History of the 21st century economy

The last global market changes in the economy of our country occurred at the end of the 20th century, namely in the early 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred. The entire economy of new Russia switched to market relations, whereas for so many years it existed in a completely opposite economic regime.

The first 10 years are noted by leading economists in our country as economic stagnation.

Definition 1

An economy in a period of “stagnation” is an economy in which there is no development; all processes are at the stage of formation, awaiting further trends.

It was in the first ten years of the 20th century that the Russian economy suffered numerous losses and destruction. The economy moved from a dead point just at the beginning of the 21st century, starting approximately in 2000. The positive economic trends were influenced by several main factors:

• Change of the country's president;
• Establishing international relations;
• More or less formed social and public policy;
• Increased labor productivity;
• Reducing the unemployment rate, etc.

Characteristics of the 21st century economy:

1. “Dutch disease”, as well-known economists call the classic mistake and shortcoming of the Russian economy at the beginning of the 21st century. The basis of this “disease” is due to the fact that power in the country passed into one hand and became centralized, and the absence or weak presence of democracy in the country. It should be noted here that, starting from the end of the 20th century, Russia switched to a democratic regime, and democratic institutions were undeveloped even 10 years after the transition to the new regime;
2. Taking into account long-term negative trends in the economy, by the beginning of the 21st century it turned out that even if we collect all the factors that influence the economic system, as well as all the resources of our country that are somehow involved in management, our economy can hardly be called positive or growing, rather the opposite;
3. The economy of our country is weakly able to change under foreign policy conditions (for example, sanctions against Russia or bans on the import and export of goods). All this is just an excuse for the negative trend of market economic processes.

Positive trends in the 21st century economy

One way or another, it must be said that the economy of the 21st century still has positive trends towards development. For example, in the first 10 years from 2000 to 2010, the government managed to accumulate hydrocarbon reserves, due to which today, with unstable oil prices, our country can still keep the economic decline at a decent level.

Note 1

It should also be noted that natural resources are the main source of income for our country.

The fate of the people of Russia depends on their competent and effective use and sale on the international market.

Features of a market economy in the 21st century

At the very beginning of the 21st century, the most important event in the international market occurred - the increase in the cost of oil. This event had a positive impact on the economy of our country. Since Russia has sufficient oil reserves, its sale on the international stage has provided our country with rapid budget growth. In those years, and even to this day, the Russian budget is formed mainly by 60-80% from oil sales, that is, from exports.

This trend initially had a positive impact on the economic development of the country, but then had negative consequences.

By the first decade of 2000, GDP was growing rapidly, oil prices were rising every day, and as a result, in 2008, oil reserves provided the country's budget by 90-95%. Since 2009, there have been dramatic changes in the international oil market; the price of this natural resource began to decline, at first at a slow pace, and then faster and faster.

The most serious economic crisis occurred in 2012, when the price of oil, according to analysts, reached almost its minimum level. When the price fell, our country was left almost without a livelihood, without a budget and without the possibility of development.

First of all, this is due to the fact that, in addition to the oil and gas policy, Russia is not developing any other branches of production. In our country, mechanical engineering, agriculture, light industry, heavy industry, fishing, forestry, etc. are completely undeveloped.

It must also be said that most economists believe that it was the abundance of resources such as oil and gas that gave our country the opportunity not to collapse on the international market; if we assume that these resources will disappear or they will no longer be in demand on the market, then the Russian economy will need to be raised from your knees

Only today, when we are deep into the economic crisis, when the price of oil is unstable, has the government of our country, for the first time in the last few decades, begun to think about boosting the economy not at the expense of oil and gas resources, but at the expense of other areas of production.

Problems of the market economy of the 21st century

The Russian economy of the 21st century was formed at a fairly rapid pace, and, naturally, this did not happen without problem areas. Thus, the first and most serious problem was the policy aimed at reducing the concentration of investment flows, strengthening control over investments and more strictly monitoring the implementation of investment projects.

All this led to the fact that foreign and even Russian investors began to leave the market en masse, and with them the country’s capital. According to analysts, about $1 trillion was withdrawn from Russia at that time. All this led to a decrease in entrepreneurial activity in the market; most businessmen were simply afraid to invest money in Russian enterprises; small and medium-sized businesses practically disappeared.

Note 2

Thus, the economy of the 21st century was largely different from the economy and economic policies of the USSR. The country's transition to market relations was not the easiest; there were positive aspects, as well as negative ones. Today, the Russian economy is in a deep crisis, from which only new directions for the development of economic relations will help to emerge.

Introduction........................................................ ........................................................ ...............3

1. Economic development of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century.................................... 4

2. Economic development of Russia in the middle of the twentieth century.................................... 7

2.1. New economic policy......................................................... ..... 7

2.2. Economic development of the USSR during the five-year plans.................................... 9

2.2.1. Pre-war period................................................... .................... 10

2.2.2. During the war years........................................................ ............................. eleven

2.2.3. Post-war period................................................... .............. 12

3. Economic development of Russia at the end of the twentieth century.....................................15

Conclusion………………………………………………………….……...……17

List of sources used............................................... ............... 18

Introduction

In the first years of the twentieth century. In Russia, the rapid rise of the basic branches of heavy industry continued - coal, oil, metallurgy, and machine building. The high profitability of new industries and the low cost of labor attracted foreign capital to the country (from Belgium, France,
Germany, England and other countries). It rushed in a wide stream into a number of advanced industries, as well as into the sphere of banking capital.
Banks increasingly invested their funds in production, contributing to the development of new forms of economic organization - monopolies (trusts, syndicates). With the support of science, the technical re-equipment of industry and other sectors of the national economy was accelerated. Mechanization also affected everyday life (Singer sewing machines).
There was an increasing tendency towards concentration and specialization in the country's economy. New large industrial centers were created in the regions of Donbass, Baku, the North Caucasus, and in Poland. Zones for the production of export products were emerging (the Baltic states, the Black Sea region, Siberia). The high activity of domestic and foreign private capital was combined with the preservation of a significant role of the state in economic development. Taking measures to protect domestic producers
(customs tariffs), making large budgetary injections into leading industries - metallurgy, mechanical engineering, railway construction, the state simultaneously strengthened the government sector (railroads, weapons and shipbuilding factories). In the country's economy, along with the moribund socio-economic structures (primitive communal, feudal), the entrepreneurial-bourgeois one, represented by various freely competing forms of ownership (private, group-joint-stock, cooperative, state), was quickly strengthened.

1. Economic development of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century

At the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. capitalism entered a new, monopolistic stage. Powerful production and financial associations were formed. Gradually, industrial and financial capital merged, and industrial and financial groups emerged. The system of monopoly capitalism, changing and adapting to new historical realities, persisted throughout the 20th century. From a backward agrarian country, Russia by the beginning of the 20th century. became an agrarian-industrial power (82% employed in agriculture). In terms of industrial output, it entered the top five largest countries (England, France, the USA and Germany) and was increasingly drawn into the global economic system.

In the process of monopolization in Russia, four stages can be distinguished:

1880-1890s - the emergence of the first cartels on the basis of temporary agreements on joint prices and division of sales markets, the strengthening of banks;

1900-1908 - creation of large syndicates, banking monopolies, concentration of banks;

1909-1913 - creation of “vertical” syndicates, uniting enterprises for the purchase of raw materials, their production and sales; the emergence of trusts and concerns; merging of industrial “banking capitals, creation of financial capital;

1913-1917 - the emergence of state-monopoly capitalism; merging of financial capital, monopolies with

Agriculture

Despite the accelerated development of industry, the agricultural sector remained leading in terms of its share in the country's economy. 82% of its population was employed in this industry. It ranked first in the world in terms of production volume: it accounted for 50% of the world rye harvest and 25% of world wheat exports.

Finance

Under the conditions of monopoly capitalism, the Russian financial system was determined by state and private forms of banking capital. The main place was occupied by the State Bank, which performed two central functions: emission and credit. The Noble Land and Peasant Land State Banks contributed to the strengthening of capitalist relations in agriculture. At the same time, with their credit policy they supported landownership.

The crisis of 1900-1903 dealt a severe blow to public finances. The government treasury was virtually emptied by attempts to save unprofitable industrial enterprises and support the collapsing banking system. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. and revolutions of 1905-1907. Russia's public debt reached 4 billion rubles. The government tried to reduce the budget deficit by increasing direct and indirect taxes and reducing spending on economic, military and cultural transformations.

Transport

Unlike other sectors of the national economy, the transport system at the beginning of the 20th century. has not undergone significant changes. Railway transport occupied a leading place in the domestic transportation of goods and passengers. However, extensive government construction of railways was curtailed due to lack of funds. Attempts to organize private railway construction did not yield positive results. Construction in the 80s of the XIX century. railway in Central Asia (from Krasnovodsk to Samarkand) and the Great Siberian Railway (from Chelyabinsk to Vladivostok) in 1891-1905. was a significant step in solving this transport problem.

In general, for the Russian economy at the beginning of the 20th century. characterized by the coincidence of the processes of industrialization and monopolization. The government's economic policy was aimed at accelerated industrial development and was protectionist in nature. At the beginning of the 20th century. Russia's gap with the leading capitalist powers was significantly reduced, its economic independence and the possibility of pursuing an active foreign policy were ensured. Russia has turned into a moderately developed capitalist country. Its progress was based on the powerful dynamics of economic development, which created enormous potential for further forward movement. It was interrupted by the First World War.

2. Economic development of Russia in the middle of the twentieth century.

2.1. New Economic Policy

Economic policy, held in Soviet Russia starting in 1921. It was adopted in March 1921 by the X Congress of the RCP(b), replacing the policy of “war communism” pursued during the Civil War. The main content of the NEP is the replacement of surplus appropriation with a tax in kind in the countryside (up to 70% of grain was confiscated during surplus appropriation, and about 30% with a tax in kind), the use of the market and various forms of ownership, attracting foreign capital in the form of concessions, carrying out a monetary reform (1922-1924), in as a result of which the ruble became a convertible currency. The Soviet state faced the problem of stabilizing money. The state, which retained its commanding heights in the economy, used directive and indirect methods of state regulation, based on the need to implement the priorities of the forerunner of the strategic plan - GOELRO. In the second half of the 1920s, the first attempts to curtail the NEP began.

NEP in the financial sector

The task of the first stage of monetary reform was to stabilize the monetary and credit relations of the USSR with other countries. Parallel circulation of depreciating Sovznak bills was introduced to service small trade turnover and hard chervonets. The issue of depreciating Soviet notes was used to finance the state budget deficit caused by economic difficulties. Their share in the money supply steadily declined from 94% in February 1923 to 20% in February 1924.

NEP in agriculture

The tax in kind was initially set at approximately 20% of the net product of peasant labor (that is, to pay it it was necessary to hand over almost half as much grain as during the surplus appropriation system), and subsequently it was planned to be reduced to 10% of the harvest and converted into cash.

The Land Code of the RSFSR was adopted in September 1922 and came into force in December of the same year. It “forever abolished the right of private ownership of land,” mineral resources, water and forests within the RSFSR. Lease of land was allowed for a period of no more than one crop rotation (with three fields - three years, with four fields - four years, etc.). At the same time, it was stipulated that “no one can receive under a lease agreement for his use of land more than the amount that he is able to cultivate in addition to his allotment with the help of his own farm.”

NEP in industry

Radical changes also took place in industry. The chapters were abolished, and in their place trusts were created (associations of homogeneous or interconnected enterprises that received complete economic and financial independence, up to the right to issue long-term bond issues). By the end of 1922, about 90% of industrial enterprises were united into 421 trusts, with 40% of them being centralized and 60% of local subordination.

In industry and other sectors, cash wages were restored, tariffs and wages were introduced, excluding equalization, and restrictions were lifted to increase wages with increased output. Labor armies were liquidated, compulsory labor service and the main restrictions on changing jobs were abolished. The unemployment rate has decreased.

In addition to capital, a flow of immigrant workers from all over the world was sent to the USSR. Cooperation of all forms and types developed rapidly. There was cooperative legislation, lending, and insurance.

The credit system has been revived. In 1921, the State Bank of the USSR was recreated and began lending to industry and trade on a commercial basis. In 1922-1925. a number of specialized banks were created (for example: joint-stock, syndicates, cooperatives, private, etc.).

Commodity-money relations in the 1920s became the main link between its individual parts. In just 5 years, from 1921 to 1926, the index of industrial production increased more than 3 times; agricultural production doubled and exceeded the level of 1913 by 18%. But even after the end of the recovery period, economic growth continued at a rapid pace: in 1927 and 1928. the increase in industrial production was 13 and 19%, respectively.

Results of NEP.

In industry, key positions began to be occupied by state trusts, in the credit and financial sphere - by state and cooperative banks, in agriculture - by small peasant farms covered by the simplest types of cooperation. Under the NEP conditions, the economic functions of the state also turned out to be completely new; The goals, principles and methods of government economic policy have changed radically. If previously the center directly established natural, technological proportions of reproduction by order, now it has moved on to regulating prices, trying to ensure balanced growth through indirect, economic methods.

2.2. Economic development of the USSR during the five-year plans.

The Five-Year Plan is the period for which centralized economic planning was carried out in the Soviet Union.

The five-year plans for the development of the national economy of the USSR, or five-year plans, were intended for the rapid economic development of the Soviet Union. The plans were developed centrally on a nationwide scale by a specially created state body (Gosplan of the USSR) under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Fulfillment of the plan became the slogan of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The USSR State Planning Committee began drawing up five-year plans and monitoring their implementation in 1928.

2.2.1 Pre-war period

In April 1929, the XVI Party Conference adopted the directives of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy. Soon the V Congress of Soviets of the USSR made the plan a state law. For the 1928/29 – 1933/34 business years, it was planned to allocate 3.7 times more funds for the development of large industry than in the previous five years. 78% of these funds were intended for group "A". The volume of industrial production was to be increased by 2.36 times, and in large-scale industry by 2.8. The production of means of production (group "A") should have increased by 3.3 times, consumer goods (group "B") - by 2.4 times. In general, the growth of industrial production during the five-year plan was expected to average 20–25% per year.

It was proposed to solve the grain problem by creating new large grain state farms and involving approximately 20% of peasant farms in collective farms within five years. Note that the plan did not provide for complete collectivization of agriculture.

In the fall of 1929, when summing up the results of the first year of the Five-Year Plan, it became clear that industry had not provided the funds required by the plan within the framework of normal trade turnover with the countryside. Funding for the second year of the five-year plan was under threat.

In the summer of 1928, the campaign to involve peasants in collective farms intensified, but it was not yet of a forced nature. If by the summer of 1928 collective farms united 1.4% of peasant households (less than 0.4 million households out of approximately 25 million), then by the summer of 1929 - already 4%, or about 1 million households. In the summer of 1929, the slogan of “complete collectivization” was proclaimed in a number of districts.

2.2.2. During the war years

The USSR was not sufficiently prepared for war, and Germany, having occupied most European countries, brought their economic potential under its control. Its total industrial power was 1.5 times greater than the Soviet one. In fact, almost all of Europe opposed us economically.

The loss of a significant part of the economic potential and the relocation of thousands of industrial enterprises to the east of the country, enormous destruction and human losses in the national economy led at the beginning of the war to a sharp reduction in industrial production, which was especially felt in the defense industries. By the end of 1941, the volume of gross industrial output of the USSR had decreased by more than half. Under these conditions, the country's leadership took extremely tough measures to strengthen the Soviet rear. From the very beginning of the fascist aggression, mass mobilizations of the civilian population to the labor front began.

Until the end of 1941, the needs of the army and navy for weapons and military equipment were far from being fully satisfied. The production of aircraft, tanks and other military equipment required a lot of high-quality steel. In connection with the relocation of the defense industry to the Urals and Western Siberia, the technology and production organization system at most metallurgical plants had to be changed. The Urals became the main forge of the country's defense industry. With the loss of Donbass and the coal regions of the Rostov region, the shortage of coal increased sharply.

Agriculture suffered heavy damage during the war. Despite the efforts of agricultural workers in 1941, the procurement of grain and other products decreased sharply. The eastern and south-eastern regions of the country became the main food and raw material base: the Volga region, Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and although there were many difficulties. Since 1943, a general rise in production began.

National income, state budget, industrial output, and transport freight turnover have increased noticeably. Already in 1943, the rearmament of the army and navy with the latest models of military equipment accelerated, the share of which reached: 42.3% in small arms, 83% in artillery, more than 80% in armored weapons, and 67% in aviation.

The eastern regions of the country played the most important role in the production of heavy industry products. At the same time, metal production increased in the center and south of the country. As a result, in 1945 almost twice as much steel was produced as in 1943. The production of rolled products, special steels and non-ferrous metals especially increased. The fuel and energy base expanded. The experience of the war years convincingly proved that the command system of production management that had developed on the eve of the war had great opportunities for mobilizing the economic potential of the country.

2.2.3. Post-war period

In general, economic recovery after the war followed the well-worn tracks of the 1930s.

Perestroika on a peaceful basis began with the liquidation of emergency government bodies. The State Defense Committee was abolished, and its functions were transferred to the Council of People's Commissars, a number of military ministries were liquidated, mandatory overtime was abolished, the 8-hour working day, weekends, and paid vacations were restored. The war tax, which was paid by the entire population, was abolished.

The restoration of pre-war proportions in the economy and the transfer of enterprises to the production of civilian products began. The conversion, however, was partial. New types of weapons were developed: an atomic bomb was exploded in September 1949, and a hydrogen bomb was exploded in August 1953; aviation was transitioning to jet aircraft; Work was in full swing on the creation of missile weapons, etc. In August 1945, the USSR State Planning Committee was instructed to prepare a draft plan for the restoration and development of the national economy and the corresponding state budget, which provided for a reduction in military spending and, conversely, an increase in spending on civilian production and socio-economic needs.

At this stage, the country underwent a radical restructuring of the fuel balance: oil and gas production increased, their share in the total energy resources increased three times, from 19.7 to 60.2%. Such an achievement of scientific and technological revolution as the invention of jet and turboprop aircraft found wide application in our country - all aviation was switched to jet fuel, air lines began to be served by high-speed aircraft, the USSR sharply expanded the network of international airlines.

During these years, a significant step was taken to improve the standard of living of the population. This was expressed in the law on pensions, in tax cuts, in the abolition of tuition fees in secondary schools and universities, in the introduction of a guaranteed minimum wage in agricultural production, and in increasing wages in other sectors. The working day was again reduced to 6-7 hours. The working week was reduced by 2 hours.

Since 1958, the treasury has stopped charging single women a tax for childlessness. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR abolished the levy of tax on bachelors, single and small-family citizens with children. Since the late 50s, the sale of goods on credit began. In July–November 1964, a set of measures was adopted to provide pensions for collective farmers.

Particular success has been achieved in solving the housing problem. In the 50s, they began to provide preferential loans to developers of individual houses. This has improved the housing situation in small and medium-sized towns and rural areas.

The rapid rates of economic growth characteristic of the 30s - 50s gave way to a period of gradual slowdown in productivity growth as the gap in living standards with developed capital countries narrowed. This was due to the exhaustion of the potential for growth and a decrease in the marginal return on the national economy as a result of the accumulation of fixed assets (similar processes were characteristic of Western countries with the only difference that the latter were at a higher stage of development compared to the USSR), and prevented thus further flow of labor into industry and services), which, despite high costs, continued to be supported by various programs and regulations until the end of the 80s. The potential for growth was also negatively affected by the low degree of openness of the domestic economy, although foreign trade turnover was growing at a high rate.

The volume of GDP, national income, industrial and construction products continued to grow quite rapidly, but the average annual growth rate of labor productivity gradually decreased: in the eighth five-year plan (1966-1970) they amounted to 6.8%, in the ninth - 4.6, tenth (1976-1970). 1980) - 3.4, but remained higher than in most developed capitalist countries. At the same time, labor productivity in absolute value remained lower than in the United States, in industry by 2 times, in agriculture by 4-5 times. The average annual growth rate of national income also fell: in the eighth five-year plan - 7.7%, in the ninth - 5.7, in the tenth - 4.2, in the eleventh - 3.5%. Population growth was about 0.9 percent, so even in the 1980s there was steady, intensive development. In general, during 1970-1990 the volume of national income increased by 2 times, per capita by 1.7 times.

As a result of ill-conceived and inconsistent policies in the country, the situation with food and consumer goods is sharply deteriorating. The country's gold reserves have decreased by 10 times. Inflationary processes increased.

3. Economic development of Russia at the end of the twentieth century.

After the collapse of the USSR, the economic situation in Russia was close to catastrophic. Emergency and decisive measures were required to stabilize the situation. The Russian leadership, led by Yeltsin, had a choice: to stabilize the economy using traditional methods and only after that begin to prepare the conditions for economic liberalization, as proposed by the authors of the “500 Days Program,” or to quickly implement market reforms in combination with some measures to stabilization of the situation.

The main task was declared to be macroeconomic and financial stabilization with a simultaneous transition to a market economy. Absolutizing the role of the market, the “young reformers” believed that the market itself would be able to regulate all economic relations quite quickly. In practice, however, this was not achieved.

The first stage of reforms (January 1992 - December 1992) began with the liberalization of consumer prices for most goods and services, and the abandonment of the centralized system of resource allocation. While maintaining a high level of monopolization of production, this led to an extremely rapid rise in prices. By the end of 1992, they grew by an average of 100-150 times, and even higher for individual goods and products. At the same time, the average salary grew by 10-15 times.

All these measures were complemented by a policy of strictly limiting the money supply and abandoning protectionist measures against domestic producers who did not have time to adapt to new economic conditions. As a result, a decline in production begins (in 1992, according to the most conservative estimates, it amounted to 14%), a crisis of non-payments, etc.

Another important area of ​​reform during this period was the privatization of state property. During 1992-1993, several privatization and corporatization programs were adopted and implemented. The first program was published on December 29, 1991, “Basic provisions of the program for the privatization of state and municipal enterprises in the Russian Federation in 1992,” which was later clarified and supplemented several times. In addition, in 1992, the “voucher privatization” program began, which in practice resulted in another “shock without therapy.” Checking investment funds created in 1993, having collected vouchers, disappeared by 1995. The vast majority of the population received nothing.

The only positive aspect of privatization can be considered only the legal registration of the population's ownership of the occupied living space. In fact, this only meant the recognition of the right of sale, inheritance and donation, since according to the right of use the housing was already owned.

The Kiriyenko government replaced the Primakov government in September 1998. In the spring of 1999, the Stepashin government took over, and finally, in August 1999, Putin was appointed head of government. None of the three prime ministers was able to propose a clear, substantiated program for leading the country out of the crisis. On December 31, 1999, Yeltsin announced his resignation, transferring power, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, to the current head of government, Putin. In March 2000, Putin was elected president of Russia.

Conclusion

By the beginning of the twentieth century. Russia was a moderately developed country of the “second echelon” of capitalist development. Unlike the “first echelon” countries (England, France), it embarked on the path of capitalism much later, only in the middle of the 19th century. Therefore, its economic development was of a catching-up nature, manifested both in high rates and in a certain deformation of its phases and stages. One of the significant features was the leading role of the state and state regulation in the economic life of the country. In the economic sphere - to industrialize all sectors, transform the village into a source of capital, food and raw materials necessary for the industrialization and urbanization of the country; in the sphere of national relations - to prevent the empire from splitting along ethnic lines, satisfying the interests of peoples in the field of self-determination, promoting the rise of national culture and self-awareness, in the sphere of external economic relations - from a supplier of raw materials and food to turn into an equal partner in industrial production, in the sphere of religion and church - to end the relationship of dependence between the autocratic state and the church, to enrich the philosophy and work ethic of Orthodoxy, taking into account the establishment of bourgeois relations, in the field of defense - to modernize the army, ensure its combat effectiveness using advanced means and theories of warfare.

List of sources used .

1. Guseinov P. History of the Russian economy. Tutorial. – M.: ICTs

"Marketing" LLC "Publishing House YUKA", 1999.

2. Voshchanova G.P., Godzina G.S. History of Economics: Textbook. – M.: INFRA, 2001.

3. National economy of the USSR in 1990 - M.: Finance and Statistics, 1991.

4. New economic policy. Questions of theory and history. M., 2000.

5. Timoshina T.M. Economic history of Russia. Tutorial. Ed. 5th. – M.: Information and Publishing House “Filin”, Legal House “Justitsinform”, 2000

6. Yablonskikh E.K. History of the Russian economy of the 20th century (1917-2000): Lecture notes. – M.: MSTU “Stankin”, 2004.

After the 1998 default, the Russian economy began to rise. In 2000-2008, the Russian economy experienced GDP growth (in 2000 - 10%, in 2001 - 5.7%, in 2002 - 4.9%, in 2003 - 7.3%, in 2004 - - 7.2%, in 2005 - 6.4%, in 2006 - 7.7%, in 2007 - 8.1%, in 2008 - 5.6%), industrial and agricultural production, construction, real income of the population. There was a decrease in the number of people living below the poverty level (from 29% in 2000 to 13% in 2007). From 1999 to 2007, the production index of manufacturing industries increased by 77%, including the production of machinery and equipment by 91%, textile and clothing production by 46%, and food production by 64%. In 2009, against the background of the global economic crisis, there was a decline in GDP by 7.9%.

The graph below shows the dynamics of GDP in the period after the financial crisis of 1998:

Source: International Monetary Fund http://www.imf.org

Russia stopped external borrowing and began to successfully pay off huge debts that it had previously been unable to repay. As a result, Russia has become one of the few countries whose external debt is much less than the critical level.

The country's gold and foreign exchange resources grew rapidly. In terms of gold and foreign currency reserves, Russia ranks third in the world, second only to China and Japan.

In many ways, the success of the Russian economy was associated with high world prices for oil and gas. In the 2000s, demand for them increased sharply, which constantly pushed prices up. Throughout the decade until 2008, they grew steadily, setting record after record.

In 2001, tax reform was carried out. A 13 percent income tax levied on individuals was introduced. This is one of the lowest rates in the world. Thanks to the low income tax, the payment of “gray” salaries - unaccounted income that is not taxed - was practically done away with. Workers were already interested in having all their salaries paid not secretly in envelopes, but officially: with such an income tax, there was no point in taking risks anymore, and besides, future pensions depended on the size of the salary.

The income tax of enterprises and organizations has been reduced, laws have been adopted to support small and medium-sized businesses. These measures did not put an end to the “shadow” economy, but they dealt a significant blow to it. For many entrepreneurs, it has lost its meaning. Thousands of enterprises began to operate openly and revealed their real income, which was previously illegally hidden due to high taxes.

Measures have been taken to limit the power of natural monopolies - such as Gazprom, RAO UES (Unified Energy Systems), Russian Railways, etc.

All these steps made it possible to improve the economy and put it on the path to full development.

Since 2008, the country's economy began to decline due to the outbreak of the global financial crisis. However, unlike Western countries, the crisis did not affect the basic parameters of the budget and the state’s social programs. Due to past savings from oil sales, Russia was able to survive the financial crisis quite painlessly for the population. And by 2011, its consequences were practically overcome.

Russia's GDP growth in 2010-2011 was 8.8%. But by the end of 2011, investments in Russia reached a record level over the past 20 years of $370 billion per year. Thus, more than $1 billion is invested into the Russian economy every day. Inflation rates have dropped to record lows since the collapse of the USSR; in 2011, the price index increased by only 6.6%. On January 1, 2012, the Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan began operating. On August 22 of the same year, Russia joined the World Trade Organization.

In the 2000s, a number of socio-economic reforms were carried out in Russia: tax, land, pension (2002), banking (2001-2004), monetization of benefits (2005), reforms of labor relations, electricity and railway transport.

However, despite high growth rates and unconditional successes in the economy, Russia still lags significantly behind leading Western countries in key economic indicators. And the standard of living in the country is one of the lowest in Europe. The reforms did not change the economic situation of the Russian Federation. Oil and gas continue to be the main item of Russian exports and the main source of revenue to the state budget. And the fall in world energy prices could turn into a new crisis for the country.

The geostrategic position of Russia in the period after the collapse of the USSR allowed and encouraged the country's leadership to further develop the state by reviving its power and achieving the goal of becoming one of the leading powers of the multipolar world, confidently overcoming the opposition of traditional and newly emerged competitors and gaining reliable and numerous allies. How successful was Russia in solving the pressing problems of the first decade?

In one of his pre-election articles, Vladimir Putin writes: “Russia today, in terms of the main parameters of economic and social development, has emerged from a deep recession... we have reached and overcome the indicators of the standard of living of the most prosperous years of the USSR” (Putin V.V. “Russia is concentrating – challenges, which we must answer").

Results of the first decade

This cheerful conclusion, on the one hand, is pleasant, but on the other, it means that more than 20 years of our history have actually been lost. Over these decades, the rest of the world has moved far ahead, and we are glad that we managed to return to the level from which the decline began. What is more here – joy or sadness? What do statistics and other authorities say about this? Let's look at tables 1 and 2.

Table 1

As we can see, the available opportunities were not implemented in the best way. The indicators that characterize the main wealth are especially depressing - the population’s savings and quality of life, GDP growth is insignificant and the raw materials structure of the economy is still archaic, which slows down its development and ability to counteract the growing threats to the security of the country and each of its citizens.

table 2

Of course, the losses of the last decade of the last century were too heavy, associated with the dishonest privatization of public property and the mediocre conversion of military production, which caused great harm in all spheres of society. But there was no proper activity and creativity, especially on the part of those in whose hands the country’s fragmented wealth ended up. They reacted sluggishly to the call of the Russian President to double GDP within ten years, preferring not to invest in the real economy, but to export their income abroad. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance was skeptical about this call, projecting lower GDP growth rates and diligently transferring colossal revenues from commodity exports to the Stabilization Fund and the funds that replaced it. Real GDP growth often exceeded forecasts. By the end of the period, it slowed down, which was facilitated, firstly, by the withdrawal of very significant amounts from the economy into the “safety cushion” stored abroad, and secondly, by the global economic crisis.

“We need technology. It is short-sighted to hope that oil and gas will pull us through,” said Mikhail Eskindarov, rector of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation. “And money that doesn’t work doesn’t do any good.” In 2008, state budget expenditures amounted to 7.57 trillion rubles, while 7.6 trillion rubles lay idle in the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund. If they had worked in the domestic economy, in its real sectors, then the doubling of GDP proposed by the president would have been achieved earlier, and investing in the real economy instead of a “safety cushion” would have doubled it a second time. But neither a second doubling nor reindustrialization occurred, and the crisis hit our economy much deeper than the economies of the United States and Europe.

Note that the situation has not changed: when discussing the state budget for 2013 in the State Duma, opposition parties noted the Ministry of Finance’s desire to underestimate real incomes, artificially show a deficit, and direct the additional funds received from oil and gas exports to the Reserve Fund, and not for investments and social needs , national defense and national security.

Define an economic model

Ten years ago, when assessing the geopolitical position of the country, general indicators of the economic, military and military-economic power of Russia and the largest countries of the world were given. Their analysis showed that the Russian Federation is superior only in terms of economic potential to Germany, France, England, Japan, and in terms of the size of its territory, it is also superior to China and the United States. However, the degree of realization of the economic potential of our state turned out to be significantly lower than those of these countries, therefore, according to general indicators of economic power, Russia was weaker than the states shown in the table. The internal system indicators of the military-economic security of our country were also disappointing, and the systems for providing structures for military counteraction to threats to national security, due to the extremely limited economic capabilities of the state, are inadequate to the military-economic needs of the forces resisting real and potential military threats.

Nevertheless, at that time we believed that the Russian Federation had, although reduced, still colossal economic potential. The revival of its power and return to one of the most developed and powerful powers in the world was possible, but only with full consideration of the main lessons of history - the consolidation of society around basic social values ​​and the tasks of countering the internal and external threats that our state faced. It is especially necessary to emphasize the urgency of this task today, since threats to national security have increased significantly, and there have been no noticeable shifts in the balance of forces in favor of Russia.

Now Russia is focusing on adequately responding to the foreseeable challenges facing the whole world: a systemic crisis, a tectonic process of global transformation - the transition to a new cultural, economic, technological, geopolitical era. While we were trying to leave socialism and become “like everyone else,” these “everyone” came more and more thoroughly to the conviction that capitalism had exhausted itself. It is impossible to list all the obstacles and tasks; let us name those that have already been clearly identified.

In general, it is necessary to “complete the creation in Russia of such a political system, such a structure of social guarantees and protection of citizens, such an economic model, which together will form a single, living, constantly developing and at the same time sustainable and stable, healthy state organism” (V.V. Putin "Russia is concentrating - the challenges we must respond to"). Such an organism guarantees the sovereignty of Russia and the prosperity of its citizens. Vladimir Putin also mentions words about justice, dignity, truth and trust. What exactly is “such” an organism?

Let us touch upon some aspects of concretizing only one of the named problems – the economic model.

Firstly, we need to get off the raw materials needle and switch to innovative development of industry, agriculture and other sectors of the real economy. Without this, it is useless to talk about solving problems of the economy and other spheres of life. And the main difficulty here is that in the economy that we are building, you cannot dictate. Other methods are needed. The private sector must be interested, and government officials must be selected who are politically and economically literate, professionally competent, creative and disciplined.

Secondly, it is necessary to destroy and eliminate the possibility of merging business with officials, to completely overcome corruption (since it is recognized as high treason), but at the same time not pushing the state out of the economy under the pretext of its alleged inefficiency, but expelling ignoramuses from the state apparatus, replacing them with honest ones , economically literate people, only then will the economy become smart and efficient. This requires a lot of creative work by lawyers and legislators in the field of improving commercial law and colossal organizational work.

Thirdly, like air, it is necessary to achieve social unity in the country. It cannot be achieved without changing the decile coefficient several times, which is 1:15 in Russia as a whole, and in Moscow 1:50, while in European countries it is 1:7. Such a gap already threatens a senseless and merciless rebellion. Social unity cannot be achieved either without a progressive scale of taxation, without a substantial compensation contribution from dealers in dishonest privatization and renationalization of that part of the property, the nature of which, as experience has shown, requires its withdrawal from private hands, as well as without the liquidation of offshore companies. A lot of withdrawals and innovations are required, but all this requires strong political will, and not vigorous election appeals and promises.

Thinking about the desired economic model, especially in terms of the defense industry, I suddenly came across the newly adopted federal law “On the Foundation for Advanced Research.” We read: “The fund has the right to carry out income-generating activities only insofar as it serves the purpose for which it was created and corresponds to this purpose.” We also read: “Federal government bodies do not have the right to interfere in the activities of the fund and its officials.” I think that this law would be very suitable for the entire economy; it is aimed at neutralizing the main defect of a market economy, which focuses its subjects not on the functional effect (result), but on profit. On the other hand, we see a desire to eliminate bureaucratic obstacles created by the often incompetent actions of government agencies.

I am convinced that in an extremely contradictory socially oriented market economy it is very important not to imitate either capitalist competition or planned socialism, but to see and observe in everything the measure that determines the transition of phenomena to a new quality, even to their opposite.

Look ahead 30–50 years

On the issue of restructuring and modernization of the economy, we often oversimplify the understanding of the relationship between the economy and national security, including national defense, repeating the wise statements of authorities of the distant past that finance is the artery of war, that war requires three things - money, money and money again. But since then, when this was said, major changes have occurred in the economy and military affairs.

The military development of the twentieth century showed that with the industrialization of the economy, money is very difficult to transform into military power, and that issues of the structure of the economy, advance economic mobilization and conversion in the processes of mutual transitions of economic and military power as elements of a system of power acquire a decisive role. The Soviet Union clearly demonstrated these processes on the eve of the Great Patriotic War and during the period of conversion of military production in the 90s. Chains of objective functional and temporary relationships between economic sectors predetermine these processes, and colossal success and shameful defeat, the opportunity to “cut corners” and fail the next SAP depend on understanding and taking into account these connections in military-economic policy.

Ignoring these relationships during the years of conversion of military production made inevitable the rapid and profound collapse of not only the defense industry, but also the entire Russian economy in the 90s. This is also the reason for the extremely weak, unstable process of economic revival in the first decade of the 21st century. This is the mystery of the failures of Russia's neoliberal military-economic policy.

Military power in modern conditions presupposes such weapons and military equipment, the production of which is possible only if the structure of the real economy contains the most modern branches of production that use high technology. We are in a hurry to worry about the problems of a post-industrial economy, but in reality we have slipped into a pre-industrial economy, having lost mechanical engineering, the electronics industry, high technology and highly qualified scientific personnel. The connection between other structures ensuring national security and the economy and its structure is similar. This connection cannot be lost sight of when talking about “smart” defense and protection from new threats, about the need to look 30–50 years ahead, allocating 23 trillion rubles for programs for the development of the Armed Forces and the modernization of the defense industry, but putting up with the dominance of a raw material orientation economic policy and the outflow of brains and capital abroad.

What are the indicators related to national defense and national security in the past decade and in the future? The data in Table 3 shed light on this question.

Table 3

As we can see, spending on national defense in the first decade of this century did not rise above 2.84 percent in GDP and 18.63 percent in state budget expenditures and tended to decrease, and spending on national security was 2.41 and 11.1 percent, respectively. . The indicators of the first years of the new decade do not indicate their growth.

Financial speculation is the trading of financial assets with the aim of making a profit as a result of taking market risk. This has become one of the main forms of financial activity, along with investing, hedging, insurance, etc. Since both investment and speculation achieve financial growth, there is some kind of clouding of thinking and degeneration of financial policy.

What is underfunding of the defense industry? This may be a necessary measure, a consequence of extremely limited resources. But this may also be a method used by corrupt officials to enrich themselves under the guise of servicing defense spending. In such a situation, military financiers have to take out loans from private banks at exorbitant interest rates. The state pays for them, enriching oligarchs and corrupt officials. How it was necessary to fight financial fraud in the field of underfunding of defense expenditures in the 90s of the last century is convincingly shown in the monograph of the former head of the Main FEU of the Moscow Region, Colonel General V.V. Vorobyov (Vorobyov V.V. “Financial and economic support of defense security of Russia: problems and solutions." St. Petersburg, 2003).

This is especially important to understand in the context of the country's transition to a socially oriented market economy with pluralism of forms of ownership. Since it is happening, it is necessary to gain knowledge and ability to work in market conditions without losing the colossal opportunities for the systematic regulation of economic processes. Almost an entire decade of the existence of the defense industry in conditions of underfunding and fragmentation in the interests of the privatization of its enterprises, the loss of much of what was necessary to ensure its adequacy to threats and reliable competitiveness, also determined the failure of the first three state armament programs in the past decade. This forces us to rethink our attitude towards financial and economic technologies, understand their enormous destructive and creative power, and skillfully use it for creation.

We are talking about the role and place of the military-financial component in the system of determining factors and how to prevent its separation from military, economic and military-economic policies, how to ensure the fulfillment of their functional purpose. The main thing is to achieve the adequacy of military-financial and military-economic interests, to exclude the exaggerated influence of narrow departmental and private interests. It is necessary to ensure a combination of functional goals and economic interests in the system of contracts of subjects of military-economic relations, developing rules of the game in economic law that are acceptable to the parties, and creating a coercion mechanism acceptable to them in the form of economic sanctions, norms of legal liability, introducing new forms of economic relations, institutional innovations, modern market technologies.

One of the most effective means and paths to the goal is the creation, and in fact the revival of large integrated structures in the defense industry, destroyed by privatization and conversion of military production.

Main directions of development of the Russian economy in the 21st century .

PLAN

Introduction 3

5

5

10

13

13

18

Conclusion 31

33

Introduction

In the last quarter of the 20th century, humanity entered a new stage of its development - the stage of building a post-industrial society, which is the result of the socio-economic revolution taking place in the modern world. It is known that each socio-economic revolution is based on its own specific technologies, production and technological systems and production relations. For a post-industrial society, this role is played, first of all, by information technologies and computerized systems, high production technologies that are the result of new physical, technical and chemical-biological principles, and innovative technologies based on them, innovative systems and innovative organization of various spheres of human activity. Its final result, in our deep conviction, should be the creation of a new form of economic organization -innovation economy . Analysis of the results of research by domestic and foreign scientists on this issue convinced us that the creation of an innovative economy is a strategic direction for the development of our country in the first half of the 21st century. This circumstance served as the main motivation for choosing the topic of the course research.

Basicpurpose course work is an analysis of trends in the development of the Russian economy in the 21st century. The set goal necessitated the solution of a number of interrelated tasks:

reveal the prerequisites for the current economic growth of the domestic economy;

analyze the problems associated with economic growth;

explore the prerequisites for the globalization of the Russian economy;

study the innovative direction of development of the Russian economy.

The subject of the study is possible directions for the development of the Russian economy in the 21st century.

The object of the study is the Russian economy.

The course work consists of an introduction, main part and conclusion. The introduction substantiates the relevance of the topic of the course work, defines the tasks, subject and object of the course research. The main part is devoted to the study of the problem posed. In conclusion, the main results of the study are formulated.

Chapter 1. Modern trends in economic development of Russia

1.1 Economic growth: from recovery patterns to structural reforms

Discussion of the socio-economic problems of modern Russia is often conducted in isolation from the experience of other countries, and especially post-communist ones. It seems that for researchers of Russian realities there is no experience of almost three dozen other countries that, having emerged from socialism, are solving problems similar to ours.

This remark fully applies to the discussion of the problems of economic growth, which began in Russia in 1999. Russian literature is dominated by two concepts for explaining the nature of this growth. The first connects it with the real depreciation of the ruble after the 1998 crisis and favorable conditions on the oil market. The second reason for the growth is the reforms carried out by the Russian government in the conditions of political stabilization that occurred after the 2000 elections. These reforms are certainly important for ensuring long-term sustainable growth. Indeed, for Russia, oil market conditions and the real exchange rate are the most important factors in macroeconomic policy that influence growth. But the nature of current growth is still different.

In the context of the experience of other countries, it is easy to see that GDP is currently growing throughout the post-Soviet space. Moreover, at the first stage, approximately in 1992-1994, there was no growth in any of them. In 1995, the first signs of economic growth appeared in the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), as well as in states that were involved in military conflicts or were the object of a blockade (for example, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan).

In 1996-1998 The first signs of economic growth began to be observed in other post-Soviet states, but they were extremely unstable and often gave way to recession. However, after 1998, growth has been observed almost everywhere (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Growth rates of physical volume of GDP in post-Soviet states in 1996-2004

1996	1997	1998	2002	2003	2004
Azerbaijan	1,3%	5,8%	10,0%	7,4%	11,1%	9,9%
Armenia	5,9%	3,3%	7,3%	3,3%	5,9%	9,6%
Belarus	2,8%	11,4%	8,4%	3,4%	5,8%	4,1%
Georgia	11,4%	10,6%	2,9%	3,0%	2,0%	4,5%
Kazakhstan	0,5%	1,7%	1,9%	2,7%	9,8%	13,2%
Kyrgyzstan	7,1%	9,9%	2,1%	3,7%	5,4%	5,3%
Moldova	5,9%	1,6%	6,5%	3,4%	2,1%	6,1%
Russia	3,4%	0,9%	4,9%	5,4%	9,0%	5,0%
Tajikistan	16,7%	1,7%	5,3%	3,7%	8,3%	10,2%
Uzbekistan	1,7%	5,2%	4,4%	4,4%	3,8%	4,5%
Ukraine	10,0%	3,0%	1,9%	0,2%	5,9%	9,1%
Latvia	3,3%	8,6%	3,9%	1,1%	6,6%	6,5%
Lithuania	4,7%	7,3%	5,1%	3,9%	3,9%	4,0%
Estonia	4,0%	10,4%	5,0%	0,7%	6,9%	4,5%

Source: Statistical Yearbook. Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS. Moscow, 2005

Thus, the presence of growth is not directly related either to the political regime (it differs significantly in the listed countries), or to the implementation of reforms reminiscent of the Russian reforms of 2000-2001, or to oil prices (among the mentioned countries there are both net exporters, and net importers of oil and petroleum products). In addition, if we trace the dynamics of the real exchange rate of national currencies in 1995-2004, it is clear that in some countries the real exchange rate fell significantly, while in others it strengthened (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Real exchange rate of the national currency to the US dollar in post-Soviet states (according to the CPI), 1995=100

1996	1997	1998	2002	2003	2004
Azerbaijan	126%	135%	131%	104%	99%	93%
Armenia	107%	104%	106%	104%	95%	93%
Belarus	110%	89%	44%	56%	39%	46%
Georgia	130%	134%	99%	107%	105%	103%
Kazakhstan	118%	131%	125%	80%	84%	85%
Kyrgyzstan	86%	100%	64%	55%	60%	63%
Moldova	113%	120%	70%	72%	86%	87%
Russia	120%	125%	45%	63%	71%	78%
Ukraine	166%	187%	113%	89%	113%	134%
Latvia	110%	111%	118%	116%	110%	104%
Lithuania	121%	129%	133%	131%	128%	126%
Estonia	110%	103%	118%	102%	95%	93%

Source: Calculations based on data from International Financial Statistics 2005. IMF, 2005.

Thus, each of the post-Soviet states has its own characteristics, but all of them manifest themselves exclusively against the backdrop of economic growth. This leads us to assume that the sources of this growth, as well as the previous decline in economic activity, must be sought in other processes.

First of all, we will try to analyze what was associated with the drop in production in 1992-1994, which was then replaced by economic growth.

The phenomenon of post-socialist recession has been well studied, and the main factors that determine its development are clear. It is worth paying attention to the nature of the socialist gross domestic product. The traditional concept of GDP used in a market economy is not applicable for a meaningful analysis of socialist economies. The correct use of the concept of GDP imposes certain limitations, which primarily include: the presence of a market economy, the share of the state (budget) in which is relatively small and there is democratic control over the formation of government spending. This leads to the fundamental principle used in calculating GDP: if people pay for certain goods and services, this means that they (the goods and services) are valuable to them. The latter is a necessary condition for including these products in the calculation of welfare.

Obviously, the situation described above does not correspond to the realities of a socialist economy, where production and distribution of products are strictly regulated, there is no market, as well as democratic control over government spending. In such a situation, a significant amount of economic activity does not contribute to the growth of welfare, which in many cases turns GDP growth into a statistical illusion. In relation to socialism, the concept of GDP is extremely conditional, because there are not always basic prerequisites that would allow one or another economic activity to be considered meaningful, oriented towards real needs. In other words, the needs and motives of economic activity in socialist and market economies are qualitatively incomparable - what is meaningful in the first may turn out to be completely meaningless in the second, which sharply limits the possibility of comparing GDP expressed in monetary units (money). When the socialist system collapses, these qualitative differences come to the surface: it turns out that a significant part of economic activity is that for which no one will ever pay in a market and democracy, either as a consumer or as a taxpayer.

That is why the process of post-socialist transformation primarily consists of a gradual redistribution of resources from those types of activities and enterprises that cannot function in market conditions to those types of activities that are in demand in market conditions. At the first stage, the volume of resource release always exceeds the volume of their use in new production, which predetermines the decline. Then the economy passes through an “inflection point” - when the volume of resources involved in production becomes greater than the volume released from previously employed in inefficient industries. This is the nature of post-socialist transition and growth.

Next, the problem of modernization arises, associated with the collapse of the old economic system and the time required for market institutions to work. This is the second important factor determining the course of the post-socialist recession. After market institutions have emerged and began to function, post-socialist reconstruction begins.

The main factors that determine the duration and depth of the post-socialist recession are:

a) the scale of the economic sector whose products and services are not in demand by the market;

b) the extent of the use of market instruments under socialism;

c) the presence in the social memory of the population of information about pre-socialist market institutions.

Based on this, we can understand, for example, why in Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries, where two generations lived under socialism, the recession lasted less than in most of the post-Soviet space, where three generations lived under socialism.

1.2 Analysis of the problems of restorative economic growth in Russia

It is obvious that modern recovery growth in Russia differs significantly from recovery growth after the civil war and revolution.

Firstly, the level of production decline in 1991-1998. was significantly lower than during the revolution and civil war. Therefore, the pace of recovery is now also slower.

Secondly, the Russian economy of the NEP period was generally a market economy, just like the Russian economy of 1913. The economic structures that were formed then, with all their differences (a significantly smaller share of foreign trade in GDP, less marketability of agriculture, a greater role of the public sector, etc. .) resembled the structure of the Russian economy of 1913 to a greater extent than the structure of the fundamentally market economy of modern Russia resembles the structure of the socialist economy of the RSFSR in 1990.

But a number of processes that were characteristic of the recovery growth of the NEP period are also manifested in today's Russia. The first characteristic feature of recovery growth is its unexpectedness. V. Groman at one time drew attention to the fact that no one in the State Planning Committee expected the pace of industrial restoration that was ensured after the stabilization of economic relations and financial stabilization in the 1923/24 business year. The State Planning Committee proceeded from the fact that without large-scale capital investments it was possible to increase the volume of industrial production by 1927/28 to only 50% of the pre-war level. In reality, by 1927/28 industrial production had almost reached the level of 1913.

A similar situation is observed in our time. The Russian government predicted for 2000 from a 2.2% decline to 0.2% growth in GDP, the IMF predicted an increase of 1.5%, but real growth was 9%. (Note that GDP growth in Ukraine in 2001 was 9%, with the IMF forecast at 3.5%.)

The reasons for errors in forecasts are understandable and closely related to the very nature of recovery growth. Since the methods used for forecasting GDP are based on extrapolation of trends of the previous period, the forecast dynamics of production factors and economic conditions, it is easy to understand that all of them are of little use for predicting a surge in economic activity due to the stabilization of economic relations.

Then you have to deal with a second surprise, but this time an unpleasant one. It turns out that recovery growth by its nature is damped. The mechanics of this process are understandable: restorative growth is ensured by the use of already created capacities and a trained, qualified workforce. It occurs with relatively minor capital investments, but its resources are quickly exhausted.

So, in the period 1998-2004. the number of people employed in the Russian economy increased by 8.9 million people (from 58.4 to 67.3 million). The shortage of skilled labor found expression in the rapid growth of real wages. During 2000-2004 real wages increased 1.7 times. A similar trend is observed in other CIS countries (see Table 3).

Table 3

Growth rates of real wages in the CIS countries in 1996-2004

1996	1997	1998	2002	2003	2004
Azerbaijan	19,0%	53,0%	20,0%	20,0%	18,0%	16,0%
Armenia	13,0%	26,0%	22,0%	11,0%	13,0%	5,0%
Belarus	5,0%	14,0%	18,0%	7,0%	12,0%	30,0%
Georgia	53,0%	37,0%	25,0%	2,0%	3,0%	22,0%
Kazakhstan	2,0%	5,0%	4,0%	7,0%	12,0%	13,0%
Kyrgyzstan	1,0%	12,0%	12,0%	8,0%	2,0%	11,0%
Moldova	5,0%	5,0%	5,0%	13,0%	2,0%	15,0%
Russia	6,0%	5,0%	13,0%	22,0%	21,0%	20,0%
Tajikistan	14,0%	2,0%	29,0%	0,3%	8,0%	11,0%
Ukraine	5,0%	2,0%	3,0%	6,0%	1,0%	21,0%

Source: Statistical Yearbook. Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS. Moscow, 2005

The growth of real wages, which is faster than labor productivity, was also pointed out as a characteristic element of restoration processes by V. Groman in his works dating back to the 1920s.

Market surveys conducted by the IET show a sharp change in the balance of assessments of the adequacy of production capacity to meet expected demand in the period 1998-2004. Assessments of labor requirements in relation to expected demand are also changing: shortages of equipment and qualified personnel are increasingly seen as a serious obstacle to production growth.

A drop in growth rates after reaching peak values ​​and the involvement of the most available resources in economic circulation almost inevitably gives rise to economic and political debates about the reasons for the fading growth rates and ways to increase them. If initially the extremely high growth rates at the beginning of the recovery period are perceived by both the authorities and the expert community as a pleasant surprise, then both the political elite and society get used to focusing on these abnormally high growth rates as a guideline for policy development, as a starting point in the assessment the policy being pursued.

Chapter 2. Study of the main directions of development of the Russian economy in the 21st century

2.1 Prerequisites for the globalization of the Russian economy

Globalization is the growth in the volume and diversity of world economic relations, accompanied by increased economic dependence of the world's countries, and has now become the main trend in the development of the world economy. It is manifested primarily in the growth of international trade volumes, financial and investment flows, which are faster than material production.

The globalization of the world economy is generated by a number of factors associated with qualitative changes in material production and infrastructure.

Market modernization represents the transition of the economy to a new technological basis and the simultaneous formation of an adequate management mechanism. The world economy knows 2 types of modernization:pioneer Andcatching up .

Pioneering is typical for countries that are leaders in the world of technological and economic progress. Catch-up modernization is typical for countries that are in the second “echelon” of development. The main difference between such modernization and the pioneer state is that its basis is the development of technologies and economic mechanisms already created in the leading countries.

Distinctive features:

Developmental delay;

Lack of internal resources due to lagging national production. Forced use of non-market methods of establishing one’s position in the world economy.

Establishment of a strong national economy, taking control of the course of economic modernization, etc.

Modern production forces require the mobilization of ever larger savings and the monopolization of economic resources by large economic entities and the state. Thus, “catch-up” modernization carries a high risk of nationalization of the economy, suppression of democracy and a rollback in reforms.

Features of the “catch-up” development of the domestic economy:

1. The economic development of Russia for almost two centuries has a common nature, goals and content with the development of other countries. The Soviet economic system became a powerful mechanism for accumulating the country's material capital and separating labor from property. Its material and technical component was adequate to the material and technical basis of early and mature industrialism, and the beginning of its crisis in the late 60s. coincides with the transition of the world economy to late industrialism.

2. Under the influence of internal contradictions and ongoing reforms, the Soviet economic system itself developed towards market economic relations. The economic system that had developed by the early 80s. cannot be unambiguously interpreted as non-market, although it differs significantly from the system of market relations in developed countries. The result of economic modernization in the USSR by the beginning of the fifth wave of reforms was the formation of a hybrid type of market - a specific economic system, which was based on the distortion of the market mechanisms of the “bureaucratic market” (a system of horizontal and vertical bidding in the process of accepting and fulfilling planned targets). The logic of economic development was undermined the material and technical base of the Soviet economic system and led to the modernization of the main features of its economic mechanism in the direction of moving the center of economic decision-making to lower levels of the hierarchy of centralized management (to ministries, departments).

The waves of Russian reforms occur during the upward phase of the “long wave” of N.D. Kondratieva. According to his calculations, the rise of “long waves” falls on the periods 1788-1814 (I wave), 1849-1873 (II wave), 1896-1920 (Witte-Stolypin reforms). According to modern calculations, the next rise of the “long wave” occurred in 1952-1974 (the Khrushchev-Kosygin reforms), and in the late 80s and early 90s, the rise of the 5th wave, which corresponds to modern market reforms of the Russian economy. This is proof that the general process of market modernization of the Russian economy over the past 200 years is sufficiently consistent with the logic of global economic development. During the “wavelength” rise, Russia’s lag behind the leading countries in economic progress increased, which forced the authorities to implement reforms “from above.”

For the country, the foreign policy factor has always been predominant when choosing a course to create an advanced industry.

The specificity of Russian industrialization has always been that the means for its implementation were withdrawn from existing production, and were not created in the course of the natural accumulation of capital. In Russia, there has always been a change in the areas of investment; funds were directed mainly to the military and related industries. In addition, the withdrawn funds could not be enough to develop all structures in all sectors of the economy. Therefore, the system of economic development in Russia has long been fragmented.

4. Russia's breakthroughs on the path of market modernization inevitably ended with rollbacks of reforms that occurred during the decline in the “long wave.” What was common to the phases of counter-reforms in the economic sphere was the introduction of restrictions on the development of market relations, curbing freedom of economic activity while simultaneously increasing state intervention in economic life.

In “catch-up” development, two strategies are mainly used: import-substituting and export-oriented.

The first puts forward as a priority the creation of diversified industrial complexes designed to saturate the domestic market and only then expand their exports.

The second puts international industrial cooperation at the forefront. The condition for Russia's successful advancement along the path of economic progress is, first of all, the concentration of its own efforts and resources on the formation of an effective, technologically advanced and competitive market economy. In the 21st century, Russia will be forced to adhere mainly to an import substitution strategy.

At the same time, the country cannot refuse to take advantage of export-oriented development. Foreign economic relations, including foreign trade, are capable of enhancing one’s own potential.

Russia's exports are dominated by goods characterized by low price elasticity, unstable price dynamics, the presence - in the long term - of a downward trend in prices and a rather slow pace of expansion of demand. In addition, the market for some goods is not free. The oil market is controlled by OPEC, the ferrous metals market is regulated by the largest Western countries, and the sale of natural gas is limited by the availability and conductivity of the pipeline network.

The share in Russian exports of machinery and equipment is negligible and 5 times lower than in the exports of an “average” highly developed Western country.

Food products and agricultural raw materials occupy too much of Russia's imports. In this state, the sphere of material production in Russia has become significantly dependent on foreign supplies.

In the geographical structure of foreign trade, there continues to be a tendency towards a weakening role of the CIS countries. The market capacity and solvency of partners in the CIS are small, and their ability to participate in industrial cooperation, especially when it comes to the creation of high-tech products, is currently limited.

Composition of Russia's main trading partners in 2004 did not change. The top ten includes Germany, the USA, Ukraine, Belarus, Italy, China, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Great Britain, and Finland.

The Russian economy has a number of advantages:

1. The country's provision with the main types of mineral resources. The country is in need of importing from outside a relatively small range of raw materials: manganese, chromium, titanium, lead, mercury and some others.

2. Comparative cheapness of some factors of production (there are large-scale production assets and qualified cheap labor). The inclusion of Russian entrepreneurs in international cooperation could be carried out by manufacturing units, parts and components according to orders from foreign manufacturers of finished products.

3.Unique advanced technologies in a number of industrial sectors (aerospace and nuclear industries, shipbuilding, production of laser technology and computer science tools, cartography and geodesy, software development, geological surveys).

In my opinion, in order to realize these advantages and obtain an effect, the following points must be taken into account in the ongoing reforms:

— settling of finances abroad through non-return of export proceeds, unequal barter, payment for fictitious imported goods and services, smuggling. It is necessary to tighten government control over these operations.

— imperfection and incompleteness of the country’s legislative framework. For example, in Russia there are no legislative or other regulations on the issue of competitiveness. Therefore, it is necessary to create a capable interdepartmental commission on competitiveness.

— the competitive entry of our products into the foreign market will require the revival and intensification of scientific and production cooperation between enterprises and foreign countries. It is necessary to strengthen the commercialization of the scientific results of our country.

In the perspective of the world economy, it is possible to distinguish 3 poles of economic power:

European

American

East Asian.

Russia can become:

participant of 1 or 2 superblocks at once (European and East Asian)

leader of the independent integration association of the CIS

an independent outsider.

2.2 Innovative economy - a strategic direction for Russia’s development in the 21st century

In solving the problems of the country's recovery from the crisis and ensuring dynamically sustainable development of the economy, the primary role belongs to innovations and innovative activities that can ensure the continuous updating of the technical and technological base of production, the development and release of new competitive products, and effective penetration into world markets for goods and services. This requires reforming all spheres of public life, and above all, the economy.

What is meant by innovative economy? The analysis of modern trends in economic development of leading Western countries suggests that an innovative economy is an economy of society based on knowledge, innovation, on the friendly perception of new ideas, new machines, systems and technologies, on the readiness for their practical implementation in various spheres of human activity . She highlights the special role of knowledge and innovation, primarily scientific knowledge. In an innovative economy, under the influence of scientific and technological knowledge, traditional spheres of material production are transformed and radically change their technological basis, because production that is not based on new knowledge and innovation turns out to be unviable in an innovative economy.

Information technologies, computerized systems and high production technologies are the basic systems of the innovation economy. In their development, they radically transform all means of receiving, processing, transmitting and producing information, radically technologizing intellectual activity (for example, automation of design and technological preparation of production, automated control over the progress of production, automation of financial and accounting reporting and organizational and administrative activities, multilingual automated translation, diagnostics and pattern recognition, etc.).

What are the main features of an innovative economy?

It seems to us that the economy of a society is innovative if the society:

any individual, group of persons, enterprises anywhere in the country and at any time can receive, on the basis of automated access and telecommunication systems, any necessary information about new or known knowledge, innovations (new technologies, materials, machines, organization and management of production, etc. .), innovation activities, innovation processes;

modern information technologies and computerized systems are produced, formed and accessible to any individual, group of individuals and organizations, ensuring the implementation of the previous paragraph;

there are developed infrastructures that ensure the creation of national information resources in the volume necessary to support the constantly accelerating scientific and technological progress and innovative development, and society is able to produce all the necessary multifaceted information to ensure dynamically sustainable socio-economic development of society and, above all, scientific information ;

there is a process of accelerated automation and computerization of all spheres and branches of production and management; radical changes in social structures are being carried out, resulting in the expansion and intensification of innovative activity in various spheres of human activity;

favorably perceive new ideas, knowledge and technologies, are ready to create and introduce into widespread practice at any necessary time innovations for various functional purposes;

there are developed innovation infrastructures that can quickly and flexibly implement innovations that are necessary at a given time, based on high production technologies, and develop innovative activities; it must be universal, competitively carrying out the creation of any innovations and the development of any production;

there is a well-established flexible system of advanced training and retraining of professionals in the field of innovation and innovation activities, effectively implementing complex projects for the restoration and development of domestic industries and territories.

The basic concepts of an innovative economy are innovation, innovative activity, and innovative infrastructure. What are these concepts, what is their content and scope? Let’s briefly get acquainted with these concepts, because the tactics and strategy for forming an effective innovative economy in the country largely depend on their correct understanding.

Innovation, innovative activity, innovative processes are concepts that currently have the most diverse and broad interpretations. The development and spread of these concepts to processes related to everything new, including new ideas and inventions, new scientific achievements, new knowledge and technologies, new results of fundamental and exploratory research work, etc., are generated by the everyday idea and confusion of two concepts : innovative and new. A broad interpretation of innovation activity as new covers everything that is meant by scientific and technological progress, confuses scientific and innovative priorities, and gives rise to false ideas about the similarity of requirements for infrastructures that ensure scientific or innovative development. To substantiate this thesis, we will proceed from the following understanding of scientific and technological progress: it is advisable to divide scientific and technological progress conditionally into two main interrelated and complementary components - the component of scientific and technological achievements and the component of production and technical achievements.

In the first case, the results of scientific and technological progress are scientific achievements - new knowledge, new scientific and technical ideas, discoveries and inventions, new technologies based on fundamentally new physical, chemical and biological principles. In the second case, the results of scientific and technological progress are production and technical achievements - innovations, the creation of which involves:

professional targeted development and bringing the results of scientific and technical achievements to the creation of new technologies, new systems, machines, equipment, new methods of organizing and planning production, etc.;

practical implementation of the created results of production and technical achievements to the consumer either through the market or through the “order - execution” mechanism;

ensuring the effective use and operation of the created innovative product;

research and obtaining new scientific and technical achievements (if there are none) necessary for the creation and implementation of innovations demanded by the market or customer (we will call them innovation-oriented scientific and technical achievements).

From the above, we conclude that innovation activity should be understood as the activity of a team of people aimed at implementing turnkey production and technical achievements in social practice - innovation, application of existing progressive technologies, systems, machines and equipment based on the use and implementation of scientific and technical achievements of domestic and world science and technology. It should ensure the elimination of the gap between the existing volume and level of scientific and technical achievements already obtained and verified and their application in developing (created) enterprises.

It follows that saturation of innovation activity is the most important condition for the formation of an effective innovation economy.

The effectiveness of innovation activity is largely determined by the innovation infrastructure. Therefore, innovation infrastructure is a basic component of the innovation economy and the innovative potential of society. What is innovation infrastructure, why is it a basic component, the foundation of an innovation economy?

Innovation infrastructure is the main tool and mechanism of the innovation economy; it, like an “Archimedean lever and fulcrum,” is capable of raising the country’s economy to a very high level. Based on this understanding, we see innovation infrastructure as a set of interconnected, complementary production and technical systems, organizations, firms and corresponding organizational and management systems that are necessary and sufficient for the effective implementation of innovation activities and the implementation of innovations. Innovation infrastructure determines the pace (speed) of development of the country's economy and the growth of the well-being of its population. The experience of the developed countries of the world confirms that in the conditions of global competition in the world market, those who have a developed infrastructure for creating and implementing innovations and who own the most effective mechanism for innovation activities inevitably win. Therefore, for the effective functioning of the country's innovative economy, the innovation infrastructure must be functionally complete.

What does it mean? This means that it must have a set of properties that should contribute to the full implementation of engineering technologies for the creation and implementation of innovations on a regional scale and the country as a whole. In our deep conviction, the mentioned set should contain a set of the following properties:

distribution across all regions in the form of innovation and technology centers or engineering firms that can locally solve problems of a functionally complete innovation cycle with turnkey delivery of an innovation activity;

versatility, which makes it possible to competitively ensure the implementation of an innovative turnkey project in any area of ​​the production or service sectors of the economy;

professionalism, which is based on conscientious and high-quality service to the customer or consumer;

constructiveness, which is ensured by a focus on the final result. The development of an innovative project must be accompanied by continuous analysis of the final results. The presence of reliable feedback on the achieved final results makes it possible to develop constructive priorities directly in the process of developing innovation activities and thereby ensure a closed system of innovation management according to the scheme: innovations - investments - monitoring of final results - investments, etc.;

high level of scientific and technical potential;

staffing, first of all, managers of innovation projects and the possibility of constant updating and improvement of innovation infrastructure personnel;

financial security (availability of working capital);

high level of tools that speed up obtaining the final result;

flexibility, ensuring adaptation of the innovation infrastructure to changes in market requirements and external conditions.

As the results of our research, as well as the experience of developed countries of the world, show, the main core of innovation infrastructure, the most adequate mechanism for the implementation of scientific and technical innovations - innovations, is the infrastructure of innovative engineering centers (firms, enterprises), which must accumulate the best domestic and foreign knowledge and technologies and act for the customer as a system integrator and guarantor of the successful implementation of an innovative project and ensure coverage of the full innovation cycle: from studying market conditions for final innovative products, feasibility studies of an innovative project and its development to complete supply of equipment, its system integration, turnkey delivery ” with staffing and subsequent service.

Let us dwell on revealing the content of some of the above properties of innovation infrastructure. Research and monitoring of market needs, the need for constant and prompt updating of manufactured innovative products require that in the innovative economy, the implementation of flexible automation be given paramount importance. Complex flexible automation with extensive use of information technologies and computerized systems is the core of the innovation economy. Therefore, the foundation of all structural transformations of the regional economy, the basis of the regional innovation infrastructure should be based on automated high technologies and computerized systems with an end-to-end “paperless” cycle: “design - production - control - implementation”. It follows that the most important regional problem in the formation and development of an innovative economy is the solution of scientific, methodological, organizational and technological issues related to the development, creation and development of automated integrated design and production systems that automatically carry out an end-to-end “paperless” cycle and combine in one system of innovatively oriented research and development work, processes of technological preparation and production planning, ultimately aimed at creating innovative products. Moreover, in such systems the three main stages characteristic of creating a new knowledge-intensive system should be automated in an end-to-end chain: innovation design; production and assembly of a prototype of a new high-tech system; commissioning and testing of a new high-tech system.

An important problem that requires an urgent solution in the conditions of an innovative economy is the rapid creation in the regions of an effective mechanism for information support of innovation activities. The effectiveness of this mechanism largely depends on the quality of continuous socio-economic monitoring of the regions. Such monitoring, in our opinion, should cover observation, analysis, assessment and forecast of the economic, social, environmental, scientific and innovation situation in the region in order to prepare management decisions and recommendations aimed at improving and developing innovation activities. Monitoring both innovation processes and more general processes of structural economic transformation in the region aims the regions to effectively manage these processes. Therefore, one of the main functions in the field of information support for the innovative economy should be the function of automated monitoring of structural transformations in the region. In this regard, it seems appropriate to create automated centers for innovation and information support (ARCI) in the regions to constantly maintain the updating and operation of innovative data and knowledge banks. In this case, we must proceed from the following position: subjects of innovative activity need, first of all, information that would contain appropriately organized technical, economic, market-oriented, statistical information, information about the characteristics of industrial products, technologies, machinery and equipment, materials, types of services, etc. And here an important role belongs to the marketing of innovations and innovative activities at enterprises in the region as an integral part of the information support of innovative ergonomics. Innovative marketing, representing a set of activities to study all issues related to the process of selling innovative products of enterprises, namely: studying the consumer and studying the motives of his behavior in the market; research of an innovative product and channels for its implementation; studying competitors and determining the competitiveness of their innovative product; studying the “niche” of the market in which the enterprise has the best opportunity to realize its advantages - should become one of the leading structures of ARCI.

The creation at the regional level of industries and enterprises of such a fundamentally new information structure - an automated integrated information system, focused on comprehensive information support for the innovative economy, will contribute to the successful solution of the most important task of the innovative economy of the state: ensuring the competitiveness of enterprises, industries, regions and the country as a whole.

The formation of an innovative economy largely depends on the creation of an effective mechanism for managing the practical implementation of complex innovative projects in the regions. And here we cannot do without government support for innovation processes. The need for financial and legal support for science and innovation, intensification of innovation activity, transition to new forms of solving economic, environmental and social problems of the regions characteristic of an innovative economy, urgently require regional authorities to develop a responsible policy in relation to the management and development of innovation activity in the region , to intensify interaction on this problem between regional government bodies and federal ones. The main form of such interaction, in our opinion, should be scientific and technical programs: state ones, financed from the federal budget, when priority national economic problems are solved on the basis of the scientific and innovative potential of the regions, and regional ones - with shared funding from the state and the region.

For the successful implementation of regional innovation policy for the formation of an innovative economy, a set of scientific, organizational and technical measures must be carried out, the main ones, in the author’s opinion, are the following.

1. Development of a concept for the development of innovation activity and innovation infrastructure in the region with the definition of long-term strategic goals and means of achieving them within the framework of the formation of an innovative economy.

2. Development of a program for innovative development of the region, which should be a targeted document indicating the resources, implementers and timing of a set of activities aimed at achieving the goals of innovative development of the region.

3. Inclusion of the main provisions of the region’s innovative development program into the program of its socio-economic development.

4. Organization of practical activities of local and regional government bodies for the implementation and adoption of relevant regulations of regional significance, as well as for their implementation of organizational and information support for this program.

We consider it necessary to especially highlight the following provision. In the conditions of development of innovative activity (in a society with an innovative economy), the attitude towards the main productive force of society - a person of highly intellectual, highly productive labor - must completely change. The role of highly qualified specialists in the innovative economy is very large and will constantly grow. Therefore, in our deep conviction, training personnel capable of effectively managing innovation processes, developing and implementing innovative projects is a priority regional and federal problem. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the objective need for innovative development and the formation of an innovative economy require the development of a new concept of personnel training. In the author’s opinion, it should be based on the following principles:

formation, development and self-realization of a creative personality;

constant focus on generating promising scientific and technical innovations and finding ways and methods for their practical implementation in innovation;

focus on training highly qualified and highly intelligent specialists, system managers of innovation activities;

considering education and training as an integral part of the production process, and the costs of training - not as costs for workers, but as long-term investments necessary for the prosperity of enterprises, industries and regions;

training in managing the social and psychological aspects of the process of creating high-tech innovations, using the creative potential of the team, and accelerating the large-scale implementation of innovative developments into practice;

creation of a system of continuous training and advanced training of personnel, integrated into the system of production of innovative products;

cooperation between universities and other universities in the region with leading enterprises in the region implementing innovative projects, and their joint activities in the field of developing educational programs, publishing textbooks and monographs on innovative technologies, machine and equipment systems, in training highly qualified specialists in new professions and promising scientific fields -innovative directions.

Innovative practice (production of knowledge-intensive innovative services in a broad sense) requires working capital. It is almost impossible to obtain this working capital (for example, a loan) in modern conditions without special support measures. Therefore, at present, the domestic production of innovative services, deprived of working capital, is losing the best (knowledge-intensive) projects in the country to foreign firms that use a balanced foreign market to obtain the required working capital. Our research, as well as our analysis of advanced domestic and foreign experience, shows that in an innovative economy, in order to eliminate the mentioned drawback, it is necessary to combine the innovation and investment functions under a single management. Such an association will help to increase the interest of performers in the successful implementation of all stages of a single innovation and investment cycle, which can be achieved when all performers are focused on the final result: responsible delivery of innovative products on a turnkey basis and participation in the sale and support of created innovative goods and services.

An effective mechanism for implementing a unified innovation and investment cycle is innovation, engineering and investment centers (firms, enterprises). Such III centers will be able to ensure the effective production of knowledge-intensive innovation and investment services already at the expense of their own working capital with subsequent (based on the results obtained) investments in new projects, etc. From the above it follows that the intensification of the formation of an innovative economy is associated with accelerated creation of domestic innovation, engineering and investment network infrastructure distributed across all regions.

Conclusion

So, to summarize our vision of the formation and development of the economy in our country in the 21st century, we will try to briefly answer the following three questions:

1. What is the strategic goal of the formation and development of the economy in Russia for the coming period?

2. What resource will be used to ensure the achievement of the strategic goal?

3. How to ensure the achievement of a strategic goal with the intended resource?

The strategic goal of economic development in our country in the coming years should be the comprehensive development of domestic industries and territories to the level of their competitiveness in the world.

The main resource for achieving this goal should be higher school. The higher education system, which provides the main component of development - personnel, must be urgently supplemented with an innovative component. The higher education system should and can perform the functions of a system coordinator for the restoration and development of enterprises and territories of the country.

To ensure the effective achievement of the strategic goal, the infrastructure of higher education in Russia must be supplemented with innovation and investment structures (centers, complexes, companies, institutes...) so that universities form educational, scientific and innovative complexes. It is the higher education system that is the most promising for building on its basis a Russian innovation and investment network, which should play the role of a bridge connecting science and production in all regions and industries. This is explained by the following properties of domestic higher education: distribution of higher education across all regions; high scientific and technical potential of higher education; the universality of the higher education system, its intersectoral nature: scientific schools of Russian universities cover all areas of the country’s economy; interaction of higher education through its graduates with all regional and industry structures; a relatively high level of information support system for higher education, including global and local computer information networks connected into a single system; high public support for higher education; flexibility of the higher education system.

The main advantage of the proposed approach is that through such development of the higher education system it is possible to effectively integrate the results of university, academic and industrial science in Russia, as well as the advanced results of science of the world community when creating, implementing innovative projects and developing innovative activities, which is a prerequisite for creating the country of an effective innovative economy.

List of used literature

XXI Century. Formation of the legal foundations of economic activity of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation / A. Gorodilov et al. - Kaliningrad: Yantar. Skaz, 2002. - 200 p.

Alekseev A.I., Mironenko N.S. Territorial organization and integration into the world economy of Russia at the turn of the century // Izv. RAS. Ser. Geography. - 2000. - N 6. - P. 18-27.

Anti-crisis economy of Russia: the beginning of the millennium. - St. Petersburg: Faces of Russia, 2000. - 446 p.

Valova D. Alternatives to the economic development of Russia in the 21st century. / Recorded by V. Semenov // Problem. theory and practice of management. - 1999. - N 6. - P.44-47

Vladimirsky E.A. Economy of Russia in the twentieth century (political economic aspect): Textbook. allowance / SPbGASU. - St. Petersburg, 2000. - 206 p.

Quality - strategy of the 21st century: Mater. All-Russian scientific-practical Conf., 27-28 Feb. 2001 - Saransk: Mordov Publishing House. University, 2001. - 188 p.

Kudrov V. Russia’s place in the global economy at the beginning of the 21st century // World Economy and International. relationship. - 2000. - N 5. - P.75-83.

Obolensky V.P. Foreign economic policy of Russia on the threshold of a new century // Mirov. economics and international relationship. - 2000. - N 2. - P.51-61.

The path to the 21st century: Strategic problems and prospects for the Russian economy. - M.: Economics, 1999. - 793 p. — (Systemic problems of Russia).

Sokolova O.Yu. Trends in interaction between Russian business entities in the 21st century / Sarat. state social-economic univ. - Saratov, 2002. - 228 p.