Economic development at the beginning of the 21st century. Economy of the 21st century – a knowledge-based economy

The geostrategic position of Russia in the period after the collapse of the USSR allowed and encouraged the country's leadership to further develop the state by reviving its power and achieving the goal of becoming one of the leading powers of the multipolar world, confidently overcoming the opposition of traditional and newly emerged competitors and gaining reliable and numerous allies. How successful was Russia in solving the pressing problems of the first decade?

In one of his pre-election articles, Vladimir Putin writes: “Russia today, in terms of the main parameters of economic and social development, has emerged from a deep recession... we have reached and overcome the indicators of the standard of living of the most prosperous years of the USSR” (Putin V.V. “Russia is concentrating – challenges, which we must answer").

Results of the first decade

This cheerful conclusion, on the one hand, is pleasant, but on the other hand, it means that more than 20 years of our history are actually lost. Over these decades, the rest of the world has moved far ahead, and we are glad that we managed to return to the level from which the decline began. What is more here – joy or sadness? What do statistics and other authorities say about this? Let's look at tables 1 and 2.

Table 1

As we can see, the available opportunities were not implemented in the best way. The indicators that characterize the main wealth are especially depressing - the population’s savings and quality of life, GDP growth is insignificant and the raw materials structure of the economy is still archaic, which slows down its development and ability to counteract the growing threats to the security of the country and each of its citizens.

table 2

Of course, the losses of the last decade of the last century were too heavy, associated with the dishonest privatization of public property and the mediocre conversion of military production, which caused great harm in all spheres of society. But there was no proper activity and creativity, especially on the part of those in whose hands the country’s fragmented wealth ended up. They reacted sluggishly to the call of the Russian President to double GDP within ten years, preferring not to invest in the real economy, but to export their income abroad. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance reacted to this call with skepticism, forecasting lower GDP growth rates and diligently transferring colossal income from commodity exports to the Stabilization Fund and the funds that replaced it. Real GDP growth often exceeded forecasts. By the end of the period, it slowed down, which was facilitated, firstly, by the withdrawal of very significant amounts from the economy into the “safety cushion” stored abroad, and secondly, by the global economic crisis.

“We need technology. It is short-sighted to hope that oil and gas will pull us through,” said Mikhail Eskindarov, rector of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation. “And money that doesn’t work doesn’t do any good.” In 2008, state budget expenditures amounted to 7.57 trillion rubles, while 7.6 trillion rubles lay idle in the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund. If they had worked in the domestic economy, in its real sectors, then the doubling of GDP proposed by the president would have been achieved earlier, and investing in the real economy instead of a “safety cushion” would have doubled it a second time. But neither a second doubling nor reindustrialization occurred, and the crisis hit our economy much deeper than the economies of the United States and Europe.

Note that the situation has not changed: when discussing the state budget for 2013 in the State Duma, opposition parties noted the desire of the Ministry of Finance to underestimate real incomes, artificially show a deficit, and direct the additional funds received from oil and gas exports to the Reserve Fund, and not for investments and social needs , national defense and national security.

Define an economic model

Ten years ago, when assessing the geopolitical position of the country, general indicators of the economic, military and military-economic power of Russia and the largest countries of the world were given. Their analysis showed that the Russian Federation is superior only in terms of economic potential to Germany, France, England, Japan, and in terms of the size of its territory, it is also superior to China and the United States. However, the degree of realization of the economic potential of our state turned out to be significantly lower than those of these countries, therefore, according to general indicators of economic power, Russia was weaker than the states shown in the table. The internal system indicators of the military-economic security of our country were also disappointing, and the systems for providing structures for military counteraction to threats to national security, due to the extremely limited economic capabilities of the state, are inadequate to the military-economic needs of the forces resisting real and potential military threats.

Nevertheless, at that time we believed that the Russian Federation had, although reduced, still colossal economic potential. The revival of its power and return to one of the most developed and powerful powers in the world was possible, but only with full consideration of the main lessons of history - the consolidation of society around basic social values and the tasks of countering the internal and external threats that our state faced. It is especially necessary to emphasize the urgency of this task today, since threats to national security have increased significantly, and there have been no noticeable shifts in the balance of forces in favor of Russia.

Now Russia is focusing on adequately responding to the foreseeable challenges facing the whole world: a systemic crisis, a tectonic process of global transformation - the transition to a new cultural, economic, technological, geopolitical era. While we were trying to leave socialism and become “like everyone else,” these “everyone” came more and more thoroughly to the conviction that capitalism had exhausted itself. It is impossible to list all the obstacles and tasks; let us name those that have already been clearly identified.

In general, it is necessary to “complete the creation in Russia of such a political system, such a structure of social guarantees and protection of citizens, such an economic model, which together will form a single, living, constantly developing and at the same time sustainable and stable, healthy state organism” (V.V. Putin "Russia is concentrating - the challenges we must respond to"). Such an organism guarantees the sovereignty of Russia and the prosperity of its citizens. Vladimir Putin also mentions words about justice, dignity, truth and trust. What exactly is “such” an organism?

Let us touch on some aspects of concretizing only one of the named problems - the economic model.

Firstly, we need to get off the raw materials needle and switch to innovative development of industry, agriculture and other sectors of the real economy. Without this, it is useless to talk about solving problems of the economy and other spheres of life. And the main difficulty here is that in the economy that we are building, you cannot dictate. Other methods are needed. The private sector must be interested, and government officials must be selected who are politically and economically literate, professionally competent, creative and disciplined.

Secondly, it is necessary to destroy and eliminate the possibility of merging business with officials, to completely overcome corruption (since it is recognized as high treason), but at the same time not pushing the state out of the economy under the pretext of its alleged inefficiency, but expelling ignoramuses from the state apparatus, replacing them with honest ones , economically literate people, only then will the economy become smart and efficient. This requires a lot of creative work by lawyers and legislators in the field of improving commercial law and colossal organizational work.

Thirdly, like air, it is necessary to achieve social unity in the country. It cannot be achieved without changing the decile coefficient several times, which is 1:15 in Russia as a whole, and in Moscow 1:50, while in European countries it is 1:7. Such a gap already threatens a senseless and merciless rebellion. Social unity cannot be achieved either without a progressive scale of taxation, without a substantial compensation contribution from dealers in dishonest privatization and renationalization of that part of the property, the nature of which, as experience has shown, requires its withdrawal from private hands, as well as without the liquidation of offshore companies. A lot of withdrawals and innovations are required, but all this requires strong political will, and not vigorous election appeals and promises.

Thinking about the desired economic model, especially in terms of the defense industry, I suddenly came across the newly adopted federal law “On the Foundation for Advanced Research.” We read: “The fund has the right to carry out income-generating activities only insofar as it serves the purpose for which it was created and corresponds to this purpose.” We also read: “Federal government bodies do not have the right to interfere in the activities of the fund and its officials.” I think that this law would be very suitable for the entire economy; it is aimed at neutralizing the main defect of a market economy, which focuses its subjects not on the functional effect (result), but on profit. On the other hand, we see a desire to eliminate bureaucratic obstacles created by the often incompetent actions of government agencies.

I am convinced that in an extremely contradictory socially oriented market economy it is very important not to imitate either capitalist competition or planned socialism, but to see and observe in everything the measure that determines the transition of phenomena to a new quality, even to their opposite.

Look ahead 30–50 years

On the issue of restructuring and modernization of the economy, we often oversimplify the understanding of the relationship between the economy and national security, including national defense, repeating the wise statements of authorities of the distant past that finance is the artery of war, that war requires three things - money, money and money again. But since then, when this was said, major changes have occurred in the economy and military affairs.

The military development of the twentieth century showed that with the industrialization of the economy, money is very difficult to transform into military power, and that issues of the structure of the economy, advance economic mobilization and conversion in the processes of mutual transitions of economic and military power as elements of a system of power acquire a decisive role. The Soviet Union clearly demonstrated these processes on the eve of the Great Patriotic War and during the period of conversion of military production in the 90s. Chains of objective functional and temporary relationships between economic sectors predetermine these processes, and colossal success and shameful defeat, the opportunity to “cut corners” and fail the next SAP depend on understanding and taking into account these connections in military-economic policy.

Ignoring these relationships during the years of conversion of military production made inevitable the rapid and profound collapse of not only the defense industry, but also the entire Russian economy in the 90s. This is also the reason for the extremely weak, unstable process of economic revival in the first decade of the 21st century. This is the mystery of the failures of Russia's neoliberal military-economic policy.

Military power in modern conditions presupposes such weapons and military equipment, the production of which is possible only if the structure of the real economy contains the most modern branches of production that use high technology. We are in a hurry to worry about the problems of a post-industrial economy, but in reality we have slipped into a pre-industrial economy, having lost mechanical engineering, the electronics industry, high technology and highly qualified scientific personnel. The connection between other structures ensuring national security and the economy and its structure is similar. This connection cannot be lost sight of when talking about “smart” defense and protection from new threats, about the need to look 30–50 years ahead, allocating 23 trillion rubles for programs for the development of the Armed Forces and the modernization of the defense industry, but putting up with the dominance of a raw material orientation economic policy and the outflow of brains and capital abroad.

What are the indicators related to national defense and national security in the past decade and in the future? The data in Table 3 shed light on this question.

Table 3

As we can see, spending on national defense in the first decade of this century did not rise above 2.84 percent in GDP and 18.63 percent in state budget expenditures and tended to decrease, and spending on national security was 2.41 and 11.1 percent, respectively. . The indicators of the first years of the new decade do not indicate their growth.

Financial speculation is the trading of financial assets with the aim of making a profit as a result of taking market risk. This has become one of the main forms of financial activity, along with investing, hedging, insurance, etc. Since both investment and speculation achieve financial growth, there is some kind of clouding of thinking and degeneration of financial policy.

What is underfunding of the defense industry? This may be a necessary measure, a consequence of extremely limited resources. But this may also be a method used by corrupt officials to enrich themselves under the guise of servicing defense spending. In such a situation, military financiers have to take out loans from private banks at exorbitant interest rates. The state pays for them, enriching oligarchs and corrupt officials. How it was necessary to fight financial fraud in the field of underfunding of defense expenditures in the 90s of the last century is convincingly shown in the monograph of the former head of the Main FEU of the Moscow Region, Colonel General V.V. Vorobyov (Vorobyov V.V. “Financial and economic support of defense security of Russia: problems and solutions". St. Petersburg, 2003).

This is especially important to understand in the context of the country's transition to a socially oriented market economy with pluralism of forms of ownership. Since it is happening, it is necessary to gain knowledge and ability to work in market conditions without losing the colossal opportunities for the systematic regulation of economic processes. Almost an entire decade of the existence of the defense industry in conditions of underfunding and fragmentation in the interests of the privatization of its enterprises, the loss of much of what was necessary to ensure its adequacy to threats and reliable competitiveness, also determined the failure of the first three state armament programs in the past decade. This forces us to rethink our attitude towards financial and economic technologies, understand their enormous destructive and creative power, and skillfully use it for creation.

We are talking about the role and place of the military-financial component in the system of determining factors and how to prevent its separation from military, economic and military-economic policies, how to ensure the fulfillment of their functional purpose. The main thing is to achieve the adequacy of military-financial and military-economic interests, to exclude the exaggerated influence of narrow departmental and private interests. It is necessary to ensure a combination of functional goals and economic interests in the system of contracts of subjects of military-economic relations, developing rules of the game in economic law that are acceptable to the parties, and creating a coercion mechanism acceptable to them in the form of economic sanctions, norms of legal liability, introducing new forms of economic relations, institutional innovations, modern market technologies.

One of the most effective means and paths to the goal is the creation, and in fact the revival of large integrated structures in the defense industry, destroyed by privatization and conversion of military production.

Tyumen region

KHANTY-MANSI AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT-YUGRA

Department of Education and Science

SURGUT STATE UNIVERSITY KHMAO

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC THEORY

DAY CARE

TEST

DISCIPLINE: economic theory

ON THE TOPIC: “Features of the development of the Russian economy in XXI century"

Completed by student:

Sharikova I.V.

Checked by: Mikityuk L.M.

In the last quarter of the 20th century, humanity entered a new stage of its development - the stage of building a post-industrial society, which is the result of the socio-economic revolution taking place in the modern world. It is known that each socio-economic revolution is based on its own specific technologies, production and technological systems and production relations. For a post-industrial society, this role is played, first of all, by information technologies and computerized systems, high production technologies that are the result of new physical, technical and chemical-biological principles, and innovative technologies based on them, innovative systems and innovative organization of various spheres of human activity. Its final result, in our deep conviction, should be the creation of a new form of economic organization - innovation economy. Analysis of the results of research by domestic and foreign scientists on this issue convinced us that the creation of an innovative economy is a strategic direction for the development of our country in the first half of the 21st century.

The main goal of this work is to analyze trends in the development of the Russian economy in the 21st century. The set goal necessitated the solution of a number of interrelated tasks:

· consider the main directions of activity of the Russian economy of the 21st century;

· analyze the problems of Russian budget policy in the 21st century;

· explore the prerequisites for the globalization of the Russian economy;

· study the innovative direction of development of the Russian economy.

The first acquaintance with the text of the Main Directions of Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation for the period until 2008 makes a good impression. “The priority areas of activity of the Government of the Russian Federation to ensure high and sustainable rates of economic growth” are:

1. Improving the standard of living of the population, promoting the development of “human capital”.

2. Elimination of structural restrictions on economic growth.

3. Contributing to increasing the competitiveness of Russian companies and strengthening their positions in the domestic and foreign markets.

4. Social and economic development of regions of the Russian Federation.

5. Rational integration of Russia into the world economy.”

However, two points immediately attracted attention. Firstly, from the text quoted above, the idea arises that raising the standard of living of the population is carried out in order to achieve high and sustainable rates of economic growth. Indeed, a high standard of living means, in particular, a high level of income of the population. They, in turn, form effective demand and savings, taxes on personal income replenish budget revenues, etc. Both of these are necessary conditions for ensuring high and sustainable rates of economic development. However, is growth, and not concern for the welfare of the population, the highest goal for which the government works?

Secondly, why only an increase in living standards, and not primarily an increase in the population and its life expectancy?

A person does not live in order to produce more goods, but increases their volume and variety in order to live better. If the population dies out, then let alone double it, there may be no one to carry out simple reproduction.

Therefore, we must put people at the forefront and look at them as a goal, and not just as a means of economic growth.

To live, a person must create, produce. If production or its result is a product, profit, etc. - is absolutized, man is reduced from the image and likeness of God to the level of a living instrument of labor or a living machine. In society, such a transformation is wider and deeper, the more the use of human labor power is carried out not by its carrier, but by another person or social institution. What happened under the slave system, feudalism, and socialism of the 20th century is what happens under capitalism.

Natural questions arise: is the economic development really so dynamic, are revenues growing so quickly that the country does not have time to spend them, is the budgetary sector really so well financed that incoming revenues turn out to be excessive from the point of view of the feasibility of increasing expenses?

The absolute and relative values of the budget deficit or surplus reflect the quality of work to implement the principle of balanced budgets established by the Budget Code, i.e. equality of income and expenses, covering planned expenses with revenues mobilized into the budget.

An effective budgetary policy of the state is impossible without the rapid growth of socially and technologically oriented public expenditures, thanks to which the state is able to give the necessary direction to the entire industrial policy and change the structure of production taking into account the realities of international competition and its own needs. An active structural policy of the state may require planning budget deficits. The most sparing sources of covering the deficit are provided, primary incomes, which are traditionally less efficient, are redistributed, and the institution of state internal debt is used.

What's new in fiscal policy in the context of the transition from a deficit to a surplus budget?

Firstly, now a surplus is being formed, but still with a primary deficit. External loans are increasingly being replaced by internal loans, and the latter are becoming not very short-term, like GKOs, but long-term (at the beginning of 2004, Bonds with a circulation period of 5 to 30 years amounted to 455.8 billion rubles out of 682 billion . rub. total volume of domestic debt).

Russia may not have to fear a large-scale crisis in the economy for at least three more years, provided that the banking system can withstand

Over the past 15 years, the Russian economy has gone through a classic resource cycle, suffered from the “Dutch disease” and ended with no factors or resources for growth. No more than 10% of the economy in Russia is independent of oil and gas. At the same time, the Russian economy is governed not by the market, but by the interests of officials. However, “fat reserves” have been accumulated for several years to come, says Andrei Movchan, head of the economic program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Andrey Movchan (photo: 24smi.org)

“THE MAIN PART OF ECONOMIC EVENTS IS DETERMINED BY THE WILL OF MANAGERS”

From numerous meetings with the audience, interviews, questions from the media and listeners, I concluded that most of our readers are interested not so much in scientific theories or curious facts from the life of the world or Russian economy, but rather in short qualitative, rather than quantitative, answers to direct and simple questions - what what happened, what will happen and how the economic heart will calm down.

Unfortunately, not all questions have clear answers. And the question “how much will it cost...” does not make much sense - most likely, accidents and circumstances still unknown to us will influence the value of assets more than we can imagine. But nevertheless, it is possible to at least identify these factors and try to define the scope of what is possible - even in the area of head-on questions.

Two important caveats. First, the answers are based on today's situation and the information available now. There is always a risk that the situation will change and that we do not have sufficient information to assess it. Secondly, the main part of economic events is determined not by the spontaneous formation of supply and demand, subject to strict laws, but by the personal or collective will of certain managers, not always rational, often incompetent, always pursuing their personal, clan, party and other goals, distant from the tasks of balancing the economy. These actions and their consequences are much more difficult to predict, but the possibility of such irrational interventions cannot be discounted.

RESOURCE CYCLE AND DUTCH DISEASE

What happened to the Russian economy in the 21st century?

Over the past decade and a half, the Russian economy has experienced the classic resource cycle and the “Dutch disease” - phenomena that are banal and well studied. The rise in oil prices at the beginning of the century created the effect of rapid growth in budget revenues and allowed the authorities to refuse to stimulate the process of expanding the tax base. Moreover, the ability to control oil flows allowed the authorities to consolidate indirect control over the hydrocarbon industry, banking business and, through them, over the entire economic and political life of the country, which significantly negatively affected the development of any non-oil business and the effectiveness of economic and budgetary decisions.

In fact, by 2008, 65–70% of Russia’s budget consisted (directly or indirectly) of revenues from hydrocarbon exports, and the correlation of GDP growth rates, federal budget revenues and the size of reserves with changes in oil prices reached 90–95%. Against this background, due to the massive influx of petrodollars, the ruble turned out to be significantly overvalued - in 2006–2007, its market rate exceeded the calculated inflation rate by 35%. Thus, three negative factors influenced the economic development of Russia.

1. The authorities, in their desire to control financial flows, deliberately worsened the investment climate, refusing to protect the rights of investors and entrepreneurs and even discriminating against investors and businessmen. This led to a reduction in investment flows, an increase in the cost of money, a decrease in entrepreneurial activity, and even an ever-increasing loss of financial and human capital - the export of capital from Russia during this period amounted to more than $1 trillion, and the best businessmen and professionals constantly left the country.

2. Sterilization of additional profits into reserves increased the cost of money, reducing the attractiveness of investment and making it impossible to develop capital-intensive or slow-growing industries.

3. The overvalued ruble and populist government measures aimed at unreasonably increasing wages, together with high taxes, sharply increased the cost of production, making domestic production unprofitable.

Ultimately, Russia deteriorated in almost all areas of the economy, having never created a competitive productive sphere, despite the general increase in income due to the export of hydrocarbons and even the rapid growth of consumption. Hydrocarbon production accounts for up to 20% of the structure of Russian GDP. Another 30% of GDP was made up of trade, hypertrophied due to huge flows of imports at the expense of petrodollars (30% of GDP is approximately twice as high as the average for developed countries). The domestic energy market and infrastructure accounted for about 15% of GDP. Another 15% came from government projects; 9% was the share of the banking sector - as a result, no more than 10% of Russia's GDP belongs together to the sphere of independent services and non-resource production.

This was compounded by unreasonable social policy - the growth of household incomes outpaced the growth of GDP, even taking into account the oil component. The budget became the employer of almost 30% of the workforce directly and another 8% of the workforce indirectly, taking on an exorbitant load. The pension reform failed due to the half-heartedness and indecisiveness of the authorities. In addition, the budget was overloaded with ambitious, ineffective projects and exaggerated defense and security spending. Finally, budget expenditures were inflated not only due to cost inefficiencies, but also due to high levels of corruption.

Ultimately, after the fall in oil prices, Russia was left with an undiversified, quasi-monopolized economy that lacks both the factors and resources for growth.

...BUT THERE WILL BE NO CRASH STILL

Can we say that Russia is suffering an economic collapse?

No, not yet. Over the years of high oil prices, Russia has accumulated sufficient reserves. Foreign exchange reserves are now three times higher than expected imports in 2016. Enterprises have created a sufficient number of fixed assets. The population has accumulated more than $250 billion in banks and, perhaps, no less in cash, more than doubled the average living space per person, and built up a stock of durable goods.

The fall in household incomes, of course, has become unprecedented, but even with oil at $35 a barrel, it returns us to the levels of 2004–2005 - not a prosperous time, but quite stable. In general, per capita GDP in Russia in 2016, according to pessimistic forecasts, will be about $7.5 thousand - at the end of the seventh dozen countries, next to Turkmenistan, just below China (and GDP according to PPP, apparently, is about $13-14 thousand - where- then in the ninth ten countries, where Algeria, Dominican Republic, Thailand, Colombia, Serbia, South Africa). These figures are modest, but still far from catastrophic (the zone of color revolutions begins at about $6 thousand per capita nominal GDP and $9–10 thousand in PPP terms).

If the current situation continues (oil is not higher than $35 per barrel, no reforms are taking place), Russia can not fear a large-scale crisis in the economy for at least three more years - provided that the banking system can withstand it.

Andrey Movchan

Moscow Carnegie Center , 25.02.2016

Andrey Movchan- Director of the economic program of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Born in 1968 in Moscow.

Graduated from the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics of Moscow State University. Lomonosov (1992), Financial Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation (1996) and University of Chicago Booth GSB (2003). Has a Certificate of Professional Competence of Supervisors and Employees of Banks and Investment Firms (Cyprus), qualification certificate of the Federal Financial Markets Service 1.0.

1993 - 1994 - Head of the economic analysis department of Alfa Group.

1994 - 1995 - Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Guta Financial Group.

1995 - 1997 - headed the economic planning department of the commercial bank "Russian Credit".

1997 - 2002 - Managing Director of the investment company Troika Dialog.

2003 - created and for 6 years led the Renaissance Investment Management group.

2009 - created the investment company “Third Rome”.

His wife Olga, a cardiologist, both enjoy ballroom dancing.

The family has four children.

Main directions of development of the Russian economy in the 21st century .

PLAN

Introduction... 3

Chapter 1. Current trends in economic development of Russia... 5

1.1 Economic growth: from recovery patterns to structural reforms... 5

1.2 Analysis of the problems of restorative economic growth in Russia 10

Chapter 2. Study of the main directions of development of the Russian economy in the 21st century... 13

2.1 Prerequisites for the globalization of the Russian economy... 13

2.2 Innovative economy - a strategic direction for the development of Russia in the 21st century... 18

Conclusion... 31

List of used literature... 33

Introduction

Basic purpose course work is an analysis of trends in the development of the Russian economy in the 21st century. The set goal necessitated the solution of a number of interrelated tasks:

· reveal the prerequisites for the current economic growth of the domestic economy;

· analyze the problems associated with economic growth;

· explore the prerequisites for the globalization of the Russian economy;

· study the innovative direction of development of the Russian economy.

The subject of the study is possible directions for the development of the Russian economy in the 21st century.

The object of the study is the Russian economy.

The course work consists of an introduction, main part and conclusion. The introduction substantiates the relevance of the topic of the course work, defines the tasks, subject and object of the course research. The main part is devoted to the study of the problem posed. In conclusion, the main results of the study are formulated.

Chapter 1. Current trends in the economic development of Russia 1.1 Economic growth: from restorative patterns to structural reforms

Discussion of the socio-economic problems of modern Russia is often conducted in isolation from the experience of other countries, and especially post-communist ones. It seems that for researchers of Russian realities there is no experience of almost three dozen other countries that, having emerged from socialism, are solving problems similar to ours.

This remark fully applies to the discussion of the problems of economic growth, which began in Russia in 1999. Russian literature is dominated by two concepts explaining the nature of this growth. The first connects it with the real depreciation of the ruble after the 1998 crisis and favorable conditions on the oil market. The second reason for the growth is the reforms being carried out by the Russian government in the context of political stabilization that occurred after the 2000 elections. These reforms are, of course, important for ensuring long-term sustainable growth. Indeed, for Russia, the oil market conditions and the real exchange rate are the most important factors in macroeconomic policy that influence growth. But the nature of the current growth is still different.

In the context of the experience of other countries, it is not difficult to notice that GDP is currently growing throughout the post-Soviet space. Moreover, at the first stage, approximately 1992-1994, there was no growth in any of them. In 1995, the first signs of economic growth appeared in the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), as well as in states that were involved in military conflicts or were the object of a blockade (for example, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan).

In 1996-1998 The first signs of economic growth began to be observed in other post-Soviet states, but they were extremely unstable and often gave way to recession. However, after 1998, growth has been observed almost everywhere (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Growth rates of physical volume of GDP in post-Soviet states in 1996-2004

1996 1997 1998 2002 2003 2004 Azerbaijan 1.3% 5.8% 10.0% 7.4% 11.1% 9.9% Armenia 5.9% 3.3% 7.3% 3.3% 5, 9% 9.6% Belarus 2.8% 11.4% 8.4% 3.4% 5.8% 4.1% Georgia 11.4% 10.6% 2.9% 3.0% 2, 0% 4.5% Kazakhstan 0.5% 1.7% -1.9% 2.7% 9.8% 13.2% Kyrgyzstan 7.1% 9.9% 2.1% 3.7% 5 .4% 5.3% Moldova -5.9% 1.6% -6.5% -3.4% 2.1% 6.1% Russia 3.4% 0.9% -4.9% 5 .4% 9.0% 5.0% Tajikistan -16.7% 1.7% 5.3% 3.7% 8.3% 10.2% Uzbekistan 1.7% 5.2% 4.4% 4.4% 3.8% 4.5% Ukraine -10.0% -3.0% -1.9% -0.2% 5.9% 9.1% Latvia 3.3% 8.6% 3.9% 1.1% 6.6% 6.5% Lithuania 4.7% 7.3% 5.1% -3.9% 3.9% 4.0% Estonia 4.0% 10.4 % 5.0% -0.7% 6.9% 4.5%

Source: Statistical Yearbook. Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS. Moscow, 2005

Thus, the presence of growth is not directly related either to the political regime (it differs significantly in the listed countries), or to the implementation of reforms reminiscent of the Russian reforms of 2000-2001, or to oil prices (among the mentioned countries there are both net exporters and net exporters). importers of oil and petroleum products). In addition, if we trace the dynamics of the real exchange rate of national currencies in 1995-2004, it is clear that in some countries the real exchange rate fell significantly, while in others it strengthened (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Real exchange rate of the national currency to the US dollar in post-Soviet countries (according to the CPI), 1995=100

1996 1997 1998 2002 2003 2004 Azerbaijan 126% 135% 131% 104% 99% 93% Armenia 107% 104% 106% 104% 95% 93% Belarus 110% 89% 44% 56% 39% 46% Georgia 130% 134% 99% 107% 105% 103% Kazakhstan 118% 131% 125% 80% 84% 85% Kyrgyzstan 86% 100% 64% 55% 60% 63% Moldova 113% 120% 70% 72% 86% 87% Russia 120% 125% 45% 63% 71% 78% Ukraine 166% 187% 113% 89% 113% 134% Latvia 110% 111% 118% 116% 110% 104% Lithuania 121% 129% 133% 131% 128% 126% Estonia 110% 103% 118% 102% 95% 93%

Source: Calculations based on data from International Financial Statistics 2005. IMF, 2005.

Thus, each of the post-Soviet states has its own characteristics, but all of them manifest themselves exclusively against the backdrop of economic growth. This leads us to assume that the sources of this growth, as well as the previous decline in economic activity, must be sought in other processes.

First of all, we will try to analyze what was associated with the decline in production in 1992-1994, which was then replaced by economic growth.

The phenomenon of post-socialist recession has been fairly well studied, and the main factors that determine its development are clear. It is worth paying attention to the nature of the socialist gross domestic product. The traditional concept of GDP used in a market economy is not applicable for a meaningful analysis of socialist economies. The correct use of the concept of GDP imposes certain restrictions, which primarily include: the presence of a market economy, the share of the state (budget) in which is relatively small and there is democratic control over the formation of government spending. This leads to the fundamental principle used in calculating GDP: if people pay for certain goods and services, this means that they (the goods and services) are valuable to them. The latter is a necessary condition for including these products in the calculation of well-being.

Obviously, the situation described above does not correspond to the realities of a socialist economy, where production and distribution of products are strictly regulated, there is no market, as well as democratic control over government spending. In such a situation, a significant amount of economic activity does not contribute to wealth growth, which in many cases turns GDP growth into a statistical illusion. In relation to socialism, the concept of GDP is extremely conditional, because there are not always basic prerequisites that would allow one or another economic activity to be considered meaningful, oriented towards real needs. In other words, the needs and motives of economic activity in socialist and market economies are qualitatively incomparable; what is meaningful in the first may turn out to be completely meaningless in the second, which sharply limits the possibility of comparing GDP expressed in monetary units (money). When the socialist system collapses, these qualitative differences come to the surface: it turns out that a significant part of economic activity is that for which no one will ever pay in a market and democracy, either as a consumer or as a taxpayer.

That is why the process of post-socialist transformation primarily consists of a gradual redistribution of resources from those types of activities and enterprises that cannot function in market conditions to those types of activities that are in demand in market conditions. At the first stage, the volume of resource release always exceeds the volume of their use in new production, which predetermines the decline. Then the economy passes through an “inflection point” - when the volume of resources involved in production becomes greater than the volume released from previously employed in inefficient industries. This is the nature of post-socialist transition and growth.

Next, the problem of modernization arises, associated with the collapse of the old economic system and the time required for market institutions to work. This is the second important factor determining the course of the post-socialist recession. After market institutions have emerged and began to function, post-socialist reconstruction begins.

The main factors that determine the duration and depth of the post-socialist recession are:

a) the scale of the economic sector whose products and services are not in demand by the market;

b) the extent of the use of market instruments under socialism;

c) the presence in the social memory of the population of information about pre-socialist market institutions.

Based on this, we can understand, for example, why in Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries, where two generations lived under socialism, the recession lasted less than in most of the post-Soviet space, where three generations lived under socialism.

1.2 Analysis of the problems of restorative economic growth in Russia

It is obvious that modern recovery growth in Russia differs significantly from recovery growth after the civil war and revolution.

Firstly, the level of production decline in 1991-1998. was significantly lower than during the revolution and civil war. Therefore, the pace of recovery is now also slower.

Secondly, the Russian economy of the NEP period was generally market-based, just like the Russian economy of 1913. The economic structures that were being formed at that time, with all their differences (a significantly smaller share of foreign trade in GDP, lower marketability of agriculture, a greater role of the public sector, etc.) resembled the structure of the Russian economy of 1913 to a greater extent than the structure of the fundamentally market economy of modern Russia resembles structure of the socialist economy of the RSFSR 1990

But a number of processes that were characteristic of the recovery growth of the NEP period are also manifested in today's Russia. The first characteristic feature of recovery growth is its unexpectedness. V. Groman at one time drew attention to the fact that no one in the State Planning Committee expected the pace of industrial restoration that was achieved after the stabilization of economic relations and financial stabilization in the 1923/24 financial year. The State Planning Committee proceeded from the fact that without large-scale capital investments it was possible to increase the volume of industrial production by 1927/28 to only 50% of the pre-war level. In reality, by 1927/28 industrial production had almost reached the level of 1913.

A similar situation is observed in our time. The Russian government predicted for 2000 from a 2.2% decline to 0.2% growth in GDP, the IMF predicted a growth of 1.5%, while real growth was 9%. (Note that GDP growth in Ukraine in 2001 was 9%, with the IMF forecast at 3.5%.)

The reasons for errors in forecasts are understandable and closely related to the very nature of recovery growth. Since the methods used for forecasting GDP are based on extrapolation of trends of the previous period, forecast dynamics of production factors and economic conditions, it is not difficult to understand that all of them are of little use for forecasting a surge in economic activity due to the stabilization of economic relations.

Then you have to deal with a second surprise, but this time an unpleasant one. It turns out that restorative growth by its nature is attenuated. The mechanics of this process are understandable: restorative growth is ensured by the use of already created capacities and a trained, qualified workforce. It occurs with relatively small capital investments, but its resources are quickly exhausted.

So, in the period 1998-2004. The number of people employed in the Russian economy increased by 8.9 million people (from 58.4 to 67.3 million). The shortage of skilled labor found expression in the rapid growth of real wages. During 2000-2004. real wages increased 1.7 times. A similar trend is observed in other CIS countries (see Table 3).

Table 3

Growth rates of real wages in the CIS countries in 1996-2004

1996 1997 1998 2002 2003 2004 Azerbaijan 19.0% 53.0% 20.0% 20.0% 18.0% 16.0% Armenia 13.0% 26.0% 22.0% 11.0% 13, 0% 5.0% Belarus 5.0% 14.0% 18.0% 7.0% 12.0% 30.0% Georgia 53.0% 37.0% 25.0% 2.0% 3, 0% 22.0% Kazakhstan 2.0% 5.0% 4.0% 7.0% 12.0% 13.0% Kyrgyzstan 1.0% 12.0% 12.0% -8.0% - 2.0% 11.0% Moldova 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% -13.0% 2.0% 15.0% Russia 6.0% 5.0% -13.0% -22 .0% 21.0% 20.0% Tajikistan -14.0% -2.0% 29.0% 0.3% 8.0% 11.0% Ukraine -5.0% -2.0% - 3.0% -6.0% 1.0% 21.0%

Source: Statistical Yearbook. Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS. Moscow, 2005.

The growth of real wages, which is faster than labor productivity, was pointed out as a characteristic element of restoration processes by V. Groman in his works dating back to the 1920s.

Market surveys conducted by the IET show a sharp change in the balance of assessments of the sufficiency of production capacity to meet expected demand in the period 1998-2004. Assessments of labor requirements are also undergoing changes in connection with expected demand: the lack of equipment and qualified personnel is increasingly regarded as a serious obstacle to production growth.

A drop in growth rates after reaching peak values and the involvement of the most accessible resources in economic circulation almost inevitably gives rise to economic and political debates about the reasons for the fading growth rates and ways to increase them. If the initially extremely high growth rates at the beginning of the recovery period are perceived by both the authorities and the expert community as a pleasant surprise, then both the political elite and society get used to focusing on these abnormally high growth rates as a guideline for policy development, as a starting point in assessing the policies being pursued.

Chapter 2. Study of the main directions of development of the Russian economy in the 21st century2.1 Prerequisites for the globalization of the Russian economy

Globalization is the growth in the volume and diversity of world economic relations, accompanied by increased economic dependence of the world's countries, and has now become the main trend in the development of the world economy. It manifests itself primarily in the growth of international trade volumes, financial and investment flows, which outstrips material production.

The globalization of the world economy is generated by a number of factors associated with qualitative changes in material production and infrastructure.

Market modernization represents the transition of the economy to a new technological basis and the simultaneous formation of an adequate management mechanism. The world economy knows 2 types of modernization: pioneer And catching up.

Pioneering is typical for countries that lead the world in technological and economic progress. Catching-up modernization is typical for countries that are in the second “echelon” of development. The main difference between such modernization and the pioneer state is that its basis is the development of technologies and economic mechanisms already created in the leading countries.

Distinctive features:

1 Developmental delay;

2 Lack of internal resources due to lagging national production. Forced use of non-market methods to assert their positions in the world economy.

3 Establishment of a strong national economy, taking control of the course of economic modernization, etc.

Modern production forces require the mobilization of ever larger savings and the monopolization of economic resources by large economic entities and the state. Thus, “catch-up” modernization carries a high risk of nationalization of the economy, suppression of democracy and rollback in reforms.

Features of the “catch-up” development of the domestic economy:

1. The economic development of Russia for almost two centuries has a common nature, goals and content with the development of other countries. The Soviet economic system became a powerful mechanism for accumulating the country's material capital and separating labor from property. Its material and technical component was adequate to the material and technical basis of early and mature industrialism, and the beginning of its crisis in the late 60s. coincides with the transition of the world economy to late industrialism.

2. Under the influence of internal contradictions and ongoing reforms, the Soviet economic system itself developed towards market economic relations. The economic system that had developed by the early 80s. cannot be unambiguously interpreted as non-market, although it differs significantly from the system of market relations in developed countries. The result of economic modernization in the USSR at the beginning of the fifth wave of reforms was the formation of a hybrid type of market - a specific economic system, which was based on the distortion of the market mechanisms of the “bureaucratic market” (a system of horizontal and vertical bargaining in the process of accepting and fulfilling planned targets). The logic of economic development undermined the material and technical base Soviet economic system and led to the modernization of the main features of its economic mechanism in the direction of moving the center of economic decision-making to lower levels of the hierarchy of centralized management (to ministries, departments).

The waves of Russian reforms fall on the upward phase of the “long wave” N.D. Kondratieva. According to calculations, the rise of “long waves” falls on the periods 1788-1814 (I wave), 1849-1873 (II wave), 1896-1920 (Witte-Stolypin reforms). According to modern calculations, the next rise of the “long wave” occurred in 1952-1974 (the Khrushchev-Kosygin reforms), and in the late 80s and early 90s, the rise of the 5th wave, which corresponds to modern market reforms of the Russian economy. This is proof that the general process market modernization of the Russian economy over the past 200 years is quite consistent with the logic of global economic development. During the “wavelength” rise, Russia’s lag behind the leading countries in economic progress intensified, which forced the authorities to implement reforms “from above.”

For the country, the foreign policy factor has always been prevalent when choosing a course to create an advanced industry.

The specificity of Russian industrialization has always been that the means for its implementation were withdrawn from existing production, and were not created in the course of the natural accumulation of capital. In Russia, there has always been a change in the areas of investment - funds were directed mainly to the military and related industries. In addition, the withdrawn funds could not be enough to develop all structures in all sectors of the economy. Therefore, the system of economic development in Russia has long been fragmented.

4. Russia’s breakthroughs in market modernization inevitably ended with rollbacks of reforms that occurred in the “long wave”. What was common to the phases of counter-reforms in the economic sphere was the introduction of restrictions on the development of market relations, curbing freedom of economic activity while simultaneously increasing state intervention in economic life.

In “catch-up” development, two strategies are mainly used: import-substituting and export-oriented.

The first puts forward as a priority the creation of diversified industrial complexes designed to saturate the domestic market and only then expand their exports.

The second puts international industrial cooperation at the forefront. The condition for Russia's successful advancement along the path of economic progress is, first of all, the concentration of its own efforts and resources on the formation of an effective, technologically advanced and competitive market economy. In the 21st century, Russia will be forced to adhere mainly to an import-substituting strategy.

At the same time, the country cannot refuse to take advantage of export-oriented development. Foreign economic relations, including foreign trade, are capable of enhancing one’s own potential.

Russia's exports are dominated by goods characterized by low price elasticity, unstable price dynamics, the presence - in the long term - of a downward trend in prices and a rather slow pace of demand expansion. In addition, the market for some goods is not free. The oil market is controlled by OPEC, the ferrous metals market is regulated by the largest Western countries, and the sale of natural gas is limited by the availability and conductivity of the pipeline network.

The share in Russian exports of machinery and equipment is negligible and 5 times lower than in the exports of an “average” highly developed Western country.

In Russia's imports, food products and agricultural raw materials occupy too large a place. In this situation, the sphere of material production in Russia has become highly dependent on foreign supplies.

In the geographical structure of foreign trade, there continues to be a tendency towards a weakening role of the CIS countries. The market capacity and solvency of CIS partners are small, and their ability to participate in industrial cooperation, especially when it comes to the creation of high-tech products, is currently limited.

Composition of Russia's main trading partners in 2004 did not change. The top ten includes Germany, the USA, Ukraine, Belarus, Italy, China, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Great Britain, and Finland.

The Russian economy has a number of advantages:

1. Provision of the country with the main types of mineral resources. The country is in need of importing from outside a relatively small range of raw materials: manganese, chromium, titanium, lead, mercury and some others.

2. Comparative cheapness of some factors of production (there are large-scale production assets and qualified cheap labor). The inclusion of Russian entrepreneurs in international cooperation could be achieved through the production of units, parts and components on orders from foreign manufacturers of finished products.

3.Unique advanced technologies in a number of industrial sectors (aerospace and nuclear industries, shipbuilding, production of laser technology and computer science, cartography and geodesy, software development, geological surveys).

In my opinion, in order to realize these advantages and obtain an effect, the following points should be taken into account in the ongoing reforms:

The settling of finances abroad through non-return of export proceeds, unequal barter, payment for fictitious imported goods and services, smuggling. It is necessary to tighten government control over these operations.

Imperfection and incompleteness of the country's legislative framework. For example, in Russia there are no legislative or other regulations on the issue of competitiveness. Therefore, it is necessary to create a capable interdepartmental commission on competitiveness.

The competitive entry of our products into the foreign market will require the revival and intensification of scientific and production cooperation between enterprises and foreign countries. It is necessary to strengthen the commercialization of the scientific results of our country.

In the perspective of the world economy, it is possible to distinguish 3 poles of economic power:

· European

American

· East Asian.

Russia can become:

1 participant of 1 or 2 superblocks at once (European and East Asian)

2nd leader of the independent integration association of the CIS

3 independent outsider.

2.2 Innovative economy - a strategic direction for Russia’s development in the 21st century

In solving the problems of the country's recovery from the crisis, ensuring dynamically sustainable development of the economy, the primary role belongs to innovations, innovative activities that can ensure the continuous updating of the technical and technological base of production, the development and release of new competitive products, and effective penetration into world markets for goods and services. This requires reforming all spheres of public life, and above all, the economy.

What is meant by sub-innovation economy? The analysis of current trends in the development of the economy of leading Western countries suggests that an innovative economy is an economy of society based on knowledge, innovation, on the friendly perception of new ideas, new machines, systems and technologies, on the readiness for their practical implementation in various spheres of human activity. She highlights the special role of knowledge and innovation, primarily scientific knowledge. In the innovation economy, under the influence of scientific and technological knowledge, traditional spheres of material production are transformed and radically change their technological basis, because production that is not based on new knowledge and innovation turns out to be unviable in an innovation economy.

Information technologies, computerized systems and high production technologies are the basic systems of the innovation economy. In their development, they radically transform all means of receiving, processing, transmitting and producing information, radically technologizing intellectual activity (for example, automation of design and technological preparation of production, automated control over the progress of production, automation of financial and accounting reporting and organizational and administrative activities, multilingual automated translation, diagnostics and pattern recognition, etc.).

What are the main features of an innovative economy?

It seems to us that the economy of a society is innovative if the society:

· any individual, group of persons, enterprises anywhere in the country and at any time can receive, on the basis of automated access and telecommunication systems, any necessary information about new or known knowledge, innovations (new technologies, materials, machines, organization and management of production, etc. ), innovation activities, innovation processes;

· modern information technologies and computerized systems are produced, formed and available to any individual, group of individuals and organizations, ensuring the implementation of the previous paragraph;

· there are developed infrastructures that ensure the creation of national information resources in the volume necessary to support the ever-accelerating scientific and technological progress and innovative development, and society is able to produce all the necessary multifaceted information to ensure dynamically sustainable socio-economic development of society and, above all, scientific information;

· there is a process of accelerated automation and computerization of all spheres and industries of production and management; radical changes in social structures are being carried out, resulting in the expansion and intensification of innovative activity in various spheres of human activity;

· accept new ideas, knowledge and technologies favorably, and are ready to create and implement innovations for various functional purposes into widespread practice at any necessary time;

· there are developed innovation infrastructures that can quickly and flexibly implement innovations that are necessary at a given time, based on high production technologies, and develop innovative activities; it must be universal, competitively carrying out the creation of any innovations and the development of any production;

· there is a well-established flexible system of advanced training and retraining of professionals in the field of innovation and innovation activities, effectively implementing complex projects for the restoration and development of domestic industries and territories.

The basic concepts of an innovative economy are innovation, innovative activity, and innovative infrastructure. What are these concepts, what is their content and scope? Let’s briefly get acquainted with these concepts, because the tactics and strategy for forming an effective innovative economy in the country largely depend on their correct understanding.

Innovation, innovative activity, innovative processes are concepts that currently have the most diverse and broad interpretations. The development and dissemination of these concepts into processes related to everything new, including new ideas and inventions, new scientific achievements, new knowledge and technologies, new results of fundamental and exploratory research work, etc., are generated by the everyday idea and mixture of two concepts: innovative and new. A broad interpretation of innovation activity as new covers everything that is meant by scientific and technological progress, confuses scientific and innovation priorities, and gives rise to false ideas about the similarity of requirements for the infrastructure that ensures scientific or innovative development. To substantiate this thesis, we will proceed from the following understanding of scientific and technological progress: it is advisable to divide scientific and technological progress into two main interrelated and complementary components - the component of scientific and technological achievements and the component of production and technical achievements.

In the first case, the results of scientific and technological progress are scientific achievements - new knowledge, new scientific and technical ideas, discoveries and inventions, new technologies on fundamentally new physical, chemical and biological principles. In the second case, the results of scientific and technological progress are production and technical achievements - innovations, the creation of which involves:

· professional, targeted development and bringing the results of scientific and technical achievements to the creation of new technologies, new systems, machines, equipment, new methods of organizing and planning production, etc.;

· practical implementation of the created results of production and technical achievements to the consumer either through the market or through the “order - execution” mechanism;

· ensuring the effective use and operation of the created innovative product;

· research and obtaining new scientific and technical achievements (if there are none) necessary for the creation and implementation of innovations in demand by the market or customer (we will call them innovation-oriented scientific and technical achievements).

From the above, we conclude that innovation activity should be understood as the activity of a team of people aimed at implementing turnkey production and technical achievements in social practice - innovation, application of existing advanced technologies, systems, machines and equipment based on the use and implementation of scientific and technical achievements of domestic and world science and technology. It should ensure the elimination of the gap between the existing volume and the level of already obtained and verified scientific and technical achievements and their application in developing (created) enterprises.

It follows that saturation of innovative activity is the most important condition for the formation of an effective innovative economy.

The effectiveness of innovation activity is largely determined by the innovation infrastructure. Therefore, innovation infrastructure is a basic component of the innovation economy and the innovative potential of society. What is innovation infrastructure, why is it a basic component, the foundation of an innovative economy?

Innovative infrastructure is the main tool and mechanism of the innovative economy; it, like an “Archimedean lever and fulcrum,” is capable of raising the country’s economy to a very high level. Based on this understanding, we see innovation infrastructure as a set of interconnected, mutually complementary production and technical systems, organizations, firms and corresponding organizational and management systems, necessary and sufficient for the effective implementation of innovation activities and the implementation of innovations. Innovation infrastructure determines the pace (speed) of development of the country's economy and the growth of the well-being of its population. The experience of the developed countries of the world confirms that in the conditions of global competition in the world market, those who have a developed infrastructure for the creation and implementation of innovations, who own the most effective mechanism for innovation, inevitably win. Therefore, for the effective functioning of the country's innovative economy, the innovation infrastructure must be functionally complete.

What does it mean? This means that it must have a set of properties that should contribute to the full implementation of engineering technologies for the creation and implementation of innovations on a regional scale and the country as a whole. In our deep conviction, the mentioned set should contain a set of the following properties:

· distribution across all regions in the form of innovation and technology centers or engineering firms that can locally solve problems of a functionally complete innovation cycle with turnkey delivery of an innovation activity;

· versatility, which makes it possible to competitively ensure the implementation of an innovative turnkey project in any area of the production or service sectors of the economy;

· professionalism, which is based on conscientious and high-quality service to the customer or consumer;

· constructiveness, which is ensured by a focus on the final result. The development of an innovative project must be accompanied by continuous analysis of the final results. The presence of reliable feedback on the final results achieved makes it possible to develop constructive priorities directly in the process of development of innovation activity and thereby ensure a closed system of innovation management according to the scheme: innovation - investment - monitoring of final results - investment, etc.;

· high level of scientific and technical potential;

· staffing availability, first of all, for managers of innovative projects and the possibility of constant updating and improvement of innovation infrastructure personnel;

· financial security (availability of working capital);

· high level of tools that accelerate obtaining the final result;

· flexibility, ensuring adaptation of the innovation infrastructure to changes in market requirements and external conditions.

As the results of our research, as well as the experience of developed countries of the world, show, the main core of the innovation infrastructure, the most adequate mechanism for the implementation of scientific and technical innovations - innovations, is the infrastructure of innovative engineering centers (firms, enterprises), which should accumulate the best domestic and foreign knowledge and technologies and act as a system for the customer an integrator and guarantor of the successful implementation of an innovative project and ensure coverage of the full innovation cycle: from studying market conditions for final innovative products, a feasibility study of an innovative project and its development, complete delivery of equipment, its system integration, turnkey delivery with staffing and subsequent service.

Let us dwell on revealing the content of some of the above properties of innovation infrastructure. Research and monitoring of market needs, the need for constant and prompt updating of manufactured innovative products require that in the innovative economy, the introduction of flexible automation be given paramount importance. Complex flexible automation with extensive use of information technologies and computerized systems is the core of the innovation economy. Therefore, the foundation of all structural transformations of the region’s economy, the basis of the regional innovation infrastructure, should be based on automated high technologies and computerized systems with an end-to-end “paperless” cycle: “design - production - control - implementation”. It follows that the most important regional problem in the formation and development of an innovative economy is the solution of scientific-methodological and organizational-technological issues related to the development, creation and development of automated integrated design and production systems that automatically carry out an end-to-end “paperless” cycle and combine innovation-oriented research and development in one system , development work, processes of technological preparation and production planning, ultimately aimed at creating innovative products. Moreover, in such systems the three main stages characteristic of the creation of a new knowledge-intensive system must be automated in an end-to-end chain: design of innovations; production and assembly of a prototype of a new knowledge-intensive system; commissioning and testing of a new knowledge-intensive system.

An important problem that requires an urgent solution in the conditions of an innovative economy is the rapid creation in the regions of an effective mechanism for information support of innovative activities. The effectiveness of this mechanism largely depends on the quality of continuous socio-economic monitoring of the regions. Such monitoring, in our opinion, should cover observation, analysis, assessment and forecast of the economic, social, environmental, scientific and innovation situation in the region in order to prepare management decisions and recommendations aimed at improving and developing innovation activities. Monitoring both innovation processes and more general processes of structural economic transformation in the region aims the regions to effectively manage these processes. Therefore, one of the main functions in the field of information support for the innovative economy should be the function of automated monitoring of structural transformations in the region. In this regard, it seems appropriate to create automated centers for innovation and information support (ARCI) in the regions to constantly maintain the update and operation of innovative knowledge data banks. In this case, we must proceed from the following position: subjects of innovation activity need, first of all, information that would contain appropriately organized technical, economic, market-market, statistical information, information on the characteristics of industrial products, technologies, machinery and equipment, materials, types of services and etc. And here an important role belongs to the marketing of innovations and innovative activities at enterprises in the region as an integral part of the information support of innovative ergonomics. Innovation marketing, representing a set of activities to study all issues related to the process of selling innovative products of enterprises, namely: studying the consumer and studying the motives of his behavior in the market; researching an innovative product and channels for its sale; studying competitors and determining the competitiveness of their innovative product; studying the “niche” of the market in which the enterprise has the best opportunities to realize its advantages - should become one of the leading structures of ARCI.

The creation at the regional level of industries and enterprises of such a fundamentally new information structure - an automated integrated information system focused on comprehensive information support for the innovative economy - will contribute to the successful solution of the most important task of the state's innovative economy: ensuring the competitiveness of enterprises, industries, regions and the country as a whole.

The formation of an innovation economy largely depends on the creation of an effective mechanism for managing the practical implementation of complex innovation projects in the regions. And here it is impossible to do without state support for innovation processes. The need for financial and legal support for science and innovation, intensification of innovation activities, transition to new forms of solving economic, environmental and social problems of regions characteristic of an innovative economy, urgently require regional authorities to develop a responsible policy in relation to the management and development of innovation activity in the region, to intensify interaction on this problem between regional authorities and federal ones. The main form of such interaction, in our opinion, should be scientific and technical programs: state ones, financed from the federal budget, when priority national economic problems are solved on the basis of the scientific and innovative potential of the regions, and regional ones - with shared funding from the state and the region.

For the successful implementation of regional innovation policy for the formation of an innovative economy, a set of scientific, organizational and technical measures must be carried out, the main ones of which, in the author’s opinion, are the following.

1. Development of a concept for the development of innovation activity and innovation infrastructure in the region with the identification of long-term strategic goals and means of achieving them within the framework of the formation of an innovative economy.

2. Development of a program for innovative development of the region, which should be a targeted document indicating by resources, implementers and timing a set of activities aimed at achieving the goals of innovative development of the region.

3. Inclusion of the main provisions of the region’s innovative development program into the program of its socio-economic development.

4. Organization of practical activities of local and regional government bodies for the implementation and adoption of relevant regulations of regional significance, as well as for their implementation of organizational and information support for this program.

We consider it necessary to highlight the following provision. In the conditions of development of innovative activity (in a society with an innovative economy), the attitude towards the main productive force of society - a person of highly intellectual, highly productive labor - must completely change. The role of highly qualified specialists in the wine economy is very important and will constantly grow. Therefore, in our deep conviction, training personnel capable of effectively managing innovation processes, developing and implementing innovative projects is a priority regional and federal problem. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the objective need for innovative development and the formation of an innovative economy require the development of a new concept of personnel training. In the author’s opinion, it should be based on the following principles:

· formation, development and self-realization of a creative personality;

· constant focus on generating promising scientific and technical innovations and finding ways and methods for their practical implementation in innovation;

· focus on training highly qualified and highly intelligent specialists, system managers of innovation activities;

· consideration of education and training as an integral part of the production process, and the costs of training - not as costs for workers, but as long-term investments necessary for the prosperity of enterprises, industries and regions;

· training in managing the social and psychological aspects of the process of creating high-tech innovations, using the creative potential of the team, and accelerating the large-scale implementation of innovative developments into practice;

· creation of a system of continuous training and advanced training of personnel, integrated into the system of production of innovative products;

· cooperation of universities and other universities in the region with leading enterprises in the region implementing innovative projects, and their joint activities in the field of developing educational programs, publishing textbooks and monographs on innovative technologies, machine and equipment systems, in training highly qualified specialists in new professions and promising scientific and innovative areas.

Innovative practice (production of knowledge-intensive innovative services in the broad sense) requires working capital. It is almost impossible to obtain this working capital (for example, a loan) in modern conditions without special support measures. Therefore, at present, domestic production of innovative services, deprived of working capital, is losing the best (knowledge-intensive) projects in the country to foreign companies that use a balanced foreign market to obtain the required working capital. The research we have carried out, as well as the analysis of advanced domestic and foreign experience, shows that in an innovative economy, in order to eliminate the mentioned disadvantage, it is necessary to combine the innovation and investment functions under a single management. Such an association will help to increase the interest of performers in the successful implementation of all stages of a single innovation and investment cycle, which can be achieved by focusing all performers on the final result: responsible delivery of innovative products on a turnkey basis and participation in the sale and support of created innovative goods and services.

An effective mechanism for implementing a single innovation-investment cycle is innovation-engineering-investment centers (firms, enterprises). Such III centers will be able to ensure the effective production of knowledge-intensive innovation and investment services at the expense of their own working capital with subsequent (based on the results obtained) investments in new projects, etc. From the above it follows that the intensification of the formation of an innovative economy is associated with the accelerated creation of a domestic innovation and engineering -investment in network infrastructure distributed across all regions.

Conclusion

So, to summarize our vision of the formation and development of the economy in our country in the 21st century, we will try to briefly answer the following three questions:

1. What is the strategic goal of forming and developing the economy in Russia for the near future?

2. What resources will be used to ensure the achievement of the strategic goal?

3. How to ensure the achievement of a strategic goal with the intended resource?

The strategic goal of economic development in our country in the coming years should be the comprehensive development of domestic industries and territories to the level of their competitiveness in the world.

The main resource for achieving this goal should be higher school. The higher education system, which provides the main component of development - personnel, must be urgently supplemented with an innovative component. The higher education system should and can perform the functions of a system coordinator for the restoration and development of enterprises and territories of the country.

To ensure the effective achievement of the strategic goal, the infrastructure of higher education in Russia must be supplemented with innovation and investment structures (centers, complexes, companies, institutes...) so that universities form educational, scientific and innovative complexes. It is the higher education system that is the most promising for building on its basis a Russian innovation and investment network, which should play the role of a bridge connecting science and production in all regions and industries. This is explained by the following properties of the domestic higher school: the distribution of higher education across all regions; high scientific and technical potential of higher education; the universality of the higher education system, its intersectoral nature: scientific schools of Russian universities cover all areas of the country's economy; interaction of higher education through its graduates with all regional and industry structures; a relatively high level of information support system for higher education, including global and local computer information networks connected into a single system; high public support for higher education; flexibility of the higher education system.

The main advantage of the proposed approach is that through such development of the higher education system, it is possible to effectively integrate the results of university, academic and industrial science in Russia, as well as the advanced results of science from the world community in the creation, implementation of innovative projects and the development of innovative activities, which is a prerequisite for creating an effective innovative economy in the country.

List of used literature

1 XXI century. Formation of the legal foundations of economic activity of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation / A. Gorodilov et al. - Kaliningrad: Yantar. Skaz, 2002. - 200 p.

2 Alekseev A.I., Mironenko N.S.Territorial organization and integration into the world economy of Russia at the turn of the century // Izv. RAS. Ser. Geography. - 2000. - N 6. - P. 18-27.

3 Anti-crisis economy of Russia: the beginning of the millennium. - St. Petersburg: Faces of Russia, 2000. - 446 p.

4 Valovoy D. Alternatives to economic development of Russia in the 21st century. / Recorded by V. Semenov // Problem. management theory and practice. - 1999. - N 6. - P.44-47

5 Vladimirsky E.A. Russian Economy in the 20th century (political economic aspect): Textbook. allowance / SPbGASU. - St. Petersburg, 2000. - 206 p.

6 Quality - strategy of the 21st century: Mater.Vseros. scientific-practical Conf., Feb. 27-28. 2001 - Saransk: Mordovian University Publishing House, 2001. - 188 p.

7 Kudrov V. Russia’s place in the world economy at the beginning of the 21st century // World Economy and International. relationship. - 2000.- N 5. - P.75-83.

8 Obolensky V.P. Foreign economic policy of Russia on the threshold of a new century // Mirov. economics and international relations. - 2000. - N 2. - P.51-61.

9 The path to the 21st century: Strategic problems and prospects for the Russian economy. - M.: Economics, 1999. - 793 p. - (Systemic problems of Russia).

10 Sokolova O.Yu. Trends in interaction between Russian business entities in the 21st century / Sarat. state social-economic univ. - Saratov, 2002. - 228 p.

Main directions of development of the Russian economy in the 21st century .

PLAN

Introduction 3

Conclusion 31

Introduction

In the last quarter of the 20th century, humanity entered a new stage of its development - the stage of building a post-industrial society, which is the result of the socio-economic revolution taking place in the modern world. It is known that each socio-economic revolution is based on its own specific technologies, production and technological systems and production relations. For a post-industrial society, this role is played, first of all, by information technologies and computerized systems, high production technologies that are the result of new physical, technical and chemical-biological principles, and innovative technologies based on them, innovative systems and innovative organization of various spheres of human activity. Its final result, in our deep conviction, should be the creation of a new form of economic organization -innovation economy . Analysis of the results of research by domestic and foreign scientists on this issue convinced us that the creation of an innovative economy is a strategic direction for the development of our country in the first half of the 21st century. This circumstance served as the main motivation for choosing the topic of the course research.

Basicpurpose course work is an analysis of trends in the development of the Russian economy in the 21st century. The set goal necessitated the solution of a number of interrelated tasks:

reveal the prerequisites for the current economic growth of the domestic economy;

analyze the problems associated with economic growth;

explore the prerequisites for the globalization of the Russian economy;

study the innovative direction of development of the Russian economy.

The subject of the study is possible directions for the development of the Russian economy in the 21st century.

The object of the study is the Russian economy.

Chapter 1. Current trends in economic development of Russia

1.1 Economic growth: from recovery patterns to structural reforms

This remark fully applies to the discussion of the problems of economic growth, which began in Russia in 1999. Russian literature is dominated by two concepts for explaining the nature of this growth. The first connects it with the real depreciation of the ruble after the 1998 crisis and favorable conditions on the oil market. The second reason for the growth is the reforms carried out by the Russian government in the conditions of political stabilization that occurred after the 2000 elections. These reforms are certainly important for ensuring long-term sustainable growth. Indeed, for Russia, oil market conditions and the real exchange rate are the most important factors in macroeconomic policy that influence growth. But the nature of current growth is still different.

In the context of the experience of other countries, it is easy to see that GDP is currently growing throughout the post-Soviet space. Moreover, at the first stage, approximately in 1992-1994, there was no growth in any of them. In 1995, the first signs of economic growth appeared in the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), as well as in states that were involved in military conflicts or were the object of a blockade (for example, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan).

Table 1.

Growth rates of physical volume of GDP in post-Soviet states in 1996-2004

1996	1997	1998	2002	2003	2004
Azerbaijan	1,3%	5,8%	10,0%	7,4%	11,1%	9,9%
Armenia	5,9%	3,3%	7,3%	3,3%	5,9%	9,6%
Belarus	2,8%	11,4%	8,4%	3,4%	5,8%	4,1%
Georgia	11,4%	10,6%	2,9%	3,0%	2,0%	4,5%
Kazakhstan	0,5%	1,7%	1,9%	2,7%	9,8%	13,2%
Kyrgyzstan	7,1%	9,9%	2,1%	3,7%	5,4%	5,3%
Moldova	5,9%	1,6%	6,5%	3,4%	2,1%	6,1%
Russia	3,4%	0,9%	4,9%	5,4%	9,0%	5,0%
Tajikistan	16,7%	1,7%	5,3%	3,7%	8,3%	10,2%
Uzbekistan	1,7%	5,2%	4,4%	4,4%	3,8%	4,5%
Ukraine	10,0%	3,0%	1,9%	0,2%	5,9%	9,1%
Latvia	3,3%	8,6%	3,9%	1,1%	6,6%	6,5%
Lithuania	4,7%	7,3%	5,1%	3,9%	3,9%	4,0%
Estonia	4,0%	10,4%	5,0%	0,7%	6,9%	4,5%

Source: Statistical Yearbook. Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS. Moscow, 2005

Thus, the presence of growth is not directly related either to the political regime (it differs significantly in the listed countries), or to the implementation of reforms reminiscent of the Russian reforms of 2000-2001, or to oil prices (among the mentioned countries there are both net exporters, and net importers of oil and petroleum products). In addition, if we trace the dynamics of the real exchange rate of national currencies in 1995-2004, it is clear that in some countries the real exchange rate fell significantly, while in others it strengthened (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Real exchange rate of the national currency to the US dollar in post-Soviet states (according to the CPI), 1995=100

1996	1997	1998	2002	2003	2004
Azerbaijan	126%	135%	131%	104%	99%	93%
Armenia	107%	104%	106%	104%	95%	93%
Belarus	110%	89%	44%	56%	39%	46%
Georgia	130%	134%	99%	107%	105%	103%
Kazakhstan	118%	131%	125%	80%	84%	85%
Kyrgyzstan	86%	100%	64%	55%	60%	63%
Moldova	113%	120%	70%	72%	86%	87%
Russia	120%	125%	45%	63%	71%	78%
Ukraine	166%	187%	113%	89%	113%	134%
Latvia	110%	111%	118%	116%	110%	104%
Lithuania	121%	129%	133%	131%	128%	126%
Estonia	110%	103%	118%	102%	95%	93%

Source: Calculations based on data from International Financial Statistics 2005. IMF, 2005.

First of all, we will try to analyze what was associated with the decline in production in 1992-1994, which was then replaced by economic growth.

The phenomenon of post-socialist recession has been well studied, and the main factors that determine its development are clear. It is worth paying attention to the nature of the socialist gross domestic product. The traditional concept of GDP used in a market economy is not applicable for a meaningful analysis of socialist economies. The correct use of the concept of GDP imposes certain limitations, which primarily include: the presence of a market economy, the share of the state (budget) in which is relatively small and there is democratic control over the formation of government spending. This leads to the fundamental principle used in calculating GDP: if people pay for certain goods and services, this means that they (the goods and services) are valuable to them. The latter is a necessary condition for including these products in the calculation of welfare.

Obviously, the situation described above does not correspond to the realities of a socialist economy, where production and distribution of products are strictly regulated, there is no market, as well as democratic control over government spending. In such a situation, a significant amount of economic activity does not contribute to the growth of welfare, which in many cases turns GDP growth into a statistical illusion. In relation to socialism, the concept of GDP is extremely conditional, because there are not always basic prerequisites that would allow one or another economic activity to be considered meaningful, oriented towards real needs. In other words, the needs and motives of economic activity in socialist and market economies are qualitatively incomparable - what is meaningful in the first may turn out to be completely meaningless in the second, which sharply limits the possibility of comparing GDP expressed in monetary units (money). When the socialist system collapses, these qualitative differences come to the surface: it turns out that a significant part of economic activity is that for which no one will ever pay in a market and democracy, either as a consumer or as a taxpayer.

The main factors that determine the duration and depth of the post-socialist recession are:

a) the scale of the economic sector whose products and services are not in demand by the market;

b) the extent of the use of market instruments under socialism;

c) the presence in the social memory of the population of information about pre-socialist market institutions.

1.2 Analysis of the problems of restorative economic growth in Russia

It is obvious that modern recovery growth in Russia differs significantly from recovery growth after the civil war and revolution.

Firstly, the level of production decline in 1991-1998. was significantly lower than during the revolution and civil war. Therefore, the pace of recovery is now also slower.

Secondly, the Russian economy of the NEP period was generally a market economy, just like the Russian economy of 1913. The economic structures that were formed then, with all their differences (a significantly smaller share of foreign trade in GDP, less marketability of agriculture, a greater role of the public sector, etc. .) resembled the structure of the Russian economy of 1913 to a greater extent than the structure of the fundamentally market economy of modern Russia resembles the structure of the socialist economy of the RSFSR in 1990.

But a number of processes that were characteristic of the recovery growth of the NEP period are also manifested in today's Russia. The first characteristic feature of recovery growth is its unexpectedness. V. Groman at one time drew attention to the fact that no one in the State Planning Committee expected the pace of industrial restoration that was ensured after the stabilization of economic relations and financial stabilization in the 1923/24 business year. The State Planning Committee proceeded from the fact that without large-scale capital investments it was possible to increase the volume of industrial production by 1927/28 to only 50% of the pre-war level. In reality, by 1927/28 industrial production had almost reached the level of 1913.

A similar situation is observed in our time. The Russian government predicted for 2000 from a 2.2% decline to 0.2% growth in GDP, the IMF predicted an increase of 1.5%, but real growth was 9%. (Note that GDP growth in Ukraine in 2001 was 9%, with the IMF forecast at 3.5%.)

The reasons for errors in forecasts are understandable and closely related to the very nature of recovery growth. Since the methods used for forecasting GDP are based on extrapolation of trends of the previous period, the forecast dynamics of production factors and economic conditions, it is easy to understand that all of them are of little use for predicting a surge in economic activity due to the stabilization of economic relations.

Then you have to deal with a second surprise, but this time an unpleasant one. It turns out that recovery growth by its nature is damped. The mechanics of this process are understandable: restorative growth is ensured by the use of already created capacities and a trained, qualified workforce. It occurs with relatively minor capital investments, but its resources are quickly exhausted.

So, in the period 1998-2004. the number of people employed in the Russian economy increased by 8.9 million people (from 58.4 to 67.3 million). The shortage of skilled labor found expression in the rapid growth of real wages. During 2000-2004. real wages increased 1.7 times. A similar trend is observed in other CIS countries (see Table 3).

Table 3

Growth rates of real wages in the CIS countries in 1996-2004

1996	1997	1998	2002	2003	2004
Azerbaijan	19,0%	53,0%	20,0%	20,0%	18,0%	16,0%
Armenia	13,0%	26,0%	22,0%	11,0%	13,0%	5,0%
Belarus	5,0%	14,0%	18,0%	7,0%	12,0%	30,0%
Georgia	53,0%	37,0%	25,0%	2,0%	3,0%	22,0%
Kazakhstan	2,0%	5,0%	4,0%	7,0%	12,0%	13,0%
Kyrgyzstan	1,0%	12,0%	12,0%	8,0%	2,0%	11,0%
Moldova	5,0%	5,0%	5,0%	13,0%	2,0%	15,0%
Russia	6,0%	5,0%	13,0%	22,0%	21,0%	20,0%
Tajikistan	14,0%	2,0%	29,0%	0,3%	8,0%	11,0%
Ukraine	5,0%	2,0%	3,0%	6,0%	1,0%	21,0%

Source: Statistical Yearbook. Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS. Moscow, 2005

The growth of real wages, which is faster than labor productivity, was also pointed out as a characteristic element of restoration processes by V. Groman in his works dating back to the 1920s.

Market surveys conducted by the IET show a sharp change in the balance of assessments of the adequacy of production capacity to meet expected demand in the period 1998-2004. Assessments of labor requirements in relation to expected demand are also changing: shortages of equipment and qualified personnel are increasingly seen as a serious obstacle to production growth.

A drop in growth rates after reaching peak values and the involvement of the most available resources in economic circulation almost inevitably gives rise to economic and political debates about the reasons for the fading growth rates and ways to increase them. If initially the extremely high growth rates at the beginning of the recovery period are perceived by both the authorities and the expert community as a pleasant surprise, then both the political elite and society get used to focusing on these abnormally high growth rates as a guideline for policy development, as a starting point in the assessment the policy being pursued.

Chapter 2. Study of the main directions of development of the Russian economy in the 21st century

2.1 Prerequisites for the globalization of the Russian economy

Globalization is the growth in the volume and diversity of world economic relations, accompanied by increased economic dependence of the world's countries, and has now become the main trend in the development of the world economy. It is manifested primarily in the growth of international trade volumes, financial and investment flows, which are faster than material production.

The globalization of the world economy is generated by a number of factors associated with qualitative changes in material production and infrastructure.

Pioneering is typical for countries that are leaders in the world of technological and economic progress. Catch-up modernization is typical for countries that are in the second “echelon” of development. The main difference between such modernization and the pioneer state is that its basis is the development of technologies and economic mechanisms already created in the leading countries.

Distinctive features:

Developmental delay;

Lack of internal resources due to lagging national production. Forced use of non-market methods of asserting one’s position in the world economy.

Establishment of a strong national economy, taking control of the course of economic modernization, etc.

Features of the “catch-up” development of the domestic economy:

2. Under the influence of internal contradictions and ongoing reforms, the Soviet economic system itself developed towards market economic relations. The economic system that had developed by the early 80s. cannot be unambiguously interpreted as non-market, although it differs significantly from the system of market relations in developed countries. The result of economic modernization in the USSR by the beginning of the fifth wave of reforms was the formation of a hybrid type of market - a specific economic system, which was based on the distortion of the market mechanisms of the “bureaucratic market” (a system of horizontal and vertical bidding in the process of accepting and fulfilling planned targets). The logic of economic development was undermined the material and technical base of the Soviet economic system and led to the modernization of the main features of its economic mechanism in the direction of moving the center of economic decision-making to lower levels of the hierarchy of centralized management (to ministries, departments).

The waves of Russian reforms occur during the upward phase of the “long wave” of N.D. Kondratieva. According to his calculations, the rise of “long waves” falls on the periods 1788-1814 (I wave), 1849-1873 (II wave), 1896-1920 (Witte-Stolypin reforms). According to modern calculations, the next rise of the “long wave” occurred in 1952-1974 (the Khrushchev-Kosygin reforms), and in the late 80s and early 90s, the rise of the 5th wave, which corresponds to modern market reforms of the Russian economy. This is proof that the general process of market modernization of the Russian economy over the past 200 years is sufficiently consistent with the logic of global economic development. During the “wavelength” rise, Russia’s lag behind the leading countries in economic progress increased, which forced the authorities to implement reforms “from above.”

For the country, the foreign policy factor has always been predominant when choosing a course to create an advanced industry.

The specificity of Russian industrialization has always been that the means for its implementation were withdrawn from existing production, and were not created in the course of the natural accumulation of capital. In Russia, there has always been a change in the areas of investment; funds were directed mainly to the military and related industries. In addition, the withdrawn funds could not be enough to develop all structures in all sectors of the economy. Therefore, the system of economic development in Russia has long been fragmented.

4. Russia's breakthroughs on the path of market modernization inevitably ended with rollbacks of reforms that occurred during the decline in the “long wave.” What was common to the phases of counter-reforms in the economic sphere was the introduction of restrictions on the development of market relations, curbing freedom of economic activity while simultaneously increasing state intervention in economic life.

In “catch-up” development, two strategies are mainly used: import-substituting and export-oriented.

The first puts forward as a priority the creation of diversified industrial complexes designed to saturate the domestic market and only then expand their exports.

At the same time, the country cannot refuse to take advantage of export-oriented development. Foreign economic relations, including foreign trade, are capable of enhancing one’s own potential.

Russia's exports are dominated by goods characterized by low price elasticity, unstable price dynamics, the presence - in the long term - of a downward trend in prices and a rather slow pace of expansion of demand. In addition, the market for some goods is not free. The oil market is controlled by OPEC, the ferrous metals market is regulated by the largest Western countries, and the sale of natural gas is limited by the availability and conductivity of the pipeline network.

The share in Russian exports of machinery and equipment is negligible and 5 times lower than in the exports of an “average” highly developed Western country.

Food products and agricultural raw materials occupy too much of Russia's imports. In this state, the sphere of material production in Russia has become significantly dependent on foreign supplies.

In the geographical structure of foreign trade, there continues to be a tendency towards a weakening role of the CIS countries. The market capacity and solvency of partners in the CIS are small, and their ability to participate in industrial cooperation, especially when it comes to the creation of high-tech products, is currently limited.

Composition of Russia's main trading partners in 2004 did not change. The top ten includes Germany, the USA, Ukraine, Belarus, Italy, China, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Great Britain, and Finland.

The Russian economy has a number of advantages:

1. The country's provision with the main types of mineral resources. The country is in need of importing from outside a relatively small range of raw materials: manganese, chromium, titanium, lead, mercury and some others.

2. Comparative cheapness of some factors of production (there are large-scale production assets and qualified cheap labor). The inclusion of Russian entrepreneurs in international cooperation could be carried out by manufacturing units, parts and components according to orders from foreign manufacturers of finished products.

3.Unique advanced technologies in a number of industrial sectors (aerospace and nuclear industries, shipbuilding, production of laser technology and computer science tools, cartography and geodesy, software development, geological surveys).

In my opinion, in order to realize these advantages and obtain an effect, the following points must be taken into account in the ongoing reforms:

- settling of finances abroad through non-return of export proceeds, unequal barter, payment for fictitious imported goods and services, smuggling. It is necessary to tighten government control over these operations.

— imperfection and incompleteness of the country’s legislative framework. For example, in Russia there are no legislative or other regulations on the issue of competitiveness. Therefore, it is necessary to create a capable interdepartmental commission on competitiveness.

— the competitive entry of our products into the foreign market will require the revival and intensification of scientific and production cooperation between enterprises and foreign countries. It is necessary to strengthen the commercialization of the scientific results of our country.

In the perspective of the world economy, it is possible to distinguish 3 poles of economic power:

European

American

East Asian.

Russia can become:

participant of 1 or 2 superblocks at once (European and East Asian)

leader of the independent integration association of the CIS

an independent outsider.

2.2 Innovative economy - a strategic direction for Russia’s development in the 21st century

In solving the problems of the country's recovery from the crisis and ensuring dynamically sustainable development of the economy, the primary role belongs to innovations and innovative activities that can ensure the continuous updating of the technical and technological base of production, the development and release of new competitive products, and effective penetration into world markets for goods and services. This requires reforming all spheres of public life, and above all, the economy.

What is meant by innovative economy? The analysis of current trends in the development of the economy of leading Western countries suggests that an innovative economy is an economy of society based on knowledge, innovation, on the friendly perception of new ideas, new machines, systems and technologies, on the readiness for their practical implementation in various spheres of human activity . She highlights the special role of knowledge and innovation, primarily scientific knowledge. In an innovative economy, under the influence of scientific and technological knowledge, traditional spheres of material production are transformed and radically change their technological basis, because production that is not based on new knowledge and innovation turns out to be unviable in an innovative economy.

What are the main features of an innovative economy?

It seems to us that the economy of a society is innovative if the society:

any individual, group of persons, enterprises anywhere in the country and at any time can receive, on the basis of automated access and telecommunication systems, any necessary information about new or known knowledge, innovations (new technologies, materials, machines, organization and management of production, etc. .), innovation activities, innovation processes;

modern information technologies and computerized systems are produced, formed and accessible to any individual, group of individuals and organizations, ensuring the implementation of the previous paragraph;

there are developed infrastructures that ensure the creation of national information resources in the volume necessary to support the constantly accelerating scientific and technological progress and innovative development, and society is able to produce all the necessary multifaceted information to ensure dynamically sustainable socio-economic development of society and, above all, scientific information ;

there is a process of accelerated automation and computerization of all spheres and branches of production and management; radical changes in social structures are being carried out, resulting in the expansion and intensification of innovative activity in various spheres of human activity;

favorably perceive new ideas, knowledge and technologies, are ready to create and introduce into widespread practice at any necessary time innovations for various functional purposes;

there are developed innovation infrastructures that can quickly and flexibly implement innovations that are necessary at a given time, based on high production technologies, and develop innovative activities; it must be universal, competitively carrying out the creation of any innovations and the development of any production;

there is a well-established flexible system of advanced training and retraining of professionals in the field of innovation and innovation activities, effectively implementing complex projects for the restoration and development of domestic industries and territories.

Innovation, innovative activity, innovative processes are concepts that currently have the most diverse and broad interpretations. The development and spread of these concepts to processes related to everything new, including new ideas and inventions, new scientific achievements, new knowledge and technologies, new results of fundamental and exploratory research work, etc., are generated by the everyday idea and confusion of two concepts : innovative and new. A broad interpretation of innovation activity as new covers everything that is meant by scientific and technological progress, confuses scientific and innovative priorities, and gives rise to false ideas about the similarity of requirements for infrastructures that ensure scientific or innovative development. To substantiate this thesis, we will proceed from the following understanding of scientific and technological progress: it is advisable to divide scientific and technological progress conditionally into two main interrelated and complementary components - the component of scientific and technological achievements and the component of production and technical achievements.

In the first case, the results of scientific and technological progress are scientific achievements - new knowledge, new scientific and technical ideas, discoveries and inventions, new technologies based on fundamentally new physical, chemical and biological principles. In the second case, the results of scientific and technological progress are production and technical achievements - innovations, the creation of which involves:

professional targeted development and bringing the results of scientific and technical achievements to the creation of new technologies, new systems, machines, equipment, new methods of organizing and planning production, etc.;

practical implementation of the created results of production and technical achievements to the consumer either through the market or through the “order - execution” mechanism;

ensuring the effective use and operation of the created innovative product;

research and obtaining new scientific and technical achievements (if there are none) necessary for the creation and implementation of innovations demanded by the market or customer (we will call them innovation-oriented scientific and technical achievements).

From the above, we conclude that innovation activity should be understood as the activity of a team of people aimed at implementing turnkey production and technical achievements in social practice - innovation, application of existing progressive technologies, systems, machines and equipment based on the use and implementation of scientific and technical achievements of domestic and world science and technology. It should ensure the elimination of the gap between the existing volume and level of scientific and technical achievements already obtained and verified and their application in developing (created) enterprises.

It follows that saturation of innovation activity is the most important condition for the formation of an effective innovation economy.

Innovation infrastructure is the main tool and mechanism of the innovation economy; it, like an “Archimedean lever and fulcrum,” is capable of raising the country’s economy to a very high level. Based on this understanding, we see innovation infrastructure as a set of interconnected, complementary production and technical systems, organizations, firms and corresponding organizational and management systems that are necessary and sufficient for the effective implementation of innovation activities and the implementation of innovations. Innovation infrastructure determines the pace (speed) of development of the country's economy and the growth of the well-being of its population. The experience of the developed countries of the world confirms that in the conditions of global competition in the world market, those who have a developed infrastructure for creating and implementing innovations and who own the most effective mechanism for innovation activities inevitably win. Therefore, for the effective functioning of the country's innovative economy, the innovation infrastructure must be functionally complete.

distribution across all regions in the form of innovation and technology centers or engineering firms that can locally solve problems of a functionally complete innovation cycle with turnkey delivery of an innovation activity;

versatility, which makes it possible to competitively ensure the implementation of an innovative turnkey project in any area of the production or service sectors of the economy;

professionalism, which is based on conscientious and high-quality service to the customer or consumer;

constructiveness, which is ensured by a focus on the final result. The development of an innovative project must be accompanied by continuous analysis of the final results. The presence of reliable feedback on the achieved final results makes it possible to develop constructive priorities directly in the process of developing innovation activities and thereby ensure a closed system of innovation management according to the scheme: innovations - investments - monitoring of final results - investments, etc.;

high level of scientific and technical potential;

staffing, first of all, managers of innovation projects and the possibility of constant updating and improvement of innovation infrastructure personnel;

financial security (availability of working capital);

high level of tools that speed up obtaining the final result;

flexibility, ensuring adaptation of the innovation infrastructure to changes in market requirements and external conditions.

As the results of our research, as well as the experience of developed countries of the world, show, the main core of innovation infrastructure, the most adequate mechanism for the implementation of scientific and technical innovations - innovations, is the infrastructure of innovative engineering centers (firms, enterprises), which must accumulate the best domestic and foreign knowledge and technologies and act for the customer as a system integrator and guarantor of the successful implementation of an innovative project and ensure coverage of the full innovation cycle: from studying market conditions for final innovative products, feasibility studies of an innovative project and its development to complete supply of equipment, its system integration, turnkey delivery ” with staffing and subsequent service.

Let us dwell on revealing the content of some of the above properties of innovation infrastructure. Research and monitoring of market needs, the need for constant and prompt updating of manufactured innovative products require that in the innovative economy, the implementation of flexible automation be given paramount importance. Complex flexible automation with extensive use of information technologies and computerized systems is the core of the innovation economy. Therefore, the foundation of all structural transformations of the regional economy, the basis of the regional innovation infrastructure should be based on automated high technologies and computerized systems with an end-to-end “paperless” cycle: “design - production - control - implementation”. It follows that the most important regional problem in the formation and development of an innovative economy is the solution of scientific, methodological, organizational and technological issues related to the development, creation and development of automated integrated design and production systems that automatically carry out an end-to-end “paperless” cycle and combine in one system of innovatively oriented research and development work, processes of technological preparation and production planning, ultimately aimed at creating innovative products. Moreover, in such systems the three main stages characteristic of creating a new knowledge-intensive system should be automated in an end-to-end chain: innovation design; production and assembly of a prototype of a new high-tech system; commissioning and testing of a new high-tech system.

An important problem that requires an urgent solution in the conditions of an innovative economy is the rapid creation in the regions of an effective mechanism for information support of innovation activities. The effectiveness of this mechanism largely depends on the quality of continuous socio-economic monitoring of the regions. Such monitoring, in our opinion, should cover observation, analysis, assessment and forecast of the economic, social, environmental, scientific and innovation situation in the region in order to prepare management decisions and recommendations aimed at improving and developing innovation activities. Monitoring both innovation processes and more general processes of structural economic transformation in the region aims the regions to effectively manage these processes. Therefore, one of the main functions in the field of information support for the innovative economy should be the function of automated monitoring of structural transformations in the region. In this regard, it seems appropriate to create automated centers for innovation and information support (ARCI) in the regions to constantly maintain the updating and operation of innovative data and knowledge banks. In this case, we must proceed from the following position: subjects of innovative activity need, first of all, information that would contain appropriately organized technical, economic, market-related, statistical information, information about the characteristics of industrial products, technologies, machinery and equipment, materials, types of services, etc. And here an important role belongs to the marketing of innovations and innovative activities at enterprises in the region as an integral part of the information support of innovative ergonomics. Innovative marketing, representing a set of activities to study all issues related to the process of selling innovative products of enterprises, namely: studying the consumer and studying the motives of his behavior in the market; research of an innovative product and channels for its implementation; studying competitors and determining the competitiveness of their innovative product; studying the “niche” of the market in which the enterprise has the best opportunity to realize its advantages - should become one of the leading structures of ARCI.

The creation at the regional level of industries and enterprises of such a fundamentally new information structure - an automated integrated information system, focused on comprehensive information support for the innovative economy, will contribute to the successful solution of the most important task of the innovative economy of the state: ensuring the competitiveness of enterprises, industries, regions and the country as a whole.

The formation of an innovative economy largely depends on the creation of an effective mechanism for managing the practical implementation of complex innovative projects in the regions. And here we cannot do without government support for innovation processes. The need for financial and legal support for science and innovation, intensification of innovation activity, transition to new forms of solving economic, environmental and social problems of the regions characteristic of an innovative economy, urgently require regional authorities to develop a responsible policy in relation to the management and development of innovation activity in the region , to intensify interaction on this problem between regional government bodies and federal ones. The main form of such interaction, in our opinion, should be scientific and technical programs: state ones, financed from the federal budget, when priority national economic problems are solved on the basis of the scientific and innovative potential of the regions, and regional ones - with shared funding from the state and the region.

1. Development of a concept for the development of innovation activity and innovation infrastructure in the region with the definition of long-term strategic goals and means of achieving them within the framework of the formation of an innovative economy.

2. Development of a program for innovative development of the region, which should be a targeted document indicating the resources, implementers and timing of a set of activities aimed at achieving the goals of innovative development of the region.

3. Inclusion of the main provisions of the region’s innovative development program into the program of its socio-economic development.

We consider it necessary to especially highlight the following provision. In the conditions of development of innovative activity (in a society with an innovative economy), the attitude towards the main productive force of society - a person of highly intellectual, highly productive labor - must completely change. The role of highly qualified specialists in the innovative economy is very large and will constantly grow. Therefore, in our deep conviction, training personnel capable of effectively managing innovation processes, developing and implementing innovative projects is a priority regional and federal problem. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the objective need for innovative development and the formation of an innovative economy require the development of a new concept of personnel training. In the author’s opinion, it should be based on the following principles:

formation, development and self-realization of a creative personality;

constant focus on generating promising scientific and technical innovations and finding ways and methods for their practical implementation in innovation;

focus on training highly qualified and highly intelligent specialists, system managers of innovation activities;

considering education and training as an integral part of the production process, and the costs of training - not as costs for workers, but as long-term investments necessary for the prosperity of enterprises, industries and regions;

training in managing the social and psychological aspects of the process of creating high-tech innovations, using the creative potential of the team and accelerating the large-scale implementation of innovative developments into practice;

creation of a system of continuous training and advanced training of personnel, integrated into the system of production of innovative products;

cooperation between universities and other universities in the region with leading enterprises in the region implementing innovative projects, and their joint activities in the field of developing educational programs, publishing textbooks and monographs on innovative technologies, machine and equipment systems, in training highly qualified specialists in new professions and promising scientific fields -innovative directions.

Innovative practice (production of knowledge-intensive innovative services in a broad sense) requires working capital. It is almost impossible to obtain this working capital (for example, a loan) in modern conditions without special support measures. Therefore, at present, the domestic production of innovative services, deprived of working capital, is losing the best (knowledge-intensive) projects in the country to foreign firms that use a balanced foreign market to obtain the required working capital. Our research, as well as our analysis of advanced domestic and foreign experience, shows that in an innovative economy, in order to eliminate the mentioned drawback, it is necessary to combine the innovation and investment functions under a single management. Such an association will help to increase the interest of performers in the successful implementation of all stages of a single innovation and investment cycle, which can be achieved when all performers are focused on the final result: responsible delivery of innovative products on a turnkey basis and participation in the sale and support of created innovative goods and services.

An effective mechanism for implementing a unified innovation and investment cycle is innovation, engineering and investment centers (firms, enterprises). Such III centers will be able to ensure the effective production of knowledge-intensive innovation and investment services already at the expense of their own working capital with subsequent (based on the results obtained) investments in new projects, etc. From the above it follows that the intensification of the formation of an innovative economy is associated with accelerated creation of domestic innovation, engineering and investment network infrastructure distributed across all regions.

Conclusion

So, to summarize our vision of the formation and development of the economy in our country in the 21st century, we will try to briefly answer the following three questions:

1. What is the strategic goal of the formation and development of the economy in Russia for the coming period?

2. What resource will be used to ensure the achievement of the strategic goal?

3. How to ensure the achievement of a strategic goal with the intended resource?

To ensure the effective achievement of the strategic goal, the infrastructure of higher education in Russia must be supplemented with innovation and investment structures (centers, complexes, companies, institutes...) so that universities form educational, scientific and innovative complexes. It is the higher education system that is the most promising for building on its basis a Russian innovation and investment network, which should play the role of a bridge connecting science and production in all regions and industries. This is explained by the following properties of domestic higher education: distribution of higher education across all regions; high scientific and technical potential of higher education; the universality of the higher education system, its intersectoral nature: scientific schools of Russian universities cover all areas of the country's economy; interaction of higher education through its graduates with all regional and industry structures; a relatively high level of information support system for higher education, including global and local computer information networks connected into a single system; high public support for higher education; flexibility of the higher education system.

The main advantage of the proposed approach is that through such development of the higher education system it is possible to effectively integrate the results of university, academic and industrial science in Russia, as well as the advanced results of science of the world community when creating, implementing innovative projects and developing innovative activities, which is a prerequisite for creating the country of an effective innovative economy.

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