In November 1991, young economist Yegor Gaidar was appointed Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Government for Economic Policy and Minister of Economy and Finance. A close group of like-minded people formed in and around the government, which determined the course of the economic reforms being carried out. Later they began to call it “Gaidar’s team”. The core of the group was Alexander Shokhin, Petr Aven, Alexey Golovkov, Anatoly Chubais, Andrey Nechaev.

Gaidar entered the government when the economic situation in the country was catastrophic. The budget deficit approached 30% of gross national product.

According to the data cited by the famous economist Evgeny Yasin in his book “Russian Economy: Origins and Panorama of Market Reforms,” the country experienced a reduction in the population’s consumption of food in almost all of its main types. Sales of sausage, which was a kind of symbol of prosperity in Soviet “developed socialism,” decreased by 24% in 1991 (from 1835 to 1393 thousand tons). The same figure for dairy products was 41% (from 21.5 to 12.7 million tons). If inventory in retail trade (at the end of the year) in days of turnover in 1985 was 93 days, then in 1990 this figure dropped to 44, and in 1991 - to 39 days.

The threat of famine loomed. By the end of 1991, the norms for food supply on cards in most regions were: sugar - 1 kg per person per month, meat products - 0.5 kg (with bones), animal butter - 0.2 kg. Part of the food came in the form of humanitarian aid from Western countries.

While the demand for food grains was 5 million tons per month in January 1992, there were 3 million tons of resources available. According to calculations by Roskhleboproduct, the grain import deficit amounted to 17.35 million tons. The situation was complicated by the fact that foreign exchange reserves were practically exhausted.

At the end of November 1991, Gaidar outlined a plan for the government's priority actions to stabilize the economic situation: by lowering prices and wages while simultaneously pursuing a tough financial policy, stabilize the economy and restore its manageability on a market basis.

It was possible to begin implementing the planned reforms only at the beginning of 1992.

From January 2, prices for the vast majority of goods (with the exception of bread, milk, alcohol, as well as utilities, transport and energy) were freed, and regulated ones were increased. A 28 percent value added tax has been introduced.

In addition to price liberalization, restrictions on imports were temporarily lifted and a zero import tariff was established. It was free imports that played a catalytic role in the development of private market trade in early 1992.

On January 29, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree “On Free Trade”. In accordance with this decree, enterprises, regardless of their form of ownership, and citizens were given the right to carry out trade, intermediary and purchasing activities without special permits. The exception was the trade in weapons, explosives, poisonous and radioactive substances, drugs, medicines, etc. All this led to the gradual saturation of the consumer market and an increase in inventories in retail trade.

At the same time, the country's economy has experienced such negative phenomena as a crisis of mutual non-payments by enterprises, a cash shortage that caused acute social tension, a decrease in tax revenues to the budget, and inflation.

In his speeches on the eve of liberalization, Gaidar spoke of an upcoming initial price increase of 200-300%. In fact, in January 1992 their growth compared to the previous month was 352%.

At the end of February, a new government program was announced; An official memorandum on the economic strategy of the Russian leadership was sent to the International Monetary Fund, which included tough measures to limit the budget deficit and free up energy prices.

In April 1992, at the VI Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, the government's economic policy was sharply criticized. On April 11, the Congress adopted a Resolution “On the Progress of Economic Reform in the Russian Federation”, in which: it noted a number of problems in the economy: a decline in production, the destruction of economic ties, a decline in the standard of living of the population, growing social tension, lack of cash; invited the President of Russia to make significant adjustments to the tactics and methods of implementing economic reform, taking into account comments and suggestions.

On April 13, Gaidar announced the resignation of the government, citing the fact that the resolution on the progress of reforms adopted at the Congress actually meant the disagreement of the deputies with the economic course pursued by the government, and the additional budget expenditures envisaged by it would not allow this course to be implemented without catastrophic consequences for the economy.

In this situation, a compromise was found: the congress adopted a Declaration of Support for Economic Reforms, in which the norms of the adopted Resolution on the progress of economic reform were softened.

After the VI Congress, the “Medium-Term Economic Concept of the Government” began to be developed, which provided for a reduction in the share of regulated prices and volumes of government procurement, the deployment of mass privatization, and bringing energy prices to global levels only within 2 years.

In fact, under pressure from deputies and directors of state-owned enterprises, financial policy has become less stringent. Combined with the significant seasonality of some economic processes for Russia, the unsettled financial relations with the CIS countries, which led to the simultaneous operation of many ruble issuing centers, and the lack of control of the government of the Central Bank of Russia, this led to the end of the period of relative financial stability and the development of a new inflationary spiral at the end of the summer - early autumn 1992.

In the fall, the government was again criticized with demands to restore price regulation and increase direct government intervention in processes occurring in the national economy.

In December 1992, the VII Congress of People's Deputies did not approve Yegor Gaidar as chairman of the Council of Ministers. After Viktor Chernomyrdin was confirmed as head of government, Gaidar was dismissed.

The activities of Yegor Gaidar are assessed ambiguously. On the one hand, his price reform in January 1992, which actually meant the abandonment of state regulation of prices for most goods, including essential goods, made it possible to almost instantly replenish store shelves that had been completely empty in previous years. However, while maintaining the population's income unchanged, this led to a catastrophic drop in living standards.

Reformers managed to reduce the state budget deficit and transfer the Soviet planned economy to a free market, but the side effects of their actions were hyperinflation and economic crisis.

Experts are still debating whether it was the reforms of Gaidar and his supporters or the decades of ineffective Soviet rule that preceded them that caused the collapse of the Russian economy in the early 1990s.

The material was prepared based on open sources

Additional sources:

Economy in transition. Essays on the economic policy of post-communist Russia 1991-1997 / Ed. E. T. Gaidar, pp. 91-93.

E. Yasin. Russian economy: origins and panorama of market reforms. Lecture course. - M.: State University Higher School of Economics, 2002.

Russian Economic Reform. Crossing the Threshold of Structural Change. World Bank, 1992.

Assessments of the work of the government of that time are directly opposite and agree on only one thing: Gaidar and his team liquidated the Soviet economy. Only some call it destruction, others call it liberation.

Journalist Yegor Gaidar(head of the economic policy department in the Kommunist magazine, head of the economics department of the Pravda newspaper) became deputy chairman of the Russian government for economics on November 6, 1991. From November 11, 1991, he moved from post to post there - Minister of Economy and Finance, Minister of Finance , first deputy chairman of the government. And on June 15 he was appointed acting Prime Minister. Gaidar was dismissed on December 14, 1992 after the candidacy of the new prime minister was approved - Viktor Chernomyrdin. But this was not the end of the reformer’s stay in the government structures. From September 18, 1993, he was First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and from September 22, 1993 to January 20, 1994, he was Acting Minister of Economy.

“When Gaidar came, there was no longer an economy,” recalls Rector of RANEPA Vladimir Mau(in 1991-1994 - adviser to Gaidar). — Gold and foreign exchange reserves amounted to $30 million. Journalists didn’t believe it and wrote “30 billion” everywhere. At the same time, the claims to prosperity created by the oil boom of the 70s were very great. 80% of the urban population demanded no deficit. But with a threefold drop in oil prices in the 80s, it was impossible to ensure the same consumption without reforms.”

“The economy was still functioning,” objects historian Evgeny Spitsyn. “However, economic ties weakened, and their severance was provoked by the Gaidarites themselves. Yes, Gaidar formally came to power in November 1991, but in fact it belonged to Yeltsin and his entourage since August. And the economy in this team was led by people from Gaidar’s circle. The shortage was caused in advance by a widely circulated promise to lower prices.”

In November - December 1991, there were lines for everything: bread, meat, sausage, vodka, vegetables... Cards were introduced by region. At the end of November 1991, Gaidar outlined the government's action plan: to release prices and wages with a tough financial policy. That is, don’t give money to anyone.

From January 2, prices for almost all goods (except bread, milk, alcohol, as well as utilities, transport and energy) were freed. A value added tax of 28% was introduced. Import restrictions were lifted and a zero import tariff was established. And on January 29, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On Freedom of Trade”: enterprises and citizens were given the right to conduct trade, intermediary and purchasing activities without permits.

“This decree led to a gradual saturation of the market and an increase in inventory in retail,” believes economist, member of the Expert Council under the Government of the Russian Federation Vadim Novikov. - We need to return it. The state is now preventing the buyer and seller from finding each other.”

“GDP in the 90s collapsed by 45%, production by 60%, investments decreased by more than 5 times,” assesses the consequences of the reforms Vladislav Zhukovsky, economist, member of the presidium of the Stolypin Club. “But crime has increased 5 times, the number of diseases has increased hundreds of times. In the 90s, about 70% of Russians were poor, and approximately 90% were poor. The middle class was destroyed, and the opportunity to enrich itself was given to a narrow circle of “insiders.” Gaidar and his team had the task of destroying the economy and then distributing enterprises through voucher privatization and loans-for-shares auctions to the “right people.” And also personal enrichment. If Gaidar had been allowed to complete the reforms, then the standard of living in Russia would have been equal not to Honduras, but to Zimbabwe. But still, the result was a monopoly economy. We took the worst of the capitalist and Soviet systems - what we got was a gangster, oligarchic, bureaucratized scoop. Gaidar is gone, but his work lives on.”

Due to the inclusion of Yegor Gaidar on November 6, 1991 in the Government, the beginning of transformations in the economic sector of the country is associated with this date. The task of the authorities was clear - liberation from communist oppression as quickly as possible. These goals implied significant changes in the planned management of the country.
The reforms carried out by Gaidar served as an impetus for the creation of a free market. The drastic changes, which included the liberalization of retail prices, the restructuring of the tax service and the creation of foreign trade levers, are called “shock therapy.”

Price liberalization

The appointment of E. Gaidar as Deputy Prime Minister in the economic sphere was preceded by a speech by President Boris Yeltsin at the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR on October 28, 1991. The need to introduce one of the key components of market relations was announced.
On December 1, a public proclamation of the course towards liberalization, implemented as soon as possible, took place. The Union republics opposed the upcoming plans, still maintaining a unified system of monetary settlements in rubles with the Russian Federation. New bills were voiced by the head of state, but they were drafted by Yegor Timurovich and his own team.
The decree of January 2, 1992 “On measures to liberalize prices” proclaimed a course for change that instantly declared itself. Regulation of 80% of the wholesale cost of goods and 90% of retail prices has been abolished. The authorities control only the most necessary products: milk, bakery products and some others. The principle of turbulence operates in society, under the influence of which, as a result of the collapse of the planned system and the Soviet form of government, the population is in a miserable state.

Program

In preparing the basic concepts, the government is guided by the fundamental principles of market management by Western powers. Before the final decision, options proposed by leading experts of the time - Yavlinsky, Shatalin, Saburov, Abalkin - were considered.
Gaidar's concept prevails. Along with economic transformations, there is a need to renew the national statehood, which was empty after the disappearance of the communist order. The main directions are contained in the documents:
o “Near-term economic prospects for Russia.”
o “Russia’s strategy in the transition period.”
The formulated crisis moments are: inflation, payments and the built system, as a result of which government agencies are unable to manage resources. Restructuring is required in conjunction with an increase in the overall level, following the example of Poland in the Rakovsky government.
The expected six-month inflation period was beyond the country's control, so the project was not recognized. The result is an immediate radical liberalization. Over time, both paths turn out to be erroneous and do not promise positive changes.

Economic collapse

Liberalization has caused numerous negative consequences. The reasons were drastic changes. Monetary policy in 1992 takes away working capital from enterprises. To pay off the budget deficit, the Central Bank issued many loans to production, rural farmers and former Soviet republics. Inflation during this period reaches 2500%.
The reason for the collapse is said to be the lack of a replacement money supply that would rid the country of obsolete Soviet rubles. The new currency came into circulation only in 1993. The number of people with low income is 45%. People's previous deposits in Sberbank have become worthless.

Privatization

The process presupposed the emergence of a class of owners - reliable support for the course being pursued in the case of completely bankrupt plants and factories, selling them for almost nothing. Due to the avalanche-like nature of such actions, transactions were subject to serious abuse.
In the 90s after the cessation of reforms, loans-for-shares auctions will be held to transfer the most significant enterprises to new owners at an extremely reduced cost. The phenomenon gives rise to a class of oligarchs, which further widened the distance between the rich and impoverished part of the population.
The reasons for the extremely negative consequences are considered to be the desire for a rapid abandonment of the Soviet economic system with increased monopolization and centralization. The accelerated pace of sales leads to unforgivable mistakes. Polls by sociologists show that 80% of the country's citizens recognize privatization as illegitimate.

Voucher system

A privatization check is an integral component intended for exchange for assets at enterprises. Transferred into private hands, it opened the way to private ownership. 146 million vouchers issued. The population is not directly involved in the process, but can:
Invest the paper as shares in the enterprise at the place of employment.
Transfer to a checking investment fund. The number of such organizations exceeds 600.
In reality, they turn out to be numerous objects of speculation. To make a profit, the owners alienated them to dishonest businessmen or invested them in CHIFs in the hope of receiving substantial dividends. With their value rapidly falling, people begin to rapidly get rid of vouchers, which end up with merchants, officials and administrative resources who are in the shadows.
According to estimates, 500 of the largest factories and factories were purchased at speculative prices for $7 billion, with a real estimate of $200 billion. “Wild capitalism” allowed 10% of the population to manage the national property. A lot of finance comes from the export of natural resources - gas, oil and non-ferrous metals, but the new owners are in no hurry to return profits, due to which the amount of external debt increases significantly.

Agricultural sector

In 1992, changes penetrate the village. Another type of business is emerging - closed and open joint-stock companies, cooperatives and partnerships, which in total occupy 2/3 of the farms that were directly affected by the crisis. There was not enough agricultural equipment, machinery and fertilizers for work.
Remnants of the previous system in the form of state farms and collective farms were eliminated everywhere. In 1992, 60,000 individual farms were formed in the country. Lack of equipment greatly reduces harvest. In the 90s production decreases by 70%. Due to increased costs for reagents and equipment, farmers are unable to provide the country with the necessary amount of food.

Defense and industry

In 1992, the purchase of weapons was reduced due to excessive waste of the budget in the USSR under the military-industrial complex. Due to the crisis situation, enterprises were closed due to bankruptcy and resold. What is happening affected research and design bureaus.
Highly qualified personnel are losing their jobs. The period will be marked by an intense “brain drain” abroad - scientists, engineers, programmers, designers and other categories of specialists. The mistakes were:
 In the absence of restructuring.
 Transfer of factories to reserve.
 Removal of restrictions on the import of goods, which had a negative impact on domestic enterprises.

Resignation

In December 1992, Yegor Gaidar voluntarily submitted his resignation, which became the reason for a compromise between the Supreme Council and the President. In 1993, deputies refused their own obligations, which caused a new conflict that escalated into street clashes, called the October events.
Having returned to the Government, the reformer remains in the post of Minister of Economy and leaves the post only on January 20, 1994, upon the final completion of economic reforms. A new reality is coming.

Positive points

Before his first resignation, E. Gaidar tries to objectively assess his personal activities in office. Positive changes in the economy included:
 Changes in the taxation system.
 Privatization process.
 Transformation of the agricultural sector.
 Restructuring of the fuel and energy complex.
 Formation of oil production companies.
 Reducing the cost of purchasing combat equipment and equipment.
The rights to free trade, debt recovery and lower budget deficits are commendable. E. T. Gaidar welcomed commerce in the export of weapons. Investment companies and exchanges are being created, which were absolutely unrealistic in the Soviet era.

"Shock therapy"

Due to a regime change unprecedented in the world, the Russian government is working to revive the economy in an extremely difficult environment. Some nuances had to be adopted from partners in the socialist camp. Temporary work places were created by analogy with the Decree on Free Trade in Poland. The stalls on the streets were partially filled, appearing chaotically and without proper management.
The reform of E. Gaidar's government is being carried out with a significant delay. Time is running out in the 80s. when the crisis begins. The Soviet country's resource-based economy is in the throes of falling oil prices, which led to queues at stores and a rationing system long before Gaidar's reforms. The name is quite justified in view of the changes taking place in truly extreme conditions.

At the beginning of 1992, the Russian leadership, headed by President B.N. Yeltsin, took real steps leading to a market economy. It was openly stated that the transition to a market economy requires a transition to a new model of social development.

The new government, headed by economist E.T. Gaidar, developed a program of radical economic reforms in the field of the national economy. The “shock therapy” measures envisaged by the program were aimed at a sharp transition of the economy to market methods of management. “Shock” measures should have been directed against the command-bureaucratic system, which is not capable of solving any positive problems, but has enormous potential and experience in suppressing everything progressive. The government was faced with the fundamental task of ensuring conditions for economic growth.

An important place in the economic reform program was occupied by the liberalization of prices - their release from state control. The state retained price regulation for only some goods and industrial products. Russian prices were brought too quickly to the world level, sales markets decreased significantly, price liberalization, and the transition to a strict financial policy should have caused a reduction in demand and production. However, during the first half of the year the rate of decline in most industries did not exceed 11-13%, but by the end of the year the demand for goods had practically disappeared. If previously some of them were competitive at least on price, then the rapid movement towards world prices has eliminated this advantage. Of the competitive industries, only those related to the export of oil, gas and partly the military-industrial complex remained.

Price liberalization caused a sharp rise in inflation. Over the year, consumer prices in Russia increased almost 26 times; The standard of living of the population has decreased. There was a reduction in investment, industrial programs and social spending. In 1992, in order to fight inflation, the government of E. Gaidar took the path of deliberately not paying people wages. Cash savings stored in the State Bank depreciated and payments to citizens were stopped.

The main role in the process of transition to the market was assigned to the privatization of property. This radically distinguished the reform carried out by the Russian government from the market reform of the perestroika period, which did not go beyond the framework of socialism. Its result should have been the transformation of the private sector into the dominant sector of the economy. Most enterprises have become private, joint-stock companies. However, significant stakes in large enterprises that play a leading role in the Russian economy remained in the hands of the state.

The economic reform program included major changes in agriculture. In particular, the emergence of new forms of management: open and closed joint-stock companies, limited liability partnerships, agricultural cooperatives.

The reforms carried out by Gaidar's government were sharply criticized by the Supreme Council, which sought a change in the Cabinet. President Boris Yeltsin strongly supported the government's course of economic reforms. However, under pressure from parliament and the consolidated opposition, by the summer of 1992, the government of E. Gaidar was forced to weaken its economic policy.

In order to prevent a decline in production, credit injections into the economy increased. A characteristic feature of economic reforms in Russia during this period were large-scale external loans; as a result, the operating conditions of the Russian economy were largely determined under the influence and direct participation of international financial organizations, primarily the World Bank and the IMF.

All efforts to strengthen the financial system have not yielded results. Control over the economy was gradually lost. In December 1992, at the VII Congress of People's Deputies, a strong confrontation took place between the executive and representative authorities. As a result, the president weakened his position and E. Gaidar was forced to resign. However, the general course of radical economic reforms was maintained, but the need to adjust the adopted course of reforms was widely recognized.

During the year of reform in Russia, the program outlined by the reformers was largely implemented: price liberalization, transition to strict financial and credit policies, introduction of a new tax system, changes in foreign economic and monetary policy, the expression of which was the free exchange rate of the ruble; development and start of implementation of the privatization program. However, the country's economy remained in a deep crisis, the manifestations of which were severe socio-economic consequences. The set goals were not fully achieved, and many of them were unrealistic.

As a result of the reform, conditions for effective competition did not develop in the country, a mechanism for market concentration and capital accumulation was not created, the necessary set of incentives for the efficient use of resources was not formed, and a system of transparent rules of the economic game that were observed by all main participants was not built. Within five years after the start of reforms, the economy experienced a decline in production. The government did not have a serious industrial policy and did not take steps to strengthen control over the public sector and did not sufficiently promote the development of private sector manufacturing.

The key result of the reform is a decrease in the standard of living of the population while simultaneously increasing social differentiation. The population experienced a severe blow due to the depreciation of their savings; the accelerated stratification that began inevitably turned out to be associated with a deterioration in the well-being and even impoverishment of certain groups of the population. The activities of the Gaidar government and the possibility of its influence on these processes were very modest, reduced to maneuvering, under pressure from parliament, trade unions and other forces, sometimes leading to unjustifiably cruel and unfair actions.

Nevertheless, a qualitative leap was made in social and economic life, a great historical step forward. Russia got rid of the elements of a totalitarian state: the general economic and personal dependence on the state was ended, the population received basic civil liberties and the foundations of a market economy. The reform gave citizens the right of economic self-determination - everyone is free to choose, based on their capabilities and desires: to become an entrepreneur or an employee in government agencies. It is freedom of choice that is the basis of personal freedom of people and the foundation for revealing the creative potential of an individual. Russia, having moved away from the principle of collectivism characteristic of Soviet society, in the first years of reforms gave preference to individualism, which determined the style of carrying out market reforms. In this choice, the pressure of external circumstances played a large role: the desire to quickly enter the world political, socio-economic and intellectual space prompted Russia to mechanically borrow the individualistic values ​​characteristic of developed Western society.

The failure of the attempt to reform the Soviet economy in a historically short time was caused by various factors and reasons. First of all, this does not take into account the realities of the Soviet economic system; setting abstract and largely unrealistic goals; as well as mistakes made in determining the content and sequence of economic and social policy measures. Reformers accepted the strategy that the IMF and the World Bank recommended to them, sometimes contradicting scientific recommendations, without really thinking about the extent to which it was suitable for Russia, taking into account its internal characteristics.

Political stability and political will to practically implement the main provisions of the economic reform program were not ensured. On the contrary, a confrontation broke out between the executive and legislative branches of government.

In many ways, the severe consequences of “shock therapy” were associated with a change in the main goal of the transformation. The main goal formulated earlier: to build a civil society with an advanced economy based on a market system, was replaced by a different goal: to implement such transformations that will undermine the socio-economic basis of possible relapses of the coup, the restoration of the communist system, and everything else, including civil society, the market the economy and so on will work out somehow later. Institutional reforms that were necessary to form a new economy capable of solving the problems facing the country were relegated to the background, which was a significant mistake when trying to implement liberal market reforms and ultimately led to their failure.

In 1992, the implementation of the program for Russia's transition to a market economy began under the leadership of the government, headed by Boris Yeltsin (combining this position with the presidency until June 1992), and most importantly, the Deputy President for Economic Policy (then First Deputy and Acting Prime Minister) Yegor Gaidar. In December 1992, Gaidar, under fire of criticism, was dismissed and replaced by Viktor Chernomyrdin. But the basis of the economic system he created in 1992 has survived to this day.

Economic and ideological justification for reforms

The economic crisis in the USSR began in the late 1980s. At the same time, projects to transfer the Soviet economy onto capitalist lines began to be proposed as a way out of the crisis. This included not only the abandonment of the state production plan and the transition to market pricing, but also the privatization of many public sector enterprises. Stagnation in the public sector became obvious in the early 1990s, although there is still no clear opinion about its reasons: were they purely economic or also political.

Opportunities for private entrepreneurship appeared under M. S. Gorbachev. Some attribute the economic difficulties of the last years of the USSR to the fact that state enterprises began to sell their products through the private sector, which, without producing anything, began to receive speculative profits. Inflation increased markedly in the last two years of Gorbachev's rule, and the standard of living of the majority of the population fell. At the same time, the first legal Soviet millionaires appeared. [C-BLOCK]

Gaidar’s reforms generally continued the line that had emerged under Gorbachev, only they were radical and proceeded at an accelerated pace. At that time, there was a discussion in society and in political circles about how to carry out the clearly overdue transformations. The most famous program (alternative to Gaidar’s) for the transition to capitalism was the famous “500 days”, prepared by a team of economists under the leadership of academician Stanislav Shatalin and Grigory Yavlinsky and proposed to the leadership of the USSR under Gorbachev in 1990. This project was supported by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Ryzhkov and approved in September 1990. However, its implementation was never started due to political reasons. In addition to the fact that “500 days” provided for implementation on the scale of the entire Soviet Union, the last leadership of the USSR clearly lacked the political will to implement unusual plans. Since August 1991, Yeltsin set a course for the Russian Federation to secede from the USSR, and they never returned to the “500 days” project.

Yeltsin, who loved decisive action, was clearly impressed by Gaidar’s willingness to carry out large-scale economic modernization, stopping at nothing. Before his appointment to the government, Yegor Gaidar headed the economic block in the leading publications of the CPSU - the Kommunist magazine and the Pravda newspaper. Back in the 1980s, he formed a critical attitude towards the economic teachings of Marx and the activities of his Soviet followers. But his acquaintance with alternative economic theories was narrow (it could not have been otherwise under Soviet conditions) and selective. In particular, opponents subsequently pointed out to him that he compiled his program according to the recipes of one American economist, Milton Friedman, known for his monetarist concept, which by the early 1990s had already become archaic. Gaidar continued to blindly follow this theory.

Key reforms and their features

The basis of the reforms were: free market pricing, privatization of the public sector, abolition of the state monopoly on foreign trade and the fight against the state budget deficit by saving on social spending. The key point was the liberalization of commodity prices, announced on January 2, 1992. As a result, in one month average retail prices soared by 345%, and annual inflation amounted to 2500%. Retail turnover fell by half over the year, which clearly showed a decrease in the purchasing power of most of the population.

On June 11, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation adopted a state privatization program. According to it, small enterprises could be sold into private hands, and large ones could be transformed into open joint-stock companies. At the same time, so-called vouchers were introduced, which every citizen of the Russian Federation could purchase from the state for 25 rubles, at the rate of one voucher per person. The voucher had its nominal value fixed - 10,000 rubles, i.e. that share of federal property that fell on one citizen. Vouchers were promoted as an opportunity for every citizen to participate in the privatization of state property. In fact, these financial documents have become a type of shares that are freely traded on the stock market. Their real market value was negligible, and most citizens simply sold them off. And immediately speculators appeared who began to buy them from the population in huge quantities. Several thousand vouchers in one hand already represented a real amount for which one could buy a stake in the enterprise.

Gaidar's innovations marked the beginning of the formation of a large private sector in the Russian economy, the creation of large corporations with mixed public-private capital, sharp social stratification and the formation of a class of business oligarchs closely associated with government agencies and government orders. In short, these reforms laid the foundation for the socio-economic system of modern Russia.

Positive and negative ratings

Rector of RANEPA Vladimir Mau believes that in disputes about the meaning of the economic model proposed by Gaidar, the parties mainly start from two unprovable judgments: Gaidar destroyed the economy and robbed the people, or the economy was destroyed by the communists before Gaidar, and he built it again. It is clear that such discussions will lead nowhere and will only stop when this economic model itself, for some reason, ceases to be a reality.

Specific complaints against Gaidar relate to what happened under him and after him, throughout the 1990s, to the real drop in production (by 45% per decade), as well as to the fact that the middle class, which was declared to be the main interested in reforms, never emerged under Gaidar . On the contrary, the majority of those who, based on their income, could have been classified in this class in late Soviet times and formed its basis in market conditions, during the period of Gaidar’s reforms slipped into the category of paupers. Historian Yu. P. Bokarev believes that Gaidar’s reform had such consequences because it did not take into account the realities of modern post-industrial society and did not set as its goal the transition to it, but was inspired by ideas drawn from the books of economists of the old industrial era. The free privatization of apartments cannot be credited to Gaidar, due to the fact that the law on this was adopted by the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation back in June 1991.

Yeltsin's decree of January 29, 1992 on complete freedom of trade softened the negative social consequences of Gaidar's reforms. Citizens who could barely make ends meet were given the opportunity to feed themselves and their families during those difficult years by selling part of their property.