Civil defense second echelon. Russian second-tier shares
Before the start of the new season, idle observers had almost reached a consensus on which teams were destined to be almost guaranteed to win. We have already heard about the magnificent eight drivers and the quadriga of Ferrari, McLaren, Mercedes and Red Bull and are in incredibly high spirits due to the prospects of exciting battles and exciting competition on the track.
It will be very difficult for new teams in F1. Even those who are not “Hispania”.
But besides these glorious teams, there are other teams in Formula 1. If you’ve lost count after the long-running saga around USF1 and Hispania’s status confirmed at the last moment, here’s a hint: in Formula 1, in addition to the four conditional leaders, there are as many as eight more teams.
Eight teams and eight different stories - it's time to evaluate their professional suitability.
The “second echelon” of Formula 1 is quite logically divided into two parts. One is formed by newcomers - Virgin, Lotus and Hispania. The second is Williams, Renault, Force India and Toro Rosso. “Sauber” is stuck between two worlds - in spirit it is a new team, but for now, by inertia, it is enjoying the rich inheritance inherited from BMW, and for this reason it is rightfully ranked among the middle peasants.
With newcomers, everything is clear: their only opportunity to win points (of which, let us remember, more are being awarded) is to demonstrate amazing reliability in a situation where during the first races the tracks can turn into a battlefield. As we expected some time ago, Lotus adheres to this tactic. However Mike Gascoigne quite reasonably assumed that the first four races would not allow either Lotus or any of the other new teams to win points on their own.
We are inclined to believe that the entire 2010 will not allow them to do this - after the first few Grands Prix, new teams will be forced to demonstrate their skills in a discipline hitherto unknown to them: updating the car during the season. In this area, Gascoigne has the most experience, although, to be fair, in theory, the notorious CFD design will help Nick Wirth create new aerodynamic parts at amazing speed. However, creating does not mean immediately obtaining the required results on the track: previous seasons (and the experience of BMW’s torment) have shown that it is not possible to trust computer calculations without corrective purging in a wind tunnel. "Virgin", taking into account the very small budget, works here like a sapper - with no room for error.
“Hispania” is a separate conversation. The FIA spent many months and all its political authority to ensure that an analogue of the long-forgotten Forti appeared in Formula 1. Even an ordinary finish for the Dallara cars, which were not tested during off-season testing, will be a great achievement. The team starts the season in an even worse state than its fellow newcomers, meaning that the team's technical staff must make double efforts to eliminate the backlog.
The main question is whether the senior will find the strength to pay for this entire holiday of life Carabante. The day before, further speculation appeared that he was only a transit figure in the deal that was arranged Bernie Ecclestone. The Spaniard, they say, after a certain time must receive back the invested amount and can retire.
The Sauber team is still in limbo. We have dedicated ourselves to the difficult situation Peter Sauber a whole column - nothing has changed since then. The team really has a good car, but, alas, it is not last year’s miracle of the Brown tests. No more sponsors were added, but there were more competitors – including in the fight for these sponsors.
Sauber is a candidate for very big financial problems during the season.
As a result, Peter can only hope for a good start to the season: Pedro de la Rosa And Kamui Kobayashi must drive very carefully in the hope of getting precious points. Despite the fact that the mood in Hinwil now remains high, it is possible that the team will face financial difficulties already in the middle of the season.
And, finally, a group of clear leaders, for whose future, sports and financial, you don’t have to worry. The Renault, Toro Rosso and Williams teams have approximately equal strength. The team of Kubica and Petrov looks ambiguous: the tests showed some lack of speed, which the team explained by their decision to deliberately work with a program that was asynchronous in relation to competitors. But Renault is no longer a factory team (last season - when it was a factory team - the results were also not outstanding), and it will be difficult to assess the competence of the new management without the opportunity to test it in action at the first few Grands Prix.
Toro Rosso is a team that can present several surprises. First of all, even if it seems incredible, but Buemi And Alguersuari They have matured and are unlikely to make a large number of mistakes (this, however, was more likely to apply to Jaime in the 2009 season). Secondly, the new STR car is based on Newey’s old creation, which, apparently, is difficult to spoil.
The only question that haunts all observers is: why? Dietrich Mateschitz second team in Formula 1? If there are reports of an upcoming move to the Red Bulls Kimi Raikkonen are truthful, Toro Rosso has no need to develop young talents in Buemi And Alguersuari. The only thing that saves the guys from STR is that the Red Bull young talent program is now sparsely populated: only the bushy-haired Brendon Hartley has a very remote chance of participating in F1.
In the new season, Williams, as the team bosses admit, completely changed the concept of the car. The engine supplier has also changed. Test results remain mixed - the team has something to prove in the first few Grands Prix. In all the years - since the last victory in 2004 - Williams has been repeating the gradual decline of Tyrrell. That team also had a charismatic leader Ken Tyrrell, but as he aged, the team lost momentum. The decline was not immediate - periodically the team produced good results and technical solutions.
Renault, Toro Rosso, Williams and Force India seem to be at about the same level.
But, alas, no victories. If the Williams team intends to secure its future, the issue of a successor must be resolved immediately.
"Force India" thanks Karun Chandhok has somewhat lost its status as the only Indian hope, but is still faithful to the strategy that brought it to the podium in 2009. We are talking about the initial focus on tracks with low levels of downforce. However, the test results suggest that the overall balance this year is also shifted towards ordinary tracks.
In general, one thing is worth stating: against the backdrop of obvious leaders, many teams in the “second league” will not become extras. How can you not be happy?
Second-tier shares are shares of companies that are less in demand on the stock market and issued by not very large companies, these include: Aeroflot, AvtoVAZ, Bashneft, Rosbusinessconsulting, Uralsvyazinform, Irkutskenergo, MGTS, North-West Telecom, IRKUT Corporation, Severstal, Centertelecom and a few dozen more. These shares, like blue chips, are listed on exchanges. For example, on the RTS, second-tier shares are included in index RTS-2.
Second-tier stocks have low price-to-earnings ratios, and the stock may rise in price simply because the market values the stock more adequately—in fair proportion to earnings per share. In addition, it is easier for a small company to show significant growth - by 50 percent or more than for a giant - it simply has room to grow. Whether this company will grow or not depends on the company’s internal and external economic conditions, processes, and events, which investors need to focus on when choosing low-liquidity stocks for their portfolio.
The second-tier equity market has three main problems:
Low liquidity - for some securities, transactions are not concluded for months.
Large spreads, that is, the difference between the purchase and sale prices of a stock. If blue chip stocks have spreads of a fraction of a percent, then for second-tier securities they can reach 100 percent or more.
Instability. Quotes of such securities may not change for a whole year, and then suddenly make a significant jump in a couple of days.
Those. You shouldn't expect high, stable returns from such stocks over short periods of time, but you can expect good growth in the long term. Therefore, it is wise for an investor to invest money in the illiquid securities market if he has a significant amount of time to invest.
In the requirements for the composition of mutual funds, second-tier shares appear as unlisted securities (more liquid, less risky, less profitable/unprofitable) and as securities without a recognized quotation (less liquid, more risky, more profitable/unprofitable).
10. Modern market for initial public offering (IPO) in Russia
The term IPO (initial public offering) has rapidly burst into the stock market and now every issuer that intends to place its securities on the stock exchange or offer them to an unlimited number of people announces an IPO.
Changes in legislation regarding IPOs in Russia put an end to disputes about terms. It is obvious that a public primary placement in Russia will henceforth be understood as the placement of an issue of issue-grade securities through an open subscription, subject to the provision of placement services by a broker and the listing by the stock exchange, including the placement of an additional issue of securities, if the listing of securities of the main issue was carried out earlier. Thus, an IPO in Russian is the placement of securities of an issue (that is, the alienation of their first owners) through an open subscription with the help of an underwriter with the condition that these securities are included in the quotation list of the Russian stock exchange.
At the beginning of 2008 year, a package of changes to legislation was adopted and came into force (Federal Law No. 194-FZ of December 27, 2005 “On Amendments and Additions to the Federal Law “On the Securities Market”, Federal Law “On Joint-Stock Companies” and Federal Law “On the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of investors in the securities market”) and other regulatory legal acts aimed at improving the procedure for conducting an initial public offering in Russia.
Participants in the relationship during the initial public offering. Issuer. The main role in conducting a public initial offering is obviously played by the issuer. Despite the fact that the law does not establish special requirements for an issuer conducting an initial public offering, an analysis of the by-laws shows that not every issuer can, from a legal point of view, carry out an IPO. Thus, first of all, the requirements for such an issuer are established by the Regulations on activities for organizing trade on the securities market, approved by order of the Federal Financial Markets Service of Russia. Thus, according to the specified Regulations, in order to undergo listing, the issuer must have a registered prospectus and comply with the requirements of legislation and other regulatory legal acts for the procedure for disclosing information on the securities market; In addition, a number of additional requirements are established directly for inclusion in the quotation list “B”.
Underwriter. An important role in the process of conducting an initial public offering is assigned to the broker, who provides services for the placement of securities of the issue. The broker performing the functions of placing securities signs the notice of the results of the issue, thereby confirming the accuracy and completeness of all information contained in this document. Moreover, in this case, the broker in this case will bear, along with the issuer's officials, if there is fault, jointly and severally subsidiary liability for damage caused by the issuer to the owner of the securities as a result of unreliable, incomplete and (or) misleading information to the investor contained in the notice of the results of the issue. The prospectus of securities, as well as the decision on the issue, must indicate the main functions of the person providing services for the placement of securities, including whether such person has responsibilities for acquiring securities that were not placed on time. If, in accordance with the prospectus, such an obligation of the underwriter is established, the specified document must also contain information about after what period and how many securities not placed on time, the specified person is obliged to purchase.
Market maker and stock exchange. One of the grounds for excluding the issuer's securities from the quotation list is the failure of the stock exchange, within five working days from the date of inclusion of the shares in the quotation list "B", of an agreement with the trading participant performing the functions of a market maker on the fulfillment by him during the entire period of holding the shares in this quotation list, the obligations of the market maker in relation to the specified securities. Fulfillment of market maker obligations means the simultaneous submission of orders for the relevant securities during auction trading.
Quotation list. To complete the initial public offering by sending a notification to the registration authority, the issuer's securities must undergo the listing procedure on the stock exchange. The conditions for inclusion of securities in quotation lists are established by the Regulations on organizers of trading in the securities market. In accordance with the changes made to the said Regulations, along with the quotation lists “A” and “B”, a third list “B” appeared, provided specifically for the purpose of conducting an initial public offering by issuers. To include securities in List “B”, the issuer of securities is subject to quite serious requirements: a) the issuer’s shares are placed for the first time through an open subscription, in which shares placement services are provided by a broker, or are offered for public circulation for the first time through a stock exchange or with the involvement of a broker to carry out transactions aimed at alienating shares in connection with such an offer; b) the issuer has existed for at least 3 years; c) the issuer has no losses for 2 years out of the last three; d) the issuer complies with the corporate governance requirements stipulated for quotation list “B”, and has also accepted the obligation to provide the stock exchange with information on compliance with these requirements; e) the issuer has accepted obligations to provide the stock exchange with a list of affiliates of the issuer and regularly update it; f) the issuer has accepted the obligation to provide the stock exchange with a copy of the notice of the results of the issue (additional issue) of shares no later than the next day from the date of submission of such notice to the Federal Service.
New procedure for exercising preemptive rights. In accordance with the new edition of the Federal Law “On Joint-Stock Companies”, a convenient procedure is provided for when an issuer carries out an initial public offering. Shareholders of the company have a preemptive right to purchase additional shares placed through open subscription in an amount proportional to the number of shares of this category (type) owned by them. As a general rule, these persons, within at least 45 days from the date of sending (delivery) or publication of the notice, can exercise their preemptive right and purchase the corresponding number of shares. However, if the placement price is determined in accordance with the placement decision after the expiration of the preemptive right, the validity period of the preemptive right cannot be less than 20 days from the date of sending (delivery) of the notice. If the placement price of securities is determined after the period of validity of the preemptive right, the placement decision must provide for a period for payment of securities, which should not exceed five business days from the date of disclosure of information about the placement price. In accordance with the Regulations on Information Disclosure, in such cases, the issuer has the right to disclose information about the placement price of securities by publishing it in the news feed and on the Internet page simultaneously with the announcement of the start date of the placement. These changes are aimed at providing the issuer with not only the opportunity to bring the placement price of securities as close as possible to their market (real) price, but also to significantly reduce the period for placement of securities. In addition, a number of changes have been made to the Federal Law “On Joint-Stock Companies” regarding the procedure for exercising the pre-emptive right to acquire placed securities.
Bibliography
Internet resources:
www.vfin.1gb.ru ABC of investment. Stock market. The beginning of the way.
www.traders-journal.ru Stock market and securities in Russia and abroad
www.bibliotekar.ru Electronic library
www.lider.su Registration of LLC, CJSC, registration of shares by the Federal Securities Commission
www.stockportal.ru All about securities for the private investor.
www.gazprom.ru Official website of OJSC Gazprom
www.lucoil.ru Official website of OJSC Lukoil
www.rt.ru Official website of OJSC Rostelecom
www.ippnou.ru Institute of Entrepreneurship Problems.
www.investpark.ru Investor information portal.
Regulations:
Federal Law of April 22, 1996 No. 39-FZ “On the securities market”.
Federal Law of December 26, 1995 No. 208-FZ “On Joint Stock Companies”.
Practical part
Problem No. 1.5.
Share with a par value of 15 rubles. with a dividend rate of 25%, it was purchased at a price of 2.5 times the face value and sold two years later, providing the owner with a return of 80% per annum.
Determine the stock price at the time of sale.
Р 1 =2.5N У к =80%
K p2 = P p2 /N
80%*2.5*2=0.25+P 2 -2.5*15*100%
5=0.25+P 2 -37.5*1.25
P 2 =-0.25+46.875+5
K p2 =51.625/15=3.44
K p1 =P p1 /N=2.5*15/15=2.5.
Problem No. 2.5.
A bill with a face value of 800 thousand rubles was issued at 15% per annum for a period of 2 months and presented to the bank for accounting 20 days before the maturity date. The bank's discount rate is 13% per annum.
Determine the bank's income from bill discounting.
r=0.15 T=61 days (2 months)
S=800000*(1+0.15*41/360)=813600
P=813600*(1-0.13*61/360)=795700.8
D=813600-795700.8=813600*0.13*61/360
D=17899.2=17874.79
Problem No. 3.5.
An investor purchased a strangle (two put options and three put options) for 1,000 shares each. The share price for the call option is 5 rubles, for the put option – 3 rubles. Option premiums are equal and amounted to 50 rubles. each. Determine the actions and financial result of the investor if at the time of expiration of the contracts the current share price was: a) 8 rubles; b) 5 rub. and c) 1 rub.
n – shares i – premium
x - share price
2 Call options 3 Put options
n – 1000 n - 1000
x – 5 rub. x – 3 rub.
i - 50 rub. PC. i – 50 rub. PC.
A) P=8, Y (8-5)*1000-50=2950 rub. Since there are 2 call options, the profit from the call option must be multiplied by 2. 2950 * 2 = 5900 rubles. (3-8)*1000+50= -4950r. Since there are 3 put options, the profit from the put option must be multiplied by 3. 3*(-4950)= -14850 rub. Overall financial result: 5900-14850= -8950 rub. This is a loss. Financial result for “call”: (5-5)*1000-50= -50r. Because call option 2, then multiply -50*2= -100r. Financial result for “put”: (3-5)*1000+50= -1950 rub. Because put option 3, then multiply -1950*3=-5850r. Overall financial result: -100+(-5850)= -5950 rub. This is a loss. B) P=1, X>P. Financial result for “call”: (1-5)*1000-50= -4050r. Because call option 2, multiply -4050*2= -8100r. Financial result for “put”: (3-1)*1000+50=2050 rub. Because put option 3, then multiply 2050*3= 6150 rub. Overall financial result: -8100+6150= -1950 rub. While the MICEX index and its dollar equivalent, the RTS index, are familiar to almost anyone who is in any way connected with Russian stocks and the Moscow Exchange, the average stock investor knows much less about the Russian second-tier stock index. In this article I will try to analyze this index, talk about its pros and cons, as well as how interesting it may be for a Russian investor. However, first, let us briefly recall the main MICEX index, consisting of shares of the largest Russian companies in the proportion corresponding to their capitalization. The shares of these companies have the following properties: They are liquid, i.e. can be bought and sold in a few minutes
They have high daily trading volume
Their quotes are less susceptible to changes than quotes for smaller stocks.
The MICEX index includes 50 such shares, with the clear leaders being Sberbank, Gazprom and Lukoil - their total share in the index is about 40%. However, from the end of 2017, the methodology for calculating the index will change - the number of shares in the index will no longer be fixed, and not only capitalization, but also the liquidity ratio, defined as the ratio of the trading volume of shares to the capitalization of the company, will become important. To include a stock in the index, it is supposed to make it no lower than 15%, to exclude it - lower than 10%. The requirement for the number of shares that must be in free circulation will increase - now their share will be at least 10%, and not 5%, as before. The index will continue to be reviewed every quarter. There is also the MICEX 10 index, which contains the 10 most liquid shares with the largest capitalization - the so-called “blue chips”. This is what the MICEX chart looks like on the Moscow Exchange today: The bars in the bottom line show the quarterly trading volume of shares from the index - it was at an average level of about 3 trillion. rubles per quarter in 2006-2012 and has become slightly lower from 2012 to the present. As you can see, since December 2004 the index has grown slightly more than 4 times, excluding dividends paid by companies. Shares of second-tier index companies have the opposite properties: They are less liquid - transactions can take days to weeks Daily trading volume is much lower than blue chips Their quotes are much more volatile than those of market leaders This is what the second-tier stock index (MICEX SC or MICEX-2) looks like since the start of calculation (December 2004): Several interesting points can be noted here. Firstly, the index of second-tier shares grew significantly more than the main one - about 7 times. gives a geometric average return of about 15% per annum - this seems to be a good result with today’s inflation at 5% and approximately the same deposit rate, but do not forget that the average inflation for the calculation period was higher than today’s. As you can see, trading volumes even in the “saturated” years of 2009-2011 were approximately 50 times lower than those of blue chips. Although the appearance of the indices appears very similar, differences can be seen that are well explained by the high volatility of small-cap stocks. Thus, by 2007, MICEX SC had risen to levels of more than 6,000 with a 6-fold profit, while the maximum profit of the MICEX in the same year did not break the 4-fold threshold. During the 2008 crisis, the index sank below the MICEX, and in 2010 it rebounded higher, setting a new maximum (the MICEX index did not do this). In the subsequent period of stagnation, the index falls by half, and from 2015 it begins to grow rapidly, currently at historical highs. In dollar terms, the index (denoted RTS-2) also receives an advantage over the RTS, although less pronounced - by about 30%: What are the disadvantages of second-tier stocks? If companies do not publish their reports, then here we have rather irregular publications made according to different standards. This complicates an already difficult analysis procedure. Information about management and shareholders is not always available. Due to the relatively small capitalization of companies, the behavior of quotes is more influenced by the political background and corruption. Due to the fairly wide spread of 1-3%, “fair” market price is a bit of a relative term. The volatility of second-tier stocks is impressive. At the beginning of 2015, preferred shares of OMZ grew by 300%, shares of Razgulay by 161%, the pharmacy chain 36.6 by almost 60% in one day, and shares of RBC by 71%. In general, daily fluctuations of 5% in stocks in this echelon can be considered normal. What makes second-tier stocks attractive to investors? During a crisis or during a long-term decline, as in 2011-2014, the price of low-liquidity shares is more likely than in the case of large shares to “absorb” all the negativity, opening up opportunities for growth. As you can see from the examples, you can wait out a fall for 4 years and immediately recoup your losses within a couple of months. Below are the top ten stocks in the second-tier index; the full list is available at http://www.moex.com/s903. As with the MICEX index, the MICEX SC index includes 50 shares. At the same time, there is no clear top three, like the MICEX - although due to possible “spasmodic” changes in share prices, the market capitalization of companies can sometimes change greatly. Volatility also causes more noticeable rotation in the index - for example, during its last revision, three new companies were excluded and added. Even if we include in the comparison period the four-year decline in second-tier shares, then over the period 2004-2015 the ruble MICEX-2 brought no less than the MICEX - both grew approximately three times. Moreover, an additional advantage of small Russian companies is that they increase their market attractiveness - at current rates you can fully count on 7-9% per annum. Well, given the subsequent growth, much more rapid in the second tier, the long-term benefits of small company shares are quite obvious. The history of the US market is also a long-term advantage for small value companies. Of course, you can analyze and buy stocks individually - but a better and much less expensive idea would be to buy the entire second-tier index. Is it possible? On the Russian market there are more than a dozen index mutual funds for the MICEX index - however, I do not know of an index mutual fund for second-tier shares. Nevertheless, there are opportunities. To see them, you can open the page http://pif.investfunds.ru/funds and in the “Object of investment” column indicate “Shares, second tier”. At the moment, there are six options for funds with second-tier shares of open and interval type: In five of the presented options, there is no rating due to the insufficient share of Russian assets, and the profitability over three years ranges from 7 to 209%. Moreover, here the December 2014 ruble is added to the yield. How the Oplot fund managed to earn nothing in a rapidly growing market is a question for the fund, but this question should be asked by its shareholders before others. It is only correct to compare the results of the Arsagera fund with the index, which has risen by 144% or 2.4 times over the past three years. At the same time, MICEX SC index quotes increased from approximately 3,000 to 7,000 points, i.e. 2.33 times. Consequently, Arsager’s company coped with the task of not losing to the index (let’s leave out dividends). On the other hand, you need to understand that these data do not mean similar returns in the future - over the period 2011-14, the ruble index fell by almost 50% and mutual funds would most likely reflect a similar result. To adequately assess risks and returns, it is better to use a period of 10 years. Detailed investment conditions (entry threshold, commissions, etc.) can be obtained by clicking on the corresponding fund. Shares that do not fall into the top hundred, but are traded on stock exchanges, can be classified as the third echelon, which borders on the over-the-counter market. The difference between the bid and offer prices per share here is within 5-10%, and transactions are very rare. Accordingly, volatility increases - the price of third-tier shares can “jump” by 15-20% within one day. And if you bought such a share and the price jumped into profit, there is little joy from this - while you sell the share, the price can easily jump in the opposite direction. There is no index for third-tier stocks—a company can only fight to get into the second tier and (possibly) get more interest from the mutual funds discussed above. Here, for example, are the stock quotes of the Zvezda company, which produces high-speed engines: Typically, these stocks are cheap. In the American market, the analogue is junk “penny stocks” costing less than $5, which also balance between exchange and off-market circulation. They're sometimes favored by value investors, but it's worth remembering that not every cheap commodity is good - there's a difference between temporarily discounting a good stock (in a crisis) and adequately assessing a company's unenviable position. In addition, they like to make money on shares of this type by “inflating” the price, when an unknown company is “promoted” by a series of articles and the price of its shares rises - after which the holder dumps his stake. The index for second-tier shares can be considered as the MICEX index “with leverage”. This means that MICEX-2 in favorable conditions grows more rapidly than the standard index, but also shows greater pessimism in a crisis. What follows from this? The fact that MICEX-2 is especially good either after a deep market decline or after protracted stagnation is no coincidence that a surge in trading volume for the second tier was noted in 2009-10. At the same time, the index can be a good option not only in a crisis, but also for a long-term investor who can easily endure a drawdown of 50% (relevant for the market in general, and especially for small volatile stocks). Whether to make second-tier stocks your investment vehicle and for how long depends on the individual investor - but I hope that my article can help in making a decision. Second strategic echelon in battle The advance of the Red Army in mobilization and deployment led to the fact that it entered the battle in parts. Those troops that were supposed to participate in the first operation of the war according to pre-war plans simply did not have time for the Border Battle. Many met the war in echelons heading west, some remained in places of permanent deployment on June 22. Actually, the absence of troops from the depths of the special districts and from the internal districts in the first line largely determined the unfavorable course of events in the Border Battle. On the other hand, the war did not end at the Border Battle. The balance of forces for the upcoming battles began to be determined when the fighting on the border raged with might and main. G.K. Zhukov recalled: “Late in the evening of June 26, I flew to Moscow and straight from the airfield to I.V. Stalin. In the office of I.V. Stalin stood at attention, People's Commissar S.K. Timoshenko and my first deputy, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin. Both are pale, haggard, with eyes reddened from lack of sleep. I.V. Stalin was not in the best condition. After greeting with a nod, J.V. Stalin said: Think together and tell me what can be done in the current situation? - and threw a map of the Western Front onto the table. We need about forty minutes to figure it out,” I said. Okay, report back in forty minutes. We went into the next room and began to discuss the state of affairs and our capabilities on the Western Front. Having discussed the situation, we could not offer anything better than to immediately take up defense at the turn of the river. Zap. Dvina - Polotsk - Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Mozyr and use the 13th, 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies for defense. In addition, it was necessary to urgently begin preparing defenses on the rear line along the lake. Selizharovo - Smolensk - Roslavl - Gomel by the forces of the 24th and 28th armies of the Headquarters reserve. In addition, we proposed to urgently form 2-3 more armies at the expense of the Moscow militia divisions. All these proposals by I.V. Stalin were approved and immediately formalized with the relevant orders.” To be precise, these measures received practical implementation a few days later. By order of the Headquarters of the High Command dated July 1, 1941 No. 00130, the troops of the Western Front from July 2 included the 22nd, 19th, 20th and 21st armies, deployed at the turn of the eastern bank of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. In the first days of July, the 19th Army was still in the stage of concentration and did not take part in the hostilities. The 22nd, 20th and 21st armies also had not yet completed their concentration, which continued as the remnants of the former Western Front retreated to the east. According to the same Headquarters Directive No. 00130, the remnants of the 3rd, 13th, 4th and 10th armies were withdrawn from the first line to the rear. Another important decision of the Soviet High Command, announced in the same directive, was the appointment of a new commander of the Western Front. He became the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko. The new commander's deputies were Marshal Budyonny and Lieutenant General Eremenko. Tymoshenko assumed the post of front commander two days later, on July 4. The decision of the Headquarters to appoint Tymoshenko looked twofold. On the one hand, the exceptional importance of the western, Moscow direction was emphasized. Now it was headed by the People's Commissar of Defense himself. On the other hand, for Tymoshenko this was a formal demotion. I.V. himself became the new People's Commissar of Defense. Stalin. Formally, he became one on July 19, 1941, but in telegraph negotiations, from the first days of July, Stalin himself introduced himself: “Saying the People’s Commissar of Defense...”, i.e., the decision to change the People’s Commissar of Defense had already been made and on July 19 was only formally confirmed. The Germans successfully broke the resistance of the armies of the Western Special Military District in Belarus. However, now they had to measure their strength with the armies unloading from the trains from the Ural, Oryol, Volga and Siberian military districts, and later with the armies from Transbaikalia and the North Caucasus. The German command, however, had no idea about this yet. However, significant, even significant changes occurred in the troop structure of Army Group Center on the eve of the battle for Smolensk. At midnight on July 2 (00.00 on July 3, 1941), both tank groups were subordinated to the headquarters of Günter Kluge's 4th Army. In this regard, the army received the name “tank”. It cannot be said that this decision received an unambiguous assessment. Thus, in the combat log of the 3rd tank group, the following entry appeared: “This decision seems more expedient than the subordination of one of the tank groups to another. The commander of the 4th Army expressed his intention to use both tank groups in close cooperation to strike through Smolensk to Moscow, transferring forces to where there would be quicker success. He expects this to happen in the 3rd TGr section. However, the subordination of tank groups to the command of the 4th Army also has its negative sides. In particular, this command has no experience in leading mobile formations; moreover, on a wide front it can only exercise leadership through the method of directives, no different in this regard from the army group command.” At the same time, it must be said that Kluge’s headquarters sought to live up to the new role. In particular, the Luftwaffe was asked to provide Storch communications units for operational control of mobile formations. The defeat of General Pavlov's armies, of course, gave the Germans a certain head start. If the armies of the internal districts had strengthened the covering armies, then events would certainly have developed not according to such a catastrophic scenario as in reality. However, the covering armies and the armies from the Urals and Volga region had to fight separately. Separated from each other, they were weaker than Army Group Center, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition, at the beginning of July, von Bock's Army Group was reinforced. If at the beginning of the war it had 50 divisions, then in the first days of July there were already 63 of them. 10 divisions were brought into battle from the OKH reserve, another 2 divisions were transferred from Army Group North, and a cavalry brigade arrived from Germany. To be fair, it must be said that if it were not for the advance in deployment, many armies of the internal districts would not have reached Belarus. According to pre-war plans, they were supposed to advance to Ukraine. So, according to a note from N.F. Vatutin dated June 13, 1941. The 20th and 21st armies were supposed to be in the first line of KOVO troops. However, in the threatening and clearly unfavorable situation of the last peaceful days, all plans were confused and the most important western, i.e. Moscow, direction was saturated with troops from the depths of the country. As a result, the 20th and 21st armies ended up in Belarus, and not in Ukraine. Later, in early July, they were joined by the 16th and 19th armies that had previously arrived in Ukraine. The history of the armies of the internal districts is divided into several short stories with a prologue and epilogue. Of course, there were common features in the use of these armies at the border of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper. Most often they entered battle from a defensive position on a wide front. However, in each case, the use of corps and divisions had its own unique features. This is precisely what is interesting: you can consider various options for the actions of formations of armies arriving from the depths of the country. Some of them were used passively, they only reacted to the actions of the enemy. Others, on the contrary, rushed into battle headlong, attacking with weak forces a numerous and dangerous enemy. There were also intermediate options between these two extremes. Moreover, today we already have the opportunity to evaluate all these actions not only from the Soviet point of view, but also taking into account the enemy’s opinion. The rapid advance of the Germans towards Smolensk created a serious danger for Soviet troops in the most important Moscow strategic direction. Armies from the internal districts were already deployed at the border of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, but the rapidly deteriorating situation required additional measures. On the Southwestern Front, in comparison with the defeats and encirclements in Belarus, the situation was quite stable. The 1st Panzer Group broke through to a shallower depth; the encirclement was still of a local, tactical nature. There were reasonable hopes for a successful withdrawal of the troops of the Southwestern Front to the line of the old state border. Therefore, the 19th Army of I.S., which had advanced to the territory of KOVO even before the war. It was decided to castle Konev from Ukraine to Belarus. General Staff Directive No. 00124 of July 1, 1941 ordered the preparation of troops of the 19th Army for transfer to the Smolensk region. However, the rapid change of situation and the delay in the arrival of the troops of the 19th Army forced the area of its concentration to be placed 75-100 km east of the previously planned one. Now the army of I.S. Koneva concentrated in the area of Kholm, Pansky, Yartsevo. The German offensive forced the redirection of two divisions already on the move to the area south of Smolensk. Here there was a threat of German mechanized formations breaking through to the city. Soviet transportation was under the vigilant surveillance of German aviation. In the operational reports of the headquarters of Army Group Center, the words about Luftwaffe attacks on Soviet communications are a refrain. Thus, back on July 2, 1941 it was stated: “The 2nd Air Fleet carried out raids on transport, along railways and highways in the area of Orsha, Mogilev, Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk.” As a result, the concentration of the 19th Army near Smolensk was delayed. By July 9, only one 220th motorized rifle division had arrived. The concentration of the army ended entirely only by July 20, 1941. In fact, from the very beginning the army was brought into battle in parts, without sufficient air and artillery support. When the Soviet General Staff planned to castelt the army from the South-Western Front, its main task should have been the defense of Vitebsk. The 19th Army was supposed to prevent the enemy from capturing Vitebsk, throw it back to the west and reach the western bank of the Western Dvina River. However, by the time this task was received, the troops of the 19th Army were not yet in the Vitebsk direction. Strategic shield protecting the strategic sword Alexey ARDASHEV Strategic troops are rightly called the nuclear sword of the state. But, in addition to the sword, the power also requires a shield. And here fortification protection comes to the fore. Protection is not only Chapter VIII. The political and strategic plan of Comrade Stalin and the initial measures for the defense of Tsaritsyn The enemies of the Soviet people sought to strangle the young Soviet Republic by famine and armed intervention. Having captured the richest grain and Other units (second tier) Many Gladiators were used for communications, pilot training and other support purposes. 18 (Bomber) Squadron, stationed in France from June 1940, flew Blenheim VIs and also had at least least Chapter Five The Strategic Alliance with Al Qaeda Osama bin Laden liked to tell his students a parable comparing the war with the Russians and the Christian siege of Mecca in 570 AD. e. The Christian army, which had much better weapons, used war elephants, and their attack was Radio receiver - strategic object On the night of July 22, 1941, a characteristic incident occurred in the city of Dzerzhinsk. The head of the city radio center, A. A. Stepanov, apparently experiencing failures at the front, systematically drank. As a result, he was allowed on duty Lieutenant General of the Engineering Troops E.V. LEOSHENYA ECHELON FROM THE CAPITAL We are leaving for Sevastopol, Evgeniy Varfolomeevich. It takes three days to get ready and load into the train... These were the words that Major General of the Engineering Troops Ivan Pavlovich Galitsky greeted me on the night of December 20, 1941, Strategic reconnaissance Messerschmitt Bf-109 Meanwhile, the 3rd squadron of Rovel's group returned to the Eastern Front, only now to the Gostkino airfield (aka Luga) in the Army Group North zone. Periodically, depending on the situation, they used Strategic triangle On December 29, 1942, the 57th and 62nd divisions of armored trains were transferred to the Velikopolye station at the disposal of the commander of the 3rd shock army, Lieutenant General K.P. Galitsky. December 30, Deputy Commander of the 62nd Division, Major V.I. Chukrin Strategic bomber B-2A "Spirit". Origins This year, the US aviation community will celebrate the quarter-century anniversary of the first flight of the B-2A Spirit aircraft, which today is perhaps the most modern, expensive and, if I may say so, Chapter XIII. Strategic reserve The reserve has two purposes that must be distinguished: firstly, prolongation and resumption of the battle and, secondly, use in unforeseen cases. The first purpose presupposes the usefulness of the consistent use of forces and therefore cannot Strategic turning point Real history does not have a subjunctive mood, but it can be reasonably assumed that if the lightning defeat of Great Britain’s continental allies had not happened, its government would not have had an urgent need to resort to Second echelon On March 2, 1959, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution “On the participation of workers in the protection of public order in the country.” Voluntary people's squads (VND) began to be created everywhere. Strategic terrorism Terrorism is also a special form of psychological struggle, a battle for minds with the help of will. On the other hand, the perception of ongoing threats from terrorist organizations has forced a number of governments to formulate strategies to combat The Barbarossa plan provided for the rapid defeat of the main forces of the Red Army in a border battle, which would mean the defeat of the USSR in the war and the imminent end of the Soviet state. But the German military did not know that the Soviet military-political leadership had prepared in advance for such a scenario. Not being confident in the success of the battle on the border, the Soviet leadership decided to divide the Red Army into two parts: The German command knew and took into account only the first strategic echelon. General Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko wrote about it this way: “When drawing up the Barbarossa plan, the Nazis took into account only the troops located on the territory of our border districts (the first strategic echelon). It is characteristic that even the forces that were under arms in other regions of our country (the second strategic echelon) were almost completely ignored by Hitler’s strategists, and in fact, in the conditions of the Second World War, the time required to attract these troops was calculated in days, so even given our enormous distances, this required a maximum of a week, in rare cases - two. The wartime formations (the third strategic echelon) were completely discounted, apparently on the grounds that a decisive victory would be achieved even before they had time to deploy. ... Thus, the Nazis’ ignorance of the possibility of us using the third strategic echelon was not only a gross miscalculation of the Nazi General Staff, but also contradicted their own basic plans. They probably thought of “exceeding” their plans. "
In fact, the Germans, having defeated the first echelon, expected to win the war. But they miscalculated; Stalin left a reserve. Adolf Hitler believed that by inflicting only one major defeat on the Red Army, he would achieve complete victory He knew nothing about the second echelon of the Red Army The first strategic echelon consisted The first strategic echelon, formed from field troops of military districts on the western borders of the USSR, including the 9th separate army in the Odessa Military District (OVD), consisted of 171 divisions (104 rifle, 40 tank, 20 mechanized and 7 cavalry) located along the front with a length of 4,500 kilometers from the Barents to the Black Sea. In these field forces, 56 divisions and two brigades belonged to the first echelon of armies covering the military district bordering their neighbors, 52 divisions belonged to the second echelon, located 50 - 100 kilometers further in the rear, and 62 were in the reserve of the military district bordering their neighbors, deployed 100 - 400 kilometers from state borders. Map of the deployment of Wehrmacht troops and the first strategic echelon of the Red Army If the first echelon were defeated, the second echelon had to defend the country If the troops of the first strategic echelon managed not only to repel the first strike of the enemy, but also to transfer hostilities to its territory even before the deployment of the main forces, the second strategic echelon (the Dnieper was planned as its deployment line) was supposed to increase the efforts of the first echelon and develop a retaliatory strike in accordance with the overall strategic plan. So what was the second echelon? The Second Strategic Echelon of the Red Army (Army of the Second Line) is the name of the seven armies that, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, began gathering and moving to the center and west of the USSR. Let us take a closer look at the process of creating the second strategic echelon, based on reliable facts and documents. The General Staff gave a preliminary order to prepare troops for sending to the west to the Far Eastern districts on April 26. In the “Considerations...” of Timoshenko and Zhukov, which appeared no earlier than May 15, the proposed Soviet grouping of reserves of the High Command was supposed to V. Grouping of the reserves of the High Command.
Have 5 armies in the reserve of the High Command and concentrate them:
- two armies consisting of 9 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions, a total of 15 divisions, in the area of Vyazma, Sychevka, Yelnya, Bryansk, Sukhinichi;
- one army consisting of 4 rifle, 2 tank and 2 motorized divisions, and a total of 8 divisions, in the area of Vileika, Novogrudok, Minsk;
- one army consisting of 6 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions, and a total of 12 divisions, in the area of Shepetovka, Proskurov, Berdichev and
- one army consisting of 8 rifle, 2 tank and 2 motorized divisions, and a total of 12 divisions, in the areas of Bila Tserkva, Zvenigorodka, Cherkasy"
Thus, three out of five armies (almost half of the 47 divisions being advanced) were assigned destination areas in the Western strategic direction. Of these, two were supposed to be concentrated behind the Zapovovo, quite far in the rear, and the third was located within this district. The remaining two, the most powerful in composition (24 divisions), were concentrated within KOVO, given that the main attack was planned in the southwestern direction. Since Stalin did not agree with the proposals of the General Staff, the second strategic echelon of the Red Army was created according to a completely different option. From May 13 to 22, the General Staff ordered the start of the nomination of four armies (16th from the Western Military District, 19th from the North Caucasus Military District, 21st from the PriVO Military District and 22nd from the Urals Military District) and the 25th sk from the Kharkiv Military District (transferred to the operational subordination of the 19th th Army). According to the plan, the troops of the 16th Army, consisting of 12 divisions, were to concentrate in the Proskurov, Khmilniki area from May 22 to June 1. The 19th Army, consisting of And divisions, was planned to be transferred to the area of Cherkassy, Bila Tserkva, Smela by June 10. By June 13, 3 divisions subordinate to the 19th Army, 25th Infantry Division, were advancing to the Lubna area. The task of the 21st Army, consisting of 14 divisions, was to advance from June 17 to July 2 to the Chernigov, Gomel, Konotop region. Finally, 6 divisions of the 22nd Army were to arrive at the assembly area of Idritsa, Sebezh, 1–3 July. Thus, it was planned to introduce a total of 46 divisions into the second strategic echelon. As it turned out later, the areas where three of the four reserve armies were sent lay away from the direction of the Wehrmacht's main attack. Two of them - the 16th and 19th - along with most of the 21st Army were intended as reserves for the future Southwestern Front. For the Western there was only one left - the 22nd and, in addition to it, the 63rd sk from the 21st army. This distribution of forces once again emphasized the exaggerated importance that the Soviet command attached to the southwestern direction. However, the time frame for preparing troops for deployment and transfer was behind schedule. And very soon the order of promotion and subordination of armies was significantly clarified. Thus, in accordance with Directive No. 504206 of the NKO, the commander of the KOVO troops, the 16th Army, consisting of 6 rather than 12 divisions, was ordered to accept it a little later - between June 15 and July 10 (the previous period was from May 22 to June 1 ) After the start of the war, Semyon Budyonny was the first to lead the second-echelon armies At the same time, the army itself was withdrawn from the reserve of the High Command and came under complete subordination to the Military Council of KOVO. At the same time, the 51st sk. from the 22nd army and the 63rd sk. from the 21st army, arriving in Zapovovo in the period from June 17 to July 2, according to directive No. 504207, were not included in the district troops, and its Military did not obey the advice. It should be borne in mind that the areas assigned to the armies did not necessarily have to coincide with the actual areas of their concentration. This is a common practice: there was no time to wait, the main thing was to organize the loading of troops as quickly as possible and begin regrouping. Thus, the divisions of the 19th, 21st and 22nd armies began moving in May, even before the formation of the directorates of the armies themselves and their army units. For example, the commander of the 19th Army (Lieutenant General I.S. Konev) and its chief of staff (Major General P.N. Rubtsov) were appointed only after the start of the war - on June 26. At approximately the same time, leadership cadres of other reserve armies were appointed. Let us recall that the formation of new armies on the basis of already existing divisions of internal military districts began only in June 1941 (except for the 16th Army, formed in 1940). It was from this month that the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies began to count their biography. The process of transferring a large number of connections was extended in time and space. The commanders of military echelons, as a rule, did not have information about their destinations. Only the VOSO (military communications) authorities and the military commandants of the junction stations knew this. Depending on changes in the situation, they, at the direction of the General Staff, redirected echelons of certain formations. A typical example: the troops of the 24th Army from the Siberian Military District were planned to be concentrated southwest of Moscow, but the situation that arose at the beginning of the war required it to be sent northwest of the capital. Its commander, Lieutenant General S.A. On June 24, Kalinin with a small task force was sent by plane to a new concentration area (Nelidovo, Bely, Dorogobuzh, Gzhatsk, Rzhev) with the task of ensuring the unloading and collection of army troops. Thus, the head echelon of the army, heading west, after Novosibirsk turned to Semipalatinsk, and then to Alma-Ata. At the same time, Vasilevsky at the General Staff handed over to the commander of the 16th Army M.F. Lukin maps of the Caucasus and Iran, warning of the advance of his army to the border with Iran. Then the army turned north and then west. The echelon of the army headquarters received the news of the beginning of the war in Novokhopersk The table data shows that the 16th and 21st armies were returned to the second strategic echelon, adding the 20th and 24th (16 divisions of which did not have time to move) and excluding the 28th army The total number of divisions in the reserves of the High Command was increased to 57. But of these, only 16 divisions (less than 30%) arrived in their destination areas by June 22, including one mechanized corps out of 4 (a total of four tank divisions out of 10). The remaining three mechanized corps never budged. Another 10 divisions were on the way. Consequently, as of a later date, only 26 divisions participated in the transfer or managed to complete it. Of the above-mentioned 939 railway echelons for transporting the 16th, 21st and 22nd armies, by June 22 only 83 echelons managed to arrive at the final stations, another 455 were on the way, and 401 echelons were not even submitted for loading. Meanwhile, the transportation time was calculated from the moment the troops began loading. At this rate, it took approximately three more months to transport the remaining divisions (not counting army units and reinforcement units). For comparison: in less than a month - from May 22 to June 18 - the Germans successfully transported 52 divisions, including 14 tank and 12 motorized, by rail alone. In addition, we note that the troops of the reserve armies advanced in a non-mobilized state, only slightly replenished with personnel called up under the guise of training camps. These seven armies (16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th and 28th) constituted the second strategic echelon. By the beginning of the war, only a few formations of the 19th Army managed to concentrate in the intended areas, while the majority were on the way or at their previous deployment points On the basis of the military district directorates, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, 7 armies were created, 4 of which began to advance to the banks of the Western Dvina and Dnieper: 22nd Army (22A), formed on the basis of troops of the Ural Military District closer to the Western Special Military District. 20th Army (20 A) - Oryol Military District to Moscow Military District. 21st Army (21A) - Volga Military District closer to the Western Special Military District. 19th Army (19A) - North Caucasus Military District in the Kiev Special Military District. 16th Army (16 A) - Transbaikal Military District to Kiev Special Military District. 24th Army (24 A) - Siberian Military District to Moscow Military District. 28th Army (28A) - Arkhangelsk Military District to Moscow Military District. The 24th and 28th armies did not begin advancing to the borders; they were supposed to concentrate near Moscow. The 20th Army also did not go to the border, but began to gather near Moscow. And the 16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd armies occupied the line of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper and did not stand “at the rear” of the armies of the First Strategic Echelon. ....................................................... Another defensive echelon was the fortifications erected in the internal territory of the USSR “At the same time, it is necessary to speed up the construction of fortified areas in every possible way, to begin the construction of fortified areas on the rear line of Ostashkov, Pochep and to provide for the construction of new fortified areas in 1942 on the border with Hungary, as well as to continue the construction of fortified areas along the line of the old state border.”
It indicates the date of its composition, May 17, 1941, and at the top, where Tymoshenko’s signature should have been, it reads: “...” May 1941. At the bottom there is a space left for Zhukov’s signature, but that is also missing, but the signature of the head of the department of fortified areas of the Red Army, Major General Shiryaev, is there. The chain of four fortified areas indicated on the map stretches exactly along the line of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky defensive line, exactly from Ostashkov in the north to Pochep in the south. And, an irrefutable argument, the map is accompanied by a construction estimate accurate to thousands of rubles. In the lower right corner of the document there is a sign with a layout of how many and what structures should be built and how much it will cost. The total price of the fortified line is estimated at almost two billion rubles, and in the “first stage” (second half of 1941) almost 440 million were to be spent. Based on this, it can be argued that the new line of defense was not just a game of the staff mind. By the time the map was created, detailed projects already existed along the entire line of defense and the volumes of earthen, concrete and other work had been determined... It is curious that the search menu on “Feat of the People” begins in June 1941, and this is the only map for the month of May located on the site. Its appearance is explained by the fact that it was in the same inventory with the September maps of the Western Front, along the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya line. Perhaps it was used for verification or as a sample, and then at the same time put into the archives. During declassification and digitization, no attention was paid to the date, and it slipped into the public domain. Now we have in our hands irrefutable proof that in 1941 the USSR was indeed preparing for defense in the depths of its territory, and the famous Rzhev-Vyazemsky line had been designed at least since 1940. Rzhevsky UR, its creation suggests that “at the top” they believed that the Red Army could be defeated The width along the front is 140 km. There is a large forefield in front of the UR. It must be said that in 1941, the front line of defense passed along the front edge of the forefield. You can also pay attention to the fact that the defense nodes are located along the Volga in such a way as to protect the flank from an attack from the north. In 1941 it was necessary to hold the opposite bank of the Volga. Noteworthy is the line near the city of Bely, which covers the junction between the missile defenses. Vyazemsky UR The width along the front is 120 km. It goes along the Dnieper. The highway and railway are covered by one defense center in the Izdeshkovo area. Spas-Demensky UR 130 km along the front, at the front border of the Urals the city of Yelnya. Bryansk UR 95 km along the front. In 1941, the line of defense ran approximately the same, including the forefield. Few people know that the initiator of the construction of Urov was Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov. In March 1940, he was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union, but in August of the same year, Shaposhnikov had to leave his post as Chief of the General Staff for health reasons. He was appointed to the quieter, but no less responsible position of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR for the construction of fortified areas (UR). Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov (left) supervised the construction of missile defense systems before the war He not only correctly guessed the directions of the June attacks of the Wehrmacht, but also believed that the country needed new defensive lines Each SD was designed and built with his direct participation. For example, the Rzhevsky UR, designed under the leadership of Shaposhnikov, was embodied in concrete, steel, earth and wood in July-October 1941. Several lines of defense, hundreds of kilometers of anti-tank ditches, several hundred concrete bunkers, hundreds of bunkers, thousands of kilometers of trenches, minefields, wire fences, countless dugouts and dugouts. Even today, after more than 70 years, the line abandoned in the forests of the Tver region is impressive. And everything was completely ready for defense: the firing points had ammunition, communications, there was electric lighting, field warehouses were bursting with supplies, there was even an abundance of weapons.Not blue chips
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Conclusion
