Sesame opened for Rosatom. How Kiriyenko gave himself a bonus before leaving

Wars of incriminating evidence within state corporations: who calls the tune March 20th, 2012

Russian state-owned companies have become a platform for behind-the-scenes intrigues and incriminating wars, which began to unfold immediately after Russian Railways, Rosatom, Aeroflot and Rosneft prepared new anti-corruption programs. According to experts, the initiators of a new wave of compromising materials on the heads of state corporations were influential corrupt officials in power who do not benefit from the fight against bribes and kickbacks. The first victim of the intrigues was the head of Rosatom, Sergei Kiriyenko. Ru_Compromat tried to figure out who benefits from the war of incriminating evidence.


Recently, several media outlets have published revealing articles about the head of Rosatom, Sergei Kiriyenko. The materials were posted on resources specializing in the publication of incriminating evidence and various kinds of rumors, and not in serious media. Kiriyenko is the first, but not the last target of “media killers” who were hired by high-ranking corrupt officials who are strongly opposed to the anti-corruption policies of state corporations. This statement was made by the General Director of the Center for Political Information, Alexey Mukhin, from the pages of Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

"Hysterical Acts"


According to him, a number of state-owned companies have prepared anti-corruption projects for Vladimir Putin’s new presidential term. Russian Railways, Rosatom, Aeroflot and Rosneft were the first to do this. However, these initiatives have met with strong resistance from some senior employees of these companies, who do not benefit from the fight against corruption. These forces decided to wage war against initiatives using compromising evidence. The first was published quite recently - on the head of Rosatom Sergei Kiriyenko, says Mukhin.

Why did Rosatom become the first? Mukhin believes that government procurement played an important role here: according to him, thanks to the new tender system, the state company saved 19 billion rubles in 2010 and 27 billion rubles in 2011. “Obviously, someone was already counting on this money,” he says.

“It is clear that such initiatives undermine schemes that are very profitable for corrupt officials. It would be frivolous to assume that such a significant number of people, deprived of the opportunity to steal budget funds, will not oppose innovations. It’s no secret that, as a rule, corrupt officials are very influential people, so it’s obvious that you need to be prepared not only for thoughtful and hidden actions on their part, but also for inappropriate, hysterical actions,” says the expert.

Mukhin attributed such hysterical behavior, in particular, to a recent letter to the State Duma Security Committee, written by four deputies. The letter is directly directed against Kiriyenko personally and Rosatom as a whole.

PR pad


The letter was signed by four deputies: V. Kashin, I. Nikitchuk, N. Kolomeytsev and V. Fedotkin. As Mukhin notes, it is very suspicious that the news about the indignation of the people's representatives appeared first on blogs, and only then was picked up by the media. Thus, the blogger igolkin was the first to publish a scan of the letter, after which “almost instantly” this entry was republished by the resource Compromat.ru.

“In the language of black PR specialists, this technique is called “laying” and is regularly used for compromising leaks to the Internet,” comments Mukhin. “It is obvious that if the action had not been ordered, it would have had the appearance of a journalistic investigation with a specific author, and most importantly, justification and evidence.”

As the expert notes, it is also curious that all four deputies are members of the Communist Party faction. And here, Mukhin believes, the “attack” takes on a political coloring. “Communists have historically become accustomed to considering nuclear cities their territory, where the Communist Party of the Russian Federation showed good results in elections, because they remember the benefits of the Soviet Union. However, recently the electoral preferences of residents of closed cities have changed, since Vladimir Putin, with his decisions, provided nuclear enterprises with orders and income growth. If earlier the Communists consistently scored above the national average there, now their results are significantly lower. The head of Rosatom himself played a significant role in changing the electoral preferences of his subordinates, who made an election tour of nuclear cities in support of the current government,” he says.

At the same time, one of the signatories, deputy Nikitchuk, himself comes from Sarov, so he probably perceived the loss of the Communist Party in this key city of the nuclear industry as a “personal defeat,” Mukhin believes. “Thus, the interests of those dissatisfied with the cover of the “feeding troughs” in a huge state corporation and offended political opponents simply converged on one target, which was the reason for such a strange protocol order from the people’s representatives,” says the expert.

He predicts that a real information persecution may soon unfold not only against Kiriyenko and Rosatom, but also against other top managers who were the first to put forward their anti-corruption initiatives. “In addition to the head of Rosatom, the president of Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin, and the general director of Aeroflot, Vitaly Savelyev, and, of course, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who has been active in anti-corruption efforts recently, could also come under attack,” warns Mukhin.

Engineering "daughter" "Rosatom"- Atomstroyexport (ASE) is discussing the possibility of purchasing the contractor Sesam, part of the Energoatomengineering holding. Vasily Boyko the Great, fearing bankruptcy of the contractor. This is stated in the procurement materials published by the state corporation, RBC reports. According to them, Rosatom chose the appraiser Nexia Pacioli to conduct an audit (due diligence) of Sesame, bypassing competitive procedures.

The state corporation justified this decision by the short deadlines for the transaction: “carrying out a competitive procurement procedure is impossible, since the results of the due diligence necessary to make a decision on the acquisition of Sesame shares will be known no earlier than January 2018.” This fact will lead to the need to attract foreign subcontractors for foreign projects, transfer of technical and working documentation for thermal installation work and technologies, according to the justification certificate for the purchase from a single supplier. In addition, in this certificate, ASE notes the increased risks of bankruptcy of Sesame and the impossibility of providing the company with additional financing under general contract agreements for the construction of the Belarusian and Rostov nuclear power plants.

The owner of the Russian Milk holding, Vasily Boyko-Veliky, before joining agribusiness in 2002–2003, worked at Rosatom, holding the position of deputy executive director for investments at Rosenergoatom (responsible for Russian nuclear power plants). He also headed the board of directors of the general contractor for the construction of the third block Kalinin NPP- “Sevzapatomenergostroy”.

In 2006, Boyko-Velikiy participated in the creation of the Energoatomengineering holding company, specializing in the construction of nuclear and thermal power plants and other energy facilities.

A representative of Boyko-Veliky’s investment holding “Your Financial Trustee” refused to comment on the sale of Sesame. ASE explained that the Sesame due diligence procedure is carried out with the aim of possibly expanding the competencies of the engineering division of the state corporation when carrying out heat installation work at nuclear power plant construction sites. Based on the results of the audit, the specialized committees of Rosatom will assess the feasibility of acquiring a controlling stake in Sesame. Rosatom declined to comment on the possible amount of the transaction, as well as its terms.

The Rosatom contractor owned by Boyko-Velikiy became widely known after the incident at the construction site of the Belarusian nuclear power plant, which occurred last summer. Then the media reported that Sesame dropped frame reactor for the Belarusian NPP during its overload. Rosatom subsequently stated that the hull did not suffer any serious damage: “The most that can be said is that the factory paint on the hull has worn off due to the friction of metal slings,” said the first deputy head of Rosatom, Alexander Lokshin. But the Ministry of Energy of Belarus asked to replace it, and the fallen reactor vessel was sent to the manufacturer - the Atommash plant, RIA Novosti reported in August. Due to the replacement of the building, the delivery date for the first unit of the Belarusian NPP has moved from 2018 to 2019, Interfax reported.

The Belarusian TV channel ONT, as reported by Interfax, estimated the cost of the reactor vessel at $400 million. Rosatom refused to comment on who will pay for the damage. A representative of Boyko-Velikiy stated that “the hull did not fall, but slipped, and the reloading operation was carried out together with two more contractors, one of which is Energostroyexport.” He also said that the examination showed no damage. Rosatom does not comment on this.

“There are no more contractors like Sesame in the country,” explains Sergei Suverov, head of the analytical department of the management company BK-Sberezheniya. “This company is the heir to the installation department created in the USSR for nuclear construction, including participation in the construction of the Kalinin NPP.”

Rosatom cannot leave a company that is now going through hard times, and has decided to consolidate it as critical to safety, he notes, recalling that the number of independent contractors at Rosatom is declining.

As follows from agency publications "Ruspres", Boyko-Veliky has a considerable number of “skeletons in his closet” - so, in 2015, the Prosecutor General’s Office charged him with creating an organized criminal group with the aim of seizing land from three hundred victims. Members of the organized crime group, including Boyko, were accused of “organizing a criminal community and participating in it,” six counts of “particularly large-scale fraud,” four counts of “legalization of stolen property,” and 14 counts of “falsification of evidence.”

The day before it became known that NPF Sberbank, controlled by Sberbank, merged with NPF VNIIEF-Garant, which belongs to it. The state bank acquired this structure back in 2017. Why did one of the largest credit institutions in the country need a modest-sized non-state pension fund from Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod region, and how the interests of German Gref and Sergei Kiriyenko could converge, a correspondent of The Moscow Post looked into it.

VNIIEF-Garant is the correct name of the fund where the money of retired nuclear workers is accumulated in closed Sarov. The abbreviation VNIIEF simply stands for VNII of Experimental Physics. As of the end of the second quarter, VNIIEF-Garant's pension reserves amounted to 3.7 billion rubles. The number of participants in NGO programs is 23.8 thousand people. Now this substance has been “swallowed” by Sberbank. This was reported by a correspondent of The Moscow Post.

Participant of scandalous chronicles

Why did Rosatom need Sberbank? Or let’s put the question differently: why did Sberbank need a “nuclear” Pension Fund?

Let's start from afar. VNIIEF-Garant has already been included in scandalous chronicles several times.

In the memorable year of 2015, VNIIEF lost part of the corporate pensions in the group of the notorious banker Anatoly Motylev (today wanted, lives in London).

Mr. Kiriyenko brought the foundation to this group. The fund placed pension reserves - funds for corporate and private pensions through the Interfin company. She was part of Motylev’s group.

On July 2, 2015, the Central Bank blocked Interfin’s transactions with the money of all NFPs. At the beginning of April, the fund had 2.6 billion rubles. pensions for 28,000 people. VNIIEF, the guarantor, held 125 million rubles in this company. Of these, 50 million rubles were placed in securities, and 75 million rubles were placed in accounts in AMB Bank of Anatoly Motylev.

A few days later, the fund notified Interfin about the early termination of the agreement and the withdrawal of its funds, while simultaneously contacting the Central Bank with a request to allow Interfin to return the fund’s funds. But it was too late to save money from AMB Bank. The locomotive left: the regulator revoked the license. A temporary administration appeared at the bank.

Another scandalous saga. VNIIEF-Garant surfaced in the story with NPF Transneft (pension reserves - 24 billion rubles) and the Vika Management Company. Law enforcement agencies opened a criminal case at the request of NPF Transneft against the Vika Management Company. The company was suspected of investing pension money in “dummy” shares.

VNIIEF-Garant also had financial claims against the Vika Management Company. The fund from nuclear Sarov entrusted Vika Management Company with 100 million rubles. The money could not be saved. But who came up with such ingenious schemes for siphoning off pension millions?

Then there was a certain lull in the activities of the NPF from Sarov, and on December 6, 2017, the Sberbank Pension Fund acquired 100% of the shares of NPF VNIIEF-Garant. The corresponding permission from the Federal Antimonopoly Service and the Bank of Russia was received on November 29. What will happen next after such a stormy merger? And for what glorious deeds was this absorption necessary?

“The merger of Sberbank NPF and VNIIEF-Garant NPF is of significant importance both for the nuclear industry and the Russian pension market. First of all, this will give residents of the city of Sarov the opportunity to take advantage of all the services provided by Sberbank NPF: compulsory pension insurance and non-state pension provision,” stated the Sberbank website.

By the way, NPF VNIIEF-Garant was founded in 2001. Sberbank NPF has been operating in the pension market since 1995. Pension savings in the fund are formed by 6.82 million people, and more than 1.12 million people participate in non-state pension programs. And 20.5 thousand clients receive pensions. Now the numbers, it turns out, will grow even more.

Banker's trail

Since 1995, the Nizhny Novgorod regional branch of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation for some reason suffered loss after loss. Over five years, the fund lost more than 250 million rubles. Let us recall that until 1998, and then from 2000 to 2005. Sergei Vladilenovich Kiriyenko lived and worked in Nizhny Novgorod. And they say he crushed everything he could.

It was during these times that the regional prosecutor's office began to understand the failures of the local pension fund. And I found the culprit. It turned out to be the head of the PF branch in the Nizhny Novgorod region, Viktor Babakaev. In February 2000, a criminal case was opened against him. And soon after the initiation of this criminal case, Sergei Kiriyenko urgently met with the all-powerful (at that time) Valentin Yumashev, who then headed not only the Presidential Administration, but was already the husband of Boris Yeltsin’s eldest daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko. The PROATOM portal reported this.

And, oh, miracle! The proceedings in case No. 550314 are closed!

But it should be noted that Sergei Kiriyenko tried not only for the sake of his old friend Viktor Babakaev. Mr. Babakaev was only one of the defendants in a complex scheme to embezzle funds from the pension fund in the Nizhny Novgorod province. As the FLB portal claimed, the process was allegedly controlled by Sergei Vladilenovich.

The scheme was born thanks to the efforts of the late Boris Nemtsov and Kiriyenko. In the mid-90s, a critical situation with the payment of pensions developed in the Nizhny Novgorod region.

The region could not pay off its debts to pensioners. In mid-September 1995, the then governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region, Boris Nemtsov, met with the manager of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation, Barchuk. And he proposed an idea. Let the enterprises of the donor regions, whose payments should ultimately go to the pension fund, give the money to the authorized bank. And the bank will pay the fund.

It should be noted that this seemingly clumsy idea actually opened up broad prospects. It was understood that when subsidies from the budget were delayed, the bank would gradually lend to the pension fund, ensuring that pensioners received money on time.

The scheme was masterfully corrected by Sergei Kiriyenko. Donor regions are raw material regions. Accordingly, their enterprises, as a rule, provided oil to offset payments to the pension fund. The scheme received the unofficial name “Pension Oil”. Sergei Kiriyenko was then considered the main “oil worker” of the Nizhny Novgorod region. He headed the NORSI-Oil company. The bank “Garantiya”, controlled by Kiriyenko, became the authorized bank. And the main founder of “Garantiya” was the Nizhny Novgorod branch of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation. Its director, Viktor Babakaev, headed the bank's board.

The pension fund was not a debtor to Garantiya Bank for a single day, as prescribed by the agreements between Kiriyenko and Barchuk. But the bank found itself in debt to the Pension Fund from the moment the first money appeared.

In fact, Garantia Bank got rid of its obligations to the pension fund without paying it anything. In return, the fund received the dubious right to demand from NORSI Oil the money that this company owed to Garantiya Bank. Everything ingenious is simple!

In 1997, Kiriyenko decided to “optimize” the scheme. He founded the Rusnefteinvest company in nuclear Sarov.

Sergey Kiriyenko constantly optimizes his circuits

And by 1999, the Nizhny Novgorod pension fund became the owner of bills of exchange from this company for almost 140 million rubles. In February 1999, when Rusnefteinvest was supposed to repay its bills, Babakaev did not present them for payment. I waited two months. And he signed another barter agreement. The Nizhny Novgorod Pension Fund received, in exchange for the liquid (with certain reservations) promissory notes of Rusnefteinvest, its own promissory notes of the Garantia Bank.

Babakaev was well covered from all sides. He was supported by a special letter from the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation No. AZ-22-28/10247 “On the need to restructure the bills of NSKB Garantiya into government debt obligations in connection with the general decrease in the liquidity of the bank’s bills.”

The letter was received shortly after the August 1998 crisis. Mr. Kiriyenko contributed to the appearance of this letter. After all, by that time he had turned into a politician at the federal level - he spent as much as 4 months as Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. In 2000, he applied for the position of plenipotentiary representative, and in 2005 - for Bolshaya Ordynka, in Rosatom.

Young shark of capitalism

But it seems that Kiriyenko’s love for banks remains throughout his life. It was at his instigation that Sarovbusinessbank came to the people. The headquarters is located right in the closed city of Sarov. Until the end of 2011, 50.09% of Sarovbusinessbank belonged to the son of the head of Rosatom, Vladimir Sergeevich Kiriyenko.

Young talent - Vladimir Kiriyenko. At the age of 23, he took control of an entire bank.

Note that back in 2005, Sarovbusinessbank absorbed the Garantiya bank, which was founded and headed by Sergei Kiriyenko.

Let's not forget about this telling fact. In September 2011, federal structures placed more than 1 billion rubles in the accounts of Sarovbusinessbank. The total amount of government funds placed in the bank’s accounts then amounted to 3.8 billion rubles. Only the country's largest banks were ahead of him. VTB - 13.9 billion rubles, Gazprombank - 8.3 billion rubles. Sberbank - 50 billion rubles.

“The volume of funds placed in Sarovbusinessbank by commercial organizations under federal ownership amounts to 16% of its liabilities,” Maxim Osadchiy, head of the analytical department of the Corporate Finance Bank, was surprised then. — Such a concentration of funds from federally owned commercial organizations is very unusual for private banks.

The analyst did not exclude that the bulk of government funds in the accounts of Sarovbusinessbank could have been placed by structures associated with Rosatom. Two subsidiaries of Rosatom are located in Nizhny Novgorod: OJSC OKBM Afrikantov and Federal State Unitary Enterprise Research Institute of Measuring Systems named after. Yu.E. Sedakova. In nuclear Sarov itself there are the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Russian Federal Nuclear Center - All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics and OJSC Technopark-Technology.

PJSC Sarovbusinessbank in Nizhny Novgorod

But after Vladimir Putin criticized energy workers on December 19, 2011, changes occurred in the lists of affiliates of Sarovbusinessbank. At the end of December 2011, Kiriyenko Jr.’s share in the bank’s capital decreased from 50.09% to ZERO. The website Fedpress.ru reported this.

But why is the Federal Nuclear Center of the Russian Federation so attractive to Mr. Kiriyenko and co? Apparently, everything has been firmly and firmly grasped here for a long time. Sarov itself, a former Arzamas license plate, depends in everything on the state corporation Rosatom. Let's not discount the fact that Rosatom's new "broom" - Kiriyenko's creature - Alexey Likhachev - was born and raised in Arzamas -16, so the whole of Sarov is jumping rope with them. Mr. Gref also received his preferences: he now also has more money and heads. In addition, all schemes relating to pension injections have long been worked out and tested.

Read The Moscow Post on Yandex-Zen

"Dashing" affairs of Rosatom

Rosatom General Director Likhachev, in his words, was supposed to become the governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region. Could theft and scandals in Rosatom have been avoided?

At one of the events of the Leaders of Russia competition, Rosatom General Director Alexei Likhachev suddenly announced that he was supposed to become the governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region. He was allegedly even warned about this in advance, reports a correspondent for The Moscow Post.

But something didn’t work out: then the deputy was sent to lead Rosatom. Naturally, with Kiriyenko’s permission.

And now many may wonder: would Mr. Likhachev lead the Nizhny Novgorod region in the same way as a state corporation? Or would it have been plundered to a lesser extent, and it would have been necessary to choose the lesser of two evils?

However, it is likely that he would have become the governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region, taking a position for which his patron Sergei Kiriyenko, the former presidential envoy for the Volga Federal District, was once rejected. That is, if the Kremlin wanted it, Likhachev would certainly be pushed there. But this idea, apparently, was considered far from the best.

But they apparently did not resist Kiriyenko’s desire to leave their man in Rosatom after his own departure to the Presidential Administration. Still, the long-standing friendship of Likhachev and Kiriyenko has yielded results - these two have known each other since the 1980s, both come from the Nizhny Novgorod region and have an interest in it. In addition, at one time, Likhachev became one of the first who stood up for Kiriyenko after a false letter about him from “American congressmen.”

In general, Likhachev knew who to be friends with and who to support. And it bore fruit. But was this appointment as beneficial for Rosatom itself as it was for Likhachev and Kiriyenko?

Shall we burn half-life?

The start of Likhachev’s career as director general of Rosatom can be called quite quiet: he was tasked with simply preserving what his predecessor had achieved, there was no talk of increasing it. However, already at the beginning of 2017, scandals rained down on him like from a cornucopia.

So, in October 2016 he was appointed, and in November, not having worked even 15 days, power unit No. 1 of the Novovoronezh NPP-2, which had been built for more than 10 years, stalled and began to smoke. Why did Likhachev give him a start? Were you afraid of missing deadlines and took risks for this?

And then he went further - the reasons for the accident were also hidden. No one at Rosatom admitted what the problem was, saying there was a “short circuit.” And everything would be fine, why do ordinary people need to know that they were on the verge of mortal danger? But the VVER-1200 nuclear reactor, which, in fact, did not pass tests in this way, then began to be installed at the Belarusian NPP, and then actively offered to partner countries.

It was not Kiriyenko or Likhachev who proposed it, but President Vladimir Putin. It turns out that Rosatom is hiding problems from him and thus exposing him to friendly states?

The eminent nuclear professor Igor Ostretsov then openly stated that these reactors, like other Russian ones, had not been brought to fruition. That is, Rosatom and Likhachev directly cannot provide guarantees for the safety of the operation of Russian nuclear power plants built in the country and abroad. Isn't that what was required of them?

Stolen "Mayak"

Likhachev also had his share of thefts. So, in October 2017, that is, a year after his appointment, Rosatom’s subsidiary, Mayak PA, went down in flames due to a corruption scandal. Then it became known that the Prosecutor General’s Office demanded that a criminal case be opened regarding the theft of 300 million rubles from a Chelyabinsk enterprise.

Then they “pocketed” money for housing for nuclear workers through payments to pseudo-developers. It’s funny that the theft occurred during the Anti-Corruption Plan introduced by the head of the Mayak PA, Mikhail Pokhlebaev.

But the thefts at Mayak did not end there. Thus, in September 2017, the PA entered into a government contract to provide “services to reduce social risks.” They did not cost the budget enterprise cheap - 43 million rubles!

Rumor has it that the money went to structures close to the “Open Government” of Minister Mikhail Abyzov and his “representative” in Yekaterinburg Georgy Belozerov. The latter, unlike the “minister of empty space,” as Abyzov is called, has no extra millions and no special business, so 43 million from the Rosatom budget is not extra for him.

PR for ruthenium

So what did Rosatom purchase “to reduce social risks”? As the companies participating in the tender show, it was about PR and publications in the media, although data on government orders from Rosatom and Mayak itself are not disclosed as secret. But it’s worth paying attention to the dates, and everything falls into place.

The government order was placed on September 29, 2017. And on September 25, sirens sounded at the enterprise - supposedly it was an inspection. But according to information from European scientists, in mid-September in the Southern Urals (Mayak is located in Ozersk in the Chelyabinsk region), a release of ruthenium-106 occurred: even Roshydromet was forced to confirm this.

It turns out that Likhachev found an excellent way to deal with a radioactive isotope in the air, the cause of which was precisely the “daughter” of Rosatom: simply buy PR! However, there is another opinion: if the money actually went to Abyzov, as the media suggests, then this may be an attempt to “buy off” problems for the management of the enterprise and Rosatom. We, they say, give you money - and you give us no problems.

And even if Likhachev did not participate in this attempt to “pay off” - the amount is too small for the general director of Rosatom - the fact that all this is unfolding under his nose cannot be ignored.

And now this man says that in fact he should not have gone to Rosatom, but should have sat in the warm governor’s chair! Our dear Alexey Evgenievich, everyone would be happy about this! At the very least, there might not have been any ruthenium in the air. Or maybe we could get rid of thefts - who knows...

The Northern Sea Route has already been transferred to the state corporation Rosatom. Now the atomic department is rewriting the hydrography for itself: it is taking over the FSUE Hydrographic Enterprise from the Ministry of Transport and Rosmorrechflot. It includes 8 hydrographic bases, an Arctic hydrographic expedition, cartographic production, an Arctic pilot service and 12 vessels.

Rosatom also promises to build 3 wind farms using Dutch technology by 2020. The state corporation is going to recycle batteries. And solve garbage problems.

Let us recall that the same Rosatom promised to commission the floating nuclear power plant “Akademik Lomonosov” by 2010, to build 26 new power units by 2014, to commission 3 new nuclear icebreakers by 2018, and also to marinate 11 Chernobyl-type reactors (RBMK) , which are still spinning at the Leningrad, Kursk and Smolensk nuclear power plants.

And so far, everything is missing the mark: Akademik Lomonosov has been under construction for 12 years, out of 26 announced new power units, 5 have been commissioned (and all of them are problematic). A huge headache - the new icebreakers "Arktika", "Sibir", "Ural". In fact, only the hulls of nuclear-powered ships have been manufactured. And it is unlikely that the nuclear giants will be able to leave the boathouses in the next 2-3 years. But why is Rosatom engaged in wind generation, raking in the Northern Sea Route, and “squeezing out” hydrography?

After all, the “10 Little Indians” of Rosatom - 10 Russian nuclear power plants constantly require close attention, especially since emergency situations (emergency situations) at nuclear power plants began to arise suspiciously often, especially at new, occupied units, in particular at the Rostov NPP, Leningrad NPP-2, Kursk NPP -2. About this to the editor The Moscow Post Signals are also coming from nuclear scientists. So it may not be far from a nuclear accident. The correspondent reports this The Moscow Post .

You are taking the northern route, comrade!

However, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted a bill on the management of the Northern Sea Route. And it declared Rosatom an infrastructure operator. The document enshrines the principle of two keys: the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation remains in charge of issuing navigation permits in agreement with the state corporation Rosatom. The procedure is approved by the Government of the Russian Federation.

At a meeting with journalists, Rosatom's new "broom" said that the complex discussion on the Northern Sea Route had finally ended. And in the first quarter of the new year 2019, Rosatom will introduce draft acts on the distribution of responsibilities between the Ministry of Transport and the Nuclear Department.

The current leadership of the Ministry of Transport looks at life sensibly and understands that Rosatom will not pretend to be a regulator and controller, but an infrastructure operator,” Likhachev summed up. “On the basis of icebreaking capacities, Rosatom is ready to deal with other issues of Arctic development, based on the task set by the president to ensure at least 80 million tons of transportation along the Northern Sea Route by 2024.” We need navigation to a new level.

The new head of Rosatom, not a nuclear scientist, but an “effective manager” Alexey Likhachev

Let us recall, however, that in the budget 2019 - 2021. The amount of finance for the infrastructure of the Northern Sea Route was reduced from 37 billion rubles to 24 billion rubles by the decision of the Government of the Russian Federation to build two more new powerful nuclear icebreakers of the LK-60 modification.

The nuclear icebreaker “50 Let Pobedy” has been tinned for more than 18 years

But Rosatom still cannot cope with its previous task - to complete the construction of the nuclear-powered icebreakers "Arktika", "Sibir" and "Ural". Will there really be a repeat of the story with the nuclear icebreaker “50 Years of Victory”, which was delayed for 18 years? As a result, “50 years of Victory” turned into 70!

Model of the new powerful icebreaker "Arktika". There is a fear that “Arctic” may remain only a “model”

By the way, the head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Alexander Shokhin, spoke out sharply against the transfer of the battery recycling business to Rosatom:

Without a detailed study and assessment of the existing need for processing truly hazardous and toxic waste, the implementation of the project to appoint Rosatom as a federal operator will lead to ineffective spending of budget funds at all levels, as well as to an increase in tariffs. Chemical weapons disposal complexes are not suitable for the disposal of acids and alkalis, and transportation of such waste will significantly increase the cost of neutralization. There is no point in appointing Rosatom as a federal operator, nor in investing - and this is 36 billion rubles - in the creation of 7 complexes.