Rice. 1. Cultural property intended for sale abroad

In the mid-20s. the problem of industrialization came to the forefront. This was explained by the need: to create the material and technical benefits of socialism, to achieve the country's economic independence, and to strengthen its defense capability. Stalin announced the “offensive of socialism along the entire front.” The accelerated development of basic industries (fuel and raw materials, metallurgy, mechanical engineering, etc.), on which the general state of the economy depended, came to the fore.

Rice. 2. American equipment

In the West, industrialization was carried out using funds received from the development of agriculture and light industry. But in the USSR there was no time to implement this approach. Therefore, industrialization was carried out through the robbery of the village and the sale of raw materials, bread, and cultural property abroad. In conditions of limited resources, management switched to their centralized distribution and planning of the entire economy.

Rice. 3. Y. Romas “Morning of the First Five-Year Plan”

In 1927, the development of the 1st five-year plan began. In 1929 it was approved. It was planned to increase industrial production by 180%, agricultural production by 55%. Heavy industry was supposed to develop at an accelerated pace - 230% in 5 years. Stalin at this time put forward the idea of ​​the “Great Leap Forward” - in order to catch up with the West in 5-10 years, which had gone ahead in its industrial development by 50-100 years.

Rice. 4. Dneproges Dam

Millions of people responded enthusiastically to Stalin's call. It was not possible to fulfill the five-year plan, but a huge step forward was made in the industrialization of the country. The output of heavy industry increased 2.8 times, industrial giants were built - the Dneproges, Magnitka, Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor plants, Turksib, aviation, chemical electrical industries, etc. appeared. The USSR reduced the import of foreign equipment.

Rice. 5. Announcements for recruitment of workers

The enormous scale of economic transformation required a huge amount of labor. In 1930, the last labor exchange in the USSR was closed. But the bulk of the workers were unskilled. To solve this problem, higher and secondary specialized educational institutions are opening in the USSR, evening faculties and technical colleges are opening. Over 5 years, 130 thousand specialists were trained, mainly from workers

Rice. 6. V. Denis, N. Dolgorukov “First Five-Year Plan”

At the same time, there were shortcomings in the social sphere - already low wages were eaten up by taxes, rising prices and inflation. The repressions initiated by Stalin against his opponents led to the creation in 1930 of the Main Directorate of Camps (GULAG). The cheap labor of prisoners made it possible to implement such grandiose projects as the construction of the White Sea Canal and the Moscow-Volga Canal.

Rice. 7. N. Dolgorukov Propaganda poster

In 1932, announcing the success of the 1st Five-Year Plan, Stalin noted that there was now no need to “spur the country”, and the 2nd Five-Year Plan provided for a reduction in the growth rate of industrial output from 30 to 16%, while the growth of light industry was to be taller than the height of the heavy. The plan provided for the creation of industrial bases in the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia.

Rice. 8. G. Ordzhonikidze - People's Commissar of Heavy Engineering

The fulfillment of the tasks of the 2nd Five-Year Plan led to the transformation of the USSR from an agricultural country into a powerful industrial power. Industry growth was 2.2 times. 80% of the increase was achieved through newly built enterprises. The country was able to overcome the 10-year period planned by Stalin through incredible efforts, and the USSR came out on top in Europe in terms of industrial production.

The 2nd Five-Year Plan did not lead to an increase in the standard of living of the population. Food cards were abolished, but the general price level increased. Workers were forced to sign up for government loans. Housing conditions did not improve, because the number of inhabitants in cities grew.

At this time, the Stakhanov movement arose. In 1935, A. Stakhanov exceeded the coal production norm by 14 times. His initiative spread to other industries. Stakhanovites received up to 2000 rubles. received awards per month.

This led to stratification in society. Soon production standards were increased by 20%, and the wages of the bulk of workers fell. They often changed jobs and violated labor discipline. In response, work books were introduced, which were required when applying for a job, and the amount of social benefits was made dependent on continuous work experience in one place. In the 1930s these measures were further tightened.

Rice. 9. P. Sokolov-Skalya “The train is coming!”

In terms of industrial growth, the USSR overtook Tsarist Russia by almost 3 times. It took 2nd place in the world in terms of overall indicators and was the leader in the growth rate of industrial production. The USSR became economically independent from the West, which at that time, like our country, was at the stage of an industrial society. But these successes were achieved at the expense of overstraining the economy and its disproportionate development, to the detriment of light industry and agriculture.

Collectivization.

Antikulak poster

The reasons for collectivization were that the agricultural revolution and industrialization in the USSR took place simultaneously. The village was seen as a source of funds for industrial development. It was easier to do this by controlling several hundred collective farms. In addition, collective farms strengthened the social support of Soviet power in the countryside, turning individual peasants into a class of socialist society.

Rice. 10. Admission to the collective farm

In 1929, Stalin’s article “The Year of the Great Turning Point” appeared in the Pravda newspaper, and a course was set for the creation of collective farms and the elimination of the kulaks as a class. In January 1930, a resolution of the Central Committee established deadlines for collectivization for the regions. For the country as a whole, this task should have been solved by the end of the first five-year plan. But nothing was said about the means of collectivization and the fate of the kulaks. Therefore, local authorities began to resort to violence.

Rice. 11. Cartoon of 1931 “The fist asks to join the collective farm” “The fist on the collective farm”

The elimination of the kulaks was aimed at providing collective farms with a material base. In the first half of 1930, 320 thousand peasant farms were dispossessed. Their property went to collective farms. All kulaks were divided into 3 categories - those who fought against Soviet power were subject to execution, the richest were evicted to remote territories of the USSR, and the rest were settled in areas outside the collective farm lands.

Rice. 12. Eviction of kulaks

An exact definition of a kulak was not given, so very often they were classified as middle peasants who had several cows or horses, etc. All districts received dispossession plans. The authorities used this company to deal with unwanted poor people. A special term was invented for them - “podkulakniks”. As a result, the layer of the most enterprising peasants, who formed the basis of the productive forces of the village, was destroyed.

Rice. 13. Cartoon from 1929 “100% Bungler”

In a number of regions, peasants showed massive resistance to dispossession - they refused to join collective farms, destroyed livestock and equipment, and started uprisings.

In the spring of 1930, it became clear that collectivization was threatening disaster. On March 2, Stalin published the article “Dizziness from Success,” in which he blamed local leaders for the failures and condemned “excesses.” In response, a mass exodus of peasants from collective farms began.

Rice. 14. Starving people in Ukraine

The policy of complete collectivization led to failure. Grain production decreased by 10%, livestock numbers decreased by 2 times. As a result, in 1932-33 the country was gripped by a terrible famine, from which approx. 3 million people. The authorities forbade mention of the starving people in newspapers, did not provide them with any assistance, and not only did not stop the sale of grain abroad, but also brought it to a record level.

Rice. 15. Stalin in front of the microphone

But Stalin triumphed - despite the reduction in grain production, its supplies to the state doubled. Collectivization created the conditions for industrialization. A mass of peasants rushed into the city, joining the ranks of the working class. In addition, a food supply system was created and the remnants of the market economy were destroyed.

Rice. 16. Collective farm equipment

Serious social changes have taken place in the life of the rural population. The kulaks, middle peasants, and poor people disappeared, and collective farmers appeared. The village was seen as a supplier of cheap food and a source of labor. At the same time, the purchase of grain was carried out at fixed prices, and the cost of manufactured goods increased 10 times. Collective farmers were paid on the basis of workdays and did not exceed the subsistence level.

Rice. 17. Poster from the mid-30s.

In the process of industrialization, MTS were created in the countryside, equipment began to be used, personnel appeared - agronomists, machine operators, veterinarians, etc., whose training began at specialized universities. In the mid-1930s, the situation in the village stabilized. Peasants were allowed to have a plot of land and a certain number of livestock and poultry. But from a legal point of view, collective farmers found themselves without rights, because They, unlike the townspeople, did not receive passports and found themselves “attached” to the land.

Studying the history of our country, it is impossible not to at least briefly touch on very important stages of its development - industrialization and collectivization. These processes brought the USSR to a new level of economics. However, political scientists and economists do not evaluate them unambiguously.

Industrialization

This term refers to an accelerated socio-economic transition from the traditional to the industrial stage of development, with a significant increase in the share of industry in the economy. The transition process is based on new scientific knowledge and technologies.
From the point of view of economic science, the goal of industrialization is the accelerated development of heavy industry and processing sectors of the economy in comparison with agriculture and resource extraction. This process is inherently global in nature. Britain was the first to fully implement the Industrial Revolution in the mid-19th century.

Industrialization in the USSR

The goal was to transform the Soviet Union from an agricultural state into a developed industrial power, not inferior to the leading capitalist countries. Accelerated expansion of industrial capacity has begun in May 1929. The basis for industrialization was five-year plans for economic development.

By the beginning of the war, heavy industry increased production volumes 4 times. Now the Soviet state has become economically independent and defensible.

GOELRO plan

By the end of 1920, a special commission headed by energy scientist G. M. Krzhizhanovsky developed a promising one (for 10-15 years) Russian electrification project.

According to this document, it was planned to build 30 power plants in eight main regions of the European part of the country, the Urals, Siberia, the Caucasus and Turkestan. At the same time, the transport network was developing: the Volga-Don shipping canal was being built, old railways were being reconstructed and new railways were being laid.

Thanks to the implementation of the GOELRO plan, the production of electrical energy increased by 7 times by 1932. Thus, the given pace of industrial development in the USSR became possible.

Features of the economic development of the USSR

The industrialization carried out by the country's leadership was characterized by the following specific features:
Investments were made in the metallurgical industry, mechanical engineering and the construction of production facilities.
Funds from the agricultural sector were pumped into industry using the so-called “price scissors,” when industrial goods turned out to be much more expensive than agricultural products.
The state carried out strict centralization of funds and resources to implement the chosen economic policy.
A new (socialist) form of ownership was created in the form of state cooperative-collective farm ownership.
The industrialization process was based on five-year plans developed by a special government body - the USSR State Planning Committee.
We used exclusively our own resources without attracting private capital.

Collectivization

This policy, pursued by the state in 1 928-1937 years, had the goal of uniting the farms of individual peasants into collective farms (collective and state farms). Only in this way could the industrialization process be provided with everything necessary:
it was easier to remove agricultural products from public production;
the transition of the working population from the agricultural to the industrial sector was simplified.

IN 1927 XV Party Congress approved the decision on socialization of peasant property. The Western republics became involved in the process after their accession to the USSR. They later returned to private land ownership.

Complete collectivization (the main stage) took place in 1929-1930. During its implementation, administrative-command methods were put at the forefront.

The peasantry was not ready for the new economic system. For example, the large livestock complexes that were being created did not have farms, feed supplies, and there were no qualified specialists - livestock breeders, livestock specialists, and veterinarians.

The policy of forcible confiscation of almost all grown crops, the destruction of private farmsteads, and mass arrests caused widespread riots in villages and villages. In 1929, the plenum of the Central Committee of the party decided on the so-called "twenty-five thousand meters"- workers of industrial enterprises sent for permanent work on collective farms.

Management was overly centralized, there were practically no experienced managers on the ground, wages on collective farms were low, and inept managers were only engaged in the struggle to “exceed the plan.” The result of two years of collectivization was the mass death of livestock and the lack of seed grain on farms.

Famine of the thirties

Harvest failure 1931 year did not in any way affect the norms for the withdrawal of agricultural products; plans for grain supplies to the state and for export were not adjusted. A difficult situation with food arose, which caused famine in the eastern regions of the country.

Due to the freezing of winter crops, the prospects for the 1932 harvest were doubtful. In addition, the collective farms did not have seed material, since grain reserves were handed over to fulfill the grain procurement plan. There were also not enough draft animals for the sowing campaign - they died from lack of food or were unfit for work due to exhaustion.

The subsequent reduction in grain supplies for export and plans for grain procurements and livestock delivery could no longer save the situation. Harvest failure 1932 years, violation of the basic principles of agricultural technology, huge losses during harvesting of grown grain caused famine in 1932-1933.

The Bolshevik Party, trying to lead the country out of the crisis, was forced to change the management policy of the agricultural sector and reorganize the system of purchasing agricultural products and their distribution. As a result In the fall of 1933, a good harvest was harvested.

Liquidation of the kulaks

At the stage of complete collectivization, the party leadership considered the wealthy stratum in the countryside - kulaks - the main obstacle to the socialization of individual peasant farms.

Mass eviction of dispossessed peasants and their families to remote areas of the USSR began. Expulsion suffered about 2 million people. The same measure was applied to middle and poor peasants who did not want to join collective farms.
The settlers died en masse - they were not supplied with food and agricultural equipment for farming, in violation of the instructions. And the new places turned out to be unsuitable for agricultural use. According to some estimates, about 10 million people died during the period of collectivization.

Since the end of the last century, disputes have not subsided about the results of two most important stages in the economic and social life of the USSR. However, it is not denied that the former Soviet states are building their economies on the industrial base created during the Soviet era. Some political scientists call the policies pursued during the period of collectivization genocide of the Soviet people. This question also remains debatable.

1929 was the time of the final transition from NEP to the direct formation of a command-administrative system. J.V. Stalin carries out all further modernization from above with the help of a powerful party-state machine, relying on the state security and internal affairs agencies. If during the NEP years the main carrier of modernization in society was the economic, creative person, now this person is obedient and conformist. Active, seeking people, dissatisfied with the curtailment of the market economy, the new party politics, socially “unreliable” millions in 1930-1952. sent to forced labor camps, to Soviet penal servitude. And before they become “camp dust” there, they perform virtually free work, carry out the construction of tens of thousands of the most important socialist enterprises and other various objects.

So, the suppression of individualism, dissent, and the use of free labor of millions of people immediately became important factors in Stalin’s modernization. Stalinist modernization of the 30-40s. XX century is assessed as the most effective of all Russian modernizations, starting with Petrovskaya. They also cite as an example the words of W. Churchill: “Stalin took Russia with a plow, but left it with an atomic bomb.” Of course, before the revolution, Russia had not only plows, but also Nobel laureates, advanced aviation and navy. Meanwhile, the social danger of such transformations lies elsewhere. The Stalinist totalitarian state and the communist party completely abandon the concept of “humanism” in order to achieve great goals. The opponents of such socialism, obvious, and more often imaginary in conditions of terror, are “mad dogs”, “monsters”, “murder-poisoners”, etc. Even the very ritual of their execution after the death sentence is pronounced, as A.G. writes. Teplyakov in his book “Procedure: Execution of Death Sentences in the 1920s”

1930s" turned quite often into disgusting sadistic actions. One of Beria's subordinates

K. Savitsky, during interrogation in 1953, stated: “For those arrested who confessed, measures of physical coercion were not applied during the investigation. But when the sentence was carried out, they were necessarily beaten on the orders of Beria, who said: “Before leading them to the next world, punch them in the face” 1 . Such terror paralyzed any resistance in society.

During the process of Stalinist modernization, the peasantry was subjected to the most massive social repressions. By the spring of 1929, emergency measures in the countryside began to be used more and more widely. In an effort to fulfill the grain procurement plan, local authorities are taking the path of wholesale searches and confiscations. Since autumn

1929 The acceleration of collectivization begins. On November 7, 1929, Stalin’s article “The Year of the Great Turning Point” was published, which states that the bulk of the peasantry joined collective farms, and a “decisive victory” was won in the socialist transformation of agriculture.

A special commission of the Politburo presented Stalin with its project for implementing collectivization. It was supposed to carry out collectivization in the main grain-growing regions in two to three years, in the consuming zone in three to four years, and in economically backward national regions in the years of the Second Five-Year Plan. However, Stalin made significant amendments and sharply reduced the deadlines. The North Caucasus, Lower and Middle Volga completed collectivization in the fall of 1930 or the spring of 1931, and the remaining grain-growing regions - in the fall of 1931 or, at most, in the spring of 1932. It was these dates that were reflected by the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) dated 5 January 1930 “On the pace of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction.”

Back on December 27, 1929, in a speech at the All-Union Conference of Marxist Agrarians I.V. Stalin announces a transition to a policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. Specific measures for the implementation of this policy were developed by a special Politburo commission headed by V.M. Molotov. It was planned to carry out a complete confiscation of the means of production, livestock, farm and residential buildings, as well as agricultural products, including seed stocks, from the kulaks. Those dispossessed of kulaks and their families were sent to the northern and eastern regions of the country. The number of dispossessed peasants was also determined - 5% of peasant farms. In reality, up to 15% of the peasants were dispossessed.

“Dekulakization” continued until the end of the spring of 1933, when instructions from Stalin and Molotov appeared, ordering to limit dispossession and eviction. Around 1937-1938. 98% of peasant farms ended up on collective farms, and collectivization was practically completed. Many peasants deciphered the letters of the CPSU (b) as “the second serfdom of the Bolsheviks.” The collective farmers found themselves in the position of camp prisoners only without an escort.

In Siberia, mass executions also began immediately after the attack on the peasants began. In 1930, the execution conveyor was operating at full speed. The commandant's office of the OGPU representative office in Sibkrai immediately began the physical extermination of the kulaks convicted by the "troika". The execution orders were signed directly by the plenipotentiary. The executioners usually included ordinary operatives. A team of three performers shot up to 20-25 people at a time. 59 peasant “rebels” of the Kochenevsky district of the Novosibirsk district in March 1930 were shot in three stages by employees of the OGPU embassy. In total, in 1930, Siberian security officers shot about 5 thousand people convicted by the troika 2.

The procedure for dispossession of economically active peasants during the NEP period who believed N.I. Bukharin and his slogan “Get rich!” determined by a non-legal document. On February 4, 1930, a secret instruction from the USSR Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars appeared. She divided the “kulaks” into several categories. In fact, in practice the following were used: Category I (transfer to the OGPU, execution or concentration camp); Category II – complete confiscation of property and exile to remote, sparsely populated areas. It is difficult to say exactly when Stalin hatched such Jesuitical plans to deprive people of property and use free labor: in Turukhansk exile, during the Civil War or in the fight against Trotsky! By the way, the idea of ​​​​creating labor armies was previously conceived by Lev Davydovich, and even earlier in August 1917 by General Lavr Georgievich Kornilov. Apparently strong political personalities as opposites often converge in their approaches and actions. The revolutionary idea of ​​expropriation of the “looted” (Rob the loot!) well covered up first the robbery of the landowners-nobles, the bourgeoisie, and then the urban Nepmen and rural economic activists. The middle peasantry, in order not to fall under dispossession or directly to the OGPU, gave up horses, bulls, cows, and agricultural equipment themselves.

In settlement areas, kulaks were forced to do logging, heavy construction and land reclamation work. The main areas of kulak exile were the Urals, Siberia, the North, Kazakhstan, and the Far East. For 1930-1931 more than 300 thousand peasant families, numbering 1.8 million people, became political migrants 3.

In May 1929, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the use of labor of criminal prisoners.” Soon that same year, the term “corrective labor camp” appeared in Soviet legislation. The amended criminal legislation provided for a new punishment: imprisonment in forced labor camps in remote areas of the USSR for a period of three to ten years. Since 1929, the camps have become self-sustaining. The number of prisoners grows from 180 thousand in the middle of 1930 to 510 thousand by the beginning of 1934. In 1940, the Gulag united 53 camps, 425 colonies - industrial, agricultural and other, 50 colonies for minors, 90 “baby homes”. According to official data, at the beginning of the war with Germany, about 2.3 million people were kept in camps and colonies. Total from 1930 to 1953 About 18 million people were in the barracks of camps and colonies, about a fifth of them under political headings” 4 .

The direct political terror of Stalin's modernization was complemented by a kind of indirect economic terror.

A. Maslow, having built his “pyramid of human needs,” noted that the basic physiological needs of people, for example, nutrition, must be satisfied unconditionally. Sociologist P. Sorokin pointed out that the suppression of basic instincts leads to revolution. But in the 30s, the modernization revolution was carried out “from above,” from the Kremlin. The theme of food and hunger was exploited completely shamelessly and immorally. Thus, in the early 30s, the Torgsin system (trade with foreigners) emerged. Foreigners, of course, also used it. But the main thing was the pumping of gold, silver, and other valuables from the “rainy day” reserves of their own citizens. And this day has come: if you have jewelry, hand it over and get food, if not, die. In 1932-33 There was a massive confiscation of grain and food supplies from rural residents. As a result, a terrible “artificial” famine hit the country. Millions of people were starved to death. Bread was sold abroad and exchanged for machinery and equipment. Artificial hunger pushed people to take their last to Torgsin. Even historical treasures were irrevocably sent abroad en masse: paintings by great artists and other works of art.

The main source for Stalin's industrial modernization was the brutal redistribution of the country's entire surplus product in favor of heavy industry. Why did the production of consumer goods develop poorly? Because all funds went to the industry. Soviet people: peasants, workers, and employees found themselves in a situation of underconsumption; people often did not eat enough. In the Stalin era, in addition to the above, an important factor in savings became the sale abroad at dumping prices of bread, oil, timber and other raw materials. It should be recognized that the country in the 30s. it was necessary to solve the most important historical task of a geopolitical nature: to preserve independence and its living geographical space, to confirm the status of a great power. Socialist construction in this case can be considered as a single form of Soviet pre-war modernization for all regions.

In February 1931, the first All-Union Conference of Socialist Industry Workers took place. Stalin gave a speech “On the tasks of business executives”, in which he quite clearly defined the timing of the upcoming industrial revolution: “We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we will do this, or we will be crushed... We have all the “objective” possibilities for this. The only thing missing is the ability to truly use these opportunities... It’s time for us to learn how to use these opportunities” 5 .

I.V. Stalin here shows a certain gift of foresight - in ten years the war will begin, the country will be economically ready for it. The country will undergo industrial modernization, but the cost will be monstrous.

Nevertheless, as a result of the first two five-year plans (1929-1937), the USSR made significant progress along the path of industrialization. The level of industrial production in 1913 was exceeded by 8.2 times. Pre-revolutionary Russia ranked fifth in the world in terms of gross industrial output, and its share in global industrial production was 2.6%. The USSR now takes first place in Europe and second in the world in terms of shaft volume. The share in global industry rose to 13.7%. On the eve of the first five-year plan, workers and office workers made up 17.6% of the country's population, and in 1939 already 50.2% 6 .

In the Yenisei region, and since 1934 in the Krasnoyarsk Territory during the years of the first and second five-year plans, the local economy began to develop at a high pace. Its modernization was based on expanded training of qualified personnel. In 1930-

1932 At PVRZ, 1,346 skilled workers were trained using the industrial and team method. In 1932-1938. The Yenisei Shipping Company, through special courses and FZU schools, trained about 3.7 thousand qualified workers. The economic modernization of the region during the first five-year plan was facilitated by socialist competition. In general, during its period, industrial output of the region increased 3.4 times. The number of workers increased two and a half times. Output per worker exceeded the 1913 level by 64% 7 . In 1933-1937 The construction of large industrial enterprises began. Among them: the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine in the Arctic, a heavy engineering plant, a pulp and paper mill and others. In 1937, the share of industry in the national economy of the region was 65.3%, compared to 25% in 1913. Now the production of means of production accounted for 65.5% of industrial output itself. Coal production increased by 33 times by 1938 compared to 1913. By the end of 1940, the region's industry had grown 21 times compared to 1913. Electricity production compared to the level of 1932 – 28 times. The growth rate of the region's industry was ahead of the all-Union rate. In the USSR they amounted to 14.7% per year, and in the region - 18.4%. In the thirties, the region's agriculture became collective farm and highly mobilized. General culture and education have been developed 8 .

In the Krasnoyarsk Territory, during the process of modernization, the same contradictions appeared as in the USSR as a whole. A large share, especially in the North, of the total labor costs was made up of the efforts of camp prisoners. Siberian working conditions have always been more difficult; backbreaking manual labor often dominated. But on the whole, a great general benefit was being done; an industrial base was being laid for the entire country in the event of military clashes. The development of the national economy of the USSR during the Third Five-Year Plan took place under the conditions of the outbreak of the Second World War. Therefore, the militarization of the country's economy became inevitable. In 1939, defense allocations accounted for ¼ of the state budget, and in 1940 - already 1/3, in 1941 - 43.4% 9 .

In the thirties of the twentieth century, profound positive social and cultural changes took place in the lives of many people in the USSR. Modernization of the economy required an increase in the well-being of the people and an increase in people's education. If in 1928 the number of specialists with higher and secondary education was 0.5 million people, then by the beginning of 1941 it had grown to 2.8 million people 10 .

At the same time, compulsory seven-year education was introduced in the city and four-year in rural areas. Mass socialist culture is spreading. Through films, theater, physical education and sports, on the one hand, social optimism and faith in a bright future are affirmed. On the other hand, hatred is instilled towards the world bourgeoisie and its own “enemies of the people”, its corrupt hirelings and agents. Even the Moscow trials of such figures, yesterday’s comrades of Stalin, who cleverly “disguised” their rotten political essence earlier, take place on the stage of theaters. People devoted to the cause of Stalin’s party and the people received tickets to such “performances.” It should be clearly emphasized once again: terror was an essential factor in the success of Stalin’s modernization. It also assumed a complete change of personnel and the liquidation of the old Leninist guard. Thus, in 1934, the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the congress of the “winners of socialism,” was held. By 1939, the XVIII Party Congress, most of the XVII delegates had already been convicted and shot. Leaders at the center and locally under Stalin lived in constant tension and always expected natural condemnation and execution in the event of their own political and economic failures. 500 thousand Stalinist cadre nominees literally “dug the earth” so as not to lose the trust of the leader. They found themselves in a constant state of modernization, when superhuman tension produces a temporary positive effect. Under normal democratic and legal conditions such modernization is impossible. And under Stalin, even scientists created advanced weapons and equipment, televisions and tape recorders in the “sharashka” concentration camps created for the scientific intelligentsia. Laws and law itself in the USSR at this time were also modernized in a totalitarian spirit. On the one hand, legal arbitrariness was happening, on the other, it was necessary to adopt the most progressive constitution of victorious socialism. The section on human rights was written by N.I. Bukharin, who was later shot himself on ridiculous charges. Why did Bukharin incriminate himself at one of the Moscow trials? But the goal turned out to be one: so that his young wife would not be shot and his child would not be killed. In the thirties, the execution of children from the age of 12 became possible in the USSR.

The Constitution came into force on December 5, 1936. This day became a general holiday. Article I declared that the USSR “is a socialist state of workers and peasants.” The Soviets of Working People's Deputies became its political basis (Article 2), all power belonged to the working people in the person of these Councils (Article 3). The economic basis was the socialist economic system and socialist ownership of tools and means of production (Article 4). Articles 9 and 10 allowed for a private economy based on personal labor, and the right of personal ownership of citizens to their labor income and savings, to a residential house and subsidiary household, to items of personal consumption and convenience. The right of inheritance of personal property was provided for. All these rights were protected by law 11.

It can be noted that at the legal level, the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, represented by its leadership, finally abandoned the principle of communist egalitarianism. The possibility of accumulating personal property and improving the material well-being of citizens became an important factor accelerating modernization.

Chapter II of the USSR Constitution guaranteed a progressive state structure, built on the successful solution of the national question in the 20-30s. XX century. Article 13 recognized all Soviet socialist republics, united into a single union, as equal. Article 16 guaranteed each republic the right to have its own constitution, “taking into account the characteristics of the republic and constructed in full accordance with the Constitution of the USSR.” All Soviet people simultaneously became citizens of the USSR, maintaining their republican status. All-Union laws were recognized as supreme, formally the republics retained the right to freely secede from the USSR

Serious modernization changes took place in the structure and order of formation of the highest bodies of the USSR. The previous system of congresses of Soviets was abolished. Article 30 declared: “The supreme body of state power of the USSR is the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.” It was divided into two chambers equal to each other: the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities

(v. 33). Elections of deputies to the first chamber were carried out on the principle of one deputy per 300 thousand inhabitants (Article 34). The following were delegated to the Council of Nationalities by electoral means: a union republic - 25 deputies, an autonomous republic - 11, an autonomous region - 5, an autonomous district was represented by one deputy (Article 35). The Supreme Council, at a joint meeting of both chambers, elected the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “consisting of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, eleven of his deputies, the secretary of the Presidium and 24 members of the Presidium” (Article 48) 13 . That is, the number of deputies for the Chairman of the Presidium was equal to the actual number of union republics at that time.

Local bodies of state power were the Councils of Working People's Deputies (Article 94). They made decisions and gave orders within the limits of the rights granted to them by federal and republican laws (Article 98). Their executive bodies were subordinate to both their Council, which elected them, and a higher executive body (Article 101) 14.

Chapter IX was devoted to the court and the prosecutor's office. Here, Article 102 determined the entire structure of the courts: from the people's court to the Supreme Court of the USSR. People's courts were elected by citizens of the relevant territorial region “on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot of citizens for a period of three years” (Article 109). Article 113 assigned the highest supervision over the precise implementation of laws to the USSR prosecutor. It was approved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for a period of seven years (Article 114). The prosecutor appointed local prosecutors. The Constitution guaranteed the prosecutor's office independence from local authorities 15 . But party bodies often directly “pressured” the court and the prosecutor’s office.

Equality in elections for all citizens, secret voting, a wide range of personal rights, equality of genders and nationalities before any law, freedom of religious worship and anti-religious propaganda: all this is formally directly reflected in the Constitution.

But Article 126 defined the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as “the leading core of all workers’ organizations, both public and state” 16 . And this constitutional thesis, modest at first glance, finally established in the country the dictatorship of the party instead of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Since the times of the underground and the Civil War, the party has been governed by the principle of democratic centralism, which rightly gave an advantage to the leaders in extreme conditions. But this principle was fully preserved in peacetime under the plausible pretext of protecting the unity of the party. In the thirties, when in fact the dictatorship of one leader was established in the CPSU (b), everything was decided personally by I.V. Stalin. Stalin's personality is very contradictory; it magically attracts and causes panic in people to this day. The cult of his personality still requires careful and careful study. Stalin instantly made and canceled decisions, moved millions and millions of people with one stroke of the pen, selected virtually all the main personnel, raised any person to gigantic commanding heights and overthrew him into camp dust and grave darkness. Stalin seemed to come from the depths of ancient centuries on the global wave of the growth of totalitarianism in the 30s and 40s. XX century. But only he became world dictator No. 1. Stalin created an ideal system of state and law in which he could do what he considered necessary at the moment. Until the end of his life, he did not part with the idea of ​​world revolution, his own world domination, and prepared the USSR for a global world war.

The Stalinist constitution turned out to be very democratic in form, but the political regime was openly totalitarian.

As A.G. writes Kanaev and S.A. Puntus: tightening of the political regime in the 1930s. could not but affect the development of Soviet law. Already in 1931, at the First All-Union Congress of Marxist Statists, the criminal law principle “no crime, no punishment unless indicated in the law” was condemned, as well as the idea of ​​the rule of law. This was reflected in a departure from the fundamental principles of law: freedom of person and property, presumption of innocence, proportionality of punishment to the gravity of the crime, personal responsibility, etc. Particularly noticeable are the changes in criminal law, which were directed to combat domestic political opponents, to provide criminal legal means for carrying out domestic policy and had a pronounced tendency to tighten existing norms. An example is the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated August 7, 1932 “On the protection of the property of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation and the strengthening of public (socialist) property.” It is known as the “law of three ears of corn”: regardless of the size of the theft of socialist property, the plunderers were declared “enemies of the people”, and any theft was subject to severe punishment. A further tightening of criminal law was manifested in the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on July 8, 1934 “On supplementing the Regulations on state crimes (counter-revolutionary and, especially for the USSR, dangerous crimes against the order of government) with articles on treason to the Motherland” 17.

It should be noted that the criminal process in the period under review acquires a dual character. Legal acts were adopted, both enshrining some democratic principles of the criminal process and becoming legal support for carrying out mass repressions. Moreover, the former were mainly declarative, while the latter actually acted. One of these acts is the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated December 1, 1934 “On the procedure for conducting cases of preparation and commission of terrorist acts.” In the pre-war period, there was a tightening of liability measures not only in criminal law, but also in other branches of law. Thus, on June 26, 1940, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was issued “On the transition to an eight-hour working day, to a six-day working week and on the prohibition of unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions.” It should be noted that this normative act established criminal liability for violation of labor discipline 18.

This decree actually prepared the country for war. Hitler defeated France. The whole question was where he would go next. Stalin assumed that the target of the attack would logically be England, and then possibly the United States. Really,

Facts confirm that Stalin was a diligent student of both Lenin and Trotsky - the two main leaders of the October Revolution of 1917. He practically successfully implemented all of their ideas, except for one: world revolution. Stalin is a sufficiently shrewd politician not to understand the need for world domination for the USSR or its complete hegemony. The founders of Marxism immediately determined that

the victory of communism is possible only as a world victory. The formula “in one particular country” was subject to subtle criticism from Trotsky back in the twenties: “you can build, but you cannot build.” Events of the 80-90s of the XX century. emphasized that he was right. Therefore, Stalin could not understand this situation differently. In his opinion, to include Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain, which were defeated in some way, into the socialist sphere would mean the creation of the Socialist United States of Europe!

Then the United States and Japan can be brought to their knees.

It should be noted right away that the problem requires a long study, but time gradually reveals some points. A certain role in this approach was played by the books by V. Suvorov (V.B. Rezun) “Icebreaker” and “Day “M” (Icebreaker: Who started the Second World War; Day “M”: When the Second World War began. M.: TKO "AST", 1994.576 p.). In the same year, a fundamental academic publication was published - Russia in the 20th century: Historians of the world argue. (M.: Nauka, 1994. 752 p.). Its fourth section is called “War”. Publications by I. Chelyshev (Russia), J. Zamoyski (Poland), G. Gorodetsky (Israel), A. Basov (Russia) depict a specific situation before

the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and after June 22, 1941. It turns out that J.V. Stalin’s plans were clearly offensive in nature. Moscow's accession to the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo pact was not ruled out. However, the Kremlin’s appetites turned out to be so high that Hitler abandoned further constructive negotiations and secretly began to prepare for a preventive war with the USSR. The “preventiveness” of the war on Hitler's part has always been disputed by Soviet historians. But the fact of a powerful concentration of Soviet troops by the summer of 1941 on the western borders is now difficult to deny. 5801 tanks were concentrated in the Kiev Military District, and 3295 tanks in the Western Special District. Of these, KV tanks - 375 tanks, T-34 - 724, i.e. more than a thousand of the latest tanks! As the above historians also testify, as of June 22, 1941, there were 9,200 Soviet tanks, 46,830 artillery pieces and mortars in the western border districts (some authors write about 14,192 tanks) 19 .

1942. Directives to the Communist Parties of the occupied countries in the spring of 1941 had a similar meaning: to enter into contact with the patriotic underground movement in order to achieve a leading role in these movements. This is especially evident in the example of Belgium and Northern France. The main representatives of the Comintern were then in Belgium, including a certain Fred, who was mysteriously killed later in Brussels 20 .

It is significant that at 21:35 on June 22, 1941 (this is indicated by G. Gorodetsky), the Soviet high command decided to switch to offensive actions in the main directions. The troops of the Northwestern and Western Fronts received the task of “encircling and destroying the enemy’s Suwalki group and capturing the city of Suwalki by the end of June 24.” Troops of the Southwestern Front: “to encircle and destroy the enemy group advancing on the Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopol front and by the end of June 24 to capture the Lublin region.” Did this turn out to be impromptu in this situation of a sudden attack or a long-standing preparation for an offensive “revolutionary” war?

Stalin's activities have always been characterized by increased secrecy; the most sensitive episodes of his contemporary history still do not receive full documentary coverage. There are simply no documents. It's clear that .

During the Great Patriotic War, there was a complete modernization of the state and society along military lines. On the basis of industry and agriculture modernized in the 1930s, it was possible through the heroic work of the people to provide the front with everything necessary. American assistance and supplies from the United States played a big role, but not a decisive one. In the historiography of the post-Soviet period, many critical assessments of I.V. Stalin, individual Soviet marshals. The essence of the criticism: they did not spare people, they allowed huge losses. These authors seem to forget the fact that our troops fought with the best army in the world - the German militaristic machine. And in World War II, no one could resist the Germans in the direction of their main attack, except the Red Army, and then the Soviet.

Modernization during the war years led to the fact that the front and rear became a single social organism. On half-starvation rations, workers, often women and teenagers, exceeded plans by 100-200%, or even 10 times. Scientists and designers steadily improved weapons in a fantastically short time. The peasant collective farmers themselves were malnourished, but they provided the front with enough bread. And again, here it is necessary to highlight the work of women and teenagers, when all men of conscription age, starting from 17 years old, went to the front. The war truly turned out to be the Great Patriotic War.

Naturally, the state then applied tough military legal solutions. And harsh measures were taken against those who did not want to work hard and fight honestly. Perhaps someone suffered undeservedly, received too harsh a punishment, and there were quite a few such cases. But this war decided one question: will there remain a state in which hundreds of peoples live in peace, or will they dissolve in an alien environment. Hitler fought not only against Stalin, not only against communism, but against the peoples of the USSR for the establishment of totalitarian German Nazism, for the forced Germanization of those people who would be allowed to continue living.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet law developed towards the adoption of emergency norms. One of the most important acts is the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 22, 1941 “On martial law.” In areas declared under martial law, all functions of state power were transferred to the military authorities. The decree tightened the regulation of labor relations. In particular, labor conscription was introduced for a number of jobs, and unauthorized departure from work was equated to desertion. A similar policy in the field of labor legislation was continued by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 26, 1941 “On working hours for workers and employees in wartime,” according to which directors of enterprises received the right to introduce overtime work up to three hours a day. Regular and additional vacations were cancelled, which were replaced by monetary compensation transferred to frozen deposits 22 .

The shortage of labor in industry that persisted during wartime led to the adoption on February 13, 1942 of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for work in production and construction during wartime,” which introduced labor mobilization for work at enterprises of the most important industries men aged from 16 to 55 years and women - from 16 to 45 years. In criminal law in wartime, the norms of the pre-war period continued to apply, but were introduced

and new ones caused by the peculiarities of the military situation. Thus, in November 1943, the Decree “On liability for disclosure of state secrets or loss of documents containing state secrets” was adopted, according to which these acts were punishable by imprisonment for a term of 3 to 10 years. Criminal liability for theft and violations of labor discipline was also increased, and criminal liability was established for evading labor mobilization and compulsory military training. Simultaneously with the Decree “On Martial Law”, the “Regulations on military tribunals in areas declared under martial law and in areas of military operations” were approved, according to which all cases against state security and crimes against defense were considered by military tribunals without the participation of people’s assessors. Sentences of military tribunals were not subject to appeal; they entered into force and were executed immediately after their delivery 23 .

Victory in the Great Patriotic War turned out to be incredibly desirable, but for most people it was very bitter, overshadowed by the loss of loved ones and property. The Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Atrocities of the Nazi Invaders reported on September 12, 1945: “Before the war, 88 million people lived on the territory of the Soviet Union that was subject to occupation...

The Nazi invaders completely or partially destroyed and burned 1,710 cities and more than 70 thousand villages... Among the destroyed and most affected cities are the largest industrial and cultural centers: Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod , Pskov, Orel, Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don and many others.

The Nazi invaders destroyed 31,850 industrial enterprises, which employed about 4 million workers; 239 thousand electric motors and 175 thousand metal-cutting machines were destroyed or taken away.

They destroyed 65 thousand kilometers of railway track, 4100 railway stations,... 40 thousand hospitals,... 84 thousand schools, technical schools, higher educational institutions, research institutes...

They destroyed and plundered 98 thousand collective farms, 1876 state farms and 2890 machine and tractor stations...” 24.

The total damage amounted to a huge amount - 679 billion rubles in 1941 state prices. This did not include losses from the cessation or reduction of work of enterprises and citizens, the cost of food and supplies confiscated by the German occupation forces, military expenses of the USSR, as well as losses from the slowdown in the pace of overall economic development countries as a result of enemy actions during 1941-1945.

The human losses turned out to be incredible and hidden for a long time: more than 27 million people. There is no data on the population size in the USSR in 1945.

At the beginning of 1950, 178.5 million people lived in the country, i.e. 15.6 million less than it was before the war (end of 1939 - 194.1 million). It should be taken into account that as a result of World War II, the Soviet Union received a number of new territories and additional population.

After the end of hostilities, two options for the development of society turned out to be probable and possible. The first is reformist: softening the pre-war mobilization model of development, abandoning the state of emergency, mass repression, promoting the development of democratization processes. The second is counter-reform: complete resuscitation of the pre-war management model, preservation and strengthening of the totalitarian regime.

The possibility and necessity of the first path of development were determined by the increased international authority of the victorious country, the growing self-awareness of the Soviet people, increased resistance to the Stalinist regime, uprisings and escapes in the Gulag, the struggle against the imposed Soviet model of development in the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, and Eastern European countries.

But it was precisely the second option for the post-war development of the USSR by restoring the pre-war model of development and management of the national economy and society that became a reality. Stalin and his entourage did not think of leading the state by non-administrative means 25.

On September 4, 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished and its functions were transferred to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In March 1946, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was renamed the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the People's Commissariats were renamed into ministries. In 1947, the State Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was transformed into the State Planning Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, whose tasks now included planning, accounting and control over the implementation of national economic plans.

I.V. Stalin, at an election meeting of voters in the Stalin constituency in Moscow on February 9, 1946, identified the main directions of modernization: “The main objectives of the new five-year plan are to restore the affected areas of the country, restore the pre-war level of industry and agriculture and then exceed this level. In the near future, the rationing system will be abolished, special attention will be paid to expanding the production of consumer goods, to raising the living standards of the working people by consistently lowering the prices of goods, to the widespread construction of all kinds of scientific research institutes that can enable science to develop its forces.

I have no doubt that if we provide proper assistance to our scientists, they will be able not only to catch up, but to surpass in the near future the achievements of science outside our country” 26 .

In mid-March 1946, the newly elected Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved a five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR for 1946-1950. Its main tasks: to reach the pre-war level (1940) within two years - by 1948, and to significantly exceed it by the end of the five-year plan.

During the implementation of the five-year plan, scientific and technological progress was used mainly in the defense industry, which received clear priority. Despite the partial conversion of the latter, the military-industrial complex (MIC) received further accelerated development. On August 29, 1949, an atomic bomb created through the efforts of Soviet scientists, primarily I.V., was tested. Kurchatova, Yu.B. Khariton, Ya.B. Zeldovich, A.D. Sakharov. The costs of developing nuclear missile weapons required gigantic funds, which were ruthlessly extracted from the sphere of public consumption.

Other sources included German reparations ($4.3 billion). They played a role in strengthening industrial power. 3.2 million German and 600 thousand Japanese prisoners of war worked in the USSR. Trains with equipment, and sometimes with designers, engineers and workers, arrived from Germany. So, for example, the Junkers company was completely relocated from Dessau to Kuibyshev, the Oppel company from Eisenach to Moscow, and the Zeiss company from Jena to Krasnogorsk. But purchases of the latest equipment and technology in the United States soon ceased due to a ban imposed by the American side 27 .

The people, who spent enormous physical and moral efforts on labor achievements, were waiting for the fulfillment of I.V.’s promises. Stalin about improving life. On December 14, 1947, the rationing system for food and industrial goods was finally abolished. This was accompanied by a monetary reform, during which 10 old rubles were exchanged for 1 new one. True, deposits in savings banks were recalculated at a preferential rate, but they accounted for only 15% of the population’s cash savings. And new uniform prices in state and cooperative retail trade were set at a level close to the previous commercial ones. All this, of course, significantly contributed to reducing the consumer pressure on the market for goods and services. In the future, this made it possible to carry out annual price reductions. The first of them occurred on April 10, 1948, when prices for alcohol, vodka, perfumes and cosmetics, vitamins, motorcycles, and bicycles fell by 20%, and tobacco and Moskvich cars fell by 10%.

In rural areas, where most of the population lived, the situation worsened sharply in the fall of 1946 due to crop failure, caused partly by a terrible drought, and partly by a catastrophic failure in the management of collective farms. In 1948, collective farmers were strongly recommended to sell to the state the small livestock that they were allowed to keep under the collective farm charter. As a result, over six months, collective farmers secretly slaughtered more than 2 million heads of livestock. Fees and taxes on income from sales on the free market have increased significantly. In addition, trading on the market was allowed only with a special document confirming that the corresponding collective farm had fully fulfilled its obligations to the state.

At the end of 1949, the economic and financial situation of collective farms deteriorated so much that the government had to develop a number of reforms. In 1950 and 1951 Discussions were held in the country about agricultural policy and measures to improve it. Previously responsible for agricultural policy, A.A. Andreev was replaced by N.S. Khrushchev.

On March 8, 1950, Pravda published, signed by Khrushchev, a new party plan for the reorganization of collective farms. The measures to consolidate collective farms that followed the decree of May 30, 1950 were carried out very quickly: in just one year the number of collective farms decreased from 252 thousand to 121 thousand, and then to 94 thousand by the end

1952 All this was accompanied by a new significant reduction in the individual plots of peasants. Payment in kind, which made up a significant part of collective farm “earnings,” was also reduced.

On March 4, 1951, Pravda published a project for the creation of “agricultural cities.” N.S. Khrushchev outlined this clearly utopian idea even earlier in one of his public speeches at the end of January 1951. According to the “reformers,” peasants inclined to a new, urban lifestyle with comfort and public services would say goodbye to their tenacious individualistic psychology and become ordinary workers, i.e. workers. Thus, this project solved two problems at once: it destroyed the peasantry as part of Soviet society and at the same time erased the difference between rural and urban labor. The day after the publication of the project, Pravda, however, issued a clarification, which noted that the previous issue was not about the project, but about the beginning of a discussion. As a result of this “newspaper experiment,” Stalin removed Khrushchev from the leadership of agriculture.

Of course, utopias in economic theory were not only the contribution of Khrushchev. In the fall of 1951, a discussion on political economy took place in the USSR. As a result, in 1952, the work of I.V. was published. Stalin "Economic problems of socialism in the USSR". The author warned against a hasty curtailment of commodity production in the country. Since there are two forms of ownership - state (national) and collective farm, the exchange between them occurs through purchase and sale. At the same time, Stalin noted: “Of course, when instead of the two main production sectors, state and collective farm, one comprehensive production sector appears with the right to dispose of all the country’s consumer products, commodity circulation with its “money economy” will disappear as an unnecessary element of the national economy 30.

Such financial modernization without a world revolution would lead to complete economic disaster. All this was a utopia in the fullest sense of the word.

The post-war regime in the USSR was deeply totalitarian in its political, ideological and socio-economic essence. After the war I.V. Stalin sought to strengthen the administrative-bureaucratic system. 13 years after the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b), the XIX Congress of the CPSU met. It replaced the name of the party, which became the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

Soviet physicist S.E. Frisch noted in his memoirs: a differentiation occurred in Soviet society that was deeper than that which existed in the pre-war years. A vast class of privileged people emerged - the “Soviet elite”. The strengthening of social differentiation was largely caused by the specifics of the war years. Thus, in the second half of the war, “special rations”, extra-limit distributions, and closed cooperatives arose. This entire system of privileges was retained after the war 31 .

The USSR, having increased its authority due to the great victory, entered the Cold War with the West. A hot war unfolded in Korea, where US troops were on one side, and Chinese volunteers and Soviet pilots on the other. Things were heading towards a new world war. Through the heroic efforts of Soviet scientists, relying on the labor contribution of the entire people, it was possible in 1949 to create domestic atomic weapons. It later became a deterrent factor for both the USA and the USSR from a major war. The internal situation in the USSR turned things completely towards counter-modernization. There was a struggle against Westernism with “rootless cosmopolitanism.” Sciences were banned: genetics, cybernetics, statistics and others. Repressions intensified: the security agencies, on Stalin’s instructions, fabricated a number of large “cases” that were absolutely illegal. But at the height of the “case of the Kremlin doctors” I.V. Stalin, who refused their services for about six months, died unexpectedly at the beginning of March 1953, as always for domestic rulers. The country found itself without a “master”. Those around him had to think hard: where and how to go next and who would be the new leader.

1 Teplyakov A.G. Procedure: execution of death sentences in the 1920s and 1930s. – M.: Return, 2007. – P.71.

2 Ibid – P.47.

3 History of Russia from ancient times to the present day: textbook / A.N. Sakharov, A.N. Bokhanov, V.A. Shestakov; edited by A.N. Sakharov... - P.643.

4 Ibid. - P.655-656.

5 Stalin I. Questions of Leninism. Eleventh edition. – M.: OGIZ State political publishing house. liter., 1945. – P.329-330.

6 Experience of Russian modernizations of the 18th-20th centuries... - P.67-68.

7 Rogachev A.G. Pre-war Soviet modernization: preparation for world war (in the book: USSR in the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War (1939-1945) We opened the merciless path to Berlin with the battle of Moscow: Materials of the interregional scientific and practical conference dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the defeat of the Germans -fascist troops near Moscow. - Krasnoyarsk: RIO SibGTU 2001. - P.6-7.

8 Ibid. – P.8-9.

9 Domestic history: Textbook. allowance / Under scientific. Ed. A.G. Rogacheva... - P.129.

10 History of Russia from ancient times to the present day: textbook. /A.N. Sakharov, A.N. Bokhanov, V.A. Shestakov; edited by A.N. Sakharov... - P.652.

11 Reader on the history of state and law of Russia: textbook. allowance / comp. Yu.P. Titov – 2nd ed. reworked and additional ... - P.347-348.

12 Ibid. - pp. 348-350.

13 Ibid. - pp. 350-352.

14 Ibid. - P.356-357.

15 Ibid. - P.357-358.

16 Ibid. - P.359.

17 History of state and law in Russia 20th century: anthology / comp. A.G. Kanaev, S.A. Puntus... - P.80.

18 Ibid. - P.80-81.

19 Rogachev A.G. World war or world revolution? / In the book: The contribution of the Siberians to the Great Victory: Abstract. scientific-practical conf. Krasnoyarsk, April 28, 1995 / Krasnoyarsk. Higher Team Air Defense Radioelectronics School. Krasnoyarsk, 1995. – P.135-137.

20 Ibid. – P.137.

21 Ibid. – P.136.

22 History of state and law of Russia 20th century: anthology / comp. A.G. Kanaev, S.A. Puntus... - P.81.

23 Ibid. – P.82.

24 Reader on the history of Russia / author: A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva, T.A. Sivokhina... - P.501.

25 Kofman Ya.M. Reforms and counter-reforms in modern national history (1945-2005): a textbook for students of higher educational institutions / Ya.M. Kofman; Krasnoyarsk State Ped. Univ. V.P. Astafieva. – Krasnoyarsk: RIO GOU VPO KSPU im. V.P. Astafieva, 2006.- P. 21-22.

26 Russia, which we did not know. 1939-1993: reader: for students of Art. class general education schools, gymnasiums, colleges, technical schools and university students / comp. L.Ya. Baranova, N.N. Baranov, Yu.V. Velichko and others; ed. M.A. Dashevskaya and others - Chelyabinsk: Yuzh.-Ural. book. Publishing house, 1995. – P.257.

27 Political history: Russia – USSR – Russian Federation: in 2 volumes. T. 2. – M.: TERRA, 1996. – P. 491.

28 Ibid. – P.508.

29 Kofman Ya.M. Reforms and counter-reforms in recent Russian history... – P.28-3

30 Reader on the history of Russia / author: A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva, T.A. Sivokhina... - P.506.

31 Frisch S.E. Through the prism of time / S.E. Frisch. – M.: Politizdat, 1992. – P.323.

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Slide captions:

Soviet model of industrialization Stalin's modernization of the country and its features

“Great Leap Forward” 1927 – grain procurement crisis. The procurement plan planned for the end (October - December) 1927 failed: instead of 4.58 million tons harvested during the corresponding period last year, only 2.4 million tons were purchased. There was nothing to export and there was nothing to buy equipment for industry, because... bread was the main export item.

“Extraordinary” administrative measures by the party leadership Ban on market trade; Criminal prosecution of wealthy peasants who do not want to hand over grain to the state at official prices; House searches involving the village poor; Party leaders went to the field to directly manage grain procurements. As a result, the required amount of grain was procured, but a significant part of the peasants lost faith in the possibility of developing their farms.

“The Great Leap Forward” As a result of trips around the country, it was concluded that it was necessary to sharply accelerate the pace of industrialization and carry out fundamental changes in agriculture, i.e. take the "big leap"

Grain procurement crisis: causes and ways out Stalin I.V. Bukharin N.I. Causes of the crisis: Weak industry cannot provide the production of necessary goods. Small peasant farming is not able to satisfy the needs of industry. The kulak deliberately sabotages grain procurements. Causes of the crisis: Subjective factors: a reserve fund for manufactured goods was not created. Low purchasing prices for bread were set. Ways out: Ways out: Concentration of all financial and material resources on solving the problem of industrialization. Reorganize agriculture on the basis of collective farms. Regulation of purchase prices. Some reduction in investment in metallurgy and mechanical engineering. Development of the cooperative movement in the countryside The basis of the agricultural sector is individual farms.

Pobeda I.V. Stalin N.I. Bukharin put forward the idea that the kulak would inevitably grow into socialism. His appeal to the peasants in 1925: “Get rich, do not be afraid of any reprisals!” Most party members sided with Stalin. At the Plenum of the Central Committee in 1929 N.I. Bukharin was accused of “right deviation”, i.e. that he and his supporters are “going to slowly restore capitalism.” A course was set for accelerated industrialization.

Reasons for industrialization In 1928, the entire country produced 2 trucks and 3 tractors per day. About a quarter of textile equipment, half of steam turbines, and almost 70% of metal-cutting machines and tractors were purchased abroad. In terms of industrial production per capita, the USSR was 5-30 times inferior to the advanced powers. Russia remained an agricultural country: by the end of the 1920s. 76% of the population lived in the village. The international situation was difficult.

Technical and economic backwardness of the USSR. The dependence of the Soviet Union on the import of machinery and equipment, this led to a weakening of the country's defense capability. Difficult international situation. Reasons for Industrialization

“To slow down means to fall behind. And the laggards are beaten. But we don't want to be beaten. We are 50-100 years behind advanced countries. We must run this distance in 10 years. Either we do this or we will be crushed." I.V.Stalin. I.V. Stalin on industrialization

XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - Congress of Industrialization (1925) Objective: “To transform the USSR from a country importing machinery and equipment into a country producing them.” The "New Opposition" was defeated at the congress. G.E. Zinoviev was removed from his post as head of the Leningrad party organization. Instead, S.M. Kirov is a supporter of Stalin.

Goals of industrialization Elimination of the technical and economic backwardness of the country. Achieving economic independence. Creation of a powerful defense industry. Priority development of basic industries (fuel, chemical, metallurgy, mechanical engineering).

Sources of industrialization Redistribution of budget funds in favor of industrial sectors. Generating additional income through the export of grain, oil, timber, furs, gold, oil and other goods. Sale of museum treasures. Increasing the progressive tax on NEPmen and income tax on urban and rural populations. Carrying out government loans from the population. Organization of socialist competition and shock work.

Loans from the population Grain export Sales of raw materials (oil, timber), gold, museum treasures Organization of competition and shock work Labor enthusiasm Sources of industrialization

Sources of Industrialization Workers were forced to sign up for government loans. This money was used for industrialization needs.

“Personnel decides everything!” I.V. Stalin Former peasants became workers overnight. Thousands of Gulag prisoners - victims of repression - worked and died in the construction of industrial giants.

First Five Year Plan: 1928 – 1932 In May 1929, at the V All-Union Congress of Soviets, the first five-year plan for the economic and socialist development of the USSR was approved. The main task of the five-year plan: transforming the country from an agricultural one to an agrarian-industrial one

The First Five-Year Plan Enthusiasm... and for the years of the First Five-Year Plan you can’t find another word, it was enthusiasm that inspired young people to daily exploits. I. Ehrenburg

Millions of people with great enthusiasm worked almost for free on the construction sites of the Five-Year Plan. A competition took place across the country under the slogan “Let’s take a year away from the five-year plan, let’s complete the five-year plan in four years!”

XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) - January 1934 - approved the second five-year plan for the development of the national economy. Task: to complete the transition period from capitalism to socialism, to build the material and technical base of socialism. Second Five-Year Plan: 1933 – 1937

Results of the five-year plans The first five-year plan 1928-1932. Second Five-Year Plan 1933-1937 Azovstal, Zaporizhstal Dneproges Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk metallurgical plants Donbass and Kuzbass mines Stalingrad, Kharkov tractor plants Moscow, Gorky automobile plants Chelyabinsk tractor plant Ural, Kramotor heavy engineering plants. Aviation factories in Kharkov, Moscow, Kuibyshev.

Stakhanov movement - beginning of 1935. In 1935, the miner of the Central - Irmino mine, Alexei Stakhanov, set a record by extracting 102 tons of coal in 5 hours 45 minutes instead of 7 tons according to the norm. His initiative spread to other industries.

Weavers E.V. and M.I. Vinogradov Newspapers reported on the achievements of N.A. Izotova, A.Kh. Busygina, E.V. and M.I. Vinogradovs. In December 1935, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the “working people’s initiative.” Production standards in industry were increased by 15-20% Shakhtar N.A. Izotov Kuznets A.Kh. Busygin

Achieving the goals of the USSR - an industrial-agrarian country New industries have been created Economic independence of the country has been achieved A powerful military-industrial complex has been created Unemployment has been eliminated

Number of large state-owned industrial enterprises built, restored and put into operation Years Number of enterprises 1918–1929 1st Five-Year Plan (1928–1932) 2nd Five-Year Plan (1933–1937) 2200 1500 4500

New industries

The cost of industrialization Declining living standards of the population (the purchasing power of workers decreased by 40%) Lagging light industry Famine 1932-33 Robbery of the village Mass repressions

Life of the townspeople Housing rents were low, but living conditions did not improve; the population of the cities was constantly increasing. Workers lived, as a rule, in communal apartments or barracks without any amenities.

Stalin's modernization

The essence of Stalin's modernization is the accelerated transformation of the Soviet Union from an agricultural country to an industrial country, ensuring maximum economic independence and strengthening the defense capability of the USSR. The concept of accelerated development of socialism included industrialization, collectivization and cultural revolution.Industrialization. In the mid-20s. The Soviet state, like Russia at the beginning of the century, was faced with the task industrialization countries. Industrialization made it possible to reach the level of industrialized countries, as well as strengthen and expand the social base of the Bolsheviks (working class).But when choosing the concept of industrial development, disagreements arose in the Soviet leadership. In December 1925, at the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), when the course towards industrialization was set, the “Bukharin” and “Stalinist” theories of industrialization were defined. Bukharin's concept was built on three pillars: the creation of heavy industry, voluntary cooperation among peasants and increasing the well-being of the people. Stalin's theory assumed the preferential and accelerated development of heavy industry, the curtailment of the NEP, the nationalization of the economy, the tightening of labor discipline and the general regime in the country. The village was seen as a source of cheap resources, and the people were required to “tighten their belts.” It was this theory that formed the basis of industrialization.The following industrialization goals were announced:

• elimination of the country's technical and economic backwardness;
• achieving economic independence;
• creation of a powerful defense industry;
• priority development of basic industries.

The immediate reason for the curtailment of the NEP and forced industrialization was the grain procurement crisis in the winter of 1927-1928. Despite the good harvest, the peasants supplied only 300 million poods of grain (which was 130 million less than the previous year). The export of grain was jeopardized, and therefore the supply of foreign currency necessary for industrialization. The issue of food supplies to cities has also become more acute. As a result, I.V. Stalin put forward a theory about the intensification of the class struggle in the country as it moved towards socialism and called for “throwing away” the NEP. 30 thousand communists were mobilized as “investigative agents” for grain procurements. They were instructed to carry out purges in unreliable village councils and party cells, create local “troikas”, which were supposed to find hidden surpluses, enlisting the support of the poor (who received 25% of the grain seized from wealthy peasants), and bring all unreliable people to criminal liability. In response, many farmers reduced their acreage the following year.Grain procurement crisis of 1927-1928. forced I.V. Stalin to draw conclusions, which he voiced in a series of speeches in May-June 1928. In his opinion, there was a need to shift the emphasis from cooperation to the creation of “supports of socialism” in the countryside in the form of collective farms and machine and tractor stations (MTS). Stalin believed that agriculture was also responsible for economic difficulties because industrial growth rates were quite satisfactory. At this time, active industrialization began and most of the material resources were invested in industry.The industrial breakthrough was made during the first pre-war five-year plans: 1928-1932 (1st), 1933-1937 (2nd). The Third Five-Year Plan (1938-1942) was interrupted by the war. The implementation of the industrialization policy required changes in the industrial management system. The transition to a sectoral management system began, unity of command and centralization in the distribution of labor, raw materials and production were strengthened. On the basis of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, people's commissariats of heavy, light and forestry industries were formed.First Five Year Plan began to be implemented on October 1, 1928. The first five-year plan was based on the fact that the rate of development of the national economy should be significantly higher than in capitalist countries. The main features of the first five-year plans were high rates of industrialization, short deadlines, priority for the construction of heavy industrial enterprises, and the use of internal sources of accumulation by pumping funds from the countryside and loans from the population. The first five-year plan set the goal of increasing industrial production by 135%, national income by 82%, and capital investment in industry by 4 times. It was planned to collectivize 20% of peasant farms within a 5-year period. During the first five-year plan, 1,500 industrial facilities were built (Dneproges, Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants, Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor plants, automobile plants in Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod, etc.). The country was filled with unprecedented sincere enthusiasm from people who selflessly worked on the leading construction projects of the Five Year Plan.But by 1930 it became clear that many plans were unrealistic due to a lack of raw materials, fuel, labor and equipment. A solution was found in the policy of priority distribution of material resources between enterprises (50-60 major construction projects - DneproGES, Belomorkanal, Turksib, Magnitka, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, etc. - received 50% of the funds, the remaining 1500 also 50%). The first five-year plan was not met in any of the indicators, but industry made a giant leap forward.Second Five Year Plan(1933-1937) was more realistic: 16.5% production growth per year. The highest growth rates were envisaged for light industry, although the tendency for priority development of heavy industry continued. During the Second Five-Year Plan, 4,500 large national economic enterprises were put into operation. The Ural-Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant and the Ural and Kramatorsk heavy engineering plants came into operation. The first metro line opened in Moscow in 1935. But in general, the policy of “big construction projects” was replaced by a call to increase labor productivity. Miner from Donbass Alexey Stakhanov in August 1935 during one of his shifts produced 102 tons of coal, exceeding the norm by 14.5 times. This record was set as a result of proper organization of work and maximum use of the jackhammer. For propaganda purposes, A. Stakhanov’s record gained all-Union fame, and the name of the record holder served as the name of the labor "Stakhanov movement". During the second five-year plan, labor productivity increased by 2 times, but the five-year plan itself was implemented by 70-77%. For a number of indicators - production of metal and consumer goods, coal mining, etc. - it was not possible to achieve the planned targets. At the same time, in less than 13 years of industrialization, our country has managed to carry out accelerated modernization, create a strong industrial base, and ensure defense capability and economic invulnerability.The implementation of Stalin's concept required huge capital investments, which, in the absence of foreign loans, were sought within the country. The sources of investment were:

• Agriculture;
• forced loans from the population;
• issue of money;
• vodka trade;
• export of raw materials;
• increased exploitation of workers.

Results of industrialization:

• economic independence of the state has been achieved;
• the gap with Western countries has been reduced;
• shortage of consumer goods;
• disproportion in the development of industry and agriculture.

Collectivization. The course towards collectivization was proclaimed at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) in December 1927. But the decisions of the Congress spoke about the development of all forms of cooperation, and not just the creation of collective farms (i.e. production cooperation). But when in 1928-1929. measures were taken to “wind down” the NEP, the processes of “complete collectivization” began. This slogan was put forward in the summer of 1929 at the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Collectivization included two parallel processes: dispossession (up to 30% of peasant farms were dispossessed, although there were no more than 5 kulaks in the countryside) and the creation of collective farms (by the end of the 30s, more than 90% of peasant farms joined collective farms). Collective farms were provided with benefits for receiving land for use, lending and taxation. At the same time, the lease of land to kulaks was limited, and they were often forced to sell their existing agricultural equipment. Beginning in November 1928, state machine and tractor stations (MTS) began to be created to help collective farms.Stalin’s article “The Year of the Great Turnaround” (November 1929) became the programmatic point for the collectivization processes. It concluded that the party managed to achieve a change in the mood of the village, and the middle peasants voluntarily “went to the collective farms.” Stalin's conclusion formed the basis for a number of important party and state decisions on the accelerated development of collective farms, the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, with the confiscation of their property and its transfer to collective farms.In January 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the pace of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction,” which determined the timing of complete collectivization in the country. The Northern Caucasus and the Volga region were supposed to complete it by the spring of 1931, Ukraine, the Black Earth regions, the Urals and Siberia - by the spring of 1932, the rest of the grain-growing regions of the country - by 1933. The decision to eliminate the kulaks was also approved. Locally, decisions of party bodies were actively implemented, which led to a rapid increase in the number of collective farms. At the same time, peasant dissatisfaction with the violent methods of collectivization, the policy of dispossession, confiscation of property, arrests and deportations to remote areas also grew. According to various sources, the number of dispossessed people ranged from 3.5 million to 9 million people. The village, in fact, lost its elite - the most skilled and enterprising peasants. Many who stayed in their native places with the peasants feared for their fate and enrolled in collective farms. Understanding peasant discontent, I.V. On March 2, 1930, Stalin published the article “Dizziness from Success,” in which he condemned the “excesses” in collective farm construction and blamed them on the local leadership. But the policy towards the countryside and the peasantry remained tough. Thus, on August 7, 1932, the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On the protection of the property of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation and the strengthening of public (socialist) property” came into force, popularly known as the “law on spikelets”. The provisions included execution for theft on an especially large scale or deportation for up to 10 years for theft of collective farm or collective property.Large-scale processes of forced collectivization were generally completed by the mid-30s. One of the results of collectivization was the creation of an entire system of transferring financial, material, and labor resources from the agricultural sector of the economy to the industrial sector. The main links of this system were: obligatory state supplies and purchases of agricultural products at nominal prices, numerous taxes, meeting the needs of the Gulag, organized recruitment of labor force in the countryside by industrial enterprises, direct intervention of the party-state apparatus in production processes.During collectivization, losses in agriculture were significant. For example, the number of cattle only for 1929-1932. decreased by 20 million (by 1/3), horses by 11 million (by 1/3), pigs by 2 times, sheep and goats by 2.5 times. But in Stalin’s strategy of forced modernization, in which all sectors of the national economy were subordinated to the needs of accelerated industrial development, a general increase in agricultural production as a whole was not required. Only such transformations in the countryside were necessary in which it was possible to increase the labor force in the growing industry, ensure the supply of industry with technical raw materials, and at the same time prevent prolonged famine with the help of the peasants remaining in the village. Collectivization provided a solution to precisely these problems. During the 30s. up to 15–20 million people were “freed” from agriculture, which made it possible to increase the size of the working class from 9 to 23 million people. The main result of collectivization was the provision of conditions for a giant industrial leap.But as a result of violent changes in the established economic structure in the countryside, the productive forces of agriculture were undermined for many years. The famine that struck the weakened village in 1932-1933. (Ukraine, North Caucasus, Volga region, Kazakhstan and other grain-producing regions) claimed the lives, according to various sources, from 3 to 5 million people.The economic costs of collectivization did not stop its implementation. By 1937, over 243 thousand collective farms were organized, which included over 93% of the total number of peasant households. In 1933, a system of mandatory supplies of agricultural products to the state was established, under which prices were several times lower than market prices. The passport regime introduced in 1932 limited the rights of peasants to move.Results of collectivization:

• mass indignation of peasants;
• decrease in grain production by 15%;
• reduction in livestock production by 40%;
• famine in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Volga region and the North Caucasus;
• attaching peasants to the land and collective farms.

The economy in the USSR, as a result of accelerated industrialization and complete collectivization, became maximally nationalized. The nationalization of the economy made it possible to say that socialism has been built in the USSR.Video lecture "Stalin's modernization":