigned. The next two cabinets of ministers (S. Stepashin and V. Putin) were mainly concerned with political tasks, postponing serious economic transformations until the issue of power was finally resolved.

On March 19, economist Yegor Gaidar, one of the main ideologists and leaders of economic reforms in Russia in the early 1990s, would have turned 60 years old.

Public opinion polls with enviable consistency place the politician in the category of the main national anti-heroes, although over the years the degree of this dislike has weakened, reports t

If in 2002, according to statistics from VTsIOM, 55% of Russians considered Gaidar’s reforms destructive, then in 2010 a similar epithet was applied to them by 23% (although another 15% believed that there was no need for them at all).

At the same time, the number of those who fully approve of the actions of the Yeltsin-Gaidar government has increased: from 2% in 2002 to 7% in 2010. The numbers still teeter on the edge of statistical error.

But, apparently, the supreme leaders of Russia belong to this category of the population. Thus, current President Vladimir Putin, after Gaidar’s death, called him “a true citizen,” “a patriot,” “a strong-willed man,” who, having led the process of transformation, “showed the best professional and personal qualities.”

The Russian service of the BBC decided to summarize some common statements about the merits of the politician, accompanying them with, if possible, laconic arguments and counterarguments. Theses for the debate that will inevitably unfold around the name of Yegor Gaidar for a long time to come.

Gaidar ruined the economy, the country was plunged into disaster

The transformational decline that occurred in Russia in the post-reform years was indeed enormous and, according to some estimates, unprecedented for the state in the absence of wars, epidemics and natural disasters:

The shadow economy grew from 10-15% of GDP under Brezhnev (the most generous estimates) to 50% of GDP in the mid-1990s
Income inequality has increased: the so-called Gini coefficient increased from 26% in 1986 to 40% in 2000
In the first years after the collapse of the USSR, crime doubled
Mortality in 1990-1994 increased by 60%
The share of R&D spending fell from 3.5% of GDP to about 1%
The aggregate index of industrial production in Russia reached the level of the early 1990s only in 2008

("Russian Economy. Oxford Collection"; other sources).

However, it would be too incorrect to attribute all the consequences of this transformational decline to the policies of Yegor Gaidar:

Firstly, he joined the government only in November 1991, when the process of transformation in the country was already in full swing
Secondly, it is difficult to blame Yegor Gaidar for the formation of structural imbalances in the Soviet economy: in particular, for the accumulation of a gigantic “money overhang” (money not backed by goods), which forced the Soviet government under the chairmanship of Valentin Pavlova to begin monetary reform
Thirdly, it is unlikely that Gaidar is to blame for the fact that prices for the main Soviet export resource - oil - have been falling since 1980, creating a budget deficit: first due to overproduction of the resource, and in 1991 - due to the end of the Gulf War "

Gaidar saved the country from mass famine

This point of view is as popular among Yegor Gaidar's associates as it is unpopular among his opponents.

In the book “Forks in the Contemporary History of Russia,” Gaidar himself wrote about the situation that had developed by the time he came to the government as follows: “The country was still bankrupt, foreign exchange reserves were close to zero. According to optimistic forecasts, grain reserves were sufficient until approximately February-March 1992..."

“The choice of accelerated price liberalization and accelerated lifting of trade restrictions prevented a catastrophic scenario on the country’s food market in the spring of 1992,” he noted.

Opponents of this point of view argue that there was no food disaster:

Firstly, the USSR had strategic reserves of grain, which economist Andrei Illarionov estimates at 48 million tons, which was enough to feed the people for a year in the absence of a new harvest.
Secondly, even the dying system of food distribution, according to the politician Grigory Yavlinsky, “did not raise fears that everything was about to perish,” because a new system was gradually replacing it: yes, “it was chaotic, strange, perverted, shadowy.” ", but quite functional
Thirdly, Gaidar, speaking about the depletion of grain reserves by March 1992, everywhere refers to a document that indicates the corresponding danger in March 1991 - that is, a year earlier than the described potential disaster

The policies of the Gaidar government led to the fact that the savings of Russians depreciated

“...By the politician’s self-confidently grinning face today, embarrassment is not visible: how, by ruining savings deposits, he threw tens of millions of his compatriots into poverty (destroying the basis of the very “middle class” that he swore to create),” he wrote about Yegor in 1998 Gaidar Alexander Solzhenitsyn, quite comprehensively reflecting the opinion of the majority of Russians about the achievements of Gaidar’s reforms.

This opinion is refuted by a number of researchers on the following grounds:

The first steps towards freezing the population's deposits in the Savings Bank were taken by the Soviet government as part of the monetary reform of Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov on January 22, 1991, according to which USSR citizens were prohibited from withdrawing more than 500 rubles per person per month
Yes, after a few months the ban was lifted, but at the same time in April they raised official prices by 65-70%. Next year's inflation of 2508.8% was still a long way off, but the purchasing power of money began to decline rapidly
In fact, there was no money in the Savings Bank, because all 369 billion rubles accumulated by Soviet citizens were withdrawn by the government of Nikolai Ryzhkov in 1990 to finance the budget deficit.

There are also counterarguments:

• The Soviet authorities confiscated the money, but only as borrowed funds, which were supposed to be returned. The problem is that the annual rate on these credit resources was at the level of 5% (that’s how much the government paid Sberbank for using the money), and neither Pavlov’s government nor the new Russian authorities, including Gaidar’s team, agreed to a radical increase in the rate
• As a result, the real rate on household savings was, according to some estimates, minus 60.8% in 1991, and minus 94.4% in 1992. Thus, in 1991, citizens’ savings depreciated by almost 61%, and the following year the remaining amount devalued by another 94.4%.

It was impossible to simply take and release prices, as Gaidar did

On January 2, 1992, the Yeltsin-Gaidar government exempted prices from regulation, which had previously been set by the state for decades of Soviet power. This process is called price liberalization.

Until now, a unified approach to this reform has not been formed in Russian public and academic discourse.

• Managed to eliminate the commodity shortage
• The country was saved from imminent famine (“Anyone who remembers the absolute emptiness of the shelves in the fall of 1991 and the real threat of famine in large cities understands why price liberalization was then accepted without much discussion,” wrote one of Yegor Gaidar’s associates, now the rector of the Academy of Civil Service under President Vladimir Mau)
• The internal convertibility of the ruble was ensured (that is, they prevented the transition to barter, when money is worthless and it is easier for people to exchange goods)

Opponents of reform in this form point to the following circumstances:

• The huge accumulated “money overhang”, that is, the lack of security of money in goods, with one-stage liberalization should have led to an increase in inflation - and so it happened
• It was impossible to let prices go in a situation where the entire economy of the country is state-owned, as a result of which huge monopolies begin to dictate prices (liberalization occurs not of prices, but of monopolies)
• In the absence of restraining mechanisms, price liberalization led “not to the creation of market competition mechanisms, but to the establishment of control over the market by organized criminal groups, extracting excess profits by inflating prices,” wrote economist Sergei Glazyev

Gaidar's government laid the foundations for future economic growth in Russia

Giving comprehensive, more accurate assessments of Yegor Gaidar's legacy is a task for future times. For now, without going to any of the extremes, we can only state that he really laid the foundations for the financial and economic structure of modern Russia, whatever this structure may be.

• In addition to price liberalization, the creation of a financial market, and privatization, Gaidar also participated in the development of the Tax Code, Budget Code, and legislation on the Stabilization Fund of Russia
• Many associates and simply supporters of Gaidar occupy key positions in the state and academic hierarchies (head of the Ministry of Economy Alexey Ulyukaev, rector of RANEPA Vladimir Mau)
• The rise in energy prices during the time of Vladimir Putin affected the economic institutions that had already been created by that time and were functioning

At the same time, it was in the 90s, according to some economists, that the structure of the Russian economy finally came to the resource type.

The post-reform years became “a period of rapid deindustrialization of the Russian economy and its transfer to a resource-based basis, and the rise in world fuel prices since 1999 appears to have strengthened this trend,” wrote Vladimir Popov, chief researcher at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

In 2004, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in his article “The Crisis of Liberalism in Russia,” came to the same conclusion: it was then that Russia became firmly dependent on raw materials (however, it was not specifically about Gaidar, but about liberal rule in general).

Subtotal

These thesis notes to the debate about Yegor Gaidar can be summed up in the words of the French moral philosopher La Rochefoucauld, who back in the 17th century said: “Philosophy triumphs over the sorrows of the past and future, but the sorrows of the present triumph over philosophy.”

As long as the 1990s are alive and “bleeding” in the consciousness of the majority of the Russian population, no dry academic discussions about Gaidar’s legacy will overpower this powerful emotional field. And academic discussions, as the above discussions partially show, do not yet seem to be completely cleared of emotions.